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Showing posts with label Identity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Identity. Show all posts

February 28, 2024

India: From 'Love Jihad' to' Lion Jihad' -- Editorial, Deccan Herald, 26 Feb 2024

Deccan Herald

From 'Love Jihad' to' Lion Jihad'

But the controversy over a lion called Akbar and a lioness called Sita could only be considered as the natural culmination of the absurdity that defied romance, good sense and the law.

But the controversy over a lion called Akbar and a lioness called Sita could only be considered as the natural culmination of the absurdity that defied romance, good sense and the law.
The controversy erupted after two lions were brought from a zoological park in Tripura to West Bengal’s Safari Park in Siliguri.
The question basically was whether a ‘Muslim’ lion and a ‘Hindu’ lioness could cohabit in the same cage. It did not matter that the male is an emperor, and the naming even became blasphemy because the female was a goddess.
The Viswa Hindu Parishad (VHP) took the matter to the Calcutta High Court.
There are no laws regarding the naming of animals and the legal issues involved in the matter are not clear.
The court did not issue any direction but the judge suggested to the state government to consider giving the animals some other names to ensure that the “controversy is put to rest”.
The court also observed that animals should not be named after revered figures like gods, mythological heroes, freedom fighters, or Nobel laureates. If the court’s observation is to be the norm, hundreds of elephants would lose their names and many other animals their identity.
In any case, the ‘lion jihad’ conspiracy theorists’ problem was not calling the animals Akbar and Sita but allowing them to live in the same cage.
A jurisprudence of animal nomenclature may be needed and perhaps it may be forthcoming because the judge has allowed the petitioners to amend their writ into a public interest petition to be heard later.
The state government shifted its responsibility by telling the court that the naming had actually been done in Tripura. It would not have liked to face an ‘animal jihad’ agitation now.
The lion and the lioness have now been separated and would be brought together only if they get new names or are de-named. But how do you de-name an animal? By notification? We make the animal world a mirror image of ours and introduce all our prejudices and stupidities into it.
It was reported from Kerala some years ago, perhaps with some exaggeration, that an elephant with a Christian name was barred entry into a temple.
Should our foolishness and religious prejudices be taken to such ridiculous lengths? Let lions and elephants and other animals be, and let them live their lives. We are making their life difficult in many ways. What right have we got to separate an animal couple for no fault of theirs?

(Published 26 February 2024, 22:24 IST)

But the controversy over a lion called Akbar and a lioness called Sita could only be considered as the natural culmination of the absurdity that defied romance, good sense and the law.

Read more at: https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/editorial/from-love-jihad-to-lion-jihad-2911255

May 16, 2023

India: The rhetoric of Indigeneity and the Ethnic Clashes in Manipur

 

Indigenous Politics Leads to Ethnic Clashes in India’s Far Eastern Corner

The narrative against the Kuki tribes in the state of Manipur straddles several issues, from conservation to migration

February 15, 2022

India: Why the hijab row is not an identity issue | Ghazala Wahab

Why the hijab row is not an identity issue

  LAST PUBLISHED 09.02.2022

The religious-political mix has historically yielded great short-term benefits, but always for the majority. In independent India’s history, there has been no instance of any minority group ever having benefitted from competitive communalism. Yet, navigating the path strewn with the carcasses of past failures, Muslims continue to blunder their way into trap after trap. [ . . . ]

https://lifestyle.livemint.com/news/talking-point/why-the-hijab-row-is-not-an-identity-issue-111644385790622.html

March 24, 2019

Rashtrya Swayamsevak Sangh by D R Goyal [PDF version]

The final 2000 edition of a much acclaimed 1979 book by Dr. R. Goyal, the well known campaigner against communalism in India is now available for all at: http://www.sacw.net/article14044.html

November 08, 2017

India: Anand Kochukudy on ABVP-OBC Front alliance . . . Ambedkar, Marx, Maududi

The Wire
Ambedkar, Marx, Maududi and Mainstream Politics
[. . .]
Ambedkar and Maududi cannot be part of the same tea party
[. . .]
Now, the question of identities that are part of subaltern political movements need to be analysed further. Muslim identity politics has a unique relevance in contemporary politics – especially when it’s the Muslim identity that is being targeted. Post independence, 28 of the 73 All India Muslim League members of the Constituent Assembly stayed back in India, and the party was revived as the Indian Union Muslim League, to address community issues and to ensure the electoral representation of the largely poorer Muslims who stayed back in the Indian Union. But post the 1980s, the League has been relegated to Kerala and pockets of Tamil Nadu as part of multiparty coalitions. But not all Muslim political movements are based on identity, when viewed through the subaltern political prism.
The Maududian interpretation of Islam and the consequent formation of Jamaat-e-Islami in 1941 is a theo-political movement where the ultimate aim is formation of an Islamic nation. Theo- politics, be it from minority or majority is something a democratic society cannot afford to not oppose. The Students Islamic Organization has tried since its inception in 1956 to influence campuses, infiltrate academia and muster popular support among Muslims which has not made much headway all these years; just like their parent organisation Jamaat-e-Islami Hind. They were against the idea of their members cooperating with a non-Islamic democratic system and had requested their associates and members to resign from government jobs in the past decades.
But in 2011, the same organisation floated a political wing named ‘Welfare party of India’. SIO is probably the only student organisation which has protested decriminalising homosexuality in India and their country-wide protests on this issue have been documented on their website. The gender discrimination of the organisation is a brilliantly hidden fact. When the organisation enters comparatively progressive university campuses, they pretend to stand for gender equality. But when it comes to campuses where orthodox ideas prevail, a separate faction for girls called the ‘Girls Islamic Organization’ gets floated.
From gender to LGBT issues, the Theo-political movement of Jamaat-e-Islami has consistently exposed their conservative and regressive mindset which can potentially alienate the Muslim community further from the mainstream.
Dalit movements should introspect if they need to share a platform with theo-political organisations that can discredit their just cause. Somehow, the SIO in the campus succeeded in conveying the idea that ‘any stand against them is tantamount to Islamophobia’. On the other hand, the student community has failed to distinguish between Muslim Students’ Federation, which is an organisation practicing identity politics and the SIO, which is a theo-political Islamist organisation. It is important to distinguish Islamist politics from Muslim identity politics. [. . .]



 FULL TEXT HERE: https://thewire.in/195024/ambedkar-marx-maududi-mainstream-politics/

August 15, 2017

India: How identity politics is programmed to classify and rule

The Economic Times

India @70: How this identity politics game is programmed to classify and rule

August 15, 2017, 12:39 am IST in Red Herring | India, politics | ET
 
Inshallah, India may never believe in the two-nation theory, but like Hinduism’s belief in 330 million gods — one deity for every Indian in 1947 — it was hardwired from its bloody birth to practise its politics according to a multi-nation theory. If the All-India Muslim League was the first to successfully introduce the notion in December 1906 of a political entity to represent a people — in its case, Muslims — over the decades, independent India’s political parties learnt well from that template.
Divide and rule, of course, predates the formation of Pakistan and the independence of India. But the British divvied up India through (already existing) religious communities and castes — not to mention ‘martial and non-martial races’ after the 1857 mutiny — to handle their affairs of state better. In the case of their successors, as well as those competing for a slice of political action, identity politics became the most efficient way of keeping and getting their snouts in the trough of power.

In the early days of Independence, of course, the Congress, radiating with the afterglow of being the political party of the freedom struggle, successfully represented the proverbial everyone: the upper caste, the lower caste, the Hindu, the Muslim, the poor, the affluent, the middle classes, the peasantry, the trader, the nationalist, and all variations thereof.
Even as challenges came from the CPI (which accused Nehru’s government of not being socialist enough), and from C Rajagopalachari’s Swatantra Party (which accused Nehru’s government of being too socialist), the Congress managed itself to be seen as everything to everyone in the first two decades of the ‘sovereign democratic republic’.
The addition of the words ‘socialist’ and ‘secular’ — to the existing ‘sovereign’ and ‘democratic’ in the preamble of the Constitution — via the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, during Indira Gandhi’s Emergency was a good indicator of the desperate need for the Congress in government to emphasise that it, and not the communist parties, was the natural port of call for the peasantry and working class, and that it, and not other entities, was the protector of Muslims and other minorities.
The 1956-founded Republican Party of India (itself evolving out of the Scheduled Castes Federation founded by B R Ambedkar in 1942) made as little headway in electoral politics as a party representing Dalits as the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, founded in 1951 by Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, representing Hindus.
It was only after Janata Dal Prime Minister V P Singh announced in Parliament in 1990 that his government was keen on implementing the recommendations for reservations along caste lines made by the Government of India Report of the Backward Classes Commission — a.k.a. the ‘Mandal Commission’ — set up by the 1979 Morarji Desai Janata government to “identify the socially and educationally backward”, that saw political parties ideologically moored to identity politics erupt.
If the Bahujan Samaj Party, founded by Kanshi Ram in 1984 to represent Dalits in general and Jatavs in particular, had lost its security deposit in 222 of the 246 seats it contested in the 1989 Lok Sabha, by 1993, riding the Mandal surf, it came to power in Uttar Pradesh in a coalition with Mulayam Singh Yadav’s Samajwadi Party, a political entity ‘for Yadavs and Muslims’. In 1997, breaking away from the Janata Dal to create his own identity politics brand equity after the fodder scam made his tenure in the party untenable, Lalu Prasad Yadav formed the Rashtriya Janata Dal — this after two stints as chief minister of Bihar that started in that magic year for caste politics, 1990.
Year Mandal also marked the breakout year for the BJP, which now was able to pitch itself properly as the ‘sole unifier’ of Hindus in a political marketplace filled with self-proclaimed guardians of more and more atomised identities. The Babri Masjid demolition in December 1992 would become both the cause and an effect of this trajectory.
At the national level, the 1990s and 2000s saw the golden age of coalitions: each ‘tribal chief ’ bringing their tribes demands and support to the long wooden table. But for both the Atal Bihari Vajpayee-led NDA government and the Sonia Gandhiled, Manmohan Singh-prime ministered UPA government, identity politics retained its lustre.
That is, until the ‘coalition compulsions’ that made corruption so visible and risible for a national electorate, ended the UPA’s tenure. Gujarat CM-turned-BJP’s prime ministerial candidate managed to convince India’s voters in 2014 that more than just narrow pipelines are needed as delivery mechanisms for ‘corruption-free’ development and progress.
This hardly spelt the end of caste and religious politics. It was about identity politics getting subsumed. Identity-based deliverables — as seen in both Nitish Kumar’s victory in Bihar and Narendra Modi’s BJP’s in UP — is today a more evolved, sophisticated, precise and subtle welding of the promise of governance and development with micro-managing the caste and community pipelines.
In Annihilation of Caste, Ambedkar had written, “I have no hesitation in saying that if the Mahomedan has been cruel, the Hindu has been mean; and meanness is worse than cruelty.” And by ‘meanness’ he meant denying the fruits of empowerment and wealth. Pure ID politics of the kind in decline today — as witnessed by the defenestration of Mayawati and defeat of the Yadav clan in UP, and the relative ease with which Nitish Kumar could dump Lalu Yadav in Bihar — was based on denying those not ‘in your fold’.
The new identity politics seeks to retain community and caste lines, perhaps even to accentuate them. But the stated objective is to make this kind of identification easier to deliver the goods. In that sense, it is a return to the old British strategy of classify and rule. It’s about not being stingy to anyone any more. Or, at any rate, not coming across as mean.

February 17, 2017

India: Does the Supreme Court See Secularism And Identity Politics as Incompatible? (M.P. Raju)

The Wire

Does the Supreme Court See Secularism And Identity Politics as Incompatible?

By on

As per a recent Supreme Court ruling, appeals to identity politics are fine, as long as they are incidental and not the core of the election campaigns

https://thewire.in/109269/secularism-hindutva-identity-politics/

January 28, 2017

India: 'Rajput Karni Sena' Mob vandalises film set in Jaipur - shooting of the film Padmavati stopped - news report The Times of India

The Times of India

Bhansali calls off shoot, 5 held for vandalism freed

| | Updated: Jan 29, 2017, 02.15 AM IST

Highlights

  • Sanjay Leela Bhansali cancelled the shooting of his upcoming movie ‘Padmavati’ in Jaipur
  • While the director and his team packed up the shooting at the Jaigarh Fort, the Rajput Karni Sena defended its actions
  • Refusing to apologise, the outfit accused Bhansali’s bodyguard of firing at its members
Sanjay Leela Bhansali, national award-winning director. Sanjay Leela Bhansali, national award-winning director.
JAIPUR: A day after he and his team was assaulted by Rajput Karni Sena for allegedly distorting historical facts, national award-winning director Sanjay Leela Bhansali cancelled the shooting of his upcoming movie 'Padmavati' in Jaipur on Saturday.

Strongly condemning the vandalism and assault, Bhansali said the incident was "uncalled for" and extremely damaging to the image of the beautiful city. In a statement, Bhansali said that keeping in mind the safety of the film's crew he had decided to stop the shooting of the film post the "shocking" incident.

"... for the safety of his crew, we have decided to stop the shoot and leave the city post the shocking incident where miscreants damaged property and misbehaved with the crew on the shoot of 'Padmavati'," the statement read.

Refuting claims of the fringe group that the film will feature an intimate scene between Alauddin Khiji, played by Ranveer Singh and Rani Padmavati (Deepika Padukone), Bhansali said that there is no such sequence.

"We clarify that there is no dream sequence or any objectionable scene between Rani Padmavati and Allauddin Khilji. We have been carefully researching and making the film. In spite of this, the attack on the shoot and crew was uncalled for and was extremely damaging to the image of the beautiful city of Jaipur."

While the director and his team packed up the shooting at the Jaigarh Fort, the Rajput Karni Sena defended its actions. Refusing to apologise, the outfit accused Bhansali's bodyguard of firing at its members, which they claimed provoked the protestors to vandalise the set on Friday.



Our history is being mocked at: Protesters

Sena's founder leader Lokerndra Singh Kalvi said Bhansali cannot be allowed to mock the valor and sacrifice of Rani Padmini of Chittor.

"Despite several warnings and numerous requests to show us the script, Bhansali came to Jaipur to shoot a movie that depicts love scenes between Padmini and invader Alauddin Khilji. Even before we could speak to him, his bodyguard fired gunshots at us," Kalvi said. "There is nothing to apologise or to regret. I am sad that our history is being mocked at, we will better die than witness such blatant lies."

Five Karni Sena activists arrested on Friday for vandalizing the set were released on bail on Saturday. Police said they were yet to get a complaint against a gunshot fired by Bhansali's bodyguard. "We have not come across any bullet mark so far," a police officer said.

Adding that Bollywood only understands 'juta ya chandi', Sena leader challenged Bhansali to depict glorification of Hitler in Germany, "These clowns from Mumbai think they can make the mockery of dignity and honour our ancestors, but not this time," Kalvi added.

Karni Sena leader Lokendra Singh Kalvi addresses the media after being accused of assaulting filmmaker Sanjay Leela Bhansali at the set of film Padmavati, in Jaipur.

Bhansali got the right treatment: Karni Sena

Kalvi said they had even moved the censor board and the ministry of information and broadcasting against the movie but to no avail. "We requested Bhansali to take out the sequence from the movie, to which he said he needs time to think," he said.

Mahipal Singh Makrana, state president of the outfit who was leading the protest at historical Jaigarh fort, said that they gave Bhansali a 'befitting reply'. "You come to our home, insult us, fire on us and then cry about being harassed or manhandled. This is the right treatment given to Bhansali," Makrana said.

Makrana said that he intervened to save Bhansali and contained protest otherwise there had been a bloodbath. "They tried to scare Rajputs with guns and weapons. I rescued the director otherwise he would not have returned home safe," he said.

Taking a jibe at Bollywood celebrities who expressed their anger on twitter to condemn Karni Sena leaders, Makrana dared them to come to Jaipur and discuss history with him. "I heard Hritik Roshan was infuriated at us (for objecting to the release of Jodha Akbar) but he doesn't know how much anger is boiling up inside us," he said.

Makrana made an appeal to other outfits to come together to save Hindu traditions and history. "When invader Khilji killed King Ratan Singh, the king of Chittor, his wife Padmini self-immolated herself so that Khilji could not touch her. There are folktales and books written on her sacrifice. This is a well-established fact of history," he added.

Rajasthan home minister Gulab Chand Kataria said violation of law and order was uncalled for and a probe was likely to be initiated in the matter. "One cannot express anger by breaking the law. They could have filed a police complaint instead of taking law in their hands," Kataria told ANI.



What is Rajput Karni Sena?

Founded in 2006, Rajput Karni Sena is a caste based organization headed by Lokendra Singh Kalvi. After parting ways with BJP, Kalvi formed an organization called 'Samajik Nyaya Manch' along with Brahmin leader Suresh Mishra. Kalvi's main poll plank was reservation for the economically weaker sections of the society. When the political party failed to make any impact in elections, Kalvi formed 'Karni Sena' to fight for the rights of Rajputs in India. The outfit had earlier protested against the shooting of Ashutosh Gowariker's movie Jodhaa Akbar on ground that movie states that Jodhabai was the daughter of Raja Bharmal of Amber. The outfit claimed that she was daughter of Motaraja Udai Singh of Marwar and was married to Akbar's son Salim alias Jehangir. And Mughal king Shahjahan was her son.

(With PTI inputs)


TIMES VIEW

Mobs cannot be allowed to dictate what film directors can or cannot do. In this specific case, the charge of the film distorting history is itself flawed, but even if it had been true, that should not be a problem. Fictionalised books or films based loosely on historical characters are a common phenomenon all over the world and artists must be granted this creative licence. Where mobs are allowed to run riot on the flimsy grounds of their sentiments having been hurt, creativity will be constrained by fear. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, that the state signals loud and clear that such mob action will not be tolerated. It must catch the culprits and prosecute them vigorously to ensure they are locked away for a long enough period to deter others from following suit.

January 12, 2017

Debate in New York Times - Can India Put an End to Identity Politics? (9 Jan 2017)

The New York Times, 9 January 2017

Can India Put an End to Identity Politics?

Indian politics have long been driven and riven by appeals to caste, religion, ethnicity and gender. The prime minister leads a Hindu nationalist party and has been accused of stoking hatred and violence against Muslims. But last week, the Indian Supreme Court ruled that political appeals on the basis of religion, caste, community or language, violate the Indian Constitution’s guarantee of fundamentally secular elections. Elections could be voided if the rule is violated.
But will the ruling create greater equality or undermine Indian democracy?
FULL TEXT AT: http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2017/01/09/can-india-put-an-end-to-identity-politics?ref=opinion

 


September 14, 2016

India: Fears Over Land, Identity Fuel Manipur’s Bonfire of Anxieties (Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty)

The Wire

Fears Over Land, Identity Fuel Manipur’s Bonfire of Anxieties
By Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty on 09/09/2016

Churachandpur seethes with anger, uncertainty remains about the Naga Accord and political tensions remain high over the ILP, as the assembly polls near.
Rally in Churachandpur. Credit: Akhil Kumar/The Wire

Rally in Churachandpur on August 30, 2016. Credit: Akhil Kumar/The Wire

Imphal: As the aircraft neared Imphal, my colleague, seated at the window, appeared thrilled by what he saw below – a sprawling water body with vegetation forming rings over it.

“What is that?” he asked in amazement.

“Loktak lake. The largest freshwater lake of the Northeast,” I responded.

It was his first trip to Manipur. As expected, he had never heard of Loktak, one of the most precious natural possessions of the northeastern state – yet, little known in rest of India.

He does know Manipur, however. He knows that it is the land of Irom Chanu Sharmila, who sacrificed nearly 16 years of her life demanding the repeal of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, or AFSPA, from the state. He knows of Thangjam Manorama’s murder. He knows about the Meira Paibi’s powerful naked protest in front of the Kangla Fort against AFSPA. He knows about the extra-judicial killings conducted by security forces in the state, 1,528 of which were recently declared as fake encounters by the Supreme Court. And he knows of Thounaujam Herojit Singh, the Manipur Police commando who confessed in the Imphal Free Press to a fake encounter, and later to the Guardian, that to more than one hundred.

The standard narrative about Manipur across the rest of India is, unfortunately, not about its natural beauty, its bounty, and its diversity of people, languages and culture, but about what has been synthetically created – a land of perennial disturbance, a conflict zone.

At times, there is a disturbed association between the state and the Centre. At others, it is between the state and non-state actors, the state government and its people, the people and “outsiders”, and lately, also between many of the state’s tribes and the majority Meitei community, with the former alleging decades of discrimination at the hands of the latter. Although many young Meiteis accept that this allegation is true to a large extent, the issue has been made use of by wider politics with links to the power corridors of New Delhi.

From Imphal to Churachandpur

Late at night, the phone rang. It was the driver of the taxi who was to take us to Churachandpur town, 70 kilometres from Imphal, early the next morning. He told me he would like us to start before dawn as he had just found out that there could be a bandh the next day. He didn’t know for sure who called the bandh, but he wanted to be careful.

Welcome to the Disturbed Area, I told my colleague jokingly.

At dawn, the driver informed me that he would only be able to reach us by 8 a.m. as he had to take an alternate route to avoid the bandh. A little after 8 a.m., we were on our way.
A map of Manipur. Credit: Wikimedia Commons

A map of Manipur. Credit: Wikimedia Commons

For those unfamiliar with the topography of Manipur, let me offer a comparison. Think of Manipur as a bowl. The four valley districts – Imphal East, Imphal West, Bishnupur and Thoubal – form the base of the bowl, surrounded by the five hill districts – Churachandpur, Senapati, Tamenglong, Chandel and Ukhrul.

Among the hill districts, Churachandpur – named after Manipuri king Meidingngu Churachanda (1886-1941) – is the largest by area and by number of tribes that reside in a single district. People from tribes like Paite, Simte, Tedim-chin, Vaipei, Thangkhal, Kom, Gangte, Zou, Mate, Kuki, Thadou and Hmar live in Churachandpur. As many as 10 dialects are spoken in the district. No wonder then, that Churachandpur is locally referred to as Manipur’s second capital.

Thanks to the clear geography, the road from Imphal to Churachandpur town is a straight line that passes through Nambol (which has a memorial of the great Left leader Hiram Irabot), Moirang (from where you get a good view of the Loktak lake) and Kwakta (one of the few pockets where Meitei Muslims reside) – all in Bishnupur district – before entering Churachandpur.

On the morning of August 30 when we reached the town, it was one day shy of a year since the bodies of nine protesters who were reportedly killed in police firing had been kept in the mortuary of the local government hospital.

Remembering the “nine martyrs”

On August 31, 2015, as soon as news of the passage of three bills – the Protection of Manipur People’s Bill, 2015; Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms (Seventh Amendment) Bill; Manipur Shops and Establishment (Second Amendment) Bill – at the state assembly reached the town, protesters hit the streets. They alleged the Bills were “anti-tribal” and “a covert attempt by the Meitei-majority state government to grab tribal land”. Since the tribal districts are protected by Article 371C of the constitution, people from the valley can’t buy land here even though tribals can buy land and settle down in the valley districts. By bringing in these Bills, the tribals felt the government was trying to snatch the authority of the Hill Area Committee (HAC) and the Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) over tribal land.
churachandpur-protest-2015

Protests in Churachandpur in 2015. Credit: Special Arrangement

As the day turned into night, the protest turned violent. The houses of a cabinet minister and some MLAs were burned down as public anger at their political representatives failing to “protect tribal interest” at the state assembly boiled over. The police reportedly responded with live bullets. All the tribes residing in the district united against the “anti-tribal” Manipur government and demanded that President Pranab Mukherjee refuse his assent to the Bills.

In June this year, the president rejected the People’s Bill and sent the other two to an expert committee for further examination.

The agitation in Churachandpur continues. But much has changed on the ground since 2015.

For three days beginning August 29, 2016, the joint action committee (JAC) – formed to spearhead the agitation against the three Bills – called for a bandh in Churachandpur in memory of those killed in the protests last year. Curiously, half the town did not observe the bandh. When we reached, one half of the town was quiet, while the other half was bustling with life.

The part that did not observe the bandh is mostly inhabited by the Kuki community, who were part of the protest against the Bills last year. As we passed by the area on August 30, dozens of Kuki women were sitting by the roadside in protest against the bandh called by the JAC, even as armed Assam Riffles personnel and Manipur Police commandos looked on.

We immediately made our way to the house of JAC chief convener H. Manchinkhup. There, a considerable number of young volunteers were busy with last minute preparations to begin the protest march from Churachandpur College grounds to a memorial built for the “nine martyrs”.
Faces painted as mark of protest by tribals, Churachandpur, August 31, 2016. Credit: Akhil Kumar
Many young men painted "tribal unity" on their faces. Credit: Akhil Kumar
At every spot where any of the nine people were killed, the rally halted to pay respect. August 31, 2016. Credit: Akhil Kumar
Scenes from the Churachandpur protest by tribals, August 31, 2016. Credit: Akhil Kumar

At the college grounds, young men and women – some dressed in black to amplify the state of mourning, others with their face painted in black and red – began to assemble. By 10 a.m., the march began. For well over four hours, the group made its way through over a dozen adjoining villages of Churachandpur before entering the town area again. Vociferously raising slogans against the Okram Ibobi Singh-led Congress government, it demanded “separate administration” from the state.

It was not just the Kukis who skipped the march; a number of people from the dominant Paite tribe were missing too.

“There is some misunderstanding between some of our tribal brothers and sisters. But this agitation is for their good too. I am sure, they will soon understand it,” Manchinkhup told this correspondent when asked about their absence.

As it made its way around the area, the march stopped to maintain a minute of silence at the points where some of the “nine martyrs” fell to police bullets last year, including in front of the local police station where five of them were reportedly killed.

Yet another meeting took place in the evening as some people from a village 34 kms away walked down to Churachandpur town to take part in the protest. Together with the people of the town supporting the protest, they lit lanterns that went up in the sky, creating a near festive setting.

The next day’s programme began at a vacant space in front of the newly-built mortuary at the hospital. In the mortuary lay the nine unburied bodies – among them 11-year-old Khaizamang, of the Kuki tribe, who ran out of the house to see what was unfolding on the street that evening.

“My son’s last words to me were, ‘don’t worry, there is police, police will kill only bad people’. Little did he know that he will lose his life due to police,” his mother Nemmeilhing told The Wire.
Women funeral song. Credit: Akhil Kumar/The Wire

Members of the Manipur Tribal Women’s Forum performing the funeral song on August 31, 2016. Credit: Akhil Kumar/The Wire

While she looked on with tears rolling down her cheeks, some of the mothers of the dead joined the funeral song sung by members of the Manipur Tribal Women’s Forum outside the mortuary. Except for one, all the dead were fatherless. All nine belonged to families of daily wage earners. On being asked if they had received any compensation from the government, they all responded in the negative. This, despite the chief minister having told the media some time ago that he did sanction compensation for the families.

The Naga conundrum

On August 31, a parallel meeting was held at the Churachandpur College grounds to mark what they called the Tribal Unity Day. Besides the JAC, leaders from Manipur Tribal Forum, Delhi, the presidents of Hmar Inpi, Thadou Inpi and the Zomi Council, and the head of Mizo People’s Convention spoke at the event to reiterate their demand for “separate administration”.

In later conversations with this correspondent, the JAC members, the members of the ADC, various Inpi heads and some other town elders also talked of “demanding sixth schedule for the tribes of Manipur” – a reference to the constitutional provision which provides additional rights to tribal areas – if not a separate administration from the Centre. While some also batted for a “Bodo Territorial Council kind of an arrangement brought in Assam,” others even advocated the demand of the Paite-dominated underground group United People’s Front (UPF) – which has been in talks with the Centre since 2008 – that “there should be a state within a state.”

While none were willing to say it on the record, almost all were wondering “what the Naga Accord will contain”.

The accord was signed last year by the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah), in the presence of Prime Minster Narendra Modi and NSCN leader Thuingaleng Muivah, but its contents have not yet been made public.

“All depends on it. If the Nagas residing in the hill districts of Manipur get a separate administration, we will be stuck with the Manipur government,” said a community leader who did not want to be named. The Meiteis, he alleged, “have traditionally looked down upon the tribes living in Churachandpur. So what will happen to those who are not Nagas? Anyway, with 40 assembly seats in the valley areas inhabited by the Meiteis, and just 20 in the hill areas, we will never have our say in the state assembly. That is why, we want even the Kukis to come with us to become one voice to demand a separate administration for the rest of the tribes.”

“It is not that we want to leave the state of Manipur, we only want that our land is secured. If the Nagas get what they want, why can’t we?” asked a Churachandpur ADC member.

Rumours abound that even though the Centre might not tinker with the physical boundary of Manipur, the Naga Accord might give a separate administration to the Naga areas of Manipur that may be governed by the Naga HoHo, or council, with a budget controlled by Naga rather than Manipur state representatives. The districts of Tamenglong, Ukhrul, Chandel and Senapati have a substantial number of Nagas.

This is also the reason why the Kukis have stepped back from the agitation at Churachandpur. There is a substantial Kuki population in most of the Naga inhabited districts. Traditionally, socio-political rivalry has meant the Kukis and Nagas have been at loggerheads. In response to the Nagas’ greater Nagaland demand, the Kukis organised themselves in the 1950s. At present, the underground Kuki Nationalist Organisation – a conglomeration of 15 ultra groups – is demanding a Kuki state to be chalked out of the Kuki inhabited areas. This demand has wide support from the Kuki community, who are now worried about “what will happen to that demand”.

Ethnically, the Kukis are from the same root, Zou, as the Churachandpur-based tribes who come under the umbrella nomenclature Zomi. Many Kuki leaders are therefore “upset” with the Zomis (Paite, Simte, Tedim-chin, Vaipei, Thangkhal, Kom, Gangte, Zou, Mate) for “siding with the Nagas” instead of with them. On September 15, the community’s leading body, the Kuki Inpi, will observe a black day.

In a later conversation with The Wire at his Imphal office, Kuki Inpi president Thangkhosei Haokip said, “All the tribal leaders of the state had a few meetings with the state government on the three anti-tribal bills. However, suddenly, the Churachandpur JAC came up with the demand of a separate administration. It surprised us as much as the government. We don’t support it because we want the agitation to confine itself to the three bills. The demand for a separate administration is a different issue. We didn’t begin our agitation for a separate administration.”

An office bearer of Kuki Inpi said, “We feel the new demand has come due to the pressure of some external forces.” Although he would not spell out what “external forces” he was referring to, other Kuki leaders, as well as Paite leaders and ADC members in Churachandpur do not rule out “the role of the Centre” there.

“Aside from the Naga issue, with the coming assembly elections (early 2017), the Centre is obviously interested in what is going on between the hill and valley areas of Manipur. Since the BJP is interested in grabbing power in the state, it’s government at the Centre is certainly looking at turning this turmoil to their advantage. But with just 20 hill seats it can’t grab power. It needs the Meitei votes too and that is why its state unit is launching street protests demanding the Inner Line Permit (ILP),” said a well-known local leader, who wished to remain anonymous.

He also added, “The BJP can be a natural choice for the Hindu Meiteis but not for the Christian people of the hill areas. Even though most people and the church in Churachandpur are a bit apprehensive of supporting the BJP, they are also angry with Ibobi for the Bills. In coming times, it will be interesting to see how it further develops.”

According to another Paite community elder and a supporter of the agitation: “There is actually no need for a separate administration. The HAC already has enough powers to administer the hill districts separately. The elected MLAs from the hill districts automatically become members of HAC. As per the HAC, the governor has the power to intervene in tribal matters. A separate budget has to be made as per the rules. But all this is only on paper. Unfortunately, the HAC members, even though they belong to the hills, are interested only in getting cabinet ranks in Imphal than looking at reviving HAC for tribal area development.”

A general sense of anger against elected leaders was palpable in Churachandpur. Over the last year, none of the MLAs had been allowed into the town.

“It is also one of the reasons why we have kept the bodies [of the nine victims of police firing]. As per tribal norms, since they are also the accused, they [the MLAs] are not allowed to return till the bodies are buried. If we bury, they will easily return and also begin campaigning for the next assembly elections and may try to win with money power, which we don’t want,” said a student leader. Kuki leaders tried to forcibly bury the dead a couple of times but have been unsuccessful.

Youth factor

Politics and tribal equations aside, what was notable in Churachandpur was that a lot of local youth, many of them educated from some of the country’s premier institutions, have returned to the town to join the agitation.

“The young people who died last year were poor. I felt compelled to join the agitation. The tribes have always been discriminated by the Meiteis. Even the name Churachandpur was given by the Meiteis. To us, this is Lamka. Nowhere will you find any tribal referring to Lamka as Churachandpur, it is there only in government records. I felt this is the time I have to raise my voice for justice, for equality, this is our last chance,” said a volunteer who graduated from the Tata Institute of Social Science (TISS).

Another volunteer, a graduate from IIM-Ahmedabad, added, “Our parents couldn’t study very well, couldn’t get better opportunities because we are a minority in the state, forever discriminated. We have to unite now, the poor and the rich, to break out of it. After all, we are also indigenous people of this land.”

Another TISS graduate quoted Benedict Anderson’s book Imagined Communities to ask, “When I land at Imphal airport, I see only Meitei women saying, Welcome to Manipur. I then wonder, where are we? Are we not a part of the state? If we are not considered a part, then why should we be together?”

Identity is closely linked to land rights. But the advent of big money is threatening to deprive the poor even from the tribal land. Add to it the rising population in the hill areas. Many in the valley blame this “sudden rise” to the influx of “illegal migrants from Myanmar”. A Churachandpur-based educationist, who wished to remain anonymous, candidly responded: “Of course, there are people from Burma in Churachandpur. It is an open border, it must be, because they are our own brothers and sisters, our own Chin people. We close doors on them just because far away a surveyor (McMohan) made an imaginary line without consulting us?”

Ride back to Imphal

In Manipur, bandhs are a part of everyday life, no matter if you’re from the hill or valley districts. Days-long bandhs are common, forcing the emergence of a parallel ‘bandh economy’. For instance, gas stations may be closed due to the bandh but all across the state you will find petrol and diesel being sold in mineral water bottles and drums by the roadside. You are lucky if you have to pay only Rs 20 more than the market rate but if the bandh goes on, the price can go up to Rs 150 per litre. The same is true of prices of other daily needs too, including food items.

“Minimum rate for a thing begins at Rs 10 in Manipur. The five-rupee coin has nearly vanished from the state. If any shopkeeper owes you five bucks, he will give you chocolate instead,” said a Paite girl living in Imphal.

On September 1, when we were travelling back to Imphal, a three-day bandh had been called.

The driver, however, told us not to worry. “It is a bandh given by the surrendered ultras. Even though they are in ceasefire with the Centre, the talks have not progressed, so they are protesting it. People are scared of underground forces, not those who are on ceasefire, so we can travel.”

So we began.

We couldn’t help but stare at the rolling rice fields enclosed by the lush hills under an azure sky, dotted with blobs of white clouds. For a moment, all the unrest, all the grievances, were forgotten.
Lush fields Manipur . Credit: Akhil Kumar/The Wire

The Manipuri landscape . Credit: Akhil Kumar/The Wire

Not for too long. Just as we began to relax, we come across a disturbing sight.

Slowing down the vehicle to let a convoy of army trucks pass by in Bishnupur district, our eyes fell on a banner with the poster of a young boy. Under it, about a dozen women in white were sitting on a mat.

“This boy died some days ago, a Meitei. His parents are so poor that they couldn’t pay his fees. The angry principal bashed him up so much that he died of head injuries. These women are demanding action against the principal,” our driver told us. He didn’t know whether the government had taken note of it although the report had come in some newspapers.

His nonchalance at the loss of a young life shocked us, but it had to be understood from the context of conflict. Years of living in a society ridden with violence can do that to people.

It was the same when we met Renu Takhellambam, the president of the Extrajudicial Execution Victims Families Association Manipur. Her husband, Mung Hangzo, was killed in a fake encounter in Imphal in 2007.

“Initially, she used to cry a lot. Her son was just a year old. Now, the tears have dried up and yet we are to get justice. The passage of years has helped my 82-year-old mother too to control her emotions,” Mung’s sister Manchin Hangzo told this correspondent.

Even as the Supreme Court is hearing the case of the fake encounters, it is not difficult to see the aggression of heavily armed Manipur Police commandoes across the state. They randomly stop young boys and apparently check their pockets for “money and drugs to consume”, say some locals.

Crisscrossing through Imphal city, it is not uncommon to see three-wheelers fitted with loudspeakers, their occupants demanding Scheduled Tribe (ST) status to the Meiteis – yet another growing worry for the tribes.

While granting the status will make the whole of Manipur a tribal region and thereby protect the state’s land from outsiders, many tribals feel such a provision “will take away whatever advantages we have as an ST category in education and state and central jobs.” Most IAS and IPS officers that you come across from Manipur are from the tribes, “primarily because of the ST status,” they say.

The ILP issue

While speaking to the Meitei leaders demanding the ILP to stop “outsiders” from settling in the state, the main thread of the conversation – like in the hill areas – was the fear of losing land and thereby their identity.

Just as posters of those killed can be found all across Churachandpur, across the valley posters saying, “No ILP, no rest” can be seen
johnson

United Committee Manipur president Elangbam Johnson. Credit: Akhil Kumar/The Wire

“Many people of the state woke up only after a Nepali man won the elections in Kangpokpi constituency in Senapati district. The outsider issue is therefore affecting the hill districts too. The broad gauge line to Jiribam (Imphal East district) is going to start soon, which will bring more outsiders to the state. If we don’t act now, our land will be gone. Manipur will become another Tripura where the indigenous people have been outnumbered by the Bengalis who came from Bangladesh,” said Elangbam Johnson, president of the United Committee Manipur.

Becoming “a guest in one’s own’s home” is a fear most Meiteis have. Even before the three Bills were brought in by the state government, an agitation began in the valley areas demanding ILP with huge public support. The protest turned violent in July 2015, leading to some police firing. A school boy was killed in the firing.

Since then, there has been a regular series of protests and bandhs given by the Joint Committee for Inner Line Permit (JCILPS)

JCILPS convener Khomdram Ratan had to go underground after the Manipur police issued a “wanted” notice against him for allegedly pledging support to the banned separatist outfit United National Liberation Front. On August 19, Ratan was arrested when he decided to come out to join a rally. He continues to be in jail.

The government had originally planned to table the draft Manipur Regulation of Non-Locals Bill, 2016 it had prepared to help bring the ILP to the state in the ongoing assembly session, which began on September 2, but has now decided not to do so since the JCILPS’s suggestions on the Bill came after the August 24 deadline.

Bijoy Moirangcha, the present JCILPS convener, in a press briefing denied a delay on their part and demanded that the Bill be tabled in this session itself.

According to a local Congress leader, with the assembly elections approaching and the BJP casting its net on the state, the Congress government “has to wait for the right moment to bring it. The elections are still at least 150 days away.”
A pro-ILP march. Credit: Special arrangement

A pro-ILP march in 2015. Credit: Special arrangement

Politics at play

Although Irom Sharmila has declared her intention to contest the elections, neither the Congress nor the BJP think she will be a force to reckon with. “It will be a fight between BJP and the Congress,” the Congress leader said.

Many civil society leaders also feel the same way.

“Nobody is opposed to her breaking the fast. It went on for too long. Not too many can do that. She deserves all the respect for that great sacrifice but when she suddenly said she will contest elections, we couldn’t support her. Unlike in other parts of India, election and politics is all about muscle and money power in Manipur, so people stay away from it, not too many think that justice can be achieved through elections,” said Meira Paibi leader Ima Ngangbi Devi.

“Let’s see, she deserves all the support, who knows, we might just decide to bend our rules only for her. We are emotionally invested in her,” she added as an afterthought.

Politics aside, like in the hills, speaking to young Meiteis is an enriching experience. Though most political leaders refuse to accept the tribal allegation that they face discrimination from the Meiteis, many young Meiteis accept it.

“It is the ugly truth, sooner we accept it, the better,” said a young woman with a degree from Oxford university, UK. However, she added, “The problem is, if you openly say it, it is considered unpatriotic. Be it in the hills or the valley, the space for dissent for young people is very little. We are forever bound by the larger interest of the community.”

Another young woman with a degree from Hyderabad University said, “We used to live in amity. There is a festival among the Meiteis where they are supposed to dress up in tribal outfits. It is incomplete without the participation of a Tangkhul (mostly residing in Ukhrul district). However, since the last decade or so, Meiteis have begun to dress up as Tangkhuls as they have stopped coming. We need to ask, why?”

Interestingly, while higher education has made many young people in the hill areas identify the schism between the hill and valley more and thereby demand a separation from the valley, the same education has not only made many young Meiteis identify the divide but also accept the tribes more as an equal.

“I agree that the discrimination happened during my father and grandfather’s time but I as a young Meitei don’t look at a young tribal as being in any way less than me. I have belief in all the young people, that we can sit together and sort out our differences so that we all can be a part of the Manipuri identity,” said a college student in Imphal.

Such a coming together on equal terms may well happen in Manipur in the future, but definitely not before the the Naga Accord is revealed and the 2017 assembly polls – where two arch national political foes are heading towards a never-seen-before collision to wrest power in the state.

Perhaps an old Assamese saying can best sum up the what’s happening in Manipur – when two elephants fight, the earth shifts.

June 06, 2016

India - 2016 Assam Assembly Election Results: Udayon Misra see's victory for identity politics not Hindutva

Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 51, Issue No. 22, 28 May, 2016

Victory for Identity Politics, Not Hindutva in Assam
2016 State Assembly Elections

Udayon Misra

Udayon Misra (udayon.misra[at]gmail.com) is a former National Fellow of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla.

During the recently concluded Assam assembly elections, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh's role was exaggerated to strengthen the impression that the Assamese have finally succumbed to the ideology of Hindu nationalism. This is not borne out either by the background of most of the successful Bharatiya Janata Party candidates or the overall voting pattern in the state.

Defying all demographic equations, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) alliance has swept the polls in Assam, winning 86 of the 126 seats in the state assembly. The Congress, which ruled the state for three terms, has been reduced to just 24 seats. This was certainly not the result of a Modi wave. Rather, it was the result of the BJP’s success in garnering the support of regional forces like the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), the Bodoland People’s Front (BPF) and the Rabha, Tiwa and other plains tribal organisations.

There was no Hindutva agenda as such in these elections and the emphasis was clearly on preserving the identity and culture of the indigenous people of the state in the face of swift demographic change triggered by "infiltration" from neighbouring Bangladesh. Alarm bells had started ringing amongst the indigenous groups the moment the religious break-up of the 2011 Census was released by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government after it had been kept under wraps by the previous dispensation. Once the figures were released, it became evident that the rise in the Muslim population in the state, which now stands at 34.2%, was the highest in the country, surpassing even a state like Jammu and Kashmir. Different ethnic organisations voiced their apprehensions at the possibility of being totally marginalised in the state’s politics and political parties like the AGP, which had lost much of its credibility but still had a substantial base in rural areas, made the issue of threat to identity a major one. Reading the writing on the wall, the BJP went out of its way to build up an electoral alliance with regional forces. This proved to be a master stroke, especially as the Congress developed cold feet in arriving at an understanding with the All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF) for fear of antagonising its Hindu vote base.

The understanding with the AGP brought in rich dividends to the BJP. Those who wrote off the AGP as a political force because of its miserable performance in the 2014 Lok Sabha polls, and in the 2011 assembly elections where it managed to secure just nine seats, failed to take into account the strong sentiments in favour of a regional force. This surfaced during the recent elections. In the last Lok Sabha polls, the AGP drew a blank but the number of votes it got in the state exceeded five lakh. Moreover, the regional party still had its organisational structure more or less intact in different parts of the state despite its reduced presence in the state’s legislature. Once it arrived at an understanding with the BJP, things started looking up. For the Congress, the resultant consolidation of votes against it proved too great a challenge as it had always made electoral gains because of a divided opposition. This accounts for the 14 seats won by the AGP and the victories of several of its stalwarts who had been virtually written off in the state’s politics.

A Secular Flavour

The AGP gave the BJP a much-needed secular flavour from which it benefited. Moreover, several AGP leaders had already joined the BJP. This made the equations between the AGP and the BJP much easier. For instance, although several former AGP leaders fought the polls as BJP candidates, the electorate continued to see them as strong supporters of regional sentiments. In fact, most of the state’s BJP leadership is made up of former All Assam Students’ Union (AASU) and AGP activists, including the chief ministerial candidate Sarbananda Sonowal who is a former AASU President and an AGP leader. The BJP’s decision to project Sonowal as its chief ministerial candidate paid off because of his wide acceptability to different sections of the people of the state. A plains tribal belonging to the small Sonowal–Kachari community of upper Assam, Sonowal has emerged as a major voice of the indigenous people. His success in getting the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act of 1983, which had made the detection of foreign nationals virtually impossible, scrapped by the Supreme Court in 2005, made him a hero amongst the Assamese people who called him jatiya nayak (national hero). Sonowal represented the AGP in the Lok Sabha from 2004 to 2009. Even when he moved from the AGP to the BJP in 2011, he was always seen as someone who represented regional interests. It was precisely because of Sonowal that so many of his former colleagues in the AGP joined the BJP.

Although initially reluctant to induct the Congress dissident Himanta Biswa Sarma into the BJP, Sonowal soon realised the latter’s worth. Together they worked out a successful strategy to defeat the Congress that had already been considerably weakened by internal dissension and family politics. Moreover, the last term of Tarun Gogoi’s 15-year rule was marked by widespread corruption and administrative incompetence compounded with arrogance and an increasing disconnect with the masses. With Himanta Biswa Sarma in charge of the election campaign, the BJP made full use of anti-incumbency feelings and pushed forth the agenda of development and identity, appealing to people to vote for the protection of their maati, bheti and jati (land, hearth and nationality).

This had a strong appeal amongst the indigenous Assamese and all the ethnic groups. Though the question of development continued to be a major issue in the elections, it was clearly the preservation of the land and the identity of the indigenous people that found greater resonance during the campaign. That is why the elections were often referred to as the last battle of Saraighat1 for the Assamese people and memories of the anti-foreigner agitation of the 1980s were revived. Following the election results, several regional newspapers commented that the spirit of the 1980s was back, with the issues of identity, land and language once again back in focus.

In recent years, the debate over Assamese identity has been acquiring new dimensions and there were signs that different ethnic organisations were coming together. More than 25 ethnic organisations gathered under the leadership of the AASU to demand constitutional safeguards as had been promised by the Assam Accord of 1985. There was much debate about the definition of “Assamese” in Clause 6 of the Assam Accord. The Asam Sahitya Sabha was asked to come out with a formula but it failed. On this issue, the then speaker of the Assam assembly, senior Congressman Pranab Gogoi, came out with a suggestion that all those who figure in the 1951 electoral rolls and anyone who spoke Assamese and any of the tribal languages as well as Bengali in the Barak Valley should be seen as Assamese. While the AASU and the tribal organisations supported this move, the Congress and the AIUDF strongly opposed it. The Congress, which claimed in its election rallies that it represented regional interests better than its opponents, did not realise that its dilly-dallying over the definition of Assamese would prove costly. The election results have shown that the fear about eventually being reduced to a minority in their homeland was shared by the broader Assamese society as well as by the different ethnic groups in the state. This also explains the victory of the BJP candidates in the hills of Karbi Anglong and in all constituencies where there is a sizeable plains tribal population, especially in upper Assam.

The massive erosion of support for the Congress amongst the tea garden community in upper Assam was another major factor in the BJP’s electoral sweep. Years of neglect, rising unemployment and pitiable health and education indices contributed to the alienation of tribal workers in tea gardens from the Congress. The BJP took advantage of this in 1985 and the result was evident in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections when BJP candidates scored victories in constituencies like Dibrugarh and Jorhat where a large section of the voters are tea garden labourers. The BJP continued its consolidation in tea garden sector that finally gave it an advantage in all the 35 assembly constituencies where tea garden labour votes are the determining factor.

Master Move

Apart from its understanding with the AGP, the BJP leadership made another master move in bringing within the fold of the BJP alliance the Tiwa and Rabha organisations. This gave the party a tribal-friendly face and helped its fortunes not only in Tiwa and Rabha areas but also in the hill constituencies of Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao. Here it virtually replaced the Congress that had held power for decades. Thus, while the AGP partly neutralised the BJP’s communal image, its understanding with the plains tribal organisations and the BPF, in particular, gave the alliance an edge. Not only did the BPF bring in 12 seats from the Bodo Tribal Autonomous District (BTAD) area but it also helped secure support from Bodo voters spread all over the state, especially in Mangoldoi, Sonitpur and Lakhimpur districts.

Despite this, it is significant that the Congress, which suffered heavy losses throughout the state, retained its hold over several Muslim majority constituencies in the three lower Assam districts of Goalpara (57.52% Muslims), Barpeta (70.74% Muslims), and Dhubri (79.6% Muslims) and also wrested several seats from the AIUDF. In Barpeta district, the Congress secured four out of the eight constituencies, having taken the Baghpat and Jania seats from the AIUDF by large margins, while retaining the Sarukhetri and Chenga seats. As a result, the Congress virtually neutralised the AIUDF which could hold on to just the Bhabanipur seat. In Goalpara district too the Congress registered wins in two out of the district’s four seats. It took the West Goalpara constituency from the AIUDF while winning the East Goalpara seat by defeating the BJP candidate by a margin of over 5,000 votes. The AIUDF succeeded in holding on to only the Jaleswar seat and that too by a small margin. Thus, in both Barpeta and Goalpara districts, the Congress succeeded in marginalising the AIUDF. Only in Dhubri district did the AIUDF register some gains, having secured three out of the district’s seven seats. The Congress and the BJP alliance won two seats each.

However, the Congress party’s most impressive win was in South Salmara, considered the bastion of the AIUDF. Here, the AIUDF leader Badruddin Ajmal was defeated by his Congress rival Wajid Ali Choudhury by over 16,000 votes. What is interesting is that in Darrang district (64.34% Muslims), the Congress defeated the AIUDF in the predominantly Muslim constituency of Dalgaon, but lost all the other three seats to the BJP combine. Immigrant Muslim votes were divided between the Congress and the AIUDF in most of the constituencies of lower Assam, with the former registering wins against the latter. It is evident from this voting pattern that a large section of the immigrant Muslim voters shifted their preference from the AIUDF to the Congress, thereby rejecting the former’s attempt at polarisation along religious lines.

That the AIUDF’s attempt at such polarisation did not succeed can also be seen in the voting pattern amongst Muslims in constituencies where they are either a majority or form a substantial section of the electorate. In as many as 36 of such constituencies, the BJP combine got some 16.6% votes, a substantial increase from the 8.3% that it had secured in the 2011 elections. On the other hand, the vote share of the AIUDF in these constituencies came down from 29.7% in 2011 to 27%. The vote share of the Congress in the minority-dominated constituencies also went down from 35% in 2011 to 32%. These are significant figures because they point to the fact that the BJP combine has succeeded in garnering a substantial number of Muslim votes without which victory would not have been possible in the four lower Assam districts of Goalpara, Barpeta, Dhubri and Darrang where it secured a total of nine seats against the AIUDF’s four. Moreover, without substantial support from Muslim voters, the BJP combine would not have been able to secure all the three seats in Nalbari district.

It is clear that the BJP combine has made major inroads into the Muslim-majority constituencies of lower and middle Assam, while at the same time making a clean sweep of all the eight seats in Sonitpur district, which has a large Muslim population. Hence the claim that the BJP combine has won the support of the state’s indigenous Muslims, especially after its success in constituencies like Barkhetri and Patacharkuchi of the Nalbari district where indigenous Assamese Muslims voted in large numbers for it.

Winning the Muslim Vote

The BJP combine’s win in Muslim-majority constituencies of the state has come as a surprise to many analysts and seems to have disproved the notion that Muslims vote in a polarised manner. In the Muslim-majority districts of Dhubri, Barpeta, Darrang, Goalpara, Nagaon, Mogaigaon, Hailakandi, Karimganj and Bongaigaon, the BJP combine did much better than expected, with a tally of 22 seats. According to a report published in the Hindu,2 in the 49 Muslim-majority constituencies spread over the nine districts of the state, the BJP by itself won as many as 15 seats, while its allies the AGP and the BPF secured five and two seats each respectively. The Congress won 14 and the AIUDF 12.

This success of the BJP combine cannot be attributed merely to division of votes between the Congress and the AIUDF, though that certainly is a major factor. According to the Hindu report, while the BJP combine did not do well in constituencies where Muslims constituted over 60% of the voters, in constituencies where Muslim voters ranged from 30%–50%, it did much better. In the three constituencies of Hailakandi district in the Barak Valley, all the seats were won by the AIUDF. But in Bongaigaon, it was the AGP, which claimed two out of the four seats, while the BPF got one. This shows that apart from a major consolidation of Assamese, Bodo and Bengali Hindu votes, a substantial number of Muslims have also voted in favour of the BJP combine.

The same may be said about Nagaon district where seven out of the 11 seats were won by the BJP combine. Between the Congress and the AIDUF, they secured four seats. The division of Muslim votes alone could not have led to such results in Nagaon district. In Darrang district, with its 64% Muslim population, the BJP and the BPF together got three of the four seats, with the Congress securing only one. Here too the consolidation of Assamese and Bodo votes helped the BJP combine but the combine’s win cannot be attributed only to division of Muslim votes, although the AIUDF acted primarily as a spoiler for the Congress.

Though it was expected that the BJP combine would do well in the upper Assam districts, the complete decimation of the Congress in Dibrugarh and Tinsukia, which with a substantial number of tea garden workers have long been its bastion, was a bit of a surprise. In Dibrugarh, the BJP combine secured all the seven seats (BJP six, AGP one). Of the five seats in Tinsukia district in upper Assam, as many as four went to the BJP, while the Congress secured one. The lone seat which went to the AIUDF in upper Assam was from Naoboisa in Lakhimpur district. In Sivasagar district, one seat each was won by the Congress, the BJP and the AGP. The former speaker of the Assam assembly and Congress leader Pranab Gogoi barely managed to retain his seat by a few hundred votes and that too because he has the image of an Assamese nationalist. That the BJP combine could register major gains in Lakhimpur and Dhemaji districts points to the support it has received from the plains tribal population in these districts. Similarly, in the Jagiroad and Morigaon constituencies in middle Assam, the inclusion of the Tiwa organisations in the BJP combine brought it substantial dividends.

Role of RSS and VHP

The role of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Hindutva bodies like the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) in the Assam elections have been commented upon in several circles. While it is true that RSS activities in Assam, particularly in the Brahmaputra Valley, began in the 1940s, it is also a fact that the RSS was never a major factor in the society and politics of the state where identity politics centred on immigration, land and language has overshadowed all other considerations. Added to this is the highly syncretic and plural nature of Assamese society that has made it difficult for organisations like the RSS to push forward the agenda of religious polarisation as it has done in the Hindi heartland.

From the beginning, RSS activities were patronised by the Marwari business lobby and the organisation did not have many local leaders. In the popular imagination, the RSS in Assam was linked with Hindi-speaking Hindus and seldom perceived as an organisation with a local base. This explains the near absence of support for the Ram Janmabhoomi movement in Assam. Similarly, issues like a ban on cow slaughter and vegetarianism have never touched a chord amongst the Assamese people who prefer to identify themselves with their hill neighbours in matters of food and culture. A small core of Assamese high-caste Hindus were attracted to the RSS–VHP ideology but their influence in the sociopolitical life of a composite Assamese people has been minimal. All this notwithstanding, the RSS–VHP combine has time and again tried to appropriate Assamese religio-cultural icons like Srimanta Sankardeva and war heroes like Lachit Barphukan in order to advance its Hindutva programme. But given the highly inclusive nature of Sankardeva’s school of Vaishnavism, it is unlikely that the RSS agenda of religious polarisation will work. Even when it comes to appropriating heroes like Lachit Barphukan, the average Assamese knows that the Ahoms did not distinguish between Hindus and Muslims when it came to defending the “cause of the nation.” In fact, Ahom kings did not hesitate to appoint Muslims in important official and army posts. Although some heads or satradhikars of the Vaishnava satras or monasteries have long been associated with the RSS, it would be simplistic to conclude that RSS influence has percolated to the common people associated with such satras.

During the 1979–85 movement on the foreign nationals’ issue, RSS functionaries tried to infiltrate the AASU and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad front but with little success. Despite many aberrations and the rise in anti-Muslim feelings during certain phases of the movement, the AASU leadership of that time succeeded in steering the organisation along largely secular lines. Even on the foreign nationals issue, the AASU has consistently maintained that any post-1971 migrant, be he a Muslim or a Hindu, must be detected and deported. The Modi government’s decision to regularise the stay in the country (Assam included) of post-1971 Hindu refugees was met with stiff opposition by the AASU and other ethnic student bodies. It is, however, a separate matter that neither the BJP nor the AGP made the issue of the Bengali Hindu refugees a major one in the elections, perhaps keeping in mind the large voter base of Bengali Hindus in the state.3

Role of RSS Exaggerated

Finally, it is significant that amongst the BJP candidates during this election, there seems to be no one with a solid RSS background, even though RSS activists have been working in the state for several decades.4 BJP leaders have credited the RSS with preparing the ground for the electoral victory. Union Minister of State for Home Kiren Rijiju praised the dedication of some 25,000 RSS volunteers who worked day and night to secure the BJP victory, especially in the tea garden areas. Even if this is true, the question remains as to whether the RSS would be able to translate these electoral gains into ideological success. Given the complexity of social formations in the state, this appears highly unlikely.

Role of the RSS has been exaggerated to strengthen the impression that the Assamese have finally succumbed to the ideology of Hindu nationalism. This is certainly not borne out by the background of most of the successful BJP candidates as well as the overall voting pattern of the state. The Congress, on its part, has credited the RSS with winning the elections merely to deflect attention from the fact that people voted against the Tarun Gogoi government because of widespread corruption and blatant encouragement of family dominated politics. Working out successful election strategies is one thing, but to impose a narrow ideology of Hindutva on an inclusive and plural society is quite another task.

Despite this, we cannot rule out the fact that with the BJP wielding power in a state where both the AGP and the BPF are relatively minor partners, the RSS and its fringe elements could get additional leverage to push forward their agenda. As it is, there are signs that the RSS–VHP section within the BJP is trying to pass off the verdict of the Assam elections as a victory of the forces of Hindutva, even though during the entire election campaign the central BJP leadership skilfully avoided highlighting the Hindutva agenda plank of religious polarisation and encouraged the Assam BJP leadership to focus almost entirely on regional issues. Attempts by the RSS to saffronise Assam politics are bound to be resisted by the BJP’s partners in government, the AGP and the BPF. Moreover, as long as Assamese nationalist organisations like the AASU and the Asam Sahitya Sabha stick to their secular credentials, the going will be tough for the RSS. We must watch how within the state BJP, the large number of leaders drawn from the AGP, the Congress and the AASU will react to RSS attempts to influence government policies and programmes. It will be simplistic to conclude at this stage that the overwhelmingly Hindu content of the coming BJP government will automatically strengthen the RSS and other fringe right-wing groups. The innate secular strength of Assamese society will hopefully prevent such a rightist slide. Nonetheless, the presence of Hindu spiritual leaders at the swearing-in ceremony of the new government is bound to send a wrong signal to all those who voted for a change in government, not because of religious reasons but because they hoped that the new government would seriously address the major issues confronting the people of Assam.

Notes

1 It was at Saraighat near Guwahati that the Assamese led by the Ahom General Lachit Borphukan finally defeated the Mughals in a crucial river battle on the Brahmaputra in 1671.

2 “How BJP Escaped the Tripwire in Assam,” the Hindu, 21 May 2016.

3 According to conservative estimates, the total Bengali Hindu population in the state is some 40 lakh.

4 Malini Bhattacharjee, “Tracing the Emergence and Consolidation of Hindutva in Assam,” Economic & Political Weekly, 16 April 2016. The first time an RSS functionary became a minister in Assam was in 1978, when Lakheswar Gohain became the revenue minister in the Janata Party government led by Golap Borbora. Gohain had fought the 1978 assembly polls as a Janata Party candidate from the Kampur constituency of Nagaon district.

February 16, 2016

On New Identity Politics and the 2012 Collapse of Nepal's Constituent Assembly

Modern Asian Studies

 New Identity Politics and the 2012 Collapse of Nepal's Constituent Assembly: When the dominant becomes ‘other’ 

by KRISHNA P. ADHIKARIa1 and DAVID N. GELLNERa2

a1 School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography, University of Oxford, United Kingdom Email: krishna.adhikari@anthro.ox.ac.uk
a2 School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography, University of Oxford, United Kingdom Email: david.gellner@anthro.ox.ac.uk

Abstract
This article explores the politicization of ethnicity in Nepal since 1990. In particular it looks at how ideas of indigeneity have become increasingly powerful, leading to Nepal becoming the first and—to date—only Asian country to have signed International Labour Organization Convention number 169 (hereafter ILO 169). The rise of ethnic politics, and in particular the reactive rise of a new kind of ethnicity on the part of the ‘dominant’ groups—Bahuns (Brahmans) and Chhetris (Kshatriyas)—is the key to understanding why the first Constituent Assembly in Nepal ran out of time and collapsed at the end of May 2012. This collapse occurred after four years and four extensions of time, despite historic and unprecedentedly inclusive elections in April 2008 and a successful peace process that put an end to a ten-year civil war.

http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=10190984&fileId=S0026749X15000438

 

March 15, 2015

India: His Name was Khan - Smita Nair (reportage on the Nagaland Lynching , Indian Express)

The Indian Express

The Big Picture: His Name was Khan

A “politically activated mob” had dragged Khan out of jail and lynched him at a public square.
Written by Smita Nair , with input from Samudra Gupta Kashyap | Published on:March 15, 2015 12:35 am

Legend has it that the “best warrior” in all the 16 tribes of Nagaland is the one who protects the women and children of his village. This is “an important context”, says a 36-year-old Naga businessman, to understand the “raw emotions” behind the incidents that unfolded on March 4 and 5, when a mob marched to Dimapur Central Jail, dragged out a rape accused from judicial custody and lynched him in public.

At 10 am on March 4, when students of the women’s college where the alleged victim studied stood outside its gates, it made a powerful picture. “Against the brick red wall of the building were these angry girls in their blue and white uniforms. They just stood silently. Nobody in the press dared speak to them,” recalls a local reporter.

The narrow red lane boxed by the college on one side and a temple on the other was where it all started. But in those early hours of March 4, it was “still a crowd condemning the rape”.
By the next morning, the “obsessed mob” had taken shape. Sharif Khan, 35, was now not just a “rapist” but also the face of an “Illegal Bangladeshi Immigrant (IBI)”, who had taken their land first, then their jobs, then married a Naga woman and now had become “emboldened” to “rape another”.

The protests were triggered by March 4 papers reporting the rape, and at least one calling Sharif Khan an “IBI”. The protests were triggered by March 4 papers reporting the rape, and at least one calling Sharif Khan an “IBI”.

By early evening of March 5, as the sun set in Nagaland, the mob had dragged Khan over 7 km, kicking and abusing him, to finally tie him at City Clock Tower — a poor replica of the Eiffel Tower, at the popular town square —and beaten him to death.

“In Nagaland, a rape and an illegal migrant can be an explosive combination,” says Wabang Jamir, IGP (Range). An IPS from the Gujarat cadre, and a Naga himself, he says to explain Nagaland to an outsider can “still be complicated”. Customary law, police say, runs parallel to the Indian Penal Code.

“It’s a traditional system used mostly in land disputes and sometimes in cases of bodily harm. It’s common to have settlement out of court,” adds Liremo Lotha, DIG (Range).

On March 5, says Jamir, “it’s a sense of proportion” of this alternative dispute resolution system that the crowd appears to have got wrong.

In Dimapur, Nagaland’s commercial capital, there are two identities you hear repeatedly, “plain” and “Nagas”. “We are the outsiders, people from the mainland plains,” says Uttar Pradesh native Bijesh Sharma, 30, who runs a shop that has been with his family for three decades, on Jain Temple Road, very near the college where the protest began.
The owner of this chicken shop is believed to have fled, leaving behind his stock and many nervous migrants. The owner of this chicken shop is believed to have fled, leaving behind his stock and many nervous migrants.

He recalls angry girl students walking past his shop on March 4. “There were a few boys, in college uniform and that of the Unity Education Institute, who kept shouting ‘close the shop’,” says Sharma.

He reopened only six days later. Ask Sharma about the law, and he says, “Yehan kanoon hai, yehan kanoon nahin hai. It depends on which side of the border you are, Naga or plain.”

Sharma also remembers that they heard of the alleged February 24 rape only that day. That morning, at least three big state dailies put the news on their front page. Two featured photographs of Khan prominently, one identifying him as a ‘businessman based in Dimapur’ and another as a ‘married man’. Leading newspaper Nagaland Post went one step further, headlining the report as ‘IBI rapes woman in DMU’.

A joint statement by the Naga Council Dimapur and the Naga Women Hoho Dimapur carried by all the papers said, “We are once again compelled to condemn the rape of a Sumi Naga girl by a suspected IBI. Not only was the girl raped multiple times, she was beaten up and threatened… Unless all Nagas take responsibility to tackle the menace of an unabated IBI influx… crimes against our women and daughters by these people will only increase.”

By March 6, it would be revealed that Khan was a resident of Karimganj in Assam, and that two of his brothers were in the Army and his father had served in it. By March 11, the Nagaland government would tell the Union Home Ministry that Khan and the alleged victim could have had consensual sex, though the Chief Secretary has since denied that such a report was sent by the state, and police insist they are probing rape.
Many fish shops are owned by migrants from Bihar, some of whom came three decades ago. Many fish shops are owned by migrants from Bihar, some of whom came three decades ago.

But by noon of March 4, Khan’s fate had already been sealed. At New Market, 2 km from City Clock Tower, a 25-year-old second-hand clothes shopkeeper, also a native of Karimganj, remembers hiding the trade licence displayed at his shop. A migrant can’t set up a shop or occupy rented space in municipal markets in Nagaland without the paper, and it was the one thing he couldn’t afford to lose if his shop was torched.

The protesting students followed a now familiar drill, he says. “They asked for our identity cards. They looked at our names and slapped us. ‘Sab Miyakani yatepora jaba lagibo (All Muslim illegal migrants get out)’, they yelled.”

Eight days later, every time a Naga walks past the shop he took over from his father and has since refurbished with Rs 8 lakh of own, he tenses up. “I fear for my life,” he says.

Around him are seven other shops owned by men with identity cards from around Karimganj and Silchar, all speaking Sylheti (a Bangaleshi dialect) and all dubbed IBIs by locals.

An IBI doesn’t have to be of a particular religion, the 25-year-old shopkeeper explains. “He comes with a national identity.”
The Nagas across the spectrum, from a policeman and a commerce official to a housewife, also agree that while IBIs may be referred to loosely as ‘Miya’, the issue is not of religion. “The Nagas use this for any IBI as after 1971, most of the immigrants have been Bangladeshi Muslims,” says one.
The Jain temple road from where the protests began. The Jain temple road from where the protests began.

There were cases of kindness as the mob drove on. A vendor who has a small shop of khadi clothes, belongs to Badarpur in Assam and wears a skull cap, was returning from the mosque on March 4 when a group of Naga girls asked him to run home or he might be attacked. “They study in the same school as my daughter, St Mary Montessori,” he says.

Soon, the lane was swarming with the crowd as it made its way to the Deputy Commissioner’s office at Duncan-basti, asking that trade licences of IBIs be seized.

Police say it’s very difficult to ascertain the number of IBIs in the state. “The FRRO (Foreign Regional Registration Office) routinely sends documents to the Assam Police to verify antecedents. We never get a response,” says an FRRO official.

The mob demanded that Khan be handed over to them. When the Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police refused, a section of the crowd turned its ire on New Market and nearby Hazi Park. Both markets have shops owned by the Nagas but run by non-Nagas.

At the corner near G S Road in Hazi Park is a group of men from Bihar selling fish. Some have lived here for three decades and get their stock of salted, dry fish from Gujarat, Maharashtra, Kerala, and an expensive variety from Lucknow. However, since everyone associates meat shops and those dealing in second-hand items with IBIs, they faced the mob’s wrath.

“It’s only today, when I saw men from the CRPF, that I felt safe,” says K Gupta, 26, whose shop was ransacked. He re-opened a week later, on March 11. The CRPF men are from the “plains” too, unlike personnel of the Nagaland Police and Indian Reserve Batallion.

Gupta’s brother too used to live in Dimapur, but early in 2013, he left for hometown Muzaffarpur after he found “the discrimination difficult to bear”. Ironically, Gupta adds, Muzaffarpur is no stranger to riots.
A Nagaland Police constable at New Market. A Nagaland Police constable at New Market.

Yogendra Prasad, 42, whose shed, located next to Gupta’s, was also smashed, has been selling fish for 26 years. “The collective loss is in lakhs, and we do not know if our FIR will amount to anything,” he says.

Prasad has been slapped around earlier by locals over bargains gone wrong, but he had started to feel he had turned the corner. He has some regular customers now, speaks Nagamese (a creole based on Assamese) and his daughter has Naga friends in school.

“Though the attackers have since apologised, we will always be an outsider… Kabhi sochte hain, paristithi (It’s our circumstances),” Prasad shrugs.

On March 4 night, a vendor who doesn’t want to be named got a call that his shop was being torched. “I ran. I was stopped by two youths. I lied, said I am a Hindu from Uttar Pradesh. I got a phone call and they asked me to answer it so as to figure out my identity. I said I won’t, and started walking. I thought if they attack me, I would get better, but if my shop was burnt, everything would be finished,” he says.

While the alleged rape occurred on February 24, IGP Jamir says the case was not made public “on the request of the victim”. It was on March 3, when a police team was seen entering her college premises, that the press got wind of a “possible crime”. On March 4, hours after the newspapers had carried the story, ‘Naga Blog’ and ‘Naga Spear’ blogs picked it up. Soon they were getting a stream of radical reactions.

While Naga Blog administrators tried to filter some of them, Naga Spear made no such effort. Twenty-five of the “core accused” in the mob that lynched Khan and who are now under arrest have said they got incited after reading the blogs.

A week later, even the Nagas are shocked at how things escalated so fast. At the Hazi Park market, Kiyekhe Chophy, a representative of the commerce body, is taking stock of the loss. A Naga himself, Chophy says he feels embarrassed. “It’s still difficult to walk here. I feel helpless I could not protect them.”

Pointing to the nameboards around the market, saying ‘Rangeela’, ‘Shree Ram’, ‘Shibani’, ‘Hussain’, ‘Kushboo’ etc, Chophy says there are no Naga shops anywhere or even a Naga shopkeeper. “That is what killed Khan.”
K Gupta’s shop was ransacked. “It’s only today when I saw CRPF that I felt safe,” he says. K Gupta’s shop was ransacked. “It’s only today when I saw CRPF that I felt safe,” he says.

In the past six months, locals say, there have been a series of episodes indicating “the growing resentment and frustration of young locals”. “The NGOs have failed them, the role of community bodies has become diluted, and the government has not responded to their woes,” says a Naga woman.

An RTI activist who does not want to be named claims that in response to a petition, he found that of the 11,000 government jobs vacated by retiring staff over five years, only a very small portion had been filled through competition. “Those who didn’t get jobs are angry,” he adds.
Many Nagas agree it was this anger that was on display on March 4 and 5. “When an outsider remains a minority, history has taught us it’s peaceful. Anything else is trouble,” says a businessman.

A movement called Survival Nagaland that has quickly garnered support within five months of its formation talks of making the state “free of IBIs”. The Naga Students’ Federation (NSF) launched a campaign recently to create awareness about “the onslaught of IBIs”.

Nagaland politicians have earlier blamed Assam for the IBI “problem”. Former chief minister Neiphiu Rio (now a Lok Sabha MP) had accused the Congress government in Assam of “aiding and abetting” the influx of illegal migrants from Bangladesh to Nagaland.

“There is absolute frustration at jobs going to migrants,” says Khukeugha Tuccu, chairman of the Confederation of Nagaland Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Hokivi Chishi, 48, who represents the Dimapur Chamber of Commerce and Industry, says he could see the anger in the eyes of the students on March 4, and ordered the shops shut. “I know many of them since their childhood, but they wouldn’t be stopped,” says Chishi.
Lashing out at the administration, he adds, “Where have you heard of Section 144 being relaxed for two hours for a protest?”

At the supermarket — on the other end of Dimapur — Naga women sell tribal souvenirs. Nearby, at a traditional market, tribal women sell everything from dry fish and pork to frogs, snails, bee larvae and red ants.

Vihuli Assumi, 39, is a Sema, the same tribe as the alleged victim. “It’s not easy for a local to earn like the migrants,” Assumi says. “There are no subsidies or grants or encouragement from the administration. Traditionally, the Nagas prefer to work in the administration as they feel secure. With jobs depleting and a growing population, it has become very difficult.”

In a complex on the highway to Kohima, with single rooms up for rent, the alleged victim and Khan were neighbours. “Khan lived in the fourth room, the girl in the ninth,” says a nearby shopkeeper who also collects the rent for the rooms on behalf of the owner. The two also knew each other as Khan’s wife belonged to the same village as the alleged victim.

Charles Chasie, a journalist based in Kohima, laments that the incident will perpetuate the image of the Nagas as “head hunters”. “Some vested interests definitely instigated the youth. Every responsible Naga is angry. Yet, it is a fact that the influx of Bangladeshis has created a problem.”

Chasie too blames the administration. “How can a mob take law into its hands? What were the authorities doing?”

By the morning of March 5, fuelled by social media and its calls for “a united Naga response”, the angry protest of the day before had morphed into a “politically motivated mob”. Jamir says a preliminary probe indicates that the vandalism of the previous night had only stopped after students’ representatives were told by the authorities that they would be allowed to hold a peaceful protest the next day. He adds that student group representatives, including of the NSF, had driven down from Kohima and held a late-night meeting in Dimapur on March 4. “They were brought in to bring order to the chaos.”

By 9 am on March 5, all roads led to the City Clock Tower, with protesters coming in from even outside Dimapur. Police say inflammatory speeches followed by suspected representatives of Survival Nagaland among others. When, around 11 am, the crowd was asked to disperse, they didn’t. “Every rally looks for a resolution, and here I believe, there was none. This angered the crowd,” says Tuccu.

The government made some half-hearted attempts, including with tear gas, but the crowd pressed on towards the Dimapur jail. “The NSF or anyone else did not have control. The mob clogged all the routes, seized a national highway leading to Manipur and blocked the way for any reinforcements, using women and minor girls in the front,” says a police officer.

Jakato Sumi of Survival Nagaland says they tried their best to control the mob. “At around 4 pm, a number of us, including from Naga Hohos, Naga Council, church bodies, the Dimapur Chamber of Commerce & Industry etc, met to discuss how to stop them. But then we heard that the mob had already entered the jail,” Sumi says.

At around 5 pm on March 5, the mob dragged Khan out of jail, and then paraded him to the Clock Tower through the markets operated by migrants. “There was nothing subtle about it, it was for all of us to see,” says a vendor.

A social media administrator who is helping the police probe says “extreme elements based out of New Delhi, Mumbai and Hyderabad played a very important role in making the issue communal”.

As Tuccu sees it, if new opportunities open up, the frustrations would ease. He speaks of a tie-up with the Chamber of Commerce in Maharashtra, a state that faces “similar migrant issues like us”.

At her home, Bano Haralu, 51, a former journalist, was sitting down to watch the banned documentary India’s Daughter on YouTube on March 5 evening when she was alerted about the story unfolding in her backyard. “I find it ironic that in a Christian state, a man was lynched, in many ways similar to what Jesus had to undergo,” she says. “My head hangs in shame.”

In the week since, DIG Lotha says, police, commerce associations and the Muslim Council Dimapur have taken measures to bring peace. The Muslim Council issued a joint statement with Naga Hoho saying it was a “social issue” and not religious or communal.

Breaking down, Haralu says such measures can no longer suffice. “Nothing, no reason can justify what happened. Let the probe take its course but it’s time we addressed our problems. This episode has left us with no face. The only redemption would be if the family of Khan forgives us.”

But two days after the incident, Nagaland Post, that had dubbed Khan an IBI, wasn’t too apologetic in its editorial: “What happened should not have happened… But it is now too late even for an academic debate. For one, the problem lies in the fact that though all Bangladeshis may be Muslims (at least in as far as the issue is involved); yet all Muslims are not Bangladeshis.”

At the camp behind New Market, a vendor from Assam is closing his shop for the day. “I come from Karimganj and there is only one border I know,” he says, “the international border. And a Naga and I are on the same side.”

with inputs from Samudra Gupta Kashyap