The title of the last Pew Research Center survey,
Religion in India: Tolerance and Segregation, sounds paradoxical — but
it’s not, except that in this context “tolerance” is different from
“toleration”. This is primarily true of Hindus’ perception of other
communities.
Certainly, 80 per cent of the Hindu interviewees said that
“respecting other religions is a very important part of their religious
identity”, but many of them do not interact with other religions and
even consider such interactions undesirable. Not only do 86 per cent
Hindus say that “all” or “most of their close friends are the same
religion as them”, but only 23 per cent of Hindus also consider that
Hindus and Muslims “have a lot in common”. Only 3 per cent of Hindus say
they have prayed in a dargah, though Sufi saints attracting Hindu
devotees in large numbers was common once. This figure could be an
underestimate, but it might also mean that some Hindus do not wish to
say they are visiting an Islamic place of worship. In the same vein, 66
per cent Hindus say “it is very important to stop women/men in their
community from marrying outside their religion”, and 36 per cent “would
not be willing to accept a Muslim as a neighbour”.
The fact that Hindus want to live separately also partly explains
that only 52 per cent Hindus look at diversity as benefiting the country
and also, possibly, that 43 per cent Hindus consider Partition “a good
thing”.
This contradicts the stated desire of the Sangh Parivar for an
“Akhand Bharat”, but the rest of the survey throws light on the reasons
why so many Hindu voters support Narendra Modi and BJP
leaders who tend to equate India with the majority community —as
evident from the fact that the Prime Minister attends the Kumbh Mela but
does not hold iftar parties (in contrast to all his predecessors,
including A B Vajpayee). Indeed, for 64 per cent Hindus, to be Hindu is
“very important to be truly Indian”, and for 59 per cent, to “be able to
speak Hindi” is equally important. These views echo the Hindu
nationalist slogan, inherited from V D Savarkar: “Hindi, Hindu,
Hindustan!” By contrast, religious beliefs do not matter so much: 51 per
cent Hindus do not hold it necessary to believe in god to be a part of
their religious community; for 70 per cent, those who “disrespect India”
cannot be Hindu. This brand of ethnicisation of religion is very
similar to Zionism, another ideology defining the nation on the basis of
the sacredness of the land, the “historicity” of the people, lineage
and language. Hindutva, similarly, defines the Hindu community not so
much on the basis of religion, but as a people with ethnic and cultural
features which make them the core of the nation.
While 50 per cent of Hindus consider that India “should rely on a
leader with a strong hand to solve its problems”, 45 per cent think that
a “democratic form of government” would do the job more effectively. In
parallel, 64 per cent Hindus consider that “politicians should have a
large or some influence in religious matters”, an opinion in tune with
Modi’s decision to preside over the laying of the Ayodhya temple’s
foundation stone.
Beyond growing affinities between the majority community and
Hindutva, the Pew Research Center’s survey illustrates the decline of
reformist attitudes. The attachment to traditions not only finds
expression in the beliefs in astrology (87 per cent Hindus say they fix
important dates according to auspicious times) but also to the
resilience of caste endogamy: 63 per cent Hindu men and 64 per cent
Hindu women told the researchers that it is very important to stop the
members of their community from marrying into “another caste”.
In fact, one can understand the high score of “tolerance” precisely
in relation with the resilience of caste. After all, upper castes
traditionally tolerate lower castes (including Dalits) provided they
remain on the periphery of society. A similar attitude towards religious
communities helps to make sense of the report’s title — “tolerance and
segregation” go together the moment Muslims become the new untouchables.
The Pew Research Center, interestingly, uses the word that
traditionally applied to caste relations — “discrimination” — to measure
this trend — and finds that 24 per cent of Indian Muslims say that
“there is a lot of discrimination against Muslims in India today”.
Regional variations are worth noticing: This percentage rises to 35 per
cent in north India.
These data need to be emphasised for resisting a sanitised
interpretation of this report: The situation is not fine because “to
live separately” is not the same thing as to live peacefully — tolerance
is not toleration. Communal violence is listed as one of the “very big
problems” of India by 65 per cent Hindus and Muslims. This is not only
due to the activities of vigilantes and politicians who polarise
religious communities, but also because of the fact that Hindus and
Muslims used to live — to some extent — together, as evident from the
architecture of the pols of Old Ahmedabad. Violence leads to separation
and ghettos like Juhapura. But ghettoisation is only one dimension of
the violence that the destruction of a composite culture like the Indian
civilisation implies — and that the shift from toleration to tolerance
causes.
This column first appeared in the print edition on July
22, 2021 under the title ‘The lines that divide’. The writer is senior
research fellow at CERI-Sciences Po/CNRS, Paris, professor of Indian
politics and sociology at King’s India Institute, London
