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Showing posts with label Communalism Combat. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Communalism Combat. Show all posts

December 29, 2015

Peacekeepers: A DM and SP prevent bloodshed in the wake of the Ramjanmabhoomi yatra, 1989 | Sabrang

www.sabrangindia.in

An Officer and a Gentleman

Written by Harsh Mander | Published on: December 22, 2015

The Ram Shila Pujan programme launched by Hindutva in 1989 was like a hurricane which shook secular India by the roots. Braving the tornado, a district magistrate and a superintendent of police stood by their post in Khargone, a communally sensitive town in M.P. In an exclusive to Communalism Combat, Harsh Mander gives a moving account of a humane and impartial administration’s encounter with the storm-troopers of hate

The storm – clouds gathered over the entire country with terrifying speed. It was the autumn of 1989, and in the short space of a few tension-racked weeks, the country changed course so fundamentally that the many values and beliefs which held us together as one people seemed to be relentlessly and inexorably swept aside.

The Bharatiya Janata Party and its assemblage of militant Hindutva allies announced the launching of combative direct action to build a Ram Temple at the disputed site of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya. The resort to legal and political processes to achieve this agenda were pushed to the background, now there would be an open and bloody battle if necessary.

This new mood of belligerence manifested itself in the countrywide Ram Shila Poojan programme. In villages and towns across the country, bricks emblazoned with the name ‘Ram’, were consecrated, worshipped and aggressively paraded through every lane and by-lane. Finally, they were transported to Ayodhya for the construction of the Ram Temple at the site of the doomed Babri Masjid, which still stood then as a forlorn symbol of India’s secularism.

The Ram Shila Poojan programme was launched on September 15, 1989, and was to become a watershed in modern Indian history. For, in the space of the next few days the country was seized by frenzy unprecedented since Partition. Groups of overcharged young men paraded the streets in every town, morning and evening, day after day, aggressively bearing bricks in the name of Ram, throwing acid at Muslims, shouting slogans which were astounding in their virulence, crudeness and naked aggression.

Huddled in their ghettos, the Muslims watched with disbelief and horror which turned quickly to cold terror and sullen anger. For many of them, their faith and hope built doggedly over tour decades soured. Avowedly secular governments across the country except West Bengal refused to ban the explosive Ram Shila Poojan programme, the media and intelligentsia were quickly infected by the communal dementia sweeping the land. Even secular voices corroborated with their deafening silence.

In less than ten days, town after town fell in a grim roll call of blood-drenched riot and curfew. The sequence was repeated with aching uniformity – militant processions brandishing Ram bricks shouting hate-filled slogans day after day, violent retaliation by small Muslim groups followed by carnage, deaths, arson and, finally, curfew. At one point, around three weeks after the launching of the programme, as many as 108 towns were simultaneously under curfew.

It was futile to expect the small district town of Khargone in western Madhya Pradesh to remain untouched by the sectarian fever that had seized the land. An undersized, haphazardly planned town with a population of less than one lakh persons, in an uneasy balance of an almost equal strength of Hindus and Muslims, Khargone is classified in official files as communally hyper-sensitive.

In villages and towns across the country, bricks emblazoned with the name ‘Ram’, were consecrated, worshipped and aggressively paraded through every lane and by-lane. Finally, they were transported to Ayodhya for the construction of the Ram Temple at the site of the doomed Babri Masjid, which still stood then as a forlorn symbol of India’s secularism

Records show that the first communal clash took place as far back as 1921 when Khargone was the capital of a tiny and modest princedom. The conflict has recurred with frightening regularity over the following decades.

With such an accumulated history of hatred and prejudice between the two communities of the town, it was only a matter of time before the conflagration sweeping the country also seared the town of Khargone. The pattern was the same – belligerent processions everyday charged with slogans of hate. The young DM and SP responded by calling meetings of the two communities, advising restraint, registering strong criminal charges against the processionists, energising peace committees, preventive arrests and so on. However, these measures, adequate perhaps in normal times, could not ebb the raging flood of communal hatred.

Flash point was rapidly approached in less than a fortnight, when the district wide Ram Shila Poojan programme was to climax in a massive procession in Khargone on September 30, 1989. Late night on the September 29, Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad volunteers were busy transforming the town into a saffron stronghold, with a profusion of flags, posters, slogans and buntings. Suddenly, out of the darkness, two Muslim youth, their faces masked by burqas, appeared on a motor-cycle and flashed daggers, seriously injuring two young men who were painting slogans. In the government hospital, a night-long series of emergency operation saved the lives and limbs of the victims, but the tension in the town was acutely palpable.

Several arrests were made through the night. At dawn, leaders of the various Hindutva factions were summoned to the police station for an emergency meeting with the DM and the SP. The appeals of the district officers for a cancellation or postponement of the Ram Shila Poojan programme that morning were stubbornly rejected, as were the appeals for changes in route to avoid Muslim settlements and mosques altogether.

Already some 25-30,000 Hindutva volunteers had assembled, determined and highly charged. The DM and SP realised that any attempt to halt the procession by force was doomed to failure and would only lead to large-scale violence and killings. The only option seemed to be to let the procession pass with intensive control and regulation.

The procession was unprecedented in size, passion and militancy. All assurances regarding restraint in sloganeering given earlier, in writing by the organisers, were thrown to the winds as the most vulgar and vicious slogans rent the air. Trishuls and naked daggers were flashed. The leaders suddenly attempted to steer the processionists into the heart of the Muslim bastis contrary to prior agreement. But they were firmly pushed back to the agreed route.

The seemingly endless procession wound its way through the narrow lanes at a tortuously slow speed, as tension mounted to unbearable levels. As it passed the mosques in particular, the virulence and passion of the sloganeering acquired a new pitch. The executive magistrates and the police had to physically push the frenzied young men forward. No Muslim was seen out of doors.

With about two-thirds of the procession having passed by late afternoon, the DM and the SP began to believe that the explosion had been diffused, at least for that day.

Suddenly, a cluster of young men came running in panic from the direction opposite the procession, shouting that the Muslims had thrown a bomb on the crowd and that a processionist had been killed. The DM and the SP ran to the spot, barely 100 metres away. There they encountered a young man, his chest torn open by a crude bomb, his life quickly ebbing away, the crowd madly enraged. The DM quickly lifted the youth into his car which was parked nearby and asked the driver to rush him to hospital. He died before the car reached the hospital.

The story of the bomb attack which unfolded later was that the daily and repeated battery of vitriolic sloganeering by mobs of Hindu youth entering Muslim bastis had terrorised the community. But a small bunch of eight youth, two of them petty government servants – a forest guard and a patwari – decided to resort to a terrorist-type attack.

Their game-plan became clear to the DM and the SP as soon as they reached the spot after the first bomb was thrown. The bomb was hurled on the mob from a small double-storeyed house in a very narrow by-lane which branched off from the main lane through which the procession was passing. The calculation clearly was that the enraged mob would gather below the house for counter-attack when a series of bombs would be thrown on the mob from above, resulting in a large number of deaths.

The DM and the SP repeatedly shouted to the mob that they were taking charge of the situation and that they, the mob, should stay away. Most of the crowd listened and tentatively stayed at bay.

Once below the house, the best course appeared to be to fire at the house from where the bomb was thrown. The SP himself, and an ASI who accompanied him, fired a repeated volley of rounds at the house. This served several purposes. The crowd was satisfied that effective action was being taken and did not insist on taking the law into their own hands.

The gunfire also frightened the conspiring men from throwing any more bombs and one of the young conspirators was caught by the police as he was running away from the house. It was through him that the subsequent police case was quickly solved.

The crowd now began to fan out in every direction with many rushing straight to the Muslim bastis. The DM imposed curfew immediately with clear instructions to the police and magistrates on duty in pickets at all sensitive points in the town, to enforce his directive with a firm hand in the shortest possible time. He authorised them to use force, including resort to firing, if necessary to carrying out his orders.

The DM and the SP jumped into the latter’s jeep and drove around the sensitive bastis. The SP himself had to fire several rounds. The police resorted to firing at three other places. Curfew was fully imposed in the brief period of twenty minutes.

However, in these twenty minutes, four lives were lost, about a hundred Muslim houses and commercial establishments set ablaze and three mosques desecrated. The deaths were by country made rifles and daggers used by mobs while attacking Muslim bastis and one by a bomb thrown by the fleeing group.

Soon, an uneasy calm fell over the city. Additional forces were called from neighbouring districts and permanent pickets established at sensitive points. All executive magistrates were pressed into duty, mobile police patrols scoured the city round the clock. Large-scale preventive arrests and searches were ordered. On the first night itself, 126 persons were arrested, but most of them were Muslim.

There was no relaxation of curfew for 72 hours with little violation barring the extensive desecration of four mosques on the second night. The anguished Muslim community insisted that this could not have been possible without police complicity.

The DM and SP snatched just two hours of sleep on the second night, inside the police station. That is where they spent the next 19 nights, first on benches under the tree and later, in camp-cots under a tent, fully dressed and ready to rush if a clash was reported. The rest of the time they were out on patrol.

The people of Khargone were to become very familiar with the while Gypsy and its flashing red light endlessly scouring the shadowy and deserted lanes and by-lanes of the city. The control room was assailed by a continuous barrage of complaints about mob assault, all of which were checked out and most of which proved to be just rumours. The press was regularly briefed, special arrangements were made for the distribution of newspapers from the second day, in order to control rumours. The peace committee and responsible leaders of the two communities were pressed into service.

The DM mobilised the services of the Public Works’ Department to repair and restore the desecrated mosques with the support of moderate Muslim leaders overnight, before the first two-hour relaxation of curfew. The Muslims wound their way straight to the mosques to offer prayers. The fresh paint and mortar told their own stories to which they responded with low voices and strained, sombre faces. But except for an explosion just before the end of curfew relaxation, in which none was injured, there was no major setback.

The police force was stretched almost unendurably. Since the commencement of the Ram Shila Poojan programme a fortnight earlier, the armed constabulary had been on continuous vigil in neighbouring districts. With the riots at Khargone, they were hastly bundled onto buses and trucks, driven into the town overnight and immediately deputed to sensitive spots.

The DM and the SP made it a point to stop at each of the pickets during their night-long rounds, speak to the men about how difficult but important their mission was and occasionally share a cup of tea with them. Later, the two officers would often recall with warmth, how the weary faces of the men lit up with just this exchange as they stood erect and alert at their watch posts. Weeks later, before the men left for the next riot-torn city, the DM persuaded eminent citizens of the town to organise a thanksgiving bada khana for the policemen, in which they sat and ate as city elders served them.

Four days after the bomb attack, the DM from neighbouring Indore telephoned to say that one of the seriously injured riot victims, a young man named Ghulam, had died in the medical college in Indore and asked the district officers from Khargone to arrange for the disposal of the body. Communal tension had risen in Indore as well and they could not risk organising the funeral there.

The DM and SP decided to go the thana (police station) to other solace to the bereaved family. They encountered the mother weeping inconsolably near the body of her son. The DM said quietly, “We cannot bring back your son, but tell us who was responsible for this and we will ensure that justice is done”.

The mother replied angrily: “There is no point telling you the names of the killers. Every time there are riots in Khargone, the same men lead the mobs for looting, burning and killing, but nothing ever happens to them. During the last riots, we were hopeful because the police even took down our statements. We waited for four days but nothing happened. In the end the police did come, but it was we who got arrested. Therefore, we have nothing to say.”

The DM promised that this time justice would be done and pressed them for the names. They finally gave the names charging some of the most powerful and respected men of the district. The DM said to the SP, “Let us round them all up before the body of this boy is lowered into the grave”.

It was past midnight when the dead body was taken to the graveyard, a bush-covered wilderness outside the town. Before the body was lowered into the grave, the SP arrived in his jeep, rushed to the DM, who was with the bereaved family and said, “They have all been arrested”.

It was about three o’clock in the morning when the DM and the SP returned to their tent in the police station and wearily stretched out, fully dressed, to catch a little sleep. Barely two hours later, they were awakened by an uproar at the thana gates. Rubbing their eyes sleepily, they found that the local MLA of the ruling party had arrived with a group of her supporters, all holding curfew passes.

“Injustice, injustice”, she screamed along with her supporters, “We will not put up with this injustice. We will not allow the arrest of innocent people”.

The DM quickly understood what had happened and was furious. “Tell me”, he asked the MLA, “are you the representative of a particular community or of this town? In the last few days, when hundreds of Muslims were arrested, beaten, dragged by their beards and placed behind bars with no criminal records or complaints against them, I never heard a whimper of protest from you. But when ten persons are arrested for murder, you come charging here and complain of injustice?”

The MLA’s protest was only the beginning. That day, the DM came under more pressure than he had experienced in a single day on any issue during his frequently turbulent career. The chief minister telephoned to enquire why there was so much outrage. The DM replied that it was a matter of basic justice and that he would not change his decision. He was relieved that the CM did not get back to him. But from the state capital downwards, pressure continued to mount.

Late that night, according to their daily routine since the tension in the town had first arisen, the DM and the SP sat at the thana, reviewing the arrests and releases of the day. With great reluctance, and after considerable probing, the Station House Officer revealed that the ten men arrested the night before, which had led to the detonation of such powerful protest, had been released by the court the same morning.

Further questioning revealed that the police had framed charges against them, not of murder, arson and rioting, but the most minor offence of all – violation of curfew. Not surprisingly, the courts had let them off after a find of fifty rupees each.

The DM cannot recall being more enraged in his life. Everyone was stunned to see the normally soft-spoken and restrained officer explode, shouting about their deceit and open partisanship, and charging that they were not fit to wear uniforms. He threatened to chase them right up to hell if the ten men were not rounded up again within an hour. The police officers rushed back into town and the ten accused men were re-arrested. This time the DM and the SP personally supervised the preparation of documents for the courts.

However, it was now the turn of the Sessions Court to release the accused on bail within a week. On the other hand, the Muslims, who had by then been rounded up in the bomb case, were refused bail for over a year. The DM went to see the district judge and said: “I have never tried to interfere with the judicial process. But in this case, with the same offence committed in the same riot, how can there be two openly different standards for people of two communities – one for Hindus, another for Muslims? It is not an ordinary case; it is the question of the faith of a whole community in the system of justice in our country”. But the district judge refused to even discuss the issue with the DM.

Complaints also came in about excesses in Muslim bastis during the house-to-house searches. The DM visited these houses. It looked as if a tornado had swept through them. Everything inside – TVs, radios, mattresses, furniture, artifacts – had been smashed, torn or burnt by the police. An old woman of about 70 showed to the DM deep lathi marks all over her body, from her shoulders down to her ankles. The DM ordered strong action against the guilty policemen. The complaints did not recur.

Several nights after peace had returned to the rest of the town, there was a recurrent complaint from the Hindus of one mohalla that stones were being hurled at their homes every night from a nearby mosque. The residents were outraged.

The mosque was so far from the houses of the complainants that it was physically impossible for anyone to hurl stones at them from such a distance. But the residents stubbornly refused to listen to reason because of the blind and wanton irrationality that infects a large majority of otherwise rational citizens in any riot situation.

The SP’s suspicion centred on an elderly resident, a member of a Hindu communalist organization since his youth. But there was no proof. Until one night, when the DM and the SP rushed to the mohalla at 3 a.m. on a fresh complaint and the SP found a broken cup amidst the stones. Without any warning, the SP marched into the house of the elderly resident and found five other cups in his kitchen matching the broken one. And, on the second floor of his house, the SP saw something which neither he nor the DM will ever forget.

Near his bedroom window was a large trunk full of stones. The old man stayed up every night until everyone else in the neighbourhood had slept and then hurled stones at his neighbours’ windows. As they gathered angrily outside their homes, he would say, “Look at these hateful people. Even after all that has happened, they are still throwing stones at us”.

But, most of all, the DM will probably remember a young man who’s humble, thatched hovel, which stood in the most densely populated part of the old town, at the boundary of Hindu and Muslim settlements, had been razed to the ground during the riots. Days later, when some sanity had returned to the town, the DM sat with him and others among the ruins of their homes and belongings. With whatever conviction he could muster, the DM said, “Do not worry, we will rebuild your house and all will be well once more”.

Hearing this, the young man suddenly broke the heavy silence of the evening crying loudly like a child. He just couldn’t be consoled. The DM felt the sharp sting of tears in his own eyes.

Finally the young man spoke, “Everytime there is a riot in this town, my hut is burned down. It has happened again and again. Tell me, how many times will you rebuild my house?”

The DM pledged to himself to do all that was within his power to help rebuild the lives of the riot victims. He called the local leaders of the communal parties and told them: “I know your aim is not merely to take lives, or loot and destroy the property of people belonging to the other community during riots. You want, even more, to see their wounds fester as they continue to suffer. I am throwing you a challenge. Those whose lives you have taken away, I cannot bring back. But I promise you the district administration will ensure that those alive who have suffered because of you are much better off than when you set out to destroy them.

To the young man who had wept so inconsolably, and all the other poor residents of over-crowded old bastis filled with decades of hatred and prejudice, the DM offered space in a new part of town, where new mixed colonies were planned so they could live in security.

A large number agreed to move. The district administration acquired land, allotted plots and sought out grants and loans for them to build new homes. Those who had lost an earning member or their commercial establishments – often no more than a rented, ramshackle kiosk in the town’s periphery – were allotted commercially valuable sites in the heart of the town, where pucca shops were built and allotted to them on an ownership basis.

The next change in government predictably saw the DM shifted out of the district. Some years later, when on an assignment at the state headquarters, he visited Khargone once again. That evening he made a quiet, sentimental journey to the new tenement of the young man who had wept so desolately years earlier because his home had been burnt down once again by rioters.

The DM asked him what happened when Khargone was rocked by riots once again after the Babri Masjid had been razed in December 1992. He replied, “For the first time in my life I felt safe during a riot”.

It was not the young man, now secure in his new tenement, who wept silently that evening.

(The writer, was in 1994 when he wrote this article, Course Co-ordinator, IAS Phase I, Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration; Archived from the Communalism Combat issue of November December 1994, An officer and a gentleman)
Bibliography:
Hindutva: the doctrine of a Hindu theocratic state (those who believe in the Hindu theocratic state
Ram Shila Pujan: the political programme using religion to collect bricks and build a temple at the north Indian town of Ayodhya; the campaign has been laced with strong anti-minority rhetoric
yatra : journey, procession
patwari: village accountant
thana: local police station
bastis: neighbourhoods, slum dwellings
pucca: means firm, signifies homes made from permanent materials
lathi: stick
burqa: black veil
trishul: tridents
bada khana: feast

July 26, 2015

Intimidating Teesta (Editorial in Daily News and Analysis)

Daily News and Analysis 25 July 2015

Edit: Intimidating Teesta
Saturday, - 6:45am IST | Agency: dna | From the print edition


It does not contribute to the political image of the Modi government if it is seen to be settling scores with the PM’s bĂȘte noire when he was Chief Minister of Gujarat

The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) seemed to have got what they wanted. A Mumbai court on Friday turned down the anticipatory bail plea of social activist, Teesta Setalvad, and her husband Javed Anand in a CBI probe into alleged violations of Foreign Contributions Regulatory Act (FCRA) in the running of her non-governmental organisation, the Sabrang Trust. However, within hours, the Bombay high court extended Setalvad’s interim bail.

But, the conflict is far from over. The Union home ministry is reported to be considering derecognition of the Sabrang Trust because of violations of FCRA. The ministry, in its attempt to be seen as fair is reported to have decided that violations by another non-governmental organisation (NGO), the Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), run by Setalvad, were not as serious as those committed by Sabrang Trust, and, therefore, the CJP will be kept under the ‘prior permission’ list. This is based on the report filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The central government had earlier asked the CBI to look into the possible violation of FCRA by the Sabrang Trust. Meanwhile, the Gujarat government opposed Setalvad’s anticipatory bail petition, claiming that the money she had raised to help the 2002 riot victims was misspent on “wine and luxury”, and that Setalvad and her husband were not cooperating with the investigative agencies on the charges of embezzlement levelled against them.

It is not a mere coincidence that the central government and the Gujarat government are probing the activities of Setalvad. It is not a routine probe. There is both a context and a motive for the government to move aggressively against her. For a decade now, Setalvad has been the most vocal voice against then Gujarat Chief Minister Modi after the 2002 communal riots in which nearly 2,000 Muslims were killed. Even, according to the official version, the figure for the dead is 1,000. Setalvad has fought this battle with great passion and courage.

The question here is not whether she is right in holding Modi and his then Gujarat government guilty of the violence against Muslims. It is the moral duty of a citizen to point out the wrongdoing of a government in good faith. In a democracy, governments are not a law unto themselves. It does not, however, justify that the Gujarat government or the Modi dispensation at the Centre retaliate against Setalvad even if they believe her view of the 2002 Gujarat riots to be flawed. It does not behove governments to retaliate against citizens who stand up against the State.

It is indeed disturbing that the CBI should be specifically asked to look into the funding and expenditure of Sabrang Trust. It is the tax authorities who should have filed a case against the organisation if they had found discrepancies in the audited accounts. As a matter of fact, the chartered accountant firms which had audited the Sabrang Trust and the CJP certified the accounts as being in order. It is here that the motive of the government comes in for legitimate interrogation. First, the government had no reason to order a CBI inquiry into Setalvad’s organisations. By asking the CBI to investigate the matter, the home ministry, in its arbitrary use of power, has clearly committed an act of high handedness.

The Gujarat government’s arguments for opposing the anticipatory bail petition of Setalvad are clearly mala fide. One of the allegations levelled by the state government is of Setalvad misusing the money she raised from the public for Gulberg Society riot victims. This money, the government alleged, was spent on “wine and luxury”. Such absurd allegations reveal a clear streak of vindictiveness and meanness. They also expose the general and ill-conceived strategy of governments targeting their adversaries by framing all conceivable crimes within every potential section and clause of the penal law. It is based on the mindless belief that if one of the charges does not stick, the other surely will. By pursuing this course of political vendetta, governments not only fail in their duty to act as impartial arbiters of justice, they also damage their reputation in public perception. The State appears to be immoral, even if not strictly illegal.

April 29, 2013

Discussion on Zakia Jafri's protest Petition,2 pm to 5 pm on Tuesday, May 7, 2013, Literature Hall. IIC Annexe, India International Centre

Communalism Combat
and
SAHMAT
Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust
29, Feroze Shah Road,New Delhi-110001
Telephone- 23381276/ 23070787
e-mail-sahmat8@yahoo.com

29.4.2013

Dear [. . .]
For over two decades now, we at SAHMAT and Communalism Combat have stood for the strengthening of India’s secular, democratic values by taking on frontally the divisive forces of communalism and fundamentalism.
As part of this ongoing battle, we believe it is imperative to host a detailed discussion/interaction between senior representatives of the political class, mass organisations and editors and journalists over the Issues Arising out of the Zakia Protest Petition, a landmark effort in the battle against impunity and for pinning responsibility for communal misgovernance.
We therefore invite you to join us at the Literature Hall. IIC Annexe, India International Centre between 2 pm to 5 pm on Tuesday, May 7, 2013 to participate in such a discussion.
The filing of the Zakia Jafri Protest Petition before the Magistrate on 15 April 2013 is a significant landmark in the sustained battle for the Rule of Law, Constitutional Governance and against communal forces and their vicious mobilisation within organs of the state and through unholy alliances with non-state actors. The petition, filed after a sustained battle to get a fair and transparent investigation against a chief minister, cabinet colleagues, senior administrators, policemen and front men and women of the RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal will now make a strong case for charge sheeting of 59 accused.
Apart from the individual accused involved in this case, against whom a strong case for criminal culpability and administrative connivance and failure has been made out, the wider issues raised are critical to understand. Communal mobilisation precedes violence. It’s transformation into brute attacks against targeted sections of the population remain fundamental threats to the lasting security of all Indians, communal harmony and the secularisation of the Indian polity.
We believe therefore the wider issues raised through the Zakia Jafri Protest Petition are debated widely to ensure a greater understanding of such mobilisation and to build a resistance to the same in future. Only then can we collectively demand a transparent and accountable system of governance from our representatives and the parties that they represent.
We look forward to such a sustained discussion and your participation.

" In all probability Mrs Zakia Jafri and son Tanvir Jafri will also be present for the discussions. "

Yours Sincerely

Ram Rahman, Teesta Setalvad
For Communalism Combat & SAHMAT

Issues Raised
· Aggressive Mobilisation of Communal Forces and Response of State Agencies & Government
· Monitoring and Check on Hate Speech, Hate Writing, Pamphleteering
· State and Government Response to a Tragedy like Godhra on 27 February 2002
· Contemporaneous Records that Reveal Government Callousness or Indifference
· Transparency in Summoning assistance from the Military /Paramilitary forces
· Comparative Analysis of Districts & Commission records worst affected (15) and those that held their own (SPs/DMs refused to bow down to political masters)
· Role of Whistleblowers in Pinning down Accountability
· Role of Survivors/Activists/ Legal and Civil Rights Groups
· Role of the Political Class
· Role of Media


SAHMAT
29 Ferozshah Road, New Delhi-110001
Tel:011-23381276/011-23070787
email:sahmat8@yahoo.com
Website: www.sahmat.org

November 17, 2011

Why the Communal and Targeted Violence Bill must be codified into law (Teesta Setalvad)

In 1998, five years after we launched Communalism Combat, we had pointed out, in possibly one of the first researched compilations on judicial pronouncements on communal violence, that from the first ever bout of communal violence in free India (Jabalpur, 1961) to the full-blown pogroms that followed some decades later, two characteristics typified the violent frenzies that frequently cost us lives and property (‘Who is to blame?’, Communalism Combat, March 1998).

Both characteristics hold good today.

One is the silent yet strident mobilisation by right-wing supremacist groups through hate speech and hate writing against religious and other minorities for months beforehand. Though these have always amounted to violations of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), they have gone unchecked and unpunished, creating a climate that is fertile ground for the actual outbreak of violence. The other major cause of such violence has been found, by several members of the Indian judiciary, to be the failure of large sections of the administration and the police force to enforce the rule of law, resulting in a complete breakdown indicating deliberate inaction and complicity.

Both these features combined each time – whether in Jabalpur (1961), Ranchi (1967, Justice Raghubir Dayal Commission of Inquiry), Ahmedabad (1969, Justice Jagmohan Reddy Commission of Inquiry), Bhiwandi, Jalgaon and Mahad (1970, Justice DP Madon Commission of Inquiry), Tellicherry (1971, Justice Joseph Vithayathil Commission of Inquiry), Hashimpura (1987) or Bhagalpur (1989) – to ensure that minorities were not just brutally targeted but also denied free access to justice and reparation.

The organised violence in Delhi in 1984, Bombay in 1992-1993 and Gujarat in 2002 took the levels of impunity for state and non-state actors to hitherto unknown heights. A historiography of communal violence since Indian independence thus reveals a poor report card on justice delivery and reparation. Today unfortunately, we have extant examples of victim survivors, Muslim, Sikh and Christian, still waiting at the threshold for the first stages of investigation and trial to begin decades after the crimes have taken place.

The newly drafted Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence (Access to Justice and Reparations) Bill 2011 (commonly referred to as the Communal and Targeted Violence Bill), which awaits a nod from the cabinet before it is tabled in Parliament, is an attempt to address the imbalance and the despair caused by over six decades of discriminatory justice delivery.

FULL TEXT: http://www.sabrang.com/cc/archive/2011/nov11/cover1.html

December 31, 2010

Report in Frontline on the symposium Faith and Fact: Democracy after Ayodhya Verdict”

Frontline, Volume 28 - Issue 01 :: Jan. 01-14, 2011


Bones of contention

T.K. RAJALAKSHMI

Experts say that not all the facts that emerged during excavations at Ayodhya were taken into account in the verdict given by the High Court.


THE verdict delivered by the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court on September 30 on the Ayodhya title suit has been a subject of debate and discussion among social scientists, activists and legal experts. “Faith and Fact: Democracy after Ayodhya Verdict”, a symposium held in New Delhi from December 6 to 8 and organised by Social Scientist, the Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust (SAHMAT) and Communalism Combat, dealt with the verdict's ramifications, including its consequences for the country's plurality and secularism, one of the basic tenets of the Indian Constitution that is unalterable even by the legislature.

Historians such as Irfan Habib, Shireen Moosvi and Syed Ali Rezavi drew on historical and archaeological evidence to show that many facts were not taken into account in giving the judgment, while the flawed report of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) was. Legal experts lamented the deep-rooted social and religious biases among members of the higher judiciary and the implications that this had for democracy in India. The occasion was marked by the release of a significant publication by the Aligarh Historians Society, titled “History and the Judgement of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in the Ramjanambhumi-Babri Masjid case”. In its preface, Irfan Habib wrote: “The operational part of the majority judgment derived not from Justice S.U. Khan's, but from Justice Sudhir Agarwal's reading of the historical background.”

The ASI's excavation report of 2002 formed the crux of the judgment. Rezavi explained, with the help of slides, how the Babri Masjid could not have been made at a time later than the 15th century and that it was not constructed by the later Mughals as alleged. Irfan Habib, who is also the president of the Aligarh Historians Society, spoke of the ASI's conduct and said that it was surprising that while the idols were assumed to be those of Ram Lalla, the Babri Masjid was referred to as an “alleged” mosque.

The ASI's report talked of finding “pillar bases” in its excavations. Rezavi, who was one of the three archaeologists appointed by the court as observers during the excavations, said that many of the ASI's actions were disturbing. He said that “minaras”, or minarets, came much after Babar's time and that the argument that all mosques had minaras and the Babri Masjid was not a mosque as it did not have one was flawed. These structures appeared from Shah Jahan's time. Even the defined arch, he explained, emerged only during Aurangazeb's and Akbar's regimes. “In Babar's period, they were still trying to perfect the arch,” he said. The main archway of the Babri Masjid and the heaviness of the structure were ideas borrowed from the Iranian tradition, he said. The material used in the Babri Masjid, surkhi (according to an established glossary this means pounded brick mixed with lime to form a hydraulic mortar) and lime alternating with rubble and calcrete was used in many structures in Ayodhya such as makbaras and mausoleums.

Rezavi, who calls himself a historian rather than an archaeologist, said that the pillars found at the site were decorative ones inserted in the archway and could not support any structure. “None of the pillars, including the free-standing ones, resembles each other. They could have been got from anywhere else and used as decorative pieces. The existence of pillars does not mean that there was no mosque,” he said, citing examples of existing mosques and Mughal structures that have pillars that are not used for decorative purposes but for supporting the roof. Fatehpur Sikri in Agra, Jama Masjid in Delhi and structures in Jaunpur, which typified Mughal mosques, used pillars, he pointed out.

Irfan Habib said that the Babri Masjid was supposed to be a protected monument. On the orders of the Bench that the ASI seek expert opinion, the ASI deployed the services of a company called Tojo-Vikas International Limited to undertake geological surveys. He quipped: “Ignorant as the ASI was of history, it got in touch with a company with the name of Tojo.” Hideki Tojo was Japan's political and military leader who ordered the attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941.

The Indian History Congress had protested when the Bench ordered the excavation to see if there was any structure below the mosque. The High Court had ruled that the exercise would be undertaken by five eminent archaeologists, including two Muslims. “The first thing the Government of India did when the ASI was assigned the task was to change the Director-General of ASI. The then Bharatiya Janata Party government got a pliant DG,” Habib said. The nomenclature of the Bench as referred to in the ASI itself changed; from being referred to as the Babri Masjid-Ram Janmabhoomi Bench, it became the Ram Janmabhoomi Bench. A team leader was selected, and of the 20 experts, only one was a Muslim.

“Even before the excavation, the religious colour of the excavation was established. The Bench took notice of this and asked the ASI to remedy it. Religion was not as important as public confidence was. In fact, more non-Muslim archaeologists and historians were representing the Sunni Waqf Board,” he said.

Of a total of 89 labourers, only nine were Muslims, and the ASI continued to defy the orders, said Habib. “It was obvious that their conduct was not above board,” he said. The matter took a serious turn when the ASI did not record the glazed ware, bones and fragments that appeared while digging the trenches. The Bench ordered that the matter should be sealed. “All this reflects in Justice Sudhir Agarwal's judgment, but he does not mention it,” he said. The Bench then passed an extraordinary order that called for the appointment of a new team leader. The existing leader, B.R. Mani, was made Director, Excavations. While Justice Sudhir Agarwal's judgment makes no note of the observations by the Bench, it took a serious view of the violations by the ASI. “It was only because of the monitors appointed by the Bench that the truth came out,” said Habib, adding that Justice Agarwal was irritated by complaints by the monitors regarding the ASI's behaviour. “It does not irritate him that the ASI was committing violations,” he said.

Judicial censures, especially motivated ones, he said, should not matter to historical experts. The monitoring did not go in vain; the ASI was forced to record the glazed ware and other findings. “The ASI report is motivated; it has concealments and defiance. It provides no concordance with layers and trenches; one just has to take their word for it,” he said. On the ASI's finding of pillar bases, he said that the ASI claimed to have found pillar bases with brickbats.

“It is interesting that B.R. Mani's own report on Lalkot where stone bases were found and were said to be weak enough to hold a canopy, in Ayodhya, brickbats can hold pillars,” said Habib. The assertion that the remains of 50 pillars were found was also specious because it was not supported by the finding of an equivalent number of slabs. “Where did they all go? Pillars are supposed to be there and cannot be found. The question is why should pillar bases be associated with Hindus and not Muslims. All this was submitted as evidence by R.C. Thakran, but it was ignored. Not only pillars are Hindu, even circles are. The area denoted as a circular shrine despite its Lilliputian size was given gigantic importance in the judgment, ” he added.

The presence of bones could have been an indication of human habitation, especially by the poor; it could not have been a temple, let alone the Ram Janmabhoomi temple, he said. There was no proof of animal sacrifice; without citing any authority on the subject, Justice Agarwal in his order emphatically stated that “it was a well-known fact that in certain Hindu temples, animal sacrifices are made and flesh is eaten as prasad while bones are deposited below the floor at the site”. No evidence has been found of the Kali cult in the Upper Gangetic Basin where Ayodhya is situated, said Habib. On the contrary, the presence of glazed ware and bones showed that the land adjacent to the walls and the main structure remained open, as would be the case with an Eidgah or Qanati (with much open land) mosque, so that the waste matter could be thrown there. The presence of glazed ware itself was a clincher of Islamic presence.

In the three centuries preceding 1528, argue the Historians' Forum, Ayodhya, or Awadh, was a city with a large Muslim population along with Hindu inhabitants, and given the dietary customs of the two communities, an “abundance of animal bones” would weigh heavily in favour of a Muslim presence in the immediate vicinity of the disputed site. The historians felt that the court should have asked the concerned plaintiffs what proof there was that a temple existed. To have merely asserted that the remains beneath the Babri Masjid were “religious” was not sufficient in itself as such a structure could be theoretically Islamic, Jain, Buddhist or even Saivite, given the presence of animal bones. Neither were any significant remains of a “massive Hindu or Vaishnavite temple”, images or stones with sculptured divinities, vandalised or otherwise, found in the excavations. On the basis of very limited “evidence”, stones and bricks, the idea of an entire temple was constructed. The detailed notes were deleted from the computer, as reported to the Bench by the ASI.

Historians baffled

The historians were baffled by the opinion of Justice Agarwal with respect to Islam where he is supposed to have said: “Whatever we had to suffice it to conclude that the incidence of temple demolition are [ sic] not only confined to past but is going in [ sic] continuously. The religion which is supposed to connect all individuals with brotherly feeling has become a tool of hearted [ sic] and enmity.” How can a historian answer in either “yes” or “no”, asked Shireen Moosvi, one of the authors of the document. Moosvi was cross-examined by the Bench.

Legal experts like B.A. Desai, Mihir Desai and Anupam Gupta and retired judges like P.B. Sawant and Hosbet Suresh felt that the act of demolition was a clear contempt of court and those responsible for that should have been put behind bars. They expressed concern as to how certain judgments had interpreted Hindutva and given legitimacy to acts perpetrated under its name. B.A. Desai, who was also the former Additional Solicitor General of India, wrote in his paper that Hindu communal forces had looked upon Justice Verma's judgment ( Manohar Joshi vs N.B. Patil) as the “judicial imprimatur of its divisive ideology”, where the judge found that the statement of Manohar Joshi that the “first Hindu state will be established in Maharashtra” did not amount to appeal on the grounds of religion. Desai said that the judge did not find anything wrong in the election speech of Manohar Joshi, a Shiv Sena leader, and held that “in our opinion, the mere statement that a Hindu state will be established in Maharashtra is by itself not an appeal on the ground of his religion but the expression at the best of such hope”.

Mihir Desai pointed out how derogatory statements of another senior Shiv Sena leader about Muslims were interpreted by the High Court as having referred to only “anti-national” Muslims. “The High Court held a view that even the Shiv Sena leader did not harbour,” said Desai. The order was challenged in the apex court, which turned down the appeal. Justice Hosbet Suresh lamented that the courts often favoured the majority community. “I could never imagine that this kind of a judgment could be delivered. If faith is to be the rule of law, it would affect democracy ultimately,” he said.

Justice P.B. Sawant felt that all the key institutions in the country were being run by the ruling classes. “As a citizen, lawyer and judge, I have yet to come across a case where a person belonging to the ruling class or supporting a ruling class has been convicted and a victim has got justice. The Lucknow Bench has committed three grave injustices. One, it converted a title suit to a partition suit; two, instead of giving a judgment, it gave a compromise that was not sought by anybody; and three, it made its basis faith and not law,” he said.

The basis of democracy was the rule of law and if that got substituted by faith, then the outcome would be disastrous, he said. All the legal experts were unanimous that in the interests of democracy and secularism, the judgment needed to be reversed. “Let us hope the Supreme Court sets things right. Had the apex court given this kind of a judgement, where would we have gone? It is now the Constitution which is at stake,” he said.

December 16, 2010

Report of the symposium on ’Faith & Fact: Democracy After the Ayodhya Verdict’

by Teesta Setalvad

On December 6/7/8, 2010, Communalism Combat, Sahmat and Social Scientist organised a three day symposium in Delhi on ’Faith & Fact: Democracy After the Ayodhya Verdict’. The deliberations, over 3 days, between academics (historians and archaeologists), jurists and lawyers, activists and journalists were invigorating and challenging.

Full Text at: http://www.sacw.net/article1761.html

July 04, 2010

Clinching evidence corroborates serious charges against Narendra Modi

Communalism Combat, June 2010

Year 16 No.152
Cover Story

DIAL M FOR MASSACRE

Clinching documentary evidence corroborates serious charges against Narendra Modi and key officials in his administration

BY TEESTA SETALVAD

Three months ago, our covert story, SIT-ting on the Truth (March 2010) exposed the frivolous and shallow investigations of the Gujarat massacres undertaken by the high-profile Special Investigation Team (SIT) appointed by the Supreme Court and headed by former CBI director RK Raghavan. One of the major issues raised was the deliberate refusal of SIT – influenced as it was by the three officers of the Gujarat police cadre, Shivanand Jha, Geeta Johri and Ashish Bhatia – to examine available documentary evidence to pin responsibility for complicity and gross dereliction of duty by top police officers, civil servants and politicians.

Shockingly, the documents that SIT deliberately overlooked are police control room records, station diary entries, fire brigade registers and, most of all, mobile phone call records of powerful and influential persons: calls received and made between top politicians, civil servants, police officers and the prime accused.

The gross failure, deliberate or otherwise, on the part of SIT to do its duty as assigned by the apex court forced us to undertake our own several months long close scrutiny of all these records. Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) submitted these findings before the Gujarat government-appointed Nanavati-Shah-Mehta Commission of Inquiry on May 14, 2010. CJP will also soon be filing its findings before the Supreme Court. Needless to say, they have a direct bearing on the critical hearing on SIT’s investigation report pending before the apex court. It may be recalled that SIT (already appointed to investigate nine major investigation into critical carnage cases in 2008) was also appointed by the Supreme Court following a petition of Zakia Ahsan Jafri and CJP asking for court directions for the filing of a First Information Report (FIR) against chief minister Narendra Modi and 61 others on charges of mass murder, criminal conspiracy, destruction of evidence and subversion of justice (April 27, 2009). The matter comes up for hearing and scrutiny before the Supreme Court on August 6, 2010. A report in this matter was submitted by SIT member AK Malhotra to the Supreme Court on May 14, 2010.

We bring to our readers the findings of our investigation that stretched over six months.

Our investigations into the mobile phone records of over 200 individuals have revealed that bureaucrats heading the chief minister Modi’s office (CMO), ministers, top police officers and several of the prime accused were constantly in touch with each other on the critical two days of mass murder, gang rapes and arson – February 28 and March 1, 2002 – following the fire in a coach of the Sabarmati Express on February 27 in which 56 persons were burnt to death. Ensuring law and order is the direct responsibility of the police force. The police officers who came under our scanner include Gujarat’s then director-general of police (DGP), K Chakravarti and PC Pande, then Ahmedabad police commissioner (PC) who Modi later promoted as DGP.

Pande who held the post of PC in Ahmedabad at the time of the massacres is widely accused of wilfully allowing the killings to go unchecked. Ironically, the Supreme Court appointed SIT that had access to the CD with over 5 lakh phone call records did not bother to analyze these till witnesses and victims filed applications under section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Trial Court ion September 2009. Embarrassed by these applications for further investigation SIT was content with taking a few corrective steps.

Strangely, Pande received 15 calls from Modi’s office on the morning of February 28, the day the massacre of Muslims began. The fact that Pande did not leave his office after 11 am that day suggests the calls from the office of the top boss were intended to ensure the police did not interfere with the murderous agenda of the rampaging mobs. Stranger still, during the same period, Sanjay Bhavsar (OSD to CM) and Tanmay Mehta (PA to CM) from Modi’s office were in constant telephonic contact with VHP’s Gujarat general secretary Jaideep Patel, a prime accused in the massacres at Naroda Patiya and Naroda Gaam.

For the CM’S office to be in touch with Patel is indeed intriguing. It is the same Patel who was entrusted by Modi – against a strong advice to the contrary by the district administration – to escort the dead bodies of 56 people (several of them Hindutva activists), who had been charred to death in a fire in the Sabarmati Express on February 27. A compartment in the train had caught fire outside Godhra railway station.

Modi’s government and the BJP-VHP allege that the local Muslims had deliberately set the compartment on fire. It was the VHP’s Gujarat bandh call to protest the train deaths that triggered the state-wide violence against the Muslims from the night of February 27 onwards. For the chief minister’s office to be directly in touch at the relevant time with the man accused of leading and inciting the massacres and rapes suggests collusion at the highest level.

The then health minister Ashok Bhatt (he still retains his portfolio) was also in telephonic contact with Patel on February 28. Gujarat’s then minister of state for home, Govardhan Zadaphia —forced out of the BJP subsequently by Modi— was also in frequent touch with both Patel and Dinesh Togadia, a VHP activist and brother of VHP leader, Praveen Togadia. Another person, Amit Shah who was heading the Ahmedabad District Cooperative Bank in 2002 stayed in touch with then joint CP, Shivanand Jha. The same Shah who is today home minister in Modi’s cabinet is desperately seeking cover, reportedly facing imminent arrest by the CBI in Sohrabuddin’s fake encounter case.

Former minister for women and child welfare, Maya Kodnani, was arrested by the SIT over a year ago. Her phone call records show that on the day of the massacres (February 28) she was in close touch with additional CP Shivanand Jha. The depositions of witnesses in the Naroda Patiya and Gaam massacres testifying to her incitement of the mobs match with the locational analysis of Kodnani’s mobile. This corroborates her presence at the site of the massacre that fateful day.

Minister of state for power, Kaushik Jamnadas Patel, too, had been in touch with Jha as also several other police officers, right down to police inspector KG Erda, who is accused of facilitating the massacres of Muslims in the Meghaninagar locality where the Gulberg society is located. Another police inspector KK Mysorewala, and BJP state president, Rajendrasinh Rana too were in touch with Kodnani and Patel among others, lending corroborative evidence and weight to the conclusion that the massacres within Ahmedabad on February 28 and all over Gujarat thereafter were part of a well-planned conspiracy at the highest political levels.

Several key questions arise. Why would so many police officers, from JtCP down to inspectors, be constantly in touch with leaders of an outfit like the VHP? Especially with those of them who were subsequently named by eye-witnesses as leading violent mobs? Why were the cops in touch with ministers? If talking to politicians was in the normal course of duty, then surely the politicians and the police officers must account for the absence of effective police action that day. In other words, if police and politicians were in continuous touch for the right reasons what accounts for the complete failure in controlling the violence? The questions are all the more relevant considering that it was the VHP that gave the call for the bandh on February 28, 2002 and its ideological ally, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), declared its unhesitating support for the same.

In view of the above, all arguments in support of a theory of “spontaneous reaction” to the Godhra incident sound hollow.

The analysis of the mobile call records unravels many gory tales. VHP men such as Babu Bajrangi – among the prime accused for the massacres at Naroda Patiya and Naroda Gaam – and Atul Vaidya – accused of complicity in the massacre at Gulberg Society in Meghaninagar where among others former Congress MP Ahsan Jafri was killed – were also in touch with each other. It may be noted that Meghaninagar and Naroda are in far apart form each other in Ahmedabad city. Why would two accused in two separate incidents of organized mob violence be in touch with each other except by design? It was Bajrangi who boasted about his involvement in the massacre before Tehelka’s hidden cameras (Operation Kalank, 2007). His phone records show that he was also in constant touch with Patel and two others of the VHP on the relevant date.

The Gujarat government and its cronies continue to peddle the theory of a spontaneous outburst in explaining the presence of armed mobs in Naroda and Meghaninagar areas and the absence of adequate police bandobast in both places. It is claimed that because these were not among the known communally sensitive parts of Ahmedabad, the police were deployed elsewhere and that is how the armed mobs had a free reign. (Both CP Pande and JtCP Tandon made much the same point while deposing before the Nanavati-Shah-Mehta Commission).

But our locational analysis of the mobile phone records reveals a sinister twist that exposes this contention as hollow. What were six persons from Modi’s office (CMO) doing in the Meghaninagar locality where the Gulberg society is located on February 27, 2002, the day of the Godhra mass arson and eve of the massacres? According to the call records, all the six persons from the CMO were in the area during 2.00-5.00 pm that day, while Modi was in Godhra. At the same time, then health minister Ashok Bhatt and Tanmay Mehta (PA to CM Modi) are shown as located at Narol- Naroda between 9.00 am and 5.00 pm. These very locations were the sites of the carnage the next day. How is the presence of key and influential persons here to be explained? What were they doing there, who all did they meet?

Even on the day of the massacres at Gulberg Society, Naroda Patiya and Naroda Gaam (February 28) call records show that officials from Modi’s office, ministers Bhatt and IK Jadeja (former urban development minister), and even DGP Chakravarti were present in these areas. The question arises: What were these bigwigs doing in those areas and why could they not stop the killings?

Most significantly, the locational analysis of mobile phone records also corroborates the critical, secret and illegal meeting held at the residence of the chief minister on the night of February 27, 2002. The graphs confirm the presence of officers from Modi’s office and senior policemen in and around his residence in Gandhinagar, Gujarat’s capital. This corroborates the fact that secret/illegal meetings did take place, where instructions to allow free reign to the organised mobs led by men of the VHP/Bajrang Dal are alleged to have been given.

What is truly mysterious is why the high-profile SIT specially appointed by the apex court failed to carry out a professional investigation. For example, eyewitnesses and victim-survivors have spoken of the anguished calls made by Ahsan Jafri (before he was finally killed in a bestial fashion) to people at the highest levels in government. Was this mere human lapse or a pre-planned conspiracy at the very highest levels to allow people to be hounded, trapped, raped, molested, burned and killed at the Gulberg Society in an orgy of violence that started around 10 am and went on until 5.30- 6.00 pm?

An honest SIT investigation ought to have concentrated on the following facts:

Ű· The post-mortem of the bodies of those burned in the Sabarmati Express (coach S-6) was done hastily at Godhra railway yard itself, allegedly on the insistence of the CM (phone call records between the personal secretary to the CM and the health minister).

Ű· Modi’s insistence on taking the dead bodies to Ahmedabad, that too under the charge of Jaideep Patel, vice-president, VHP and not any government functionary (affidavits of additional chief secretary, home and collector, Godhra filed before the Nanavati-Shah Commission).

Ű· The bodies carried by road to Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad in open trucks against the advice of government officers?

Ű· Call for Gujarat Bandh given by the VHP.

Ű· State government’s endorsement of the bandh through an official press note.

Ű· The CM called a meeting of senior police officers & bureaucrats on the night of February 27, 2002 at which officers were allegedly “advised” not to take action against the riotous mobs the next day and let people vent their anger.

(Meeting attended by chief secretary, ACS (home department), DGP, Gujarat, principal secretary to the CM, CP, Ahmedabad city. Testimony of the meeting was given to Concerned Citizens Tribunal by the then minister of state, revenue, Haren Pandya on May 18, 2002 before Justice (retired) PB Sawant, KG Kannabiran and Teesta Setalvad, convenor of the tribunal).

Thereafter, over the next two days:

Ű· Positioning of senior ministers/party functionaries at police control rooms to monitor the massacres and to ensure police inaction.

Ű· Muslim residential colonies, shops & establishments identified beforehand.



PC Pande‘s role as revealed on analysis of the call records

Ű· Analysis of call records of police commissioner Pande suggest that he is being protected by SIT.

Ű· The phone call records of both Pande and JtCP CP Tandon (see below) show that at the critical time when the latter visited Gulberg Society on February 28 (between 11.43 am and 12.42 pm) when the mob build-up was at its peak, the two spoke to each other six times. For Pande or Tandon to say as they did in affidavits before the commission that neither was aware of what happened at Gulberg Society defies explanation.

A close and dispassionate analysis of the police control room (PCR) records of Ahmedabad city co-related with the analysis of mobile phone call records reveal that:

Ű· Adequate forces were not sent to Gulberg society despite repeated calls made to the police control room (PCR) as is evident from its own official records though Pande would get intimations every 15 minutes of the PCR information.

Ű· The first time that the fire brigade was called to Gulberg Society was at 6.55 pm in the evening (February 28) when the massacre was over and the entire colony was aflame. Despite this call to the fire brigade, the official panchnama shows that the fire inside Ahsan Jafri’s home was burning for three-four days after the crime.

Call records of Pande

Pande was in his office till about 1.00 am on the night of February 27/28. Normally, he would leave office at around 7 pm every evening. This clearly suggests that he was aware of the gravity of the situation following the Godhra train fire that day. He was back at his office by around 8.00 am. His normal schedule shows that he used to arrive at his office at about 10.30 am. His early arrival again shows that he was aware of the gravity of the situation.

Pande left his office at around 9.45 am and went towards Gota. This is likely to be his visit to the Sola Civil Hospital, where the dead bodies of the Godhra victims had been kept. He returned to his office around 10.50 am. He then remained confined to his office for the entire day and did not move out till about 7.10 pm, when he probably went to Gulberg Society, Meghaninagar.

The important point to be noted is that during the peak hours of the massacres, he did not move out of his office. It also appears that he did not issue clear and firm instructions to any of his officers and let things take their own course.

An analysis of the call records of Pande shows that on February 28 he made or received a total of 302 calls from his mobile phone. He had dialled 39 numbers from his mobile phone. Out of these 39 calls, he called the DGP, K Chakravarti, six times. He spoke to JtCP Jha eight times and his DCPs eight times. Significantly, he called DCP, Zone IV, PB Gondia only twice: 15:16:12 hrs and 15:54:39 hrs. This despite the fact that both the worst-affected Gulberg society, Meghaninagar and Naroda areas were under Gondia’s jurisdiction.

Calls to/from CMO/Secretariat

There were as many as 15 calls received/and made to the bureaucrats who constantly shadowed the CM. Some secret numbers used by the chief minister himself have been revealed to us by members of Modi’s cabinet at the time that reveal calls made to a set of un-located and unknown numbers. At least about 40 per cent of the calls shown up in the phone records even today remain untraced showing a wilful refusal of both AT&T and Cellforce companies to cooperate with law enforcement agencies. If the Supreme Court were to directly order these companies to cooperate would they be able to get away with such deliberate non-compliance?

Ű· There were five incoming calls received by Pande from the PA to the chief minister, Tanmay Mehta (PA to CM) on February 28, 2002: 11:14, 13:21, 15:38, 15:57 and 19:26 hours. This was the time of the peak violence when neither Pande, nor any political heavyweight in the state moved to the affected areas.

Ű· Pande received two calls from Sanjay Bhavsar, OSD to Modi: 13:07 and 14:22 hours.

Ű· Pande received/made seven calls to/from Anil Mukhim, additional principal secretary to the chief minister on that day. His call records show that he received four calls from Mukhim: 13:09, 13:12, 15:43, 15:50 and 21:14 hours. At 20: 09 hours and again at 21:03 hours he made calls to Mukhim’s number.

Ű· Pande also received one call from the mobile number of AP Patel, PA to the CM at 17:17 hours on February 28, 2002.

Ű· Pande was in touch with Ashok Narayan (then additional chief secretary, home) eight times during the day. Each time it is he who made the calls: 13:52,14:17, 14:19, 15:02, 15:25, 20:11, 23:26 and 23:42 hours.

Ű· Pande got in touch with SK Nanda, secretary, health and family welfare board, once during the day (at 15:05 hours).

Note: The three men close to the chief minister, Tanmay Mehta (PA to CM), Sanjay Bhavsar (OSD to CM) and OP Sinh (PA to the CM) did not file any affidavits before the Nanavati-Shah-Mehta Commission till recently. Mehta filed his two page affidavit dated January 22, 2010, Bhavsar on January 22, 2010 and Sinh on February 1, 2010. Until then, for eight long years after the carnage, they found no reason, nor were they asked to, file an affidavit.

In these two page affidavits they have explained away the calls made or received from Zadaphia (MoS, home) and Jaideep Patel saying they were probably official and due to passage of time they do not recall what was spoken. There are no averments/explanations in these affidavits about the CMO being in touch with the commissioner of police Ahmedabad while violence had raged: 15 times during the day, a period that also coincided with complete and utter inaction on the part of the Ahmedabad Police. What were they talking to each other about?

Calls to/from other ministers

Ű· Pande received six calls from MoS, home, Govardhan Zadaphia on February 28, 2002: 11:31, 14:20, 14:5, 16:20, 17:16 and 19:11 hours.

Ű· Pande spoke to Narottam Patel, minister for water supplies and resources at 13:56 hours form his office landline number.

Ű· Pande spoke to Ashok Bhatt, state health minister twice: 15:09 and 18:31 hours (both were incoming calls).

Calls to/from main accused

Ű· Pande spoke to Jaideep Patel, VHP Gujarat general secretary and accused in the Naroda Patiya and Gaam massacres once during the day at 19:31 ours (incoming call). By then the massacre was over.

Analysis of calls made from his office landline phone to mobiles of officers show that he connected to mobiles operating in Ahmedabad city only 13 times (out of 302 calls). Of these, 12 were incoming calls on his landline phone. He made just one phone call from his landline number and that too was probably not to an officer. In addition, this single call was made at 20:10:56 by when most of the massacre and mayhem was over. It can be concluded that he did not use the landline to pass orders or instructions to his field officers.

Pande has so far stuck to his ludicrous claim that he had no information of the happenings in Naroda Patiya or Gulberg Society. In the deposition before the commission he attributed this to memory loss concerning the events of February 28, 2002. Pande must be recalled by the commission and re-examined in the wake of these fresh disclosures. That he was fully informed about the developments at Gulberg Society and at Naroda are obvious from his call details. The police control room records confirm that KG Erda, PI Meghaninagar police station (Gulberg Society is under its jurisdiction) called the PCR 10 times.

Has Erda been made the fall guy for the lapses of his superiors?

Pande is also guilty of not declaring curfew on time. Curfew was declared only at 12.54 pm on February 28, 2002 after PCR Shahibaug reported that a 5,000-strong mob had gathered there (12.38 pm) Piecemeal curfew was declared at 12.38 (in another area, not in Meghaninagar) and then at 12.54 pm in the Meghaninagar area instead of a single order being issues for the whole of Ahmedabad city where mobs were on the rampage in different areas simultaneously. Why?

Was this a part of the strategy to keep areas unprotected and to leave the mobs to roam free?

The inaction on the part of Pande is apparent. The real question that arises is the root cause of this inaction: Did he omit to take necessary measures of his own volition, or was he coerced into doing so?

There is another aspect that requires detailed consideration and investigation. On the evening/night of February 27, a meeting was called by the CM. Pande was one of the officers who attended the meeting. What instructions were issued by the CM at the meeting? Were the officers instructed to take firm action? If that was so, then would any officer have dared to disobey the CM over a legal order?

The state government has till this day not taken any serious disciplinary action against any officer. Denying a handful of officers a few months’ salary is all that the government has to show by way of disciplinary action for gross dereliction of duty. It is evident from such farcical action that the Gujarat government was not agitated by the intentional lack of compliance of its legal orders, assuming it had issued any.

Role of JtCP Tandon

Tandon too was in his office late on the night of February 27/28, until about 1.15 am. He was back at his office at by about 8.30 am.

Tandon had visited Gulberg society at around 11.25 am on February 28. But as police witness testimonies before the trial court show, on reaching the spot accompanied by a strike force, he found there a restive mob in an ugly mood. Junior officers on duty pleaded with him to rush additional police personnel to the trouble spot. But he simply left the place with his well-armed strike force in tow. Was his decision to leave Gulberg society unprotected a professional decision or governed by political pressure?

Tandon’s call records show that he received many calls from political bigwigs and some of the prime accused:

Ű· In the early hours of February 28 (0.32 am) he received a call from Zadaphia; much later, around 5.00 pm a call from Kaushik Jamnadas Patel, state minister for power. Nimesh Patel, accused of killing eight people, got in touch at 22:28:34 on February 28.

Ű· At 12:06:57 pm (afternoon) Tandon received a call from his immediate boss Pande. Tandon was at Gulberg Society at that time. They talked for about 75 seconds. What they talked about is not known?

Ű· At around 12:10 pm, there was a wireless message from a vehicle of the Meghaninagar police station to the police control room informing that police had resorted to firing at Gulberg Society. Anyone familiar with police operations would agree that it is not routine practice that the police rush to inform the police control room as soon as they resort to firing. Police would normally inform the Control room only after the situation eases a bit. This can only mean that when Tandon got a call from Pande, police had either already resorted to firing or the mob surrounding the Gulberg Society had become so restive that police firing was imminent. In such a situation, Tandon would certainly have mentioned to Pande the grave situation prevailing at the Gulberg Society.

Ű· At 11:34 am he made a call to his DCP PB Gondia while he was somewhere near the Shayona Plaza Tower area, which is within 1.5 mtrs. of the Gulberg Society, Meghaninagar. Eye-witnesses and police witnesses have testified to Tandon’s visit and this fact has not been denied by Tandon either.

Ű· Again at 11.43 am he made a call to Pande on the latter’s mobile number. He made a call thereafter to the police control room at 11.47 am. He then received a call at 11.48 am from an undisclosed landline number. Ten minutes later, he made another call and yet again at 11.58 a.m. He took another call from an undisclosed number to the Control room landline. At 12.06 pm, he received a call from Pande (mobile). Thereafter, he made a call to RJ Savani, DCP Zone V (a neighbouring zone) at 12.09 p.m. He was still in this area when he called Pande at 12:.37 pm. In between at 12.11 pm he made a call to DCP Jabelia of Zone VI while his location shows him at Kailash Complex, Naroda. When he received a call from Savani at 12.13 pm, he was at the same location but a minute later at 12.14 when he called Pande his location showed up as Kubernagar.

There are other calls including two calls made to Pande at 12.18 pm when he was at the Kubernagar location. Between 12.11 pm and 12.33 pm, when he received and made calls his location is shown as Kailash Complex Naroda. Thereafter at 12.41 pm. and 12.42 pm he is shown at Vishal Diamond Factory near New India Colony at Bapunagar. This is a factory owned by MOS home, Zadaphia. Then he is out of the affected area and is shown to be in the vicinity of or at the Bora marriage Hall, Rakhial, Char Rasta (12.44 pm).

The phone call records of both Pande and Tandon show that at the critical time when the latter visits Gulberg Society (between 11.43 am and 12.42 pm) when the mob build up was at its height, the two spoke to each other six times. Tandon’s justification of his departure without leaving behind the strike force (evidence before the Trial Court).

Tandon at Gulberg Society

While just outside Gulberg Society, Tandon received a call from Pande and it may be assumed that the two would have spoken about the violence and restiveness of the mob at Gulberg society at the time. PCR records also reveal that by the time Tandon got a call from Pande when he was at Gulberg society, the police had either already resorted to firing or the mob surrounding the Gulberg Society had become so restive that police firing was imminent. In such a situation, Tandon, ought to have informed Pande about the grave threat to the Gulberg Society. Yet Pande states on oath that he had no knowledge of the happenings there until much later?

Inexplicably, after talking to Pande, Tandon heads for Naroda Patiya. If this movement was on the instructions of Pande, it shows that Pande, who has reportedly pleaded ignorance of the incidents at Gulberg Society and Naroda Patiya before the Commission of Inquiry, was actually fully aware of the entire happenings. And that would mean he committed perjury in wilfully misleading the Commission.

Tandon reached Naroda Patiya at around 12.15 pm, imposed curfew at 12.29 pm in Naroda Patiya (wireless message records of the same are available), and then left Naroda Patiya at about 12.33 pm – within 4 minutes of imposing the curfew! At this point a huge mob had already gathered at Naroda Patiya and its intentions to kill and plunder were apparent. It was for this reason that Tandon had to order the imposition of the curfew. However, Tandon made no effort to implement the curfew. He left the place leaving the hapless residents of Naroda Patiya undefended.

On leaving Naroda Patiya, Tandon went to Dariapur and Revdi Bazaar areas where nothing all was quiet. Thus, Tandon was neither at Gulberg Society nor at Naroda Patiya despite having full knowledge of the prevailing situation at the two places. He was not present at the places where the crime was taking place despite having sufficient police force at his disposal. He, thus, clearly abdicated his responsibility and abetted the commission of the crime by the riotous mob.

Was this omission on the part of Tandon a mere act of cowardice or was it an intentional omission to leave the mob free to kill, rape and loot? Was it that he was expected to fall in line and allow the pre-planned pogrom to be executed without any obstruction or resistance?

Witnesses deposing before the trial court in the Gulberg society case have testified to Tandon’s refusal to allow them to take the slain bodies of their near and dear ones when they (survivors) were rescued around 5.30 pm. Evidence also points to the fact that until then the bodies were in a recognisable state. Three days later, when survivors were called for the mass burial of their near and dear ones at the Kalandari Masjid Kabrastan, the bodies were charred lumps of flesh. Is not the joint commissioner of police Ahmedabad guilty of destruction of the bodies and therefore also tampering with evidence?

Role of JtCP Shivanand Jha

Jha, too, was in his office till about 1.15 am on the night of February 27/28 and was back there only a few hours later, at about 5:10 am. As in the case of Pande, his being in his office till late hours and arriving very early suggests that he, too, was aware of the gravity of the situation. It is seen that both the sector heads – Tandon and Jha did not move out of their offices till about 11.00 am despite mounting tension and reports of gathering mobs and skirmishes.

On February 27, 2002 Shivanand Jha received 68 phone calls, mostly from numbers not listed in the official government directories. This suggests they were private phone numbers owned by politicians or officials or they were using phones actually in other’s names. The next day, Jha’s call records show as many as 192 calls of which four are the ones he made to then Gujarat power minister, Kaushik Jamnadas Patel (an MLA from Jha’s jurisdiction). Another three are those that he made to then MLA from an area outside his jurisdiction, Dr. Maya Kodnani. Jha’s phone call records show that he called JtCP Tandon once at 18:16 hours. Jha and Pande were in touch nine times during the day which shows that they were clearly aware of the inaction of the police and action of the mob.

Jha was also in touch with Harsh Bhahmbhatt, a close aide of the chief minister, from whose instrument the chief minister could have made calls at 19:35 hours.

Role of PB Gondia (DCP, Zone IV (Meghaninagar and Naroda areas):

Ű· Gondia received two calls from Maya Kodnani at 10.39 hours and 17.05 hours. Gondia received three calls from the accused Jaideep Patel of the VHP at 11:40, 11:52 and 12: 20 hours. This is a crucial time when the violence was building up, mobs were attacking Naroda Patiya, Gaam and Gulberg Society. Gondia spoke to the accused Nimish Patel six times during the day: 13:53, 14:13, 15:01, 18:55, 21:43 and 22:10 hours.

Ű· Gondia received two calls from minister Kaushik Patel at 17:24 and 17:29 hours.

Ű· He also received three calls from K Nityanandan, secretary home department: 19:40, 23:15 and 23:16 hours.

Gondia’s records show that from 12:35 hours to 22:01 hours on February 28, 2002 he was in the Meghaninagar and Narol (Naroda) areas and yet did nothing to dispel the mob, call the fire brigade or stem the violence. At 18:55:59 and then again at 21:43:23 Gondia received a call from Nimesh Patel (9824255788). It appears as if this officer was regularly reporting to Nimish Patel and Jaideep Patel: at 22:10:52 Gondia called Nimesh Patel and at 11:40:02 he received a call from Jaideep Patel

Role of KG Erda (Police officer, Meghaninagar police station)

KG Erda, investigating officer, Meghaninagar who was accused by SIT in its charge-sheet dated May 16, 2009 before the trial court is the lowest officer in the chain of command vis-Ă -vis Gulberg Society carnage:

Ű· Erda’s phone call records show that he had been in constant touch with the Control room throughout February 27 and 28. Even on the day of the Godhra tragedy, Erda had been in touch with the Control room from 1.21 pm right up to 11.10 pm, and even kept regular contact with his immediate superior Gondia.

Ű· On February 28, of the 28 logged calls made and received by him, 13 were made by him to the police; 10 calls logged on his mobile show that he called the Control room 10 times speaking for a total of about 12 minutes; three calls were made by him to the local Meghaninagar police station during which he spoke a total of 65 seconds; two calls were made to DCP Gondia and two calls to JtCP Tandon.

Ű· The fact that this police officer, the man on the spot, was in touch with the control room except between 15.33 pm and 17.52 p.m. (that is for a period of two hours and 20 minutes) when he preferred to call his immediate bosses Gondia and Tandon could be significant. This is because this was a critical period of the killing and carnage at the Gulberg Society when frantic messages to the control room could have yielded more immediate help.

Ű· In police and law enforcement language, a call to the control room effectively means a call to the commissioner of police, CP Ahmedabad in this case. Various officers in charge of the control room are expected, to report to the CP area-wise every 15 minutes. A close scrutiny of the phone call log records of the various police stations connected with these trials, the police control room, Shahibaug Ahmedabad, and state police control room, Gandhinagar would reveal which officers performed their duties and kept their superiors constantly briefed. If these records then show that after having received such critical information a close coterie of senior officers who were in touch with the CMO did not act, allegations of conspiracy get substantiated.

Ű· To top it all, the phone call records of Erda also reveal that on February 28 he was in touch with influential and key accused at various times of the day. At 15:20:35 Erda received a call from the then MLA Maya Kodnani’s office. (It may be recalled that Kodnani was Gujarat’s minister, women and child development, in 2009 when she was served notice of arrest by SIT. She then absconded for several days before surrendering. Kodnani thereafter resigned her position and was refused bail by the Gujarat high court. At 18:20:31 Erda again called Kodnani on her mobile and spoke for 93 seconds from the Meghaninagar area. Mysteriously, at 17:59:24 the same evening, Erda also called the accused Nimesh Patel that lasted 24 seconds. In what could be the strangest co-incidence or have the ingredients of a sinister conspiracy, Nimesh Patel spoke to Kodnani from his mobile four times – at 12:40 for 29 seconds, at 10:03 for 32 seconds, at 20:58 for 22 seconds and at 12:21 for 154 seconds.

(The investigation and scrutiny on which this report is based was directed and supervised by Teesta Setalvad in which the entire staff of CJP and Sabrang Trust participated wholeheartedly and with dedication. Many individuals from Ahmedabad who were witness to the 2002 massacre but who wished to remain anonymous made invaluable contributions to the investigation.)

December 15, 2009

Editorial from Communalism Combat Special issue on Liberhan Report



Communalism Combat
December 2009

Editorial

Who are the guilty?

What can one say about the wisdom of a judge who damages his own case before his verdict concerning others! After 17 long years and eight crore rupees of public money Justice Manmohan Singh Liberhan has delivered to the country an over 1,000 page report on the 1992 Babri Masjid demolition that is full of howlers. According to the Liberhan Commission report, Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated on January 31, 1948. Names of the same persons are spelt differently in different places; designations too are mixed up on occasions. Looks like the learned judge could not be bothered with reading his own report before placing it before the nation.

Not surprisingly, those indicted, and rightly so, have latched on to the howlers to dismiss the entire report as lacking credibility. But though Justice Liberhan’s callousness is indefensible, his report remains an evidence-backed damnation of those who took the Indian Republic to the brink in December 1992. Not only was the Babri Mosque demolished in full public view on December 6, it also created the communal climate that made possible the pogrom against Mumbai’s Muslims in December 1992-January 1993 and the Muslims of Gujarat 10 years later.

Reading the report is like watching a horror film with an unfolding evil plot, step-by-step. Until 1983 when the VHP decided to jump on to the bandwagon, the Babri Masjid-Ramjanmabhoomi dispute remained a local issue that agitated some residents of Ayodhya… and Faizabad district at most. By 1989, however, a multitude of ordinary Hindus from across the country had been transformed into a frenzied mob that converged on Ayodhya again and again with a single object: construction of a Ram Mandir on the very spot where the Babri Masjid had stood for a few hundred years. Mission demolition on December 6, 1992 was the logical culmination and climax of a hate-driven agenda.

If the criminal intent of the various constituents of the sangh parivar and its ally the Shiv Sena was public knowledge the contribution of the report lies in establishing in great detail how a malevolent intent was translated into malicious action in such a short period as the institutions of State sworn to protect constitutional values and provisions – Union government, Parliament, the Supreme Court of India, the governor of Uttar Pradesh – stood as "helpless" spectators while corresponding institutions and individuals with similar obligations at the state level – chief minister Kalyan Singh, his cabinet, senior to top level civil servants and police officers – acted instead as the private army of a campaign brimming with contempt for the rule of law. If the Liberhan report provides us overwhelming evidence of the acts of commission of those guilty of the criminal act, far more damning is the evidence it marshals against those whose acts of omission made it possible.

It has been the plea of the BJP and the RSS ever since December 1992 that mosque demolition was never on their agenda. To puncture this claim, Justice Liberhan asks a simple question: why then were tens of thousands of kar sevaks mobilised to descend in Ayodhya repeatedly, indoctrinated with incendiary slogans till a very large number of individuals had turned into a hate-filled frenzied mob, straining at the leash? Justice Liberhan does not buy the innocence plea.

From the evidence gathered before the commission it was more than apparent well before December 6 that the plan for that day was anything but a "symbolic kar seva". What’s more, the report points out that much of this information was already in the public domain. By December 2, if not earlier, it was so easy to anticipate the climax of this dance of the macabre on December 6. Why then did the Union government, the Allahabad High Court, the Congress-appointed governor of UP, the Supreme Court of India not intervene?

Justice Liberhan seems over-eager to give the then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao (and the Congress party?) a clean cheat. "In 1992, the central government had been blinded and handicapped by the inaction of its own agent (governor) in the state and by the unfathomable trust the Supreme Court placed in the paper declarations of the sangh parivar". But he is not so sparing with other agents of State. Here are his parting words: "the intransigent stance of the High Court of Uttar Pradesh, the obdurate attitude of the governor (of UP), the inexplicable irresponsibility of the Supreme Court’s observer (sent to Ayodhya) and the short-sightedness of the Supreme Court itself are fascinating and complex stories, the depths of which I must not plumb... (But) historians, journalists and jurists may – and should – explore these dimensions and tell these untold stories for the benefit of the current and unborn generations".

In short, the Liberhan Commission tells us that our constitutional edifice today stands on shaky pillars – legislature, executive, judiciary – of State. Unless the System addresses the rot within and secures its porous borders from pretentious infiltrators, there’s little hope of meeting the challenge from without.

We reproduce in this issue excerpts from the Liberhan Commission’s Report with a few obvious corrections and clarifications.

– EDITORS

The complete December 2009 issue of Communalism Combat is available at:
http://www.sabrang.com/cc/archive/2009/dec09/index.html

December 15, 2008

Amaresh Mishra’s web of lies

[11 December 2008]

Shri Aziz Burney,
Editor In Chief
Rashtriya Sahara Newspaper

Dear Shri Burney,


I am writing this specifically in response to a news item that appeared in The Rashtriya Sahara on December 7, 2008. I was surprised and shocked that a respectable and widely read Urdu daily published an item without cross checking the baseless allegations made therein. I am referring, Sir, to the scurrilous and unsubstantiated new items carried by your esteemed publication obviously authored by one MR. AMARESH MISHRA, a dangerous individual. I am shocked that your newspaper printed without bothering to verify the false and baseless allegations against my husband and colleague JAVED ANAND, co-editor of COMMUNALISM COMBAT and secretary, MUSLIMS FOR SECULAR DEMOCRACY.

To rectify the one-sided view that has been published, I crave leave to dwell on the events of that day. The Citizens for Justice and Peace had hosted a meeting at the St. Xaviers College Hall to condemn the horrific terror attacks and to outline an action plan for youth and citizens. All of us were gathered there, scattered in the quadrangle and the hall. Swami Agnivesh and Mufti Fuzail Ul Rahman Hilal Usmani, our special guests, were also present having been escorted by my husband and colleague, Javed Anand. Suddenly Mr Amaresh Mishra arrived on the scene and first started using abusive language against M Rajdeep Sardesai, editor in chief of CNN-IBN at which point his mother Smt Nandini Sardesai also intervened. He then started haranguing Swami Agnivesh our guest, "warning" him on how he should speak related to the recent terror attacks in Mumbai! He soon turned to abusing both Mr Javed Anand and journalist Sajjid Rashid in offensive and unprintable language. In fact our daughter hurried to me at this point thinking that her father, Javed Anand was about to be assaulted. One of the over dozen witnesses, Shahbaz Khan intervened at this point and escorted Mr Amaresh Mishra out of the college.

Sir, there were many witnesses present that day, December 4, 2008 when Mr. Mishra in fact did his best to disrupt our meeting and abuse Mr.Rajdeep Sardesai, Mr. Javed Anand and others. I believe he did this because he is threatened by the scope and reach of our activities and
especially the role of MSD in drawing the Muslim community into Civic, Secular Democratic issues breaking the manipulative stereotypes perpetrated by the Hindu right wing -- the RSS, the Bajrang Dal and the VHP among many other organizations -- against the entire community. Specifically, I believe that Mr Amaresh Mishra was out to discredit the courage and initiative shown by both Mr Javed Anand and myself in suggesting to Indian Muslims all over the country to demonstrate in one voice against the enemies of India and the forces of terror following the recent attacks on Mumbai on November 26, 2008. This eleven city protest was successfully held on Sunday December 7, 2008, the day the unsubstantiated news item in your newspaper appeared. I trust and hope that this letter of mine finds prominent space n ALL editions of the newspaper.

There are more falsehoods, Sir, in Mr Mishra's claims. He mentions three respected members of the Muslim clergy who he says also condemned M Javed Anand for "ostensibly attacking Mr Mishra (sic)". One of the three respected persons Maulana Mustaqeen Azmi specifically spoke to me, categorically refuting Mr Mishra's claim that he had issued any such statement of condemnation. Finally, Mr Mishra ends his diatribe stating that he spoke to some persons that include Mr Javed Akhtar, Ms Shabana Azmi and me, Ms Teesta Setalvad about the incident. This is an absolute lie. He did not speak to either of us and has not for some time.

I am consciously not engaging here on the merits and de-merits of the conspiracy theories spouted by Mr Mishra in print and on the internet that are not just too incerdible but have also, surprisingly escaped the wrath of the sangh parivar. I am hoping that your publication will give me an opportunity to engage in an open debate with him on these theories. Until then I am hopeful that this short piece of mine receives de space attention and prominence in Rashtriya Sahara.

In anticipation

Teesta Setalvad
Secretary Citizens for Justice and Peace

Co-Editor Communalism Combat

November 03, 2008

Impartial judicial monitoring of all terror investigations needed

Impartial judicial monitoring of all terror investigations by the apex court the need of the hour

Monday November 3, At 3.30 pm Press Club Mumbai.

Mr. Javed Akhtar, Mr Mahesh Bhat, Mr Nandan Maluste, Mr. Anil Dharker, Mr. Javed Anand and Ms. Teesta Setalvad address the media.

Stop the Politicisation of Bomb Terror

CJP demands that the Central Government appoint a Sitting Three-Member Tribunal of Supreme Court Judges to oversee the Investigations into all Terror Related Crime Investigations. Only such a transparent process will help trace the tentacles of this hitherto unsuspected monster that threatens national security, public peace and harmony.

Recent developments have shown undue pressure and politicization of the law and order machinery into terror/blast investigations. Not only was there for the past several years, a blatantly selective demonization of the minorities when it comes to incidents of terror; recent developments have revealed, that various different political outfits are using violence and terror within Indian democracy to further narrow political ends. It is therefore imperative that

An Independent Judicial Scrutiny is a must for the following reasons:

1. Vagaries and Inconsistencies in the Investigation Processes are brought to the attention of the Tribunal, and public before the finality of a chargesheet being filed. The absence of such a non partisan judicial monitor has succeeded in limiting and influencing of the prosecution of the guilty and has, in fact therefore preventing the real guilty from being brought to book;

2. Gross abuse of political power and influence into the investigations are being similarly exposed holding ordinary Indian citizens, of each and all communities victims and hostages to terror. With outfits related to extreme and political outfits claiming to speak on behalf of Hinduism and Islam allegedly behind the attacks, the ordinary Hindu and Muslim is not just under threat but the national security of the country in grave danger.

3. Preliminary leads into the gruesome and tragic blasts that took over 68lives in Assam just recently alleged and suggest even a ULFA and HUJI link. This cynical use of bomb terror by communal, fanatic and extreme outfits of all hues requires that Independent Judicial Scrutiny is maintained of all investigations. Reports of the investigations into the recent 2008 Malegaon blasts have also suggested that there is a Bangladeshi angle with the interrogation of five members of Abhinav Bharat Sangathana (ABS), who allegedly hatched conspiracy and conducted the terror strike in Malegaon, stating that their group had links across the border, this time in Bangladesh. According to ATS sources, the ABS has around 5,000 members, around 20 of who are from Bangladesh. According to ATS sources, based on the interrogation of Kulkarni, they are on the lookout for two Bangladeshis who attended the Kolkata meeting of the ABS. "Kulkarni has revealed that they had conducted various meetings across the country and one such meeting was held at Kolkata," sources said, adding, "Two Bangladeshis had attended this meeting. These Bangladeshis are Hindus." Kulkarni is the chief promoter and campaigner of the ABS and was employed by serving Colonel S. Prasad Purohit. Kulkarni is a commerce graduate and his father is employees by the Mahrashtra state electricity board in Jalgaon. "Kulkarni was even paid Rs 5,000 as monthly salary by the ABS," sources said.

4. Issues like the dangerous leakages of explosive substances like RDX, Gelatine Sticks and Ammonium Nitrate – all substances that are governed, monitored and controlled strictly under different legislations are in fact being leaked out –even from the Indian Army and BSF control—and finding themselves into the market. This is truly dangerous for any society but especially so when a society is now subject to an assault from different outfits generating terror;

a) CC/CJP Monitor on Terror has monitored that though a leading national daily The Hindustan Times investigated and exposed on that after the seizure of 185 kg of RDX from a scrap dealer Shankar Shelke on September 2 (six days before the first Malegaon blast) he committed suicide and was found dead on September 10, 2006 after being absconding for a week. An employee of Shelke’s Shankar Gaikwad was absconding. Then ASP Mahesh Patil had told the national daily that calls were made by Shelke in fictitious names and that a new angle to these issues was how military ammunition is being stolen/leaked and being used and by whom; This case is languishing

b) The Times of India had reported how barely fifty miles from Mumbai, in the dense woods around Tansa Lake, anyone could buy gelatine sticks for just Rs 50 from tribals; This case is also languishing

c) After the 2008 Ahmedabad blasts the state government stated that the leak of gelatine sticks and explosives was from a Rajasthan Dholpur factory; the SP of that district admitted the leaks; thereafter the Maharashtra ATS also found that the gelatine sticks used in the Thane Panvel blasts were also from the same source.

d) The RDX and other explosives used in the September 29 Malegaon blasts that claimed five lives may have been pilfered from an Indian Army ammunition depot. This was revealed during the interrogation of the two retired army officers presently being questioned by the ATS, said top police sources, who refused to be named. It is not yet clear, however, as to which ammunition depot in the country it was pilfered from. Mumbai Police Commissioner Hasan Gafoor has neither confirmed nor denied the information. "People are still being questioned and these are matters of investigation," he said. (The Times of India, October 27, 2008)

5. Please refer to ‘Blast After Blast’ issue of Communalism Combat that exposes the role of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) into the Nanded 2006 Bomb Blast case and also analyses contradictions of the Gujarat blasts probe. Issues related to laxity in tracking information related to SIMI given by Maharashtra ATS and Madhya Pradesh STF, by the Gujarat police is stark. In July-August 2008, CC in its 15th anniversary issues raised issues related to training by military officers especially by Santkumar Bhate former militaryman. The ATS Maharashtra simply interrogated Bhate and let him off without arrest though he stated that he was actively involved in training in the use of violent explosives both Bajrang Dal members (115) at which training at the Bhonsla Military School was revealed. While CBI mentions Bhate as witness in its chargesheet the CBI, shockingly allows him to go scot free. Today with the issue of another former armyman Ramesh Upadhye and the questioning of Lt Colonel Prasad Purohit, the suggestion that the politicisation of sections of the army is taking place cannot be ignored. The issue of ideological screening of armymen and IB officials given the communalised face of terror is also critical.

6. Malegaon 2008 blast. Even before the recent revelations alleging involvement of certain outfits behind the blasts key questions raised are: the local police chowky near Bhiku Chowk where the blasts took place was informed at least three hours prior to the blast, by one hotel worker Iqbal Ahmed that an unidentified bike was standing there looking suspicious. Neither the Bhiku Chowk staff nor the police parol, including women stationed at Anjuman Chowk patrolled the area and examined the bike that finally exploded around 9.35 p.m. killing five people on the spot. Security had been lax for two days prior just as on September 8, 2006, the day of Shab-e-Barat, the security that had been tight until Ganpathy immersion was suddenly lifted by then SP Rajwardhan.

7. Information of the Modasa bike blasts also points two political pressure and influence trying to cover up the accused.

8. Recent investigations into the 7/11 blasts by the Mumbai Crime Branch (Times of India, October 15, 2008) reveal contradictions between the investigation under former Commissioner of Police, AN Roy in 2006 (chargesheet has already been filed) and the new leads being followed by Mumbai being followed by the Crime Branch that point to different culprits and a whole new list of accused. The serious contradictions are exposed in the earlier chargesheet filed by these agencies . These recently revealed contradictions underline the need for transparent and responsible scrutiny of terror related investigations given the sensitivity and aggressive politicisation of the incidents by different sides of the political class that also seeks to influence the police and the CBI.

9. CBI Cover Up of Nanded

The CBI Chargesheet into the Nanded Blasts of 2006 filed in 2008 completely covers up the role of the RSS/VHP/Bajrang Dal Maharashtra wide network that was training youth in the manufacture of explosives and bombs after indoctrinating them in hate propaganda against India's Muslims. Despite the fact that the Maharashtra ATS had chargesheeted accused persons involved in the blasts of 2006 for dressing 'like Muslims' and bursting bombs at the Mohammadiya Masjid in Parbhani (2003), Quadriya Masjid Jalna August 2004) and at the Meraj Ul Uloom Madrassa/Masjid in Purna in Parbhani (August 2004), the CBI's chargesheet exmorates the accused and their organisations of any terror conspiracy.

10. The Maharashtra ATS investigations into the Thane Panvel blasts shows that members of the Sanatan Sanstha,, Hindu Jan Jagran Samiti and Gurukripa Pratishthan are involved and ironically,investigations reveal that Karan Singh of the Jammu Sangharsh Samiti and Swami Dharmesh are also members of the Sanathan Sanstha. Investigations also reveal that the Sanathan Sanstha publishes Santhan Prabhat, who's editor has been indicted for fomenting communal violence. The publication is published from Goa, North Karnataka, Mumbai and Jammu.

11. Nanded-Parbhani-Purnea-Jalna Terror Link. 2007 Blast Case also being buried. (see Annexure to press note)

12. Our nationwide monitor has also revealed the following terror related incidents and investigation lacunae that have fallen off the public radar.

A) Mhow bomb blast that occured on 22.4.2002., at 6.00pm near the Swarg Mandir , Mhow. Complainant / victim was Mr. Chandmal agarwal. So far 4 accused have been arrested. The following have been arrested:
1) Shekhar choudary s/o Mangilal choudary , Mhow.
2) Satyanarayana, s/o PArameswar parmar, village Harsola, Kurda these 2 were arrested on 8-9-2003.
3) Mukesh Patidar s/o Jule lal Patidar, Mhow
4) Rajesh Misra s/o, Sital misra, Pithampur these 2 were arrested on 12-9-2003
All the above 4 persons were also arrested in Pyare Lal Ninama murder case. Manpur, dated 8-9-2003. in this pyare lal ninama murder case total 10 persons were arrested which includes the above four persons. The main conspirator behind these 2 cases was found to be one Sanjay Joshi. who was recently murdered in Dewas.
The Mhow bomb blast case of 2002 is still pending with CID Bhopal where as the murder case is under trial .

Similarly our team will be investigating the other blast related cases from Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat even before 2002 and will be releasing these investigations, periodically.

The Citizens for Justice and Peace through Communalism Combat has been, for over three years now been closely monitoring all blast investigations from statements revealed in the media through a team headed by Teesta Setalvad, secretary and co-editor, CC. This study that shall be on the internet by November 15, 2008 will raise logical and searching questions from the eye of the independent legal and human rights perspective. This will be information available for the public.


Javed Akhtar Nandan Maluste Anil Dharker Mahesh Bhat

Javed Anand Teesta Setalvad