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Showing posts with label Europe. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Europe. Show all posts

May 24, 2024

In Madrid, a Vox party rally brought together Holocaust deniers, Israeli officials and right-wing leaders from around the world

 

The Reactionary International

This week in Madrid, a Vox party rally brought together Holocaust deniers, Israeli officials and right-wing leaders from around the world — putting Spain at the centre of a new far-right international movement.

 

https://www.tribunemag.co.uk/2024/05/the-reactionary-international

February 01, 2023

The European Union investigated the 2002 Gujarat riots but is refusing to make its report public | Nachiket Deuskar (on scroll.in)

scroll.in 

  2002 gujarat riots

The European Union investigated the 2002 Gujarat riots – but is refusing to make its report public

The bloc’s diplomatic wing cited concerns that disclosing the document in full might ‘prejudice’ relations with India.

Jan 30, 2023

The 2002 Gujarat riots were investigated not just by the United Kingdom, but also by the European Union. A new BBC documentary has revealed that an inquiry by the UK government indicted Prime Minister Narendra Modi, then the chief minister of Gujarat, for the “climate of impunity” that led to the “ethnic cleansing” of 2,000 Muslims. But the European Union has declined to make its report public, citing the potential harm its release could cause to its relationship with Delhi.

“Disclosure of this document to the public would harm the relations between the EU and India, by undermining the confidence and trust in EU-India partnership, thus prejudicing EU’s capacity to protect and promote its interests in this context,” an official of the European Union wrote in response to Dutch activist Gerard Oonk’s request for access to the EU’s inquiry report on the 2002 Gujarat violence.

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Scroll has reviewed the correspondence between Oonk and the European External Action Service, the European Union’s diplomatic wing. A spokesperson of the diplomatic service has confirmed its authenticity.

Commenting on the European Union’s decision not to disclose the report, Oonk, former director of a non-profit organisation called the India Committee of the Netherlands, said in an email to Scroll: “From the strong wording of the letter in terms of the political damage that publication of the report would cause, one can only conclude that the statements on the role of Modi and his ministers are most probably quite negative.” [ . . . ]

 full text at : https://scroll.in/article/1042811/the-european-union-investigated-the-2002-gujarat-riots-but-is-refusing-to-make-its-report-public

June 21, 2022

Right-wing populist media and the public opinion on the environmental movement in Poland | Piotr Żuk

“Eco-terrorists”: right-wing populist media about “ecologists” and the public opinion on the environmental movement in Poland Piotr Żuk https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2022.2055551

June 04, 2022

India: On Hindutva’s Italian connection | Ramachandra Guha

Indisputable link

Hindutva’s Italian connection 
 
by Ramachandra Guha

"Last month, a teacher of political science in Uttar Pradesh’s Sharda University posed this examination question to his students: ‘Do you find any similarities between Fascism/ Nazism and Hindu right-wing (Hindutva)? Elaborate with the argument.’ The teacher was suspended by the university authorities, on the grounds that the very posing of the question was “totally averse” to the “great national identity” of our country and “may have the potential for fomenting social discord”. (see https://thewire.in/ education/sharda-university-professor-hindutva-nazism)

This column seeks to answer the question the teacher in Sharda University was forbidden from asking his students. I use, as my main sources, the writings of the Italian historian, Marzia Casolari, in particular an essay she published in the Economic and Political Weekly in 2000 titled “Hindutva’s Foreign Tie-up in the 1930s” (see https://www.epw. in/journal/2000/04/special-articles/ hindutvas-foreign-tie-1930s.html), and a book she published twenty years later, titled In the Shadow of the Swastika: The Relationships Between Indian Radical Nationalism, Italian Fascism and Nazism (available at https://www.amazon.in/ Shadow-Swastika-RelationshipsNationalism-Routledge-ebook/dp/ B08DPXXLF6)."

[ . . . ]

https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/indisputable-link-hindutvas-italian-connection/cid/1868274

 

January 22, 2020

Eviane Leidig: The Far-Right Is Going Global | Foreign Policy, January 21, 2020

Foreign Policy

The Far-Right Is Going Global


An unofficial visit by nationalist European leaders to Kashmir highlights the solidarity of far-right movements across the globe.


In October 2019, 23 members of the European Parliament (MEPs) visited Kashmir, just two months after the Indian government removed the region’s special autonomous status. The trip sparked controversy when it was revealed that most of the MEPs belonged to far-right political parties, including France’s National Rally (formerly National Front) and Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). It wasn’t just the affiliations of these visitors that drew attention: The MEPs had been granted access to Kashmir even as foreign journalists and domestic politicians were barred access to the region, and the Indian-administered government had imposed an internet shutdown since August.
This visit was the latest example of the growing ties between the far-right in India and Europe, a connection that is rooted primarily in a shared hostility toward immigrants and Muslims, and couched in similar overarching nationalistic visions. Today, with the populist radical right ascendant in India and in several European democracies, the far-right agenda has been increasingly normalized and made a part of mainstream political discourse.
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The link between far-right ideologies in these regions long predates the relatively recent rise of right-wing populist leaders. In the 1930s, Hindu nationalists collaborated with key figures in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in order to help advance their extreme right-wing projects.
In the 1930s, Hindu nationalists collaborated with key figures in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in order to help advance their extreme right-wing projects.
One of the pioneers of Hindu nationalism, V.D. Savarkar, once wrote that India should model its approach to its “Muslim problem” on that used by the Nazis to deal with their “Jewish problem.” Similarly, European ideologues like Savitri Devi (born in France as Maximiani Portas) described Hitler as an incarnation of the Hindu god Vishnu. Nearly four decades after she died, her ideology remains popular among American white nationalists. The manifesto of Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian terrorist who killed 77 people in 2011, also expressed an affinity for the Hindu nationalist approach to Islam that highlights many contemporary European attitudes toward Muslim immigrant populations.
“The only positive thing about the Hindu right wing is that they dominate the streets. They do not tolerate the current injustice and often riot and attack Muslims when things get out of control, usually after the Muslims disrespect and degrade Hinduism too much,” Breivik wrote before bombing a government building in Oslo and killing dozens of children at a summer camp. “India will continue to wither and die unless the Indian nationalists consolidate properly and strike to win. It is essential that the European and Indian resistance movements learn from each other and cooperate as much as possible. Our goals are more or less identical.”
More recently, Steve Bannon, the former White House chief strategist and editor in chief of the far-right site Breitbart News Network, had considered creating a Breitbart India in 2015 after Narendra Modi became prime minister of India. Bannon has long admired Modi, once calling him “a Trump before Trump.” Meanwhile, European supporters of Modi and his nationalist message include the leader of the Dutch far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) Geert Wilders.
The MEPs’ visit to Kashmir sheds light on the solidarity of the global far-right. Although they were sent invitations on behalf of Madi Sharma, a Brussels-based entrepreneur and president of the NGO Women’s Economic and Social Think Tank (WESTT), the visit itself was funded and organized by an NGO registered in New Delhi called the International Institute for Non-Aligned Studies (IINS)—a group that shares the same IP address as the obscure news website New Delhi Times.
Steve Bannon has long admired Narendra Modi, once calling him “a Trump before Trump.”
This website, in turn, is connected to a global network of think tanks, companies, NGOs, and, significantly, over 265 local media outlets in 65 countries. EU DisinfoLab, which conducts research on disinformation campaigns targeting European Union member states, recently concluded that the media outlets tied to the New Delhi Times are attempting to influence international institutions and elected representatives.
While the ideological leanings of the New Delhi Times are unclear, its network of media outlets syndicate content criticizing Pakistan’s role in Kashmir, and they regularly take Islamophobic editorial stances. Although those positions are not unusual in the Indian media landscape, it is rare for such outlets to lobby on a global scale. Two notable websites in this network—EP Today and Times of Geneva—maintain strong connections to NGOs and think tanks in Brussels and Geneva, in effect serving as lobbying interests to the EU and the United Nations.
Sharma promised invitees “a prestigious VIP meeting” with Modi in addition to their trip to Kashmir. The MEPs stated that the purpose of the visit was to “gather information” on the situation in Kashmir. Although the MEPs were technically an unofficial delegation, they received clearance not just to tour Kashmir, but also to meet with several senior members of the Indian government and military. Government ministries have publicly stated that they were not involved in arranging the visit, although it is unlikely that such clearance could have been obtained without approval from high-level authorities.
Before visiting Kashmir, the MEPs went to New Delhi to meet Modi, who said that the delegation would gain “a better understanding of the cultural and religious diversity of the region.” While in Kashmir, the European delegation went on a guided tour through the capital of Srinagar before having lunch at the Indian Army Headquarters, where they saw maps of supposed terrorist training camps in Pakistan, where attacks in Kashmir are allegedly plotted.
Several MEPs, including far-right Czech MEP Tomas Zdechovsky and National Rally MEP Thierry Mariani, later used social media to share their experience meeting the prime minister; Mariani, for example, tweeted in support of the Indian government’s policy in Kashmir. Mariani also told reporters that “we stand with India in its fight against terrorists,” while AfD MEP Lars Patrick Berg accused the media of branding them “Muslim-hating Nazis.” Both Mariani and Berg have called for stronger border security in the EU, linking migration to potential Islamist terrorist attacks.

The Kashmir issue is a rallying cry for much of Europe’s far-right. Europe’s nationalists share a deep concern over Islamist extremism, as well as an overarching vision of national strength. In many ways, they see Modi’s hardline stance in Kashmir as indicative of their own aims.
The latest crisis in Kashmir began when Modi’s government revoked Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, thereby removing Jammu and Kashmir’s special autonomous status. Wilders openly tweeted his support of the revocation of Kashmir’s autonomy the day it was announced. The British columnist Katie Hopkins also expressed solidarity and has more recently claimed that Hindus are the victims of ethnic cleansing in Kashmir.
The Kashmir issue is a rallying cry for much of Europe’s far-right. Europe’s nationalists share a deep concern over Islamist extremism, as well as an overarching vision of national strength.
The immediate pretext for Modi’s move was brewing unrest in the region. An ongoing separatist insurgency has gripped Kashmir since 1989, and Pakistan has played a substantial role supporting violent separatist groups in the region. Islamist terrorist attacks remain an everyday reality on the ground, and they have sometimes spilled over into India itself. This includes the 2008 Mumbai attacks, in which Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, a Pakistan-based Islamist group seeking Kashmiri unification with Pakistan, launched a massive attack in Mumbai killing 164 people.
The situation continued to escalate in February 2019, when Pakistan’s Air Force launched a series of airstrikes in Indian-controlled Kashmir, leading to Indian retaliation. Periodic airstrikes have been conducted intermittently since—arguably boosting Modi’s popularity with his base and helping him win reelection last year.
Although the pretext for the constitutional change was regional unrest, there are broader goals. Hindu nationalists have long sought to expand India’s territorial reach into what was once British-controlled India—including not only Kashmir but also Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other parts of South Asia.

July 16, 2018

FIFA World Cup: Croatia Team Represents the Rot in Its Society as Much as Football Excellence | Priyansh

The Wire

FIFA World Cup: Croatia Team Represents the Rot in Its Society as Much as Football Excellence

If Croatia wins the World Cup, this pungent reality will probably dig its heels in further, and it might just be the national team’s long-term legacy.


[by] Priyansh


This article is part of a series from Russia that analyses the sociopolitical issues surrounding the World Cup. With a combination of perspectives and reporting from the ground, overlooked and underplayed themes in football will be carried to the surface on The Wire.

Moscow: “We still talk about that game.” Coach Zlatko Dalić spoke for a lot of Croatians on Wednesday after confirming his country’s spot in the final against France here. Twenty years ago, Dalic was away training with his club but his mind was fixed on the proceedings in a suburb of Paris, Saint-Denis.

Just seven years after formal independence, Croatia had stunned the world by reaching its first-ever World Cup semifinal. The shock only grew in magnitude when the Vatreni took the lead against France in the last-four clash. The host, led by current manager Didier Deschamps, did recover eventually to script its own history but the Croatian upsurge would not be forgotten.

Now, as the two countries meet again in a contest of even greater significance, it is time for upending of past narratives even as new designs appear. For Croatia, football is an ever-present palimpsest. As the country’s first president, Franjo Tuđman, said, “Football victories shape a nation’s identity as much as wars do.” His oft-quoted words carried a more hopeful resonance when the Croatian War of Independence was fresh in public memory. Two decades on, the questions of football are still politically vexed but less sanguine.

The shadow of Croatian politics has been acutely felt while the national team has broken new ground in Russia. Earlier this year, skipper Luka Modrić was charged with perjury for his role in protecting Zdravko Mamić, arguably the most influential figure in the country’s football circles. Defender Dejan Lovren has been accused of the same. The dark clouds appeared in full view when, 10 days before Croatia started its World Cup campaign, Mamić was handed a six-and-half year prison sentence for illegally profiting from players’ transfers.

If the case was not complicated enough, Mamić’s close relationship with the Croatian president Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović muddied the waters. The football administrator funded Grabar-Kitarović’s campaign for the 2015 presidential elections, and their public association continued following her victory. To her chagrin, the president later learnt that their private meetings were not secret as the investigation into Mamić’s corruption had put him under state surveillance.

Grabar-Kitarovic has had a better time in Russia, attending Croatia’s games in the team’s chequered red and white jersey. She is keen to make the most of this opportunity. After Croatia edged past Russia on penalties in the quarterfinals, the president turned up in the dressing room to celebrate with the players.

The celebrations, however, got out of hand as defender Domagoj Vida and assistant coach Ognjen Vukojević shot an Instagram video with chants of “Glory to Ukraine!” That obviously did not go down very well in Russia. Croatia moved in haste to sack Vukojević but Vida escaped censure. This was not the first time, though, that a chant had landed Croatia in trouble at this World Cup.

After their group stage win over Argentina in Nizhny Novgorod, Croat footballers were the subject of public disapproval for bellowing a song with the words “Za dom – spremni ” (“ready for home”). The phrase carries an indelible association with the fascist Ustaše movement, which had shared close links with the Nazis. It was banned in erstwhile Yugoslavia but the salute has experienced a slow resurgence since Croatia’s independence. It is not uncommon to hear the phrase at the national team’s football matches now.

The salute’s renewed popularity owes much to the rise of right-wing forces in Croatian society, but the use of fascist symbols in public life is not new. As historian Florian Bieber wrote a few years ago, it was the Tuđman regime that “began the ambiguous use of fascist symbols and references that brought it to the mainstream.”

But the motivations behind their usage can’t be painted with the same brush. The reappearance of such symbols is a result of changes in 21st century Croatian society. In 1998, with Croatia still taking baby steps as a nation, there was much optimism for the country’s future. The exploits of the football team at that summer’s World Cup were symptomatic of the bounteous hope and the achievement only fed the feel-good factor.

But in the two decades since, much of that goodwill has been spent as economic and political concerns have become more apparent. The national football team’s success is now seen by many commentators as a distraction from the problems that beset life in Croatia. Citizens who feel neglected by the state have used chants and symbols of the Ustaše to attract attention, even though it remains a misguided endeavour.

The upsurge of extreme right voices and symbols in public life has a resonance with football, too. The Croatian national side’s popularity has often been used to play the politics of patriotism. Grabar-Kitarović’s public association with the World Cup squad is a function of this impulse. But this agenda also seeks to paint critical voices as unpatriotic.

Croatian football’s overt link with right-wing politics, however, has caused plenty of problems for the national team over the last decade or so. From a point deduction for the ‘human swastika’ in Livorno to a stadium ban for violence in the stands of Milan, to the 10-game suspension for Josip Šimunić after he chanted “Za dom – spremni” in Zagreb following Croatia’s qualification to the 2014 World Cup – politics has exacted a heavy cost on the football pitch.

These incidents, along with the scandals of privatised interests in Croatian football, are not forgotten. In fact, they still feed resentment and the historic success of the national side has not swept away polarising opinions. Interestingly, this World Cup has seen the coming together of fans who proactively despise the Vatreni and its icons and those who swear by them. The team itself reflects the ills of Croatian football as it is full of Mamić loyalists and also a player, Andrej Kramarić, whose career somehow survived the machinations of the convicted administrator.

As Croatia prepares to play France in an era-defining World Cup match again, the political tussle will be shaded into the background for once. But if Zlatko Dalić and his players lift the hallowed trophy at the Luzhniki Stadium here on Sunday, they will not just shake up the world of football. Croatian politics and society will feel its aftershocks as well.

Just like 20 years ago, Croatia’s run to the final has already given an impetus to a nationalist drive in public discourse. There might be temptations to say that not much has changed in this time. Croatia, after all, is still an underdog and that is why its success is being celebrated with gusto.

But the frames through which the national team is seen have undergone a sea change. Now, the Croatian side represents the rot in its society as much as it stands for football excellence. The former thrives in the company of the latter. If Croatia wins the World Cup, this pungent reality will probably dig its heels further. And that might just be the national team’s long-term legacy.

Priyansh is an independent writer based in New Delhi. He tweets @GarrulousBoy.

October 23, 2017

Five myths about Nazis | Thomas Childers

The Washington Post, October 20 2017

Five myths about Nazis

It wasn’t Hitler’s hateful rhetoric that earned him the lion’s share of his support

[Photo] Adolf Hitler is saluted as he leaves the Nazi party's Munich headquarters in 1931. (AP)

By Thomas Childers

(Thomas Childers, author of "The Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany," is the recently retired Sheldon and Lucy Hackney professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania.)

White nationalists have been seeking (and finding) attention frequently this year, in the form of widely publicized protests and rallies. But for all the attention focused on this new wave of Nazi imitators, the original Nazi party, which unleashed chaos on the world in the early decades of the twentieth century, is still shrouded in myths. Here are five of the most persistent.

Myth No. 1
Adolf Hitler was bankrolled by big corporate donors.

In his biography of Henry Kissinger, historian Niall Ferguson notes that “old man Thyssen” — that is, German steel magnate Fritz Thyssen — “bankrolled Hitler.” Businessmen such as Thyssen using their financial assets to assist the Nazis was “the mechanism by which Hitler was funded to come to power,” according to John Loftus, a former U.S. attorney who prosecuted Nazi war criminals.

But the Nazis were neither “financed” nor “bankrolled” by big corporate donors. During its rise to power, the Nazi Party did receive some money from corporate sources — including Thyssen and, briefly, industrialist Ernst von Borsig — but business leaders mostly remained at arm’s length. After all, Nazi economic policy was slippery: pro-business ideas swathed in socialist language. The party’s program, the Twenty-Five Points, called for the nationalization of corporations and trusts, revenue sharing, and the end of “interest slavery.” Capitalism, the Nazis charged, “enslaves human beings under the slogan of progress, technology, rationalization, standardization, etc.”

The party largely depended on grass-roots sources of funding (membership dues, subscriptions to the party press, admission to events and so forth). The Nazi propaganda machine — the dances, the “German evenings,” the concerts, the speeches — was also a moneymaking operation, as is made clear in entries in Joseph Goebbels’s diary.

Once in power, however, the Nazis did receive funding from corporate sources, as business leaders were given fat contracts for armaments production and construction projects. The regime also seized Jews’ assets, from valuable art to private savings and investments. And it took control of Jewish-owned companies in what the Nazis called the “Aryanization” of the economy.

Myth No. 2
Jesse Owens’s 1936 Olympic wins embarrassed Hitler.

“Although Adolf Hitler intended the 1936 Berlin Games to be a showcase for the Nazi ideology of Aryan racial supremacy,” the History Channel wrote in 2013, “it was a black man who left the biggest imprint on that year’s Games.” Such retellings of Owens’s stunning four-gold-medal win are common: “Owens shattered the myth the Nazis so desperately craved to display,” CNN claimed in 2015 . “80 years ago, Owens destroyed the Olympics’ racial hierarchy and humiliated Hitler,” the news site Splinter declared a year later.

Yet while the public (especially in the United States) focused on Owens, the Germans actually won the Olympic medal count , surpassing the favored Americans. Germany walked away with 33 gold medals to America’s 24, 26 silver to America’s 20, and 30 bronze to America’s 12.

Hitler took great pride in hosting the Olympics, and for him the event was a roaring success — even according to Owens, who told the press : “When I passed the Chancellor, he arose, waved his hand to me, and I waved back to him. I think the writers showed bad taste in criticizing the man of the hour in Germany.”

Myth No. 3
Racist ideology was the key to Hitler’s rise.

“Sixty-five million Germans yielded to the blandishments and magnetism of this slender man . . . whose fervor and demagogy swept everything before him with outstretched arms as the savior and regenerator of the Fatherland,” the New York Times wrote in May 1945. That Hitler ascended because of his hateful, racist rhetoric is now so much a part of his legend that, according to one German writer, it is taught in the country’s schools: “Germans have internalized that the reason why Adolf Hitler was able to rise to power was that no one stood up for the Jews.”

It’s true that Nazi racism, especially rabid anti-Semitism, was always on the surface. Hitler was an ideological fanatic, and his ideology attracted a small but intensely loyal core of supporters during the party’s early years — 3 to 6 percent of the electorate during its first obscure decade. Even in regional elections throughout the 1920s, the Nazis’ share of the electorate never reached 10 percent.

The truth is that Hitler rose on the strength of his skill as a political strategist, more than anything else. The Nazi Party’s propaganda staff became masters of negative campaigning, launching vicious assaults on the establishment parties and the “system” they supported. They were convinced that details didn’t matter; indeed, Nazi claims were often outright lies. The Nazis also promised everything to everybody, pledging higher sale prices for farmers and lower food prices for workers in the cities. The contradictions abounded, and opposing parties never tired of pointing them out.

Such criticism did not faze the Nazis in the least. They either ignored it or railed that this sort of whining was what was wrong with German politics. Hitler understood that there are times when desperate, angry people want two and two to be five, and he swore that the Nazis would make it so. After the onset of the Great Depression, the party saw its vote totals jump dramatically in 1930, then rocket to 38 percent in July 1932 — a huge increase over its early, more strictly fanatical days.

Myth No. 4
Hitler was a forceful, decisive leader.

In 2010, Wisconsin state senatorial candidate Dane Deutsch sparked controversy by tweeting: “Hitler and Lincoln were both strong leaders. Lincoln’s character made him the greater leader whose legacy and leadership still lives on!” Echoing his sentiment, a 2016 Los Angeles Times op-ed held that, like Russian President Vladimir Putin, “Hitler was a strong leader with good poll numbers too.”

But Hitler was, in reality, a vacillating, indecisive leader who drove his lieutenants, and later his military, to exasperation with his long delays and shifting, often contradictory decisions. His closest advisers complained frequently about his inability to make a clear call. In 1935, for example, Hitler announced the Nuremberg Laws, which, among other sinister things, made Jews noncitizens. But who was to be considered a Jew? Would a half-Jewish person, for instance, count? Party and state officials argued for months about this, but despite their pleas for a solution from their Führer, Hitler refused to clarify the situation.

Making matters worse, Hitler’s decisions were rarely committed to paper; instead, he preferred issuing vague verbal orders that contributed mightily to the confusion around his stances. Once he had finally decided on a course of action, nothing could change his mind — but reaching that decision was often a long, circuitous, frustrating process.

Myth No. 5
The Third Reich was well-organized.

Since World War II, the Nazi regime has gone down in popular culture as, among other things, a paragon of brutal, mechanistic optimization. Novels refer to “Nazi-like organization,” newspaper articles to “Nazi-like discipline” and encyclopedia entries to “Nazi-like efficiency.” Perhaps bolstered by an overall impression of Germans as methodical, orderly people, we tend to imagine that the Third Reich embodied these characteristics to the nth degree.

In fact, the regime was, according even to the memoir of Hitler’s minister of armaments and munitions, Albert Speer , more like organized chaos. Offices and agencies of party and state often overlapped or were given identical responsibilities, creating confusion. There were, for example, five different military, state and party agencies charged with leadership of the war economy. Hitler was also fond of creating ad hoc bodies to operate alongside (but often in conflict with) established party or state agencies.

Hitler explained this approach to governing by claiming that in this situation, “the strongest gets the job done.”

Thomas Childers, author of "The Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany," is the recently retired Sheldon and Lucy Hackney professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania.

October 08, 2017

Germany: 'dramatic loss of center parties, a big growth of the new rightist party' What Happens Next? | Claus Offe

Social Europe - 3 October 2017

by Claus Offe

The key question now is: What happens next? After the social democrats have (wisely, I think) opted for a role in the opposition, there will be an extended period of bargaining on coalition formation, with only one majority option remaining on the table: the black-yellow-green “Jamaica”. That option is likely to fail. Differences among the participants cannot possibly be bridged in stable ways. After all, the Greens would at the very least have to win the support of the majority of their membership constituency, which is hard to imagine. The next option is the formation of a black-yellow minority government. That would be without precedent in Germany at the federal level. But it will be tried, as new elections are unlikely to yield an easier-to-handle result, perhaps a worse one. Moreover, there are creeping succession leadership crises in both the CDU and CSU (if not SPD), plus looming divorce issues between the two Christian “sister” parties regarding the continuation of a joint faction in the Bundestag.

We see an ongoing flattening of the bell curve of the parties’ electoral strength. We see a rather dramatic loss of center parties, a moderate growth of the leftist parties, and a big growth of the new rightist party. “Catch-all” parties catch less and less.

They pay the price for their centrist complacency, consensus politics, and their silencing of contentious issues. The CDU slogan “A country in which all of us like to live and live well” can hardly be surpassed in its political emptiness. Merkel told voters “You know me”, implying that more does not have to be said: let the incumbency bonus speak for itself. Schulz was right: the chancellor won by denying politics and open controversy – but why has he failed to revive it?
No more unique Germany

German exceptionalism is over. It consisted of the combined effects of historical immunization to authoritarian regime forms and political as well as economic stability. So far, Germany has lacked a relevant force of the political right in its federal parliament. Now we face the dynamic of accelerated centrifugality. Even if it were desired/-able, a grand coalition would no longer be possible (or highly unstable and virtually suicidal for SPD). German exceptionalism also consisted of the relative robustness of social democracy, which has now hit its historical low, though not (yet) having arrived in the single digit realm as in France and the Netherlands.

Also, a historical virtue of PDS/die Linke is a thing of the past. It consisted of its capacity to mask the legacies of East German xenophobic, authoritarian nativism by reframing it in terms of social justice issues. Now die Linke has lost 420,000 of its voters to Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, which also mobilized nearly 1.5 million non-voters, making it the party with by far the greatest success in mobilizing this group relative to the number of votes it received). In spite of this massive loss to AfD, however, die Linke has been able to more than compensate for it by winning the support of 700,000 former social democratic and 330,000 former green voters.

There is a clear East/West divide in Germany. The new Länder in the East provided almost twice the level of electoral support for AfD as that of the old Länder. In Saxony, AfD even overtook CDU by a narrow margin and came in first. The same divide worked in Berlin as well as in the EU in general: populists are in power in Hungary and Poland and (so far) nowhere in the West of Europe.

We seem to have arrived at an age of non-cooperation where the world is framed as a zero sum game immersed in moral hazard psychology. The anti-EU mobilization has been successful by asking the rhetorical question: why should we share our resources with others? Euro bonds and other forms of debt mutualization are taboos that are strictly observed by virtually all sides. There is a new ethos of “going it alone”, of resentful unilateralism, of putting ourselves “first” (Trump), and of taking back “control of our country” (as in Brexit).

This is of course very bad news for Emmanuel Macron and others who have launched plans for deeper integration and the pooling of parliamentary, fiscal, educational, military and research resources and competencies in order to cope with border-transcending challenges that affect all of us. Yet, in order to maintain domestic support, the new German government will feel encouraged to use its power within the EU (power being, as we know from Karl Deutsch, the privilege to be relieved from the need to learn) to continue its course of unashamed punitive austerity mercantilism, mitigated by a Europhile rhetoric that serves little more than the purpose of blame avoidance. Whereas the French President shows a remarkable degree of ambition, imagination and determination, many members of the German ruling elite, as well as the majority of the media, are busy drawing up red lines.
More than a protest

A key feature of populism is its “negative” politics (Max Weber) of distrust and protest without a coherent programmatic stance (or even a credible ambition) to govern. An excuse often heard these days is that AfD voters do not really believe in this party’s ideology but just wanted to register their protest against Merkel; yet they did not hesitate to register protest with an authoritarian and xenophobic bunch of people whose declared purpose is to “pursue” their political enemies, a change which indicates the weakening of normative inhibitions which so far have been operative in German politics.

Populist mobilization relies on the (vertical) mobilization of distrust (of political elites and intermediary institutions – mendacious media (Lügenpresse), academia, experts, civil society associations, also courts) – and the (horizontal) spreading of fear of outsiders. Migrants/refugees are ideally suited as objects of fear mongering for three reasons:

Economic: they threaten us in the labor and housing markets and live at the expense of our taxes;
Cultural: allegedly incompatible language, religion, ethnic identity;
Failures of state protection: rape, crime, terrorism.

Distrust is particularly effective when the two can be combined: Elites are to be distrusted because they fail to protect us from or are even actively promoting (Merkel in September 2015) the access of migrants. (Trust is anyway a scarce political resource. It is most readily granted in Germany to professions such as fire-fighters and rescue medics (=96%) and least so to professional politicians (=15%)).

One lesson we can draw from the 2017 campaign and its outcome is this: Centrism of grand coalition governments breeds anti-elite centrifugality and the further fragmentation of party system, with an unprecedented number of seven distinct parties now in the Bundestag. As one commentator observed: “Fighting extremism in Germany may demand less political centrism.” (Another one has joked: There are two right answers to the question: Are there still true social democrats in Germany? One answer is: No – all socialist projects have been abandoned by SPD. The other is: Yes – there are even two of them, namely both members of the grand coalition whose social and economic policies have become virtually indistinguishable.)

Yet that may soon change under the impact of the new rightist forces in parliament. A typical response of threatened conservative leaders (Cameron/May in Britain, Rutte in the Netherlands, Kurz in Austria, Seehofer in Bavaria, among others) is to follow the strategy: If you can’t beat them at the polls, adopt (a light version of) their appeal and assure their voters of your “understanding”.

Another problem grand coalition strategists must face is this: Centrist parties cannot fight their partners because they are themselves to be blamed for failures they committed while governing in coalition with them. (Which is why candidate Schulz was “imported” from outside German politics, i.e. from the European Parliament, in spite of his manifest deficiencies.)

Thus, important controversies were covered up by consensual silence: The EU debt crisis, migration and integration, the future of the EU, poverty/inequality, climate, Leitkultur (mainstream culture), international and Atlantic relations, German arms trade, Russia/Ukraine, Poland, investment gap vs. austerity and “black zero” (balanced budget) etc. figured at best marginally or not at all in the campaign. Instead, parties focused on quite arguably secondary issues such the use of diesel. Yet, after all: Who can be opposed to cleaner air, or, for that matter, to sanctioning the fraudulent machinations of top managers of the car industry? Outside observers agreed: “Germany’s sleepy campaign has left most of these issues unattended”. As the NYT wondered: The “paradox is that the most important political topic is not being discussed by the most important political parties in public.”

This applies to issues of inequality and poverty, too. Schulz has proclaimed that it is “time for social justice”, without providing the bare outline of relevant and credible policies enhancing “justice” – and this in a country where simply not all “live well” (as the CDU slogan claimed) but where the lowest 40 per cent of earners have seen no real pay increases in two decades, where every sixth child lives in near-poverty and where no less than 1.5m are being served by food banks.
Still exceptional

Germany’s intransigence on economic cooperation and “leadership” (the opposite, nota bene, of domination) in Europe has structural causes in the German political economy: once described as “overindustrialized“, it still has an outsized manufacturing sector that employs 19% of the workforce (as opposed to 10% in the US and 9% in the UK). Maintaining a high level of manufacturing employment requires Germany to secure a trade surplus (of currently 8% GDP, twice the volume of China!). This can be done only if the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) regime remains stable, as the external value of the Euro is depressed by all the others that export less or import more than DE. Absent the Euro, from the presence of which Germany profits more than anyone else, German exports would become mostly non-competitive, as a new Deutschmark would dramatically appreciate, putting exports and export-dependent jobs into jeopardy. Without the Euro, the German economy would price itself out of markets for many manufactured goods. In order to keep export industries alive and prevent companies moving to low wage locations, Germany depends on wage restraint and other measures that ensure favorable unit costs of labor and productivity gains through process innovation. Other members of the Eurozone cannot improve their competitive position through the devaluation of their currency anymore; the EMU regime deprives them of their monetary sovereignty, thus leaving them with the only option of adjustment by “internal” devaluation.

It used to be a blessing in Germany (and similarly in France) that the right is divided into sectarian groups vehemently fighting each other. An instance of this divisiveness is the unprecedented refusal, declared one day after the election, of AfD chairwoman Frauke Petry to join her party’s parliamentary caucus (a party she co-founded and is now ready to leave). Much will depend on whether AfD can overcome that kind of internal struggle, which I think is unlikely.

With the SPD (and probably the Greens) out of power, the German government is no longer prevented from shifting rightwards (under CSU pressure) to even more explicitly dominant, Eurosceptic and migration-averse policies.

Based on a talk given by the author at the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, on September 28

About Claus Offe

Claus Offe teaches Political Sociology at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. He has held chairs for Political Science and Political Sociology at the Universities of Bielefeld and Bremen as well as at the Humboldt-University of Berlin. He has worked as fellow and visiting professor at, among others, the Institutes for Advanced Study in Stanford, Princeton, and the Australian National University as well as Harvard University, the University of California at Berkeley and the New School University, New York. He is the co-chair of the Working Group ‘Europe and the MENA-region’ in the Dahrendorf Forum.

February 09, 2017

France: How Leftists Learned to Love Le Pen (Katy Lee, Claire Sergent)

How Leftists Learned to Love Le Pen

The far-right National Front’s path to victory runs through France’s former northern Communist strongholds.
HAYANGE, France — The towers of the ArcelorMittal steel mill loom over the little town of Hayange, silent and shuttered. Few people stopped to chat on a recent winter day — the streets were shrouded in an icy fog — but those who paused summarized life here succinctly: There has been little work since the blast furnaces at the mill were shut down in 2013, and little hope either.

In this relentless, breathless news cycle, critical issues are getting lost in the chatter.


“Everyone is sick of it,” said Pascal, who declined to give his last name, leaning on the door of his tattoo parlor. “100 percent I am going to vote for Marine Le Pen.”
Like much of France’s industrial north and east, Hayange, a town of 15,000 near the border with Luxembourg, has a solid left-wing tradition. It has been sending Socialist lawmakers to Parliament for 20 years, while Communists and other far-left parties have played an active role in local politics for decades.
But in 2014, the town booted out its Socialist mayor in favor of a candidate from Le Pen’s National Front (FN). Mayor Fabien Engelmann, a slick 37-year-old, embodies changing local tastes in politics. A former hard-left trade unionist, he switched to the FN in 2010 due to his growing concerns about immigration and Islam. The town backed Socialist François Hollande by a whisker ahead of Le Pen in the last election, but if conversation on the streets is anything to go by, she has a good chance of coming out on top here when Hayange votes along with the rest of the country in April.
Hayange, in other words, is the French equivalent of Donald Trump country, that swath of voters in the deindustrializing rust belt who helped give Obama the presidency in 2008 and 2012, and whose votes delivered formerly Democratic states to Trump in 2016.
Like Trump, Le Pen has a voter base beyond angry whites in the economically depressed regions that account for most of the 900,000 industrial jobs France has lost over the past 15 years. The FN counts the sun-soaked south as its historic stronghold, where social conservatives and staunch nationalists returning from colonial-era Algeria have long backed the movement. But if Le Pen manages to ride the global populist tide to a shocking win after Brexit and Trump, decaying northern industrial towns like Hayange will have helped her get there.
“The counties that voted for Trump have the same sociological profiles as districts voting for Marine Le Pen — deindustrialized, rather lost, very socially vulnerable,” said Stéphane Wahnich, a political analyst who has written two books about the FN leader. “Paris and Lyon vote for the left, because they’re wealthy. Guys from Hayange vote for the far right, because they feel forgotten. The only one who’s taking up their cause is Marine Le Pen.”
* * *
Hayange is nestled in the Moselle Valley along the borders of Luxembourg and Germany, and has passed in and out of French hands over the course of its history. However, it has been a consistent symbol of France’s changing industrial fortunes. The de Wendel family, one of the country’s oldest and most powerful industrial dynasties, bought its first forges here in 1704, making it a birthplace of French heavy industry. From their base in Hayange, the de Wendels spread out across a region rich in iron ore, growing into one of Europe’s biggest steelmakers by 1900.

Fast-forward another century and the town had become a byword for President Nicolas Sarkozy’s failure to halt industrial collapse.
Fast-forward another century and the town had become a byword for President Nicolas Sarkozy’s failure to halt industrial collapse. By 2012, ArcelorMittal, now the owner of Hayange’s blast furnaces, was seeking to shutter them as the European steel sector grappled with massive overcapacity and a flood of cheap metal from China and elsewhere. The fate of the plant became a focus of that year’s presidential election. Then-candidate Hollande descended on the steelworks — briefly casting a spotlight on a corner of the country that had long felt forgotten — and mopped up blue-collar votes with a promise to do better. He eventually sealed a deal with ArcelorMittal to avoid 600 layoffs, sending some workers home on early retirement or pushing them into other jobs at the huge site, which stretches into the neighboring town of Florange. But he could not save the blast furnaces. The giant towers remain shut. They dominate the skyline in Hayange, a painful reminder of busier times. Officially, the blast furnaces are being kept mothballed for potential use in a future project — but no one in Hayange believes that will happen, not even the FN mayor.
“It’s finished; they’re out for eternity,” said Engelmann, who believes the site should have been nationalized and resold when the market was doing better.
A steelworker’s grandson, Engelmann started his career as an official for France’s biggest and most hard-line trade union, the General Confederation of Labour. Back then he was a Communist. His political conversion, which he detailed in his 2014 book From Leftism to Patriotism, came gradually. He always believed in a strong role for the state, and still does. But increasingly he believed the left wasn’t addressing his concerns about immigration and the role of Islam in France. The National Front had the answers he was looking for.
“The politics of Marine Le Pen is the politics of common sense allied with protectionism and a state that protects, but also a politics that is clearer and tougher on security and massive immigration,” he said in an interview at the Town Hall, a forbidding-looking building in the main square.
“At the beginning I was worried there’d be skinheads and anti-Semites like the media said,” he said of his early ventures to party meetings. “But I saw middle-class French people who were saying, ‘We’ve got big problems in France; we’re struggling to pay the bills.’ Shopkeepers struggling to make ends meet.”
Outside Engelmann’s Town Hall, a few Trotskyist activists could be seen handing out leaflets. Hayange’s first postwar mayor was a Communist, but the town’s far-left influence has waned in keeping with the decline of a party that up until the 1980s was a major national player, with its members even serving as ministers. François Mitterand’s election in 1981 as France’s first Socialist president, and the country’s longest postwar leader, made the mainstream left an electable force — but it sapped much support from the once-popular Communists in the process.
* * *
The de Wendel family, like other paternalist tycoons of the 19th century, shaped Hayange’s culture such that the mines and steelworks dominated all aspects of life. The city’s patrons didn’t just provide their workers with employment, but extensive welfare services, from health care to housing.
“You were born in their hospitals; the schools were provided by the Wendels and the church too,” said Marc Olénine, a local business consultant who has written a book about Hayange. He believes these generous benefits — provided to some extent until the 1980s by employers who wanted their workers healthy but compliant — were largely responsible for the hard-left culture that still lingers today.
But Wahnich believes the region’s past helps explain why so many locals have found it easy to switch support to the National Front.
“It’s important to know that the Moselle was annexed by the Germans” during World War II, Wahnich said. Its citizens became German citizens, its young men were conscripted into the German army. That wasn’t the case in parts of France that were occupied rather than annexed. “Fascism is something that’s slightly normalized there,” he said.
France’s experience with authoritarianism under Nazi occupation is part of what makes the prospect of a National Front government so abhorrent to mainstream voters. But for the annexed Moselle, the psychological experience of the war was different, Wahnich said. It helped lend an authoritarian bent to the leftism later found in steel families like Engelmann’s. From authoritarian left to authoritarian right, “it doesn’t take much to tip them over,” he said.
Others have asked if it’s really so surprising that rust belt voters might flip from the hard left to the National Front, given that both carry an anti-elitist message and claim to have the working man’s interests at heart.
The difference, it seems, is Le Pen’s timely messaging on immigration and Islam. Like elsewhere in the West, a fading economy has been accompanied by a backlash against newcomers. Many locals are of immigrant stock — descended from generations of Italians and others who came to work in the valley’s mines and steelworks since the end of the 19th century. But there’s a growing sentiment that more recent arrivals are different.
“The Italians and the Portuguese came, and they integrated,” said Georges Dibling, an aging rocker selling punk knickknacks at a market stall. “Now we’ve seen immigration from beyond Europe, and that is causing problems.” Though there are two halal butchers in town, Hayange remains largely white. But residents like tattoo shop owner Pascal talk of feeling “invaded.”
“We have to stop the foreigners coming here. Already there’s not much work and what little there is, they come and take,” says Véronique, a 57-year-old market trader who is backing Le Pen after a lifetime of voting for the left. “Something has to give.”
Marc Guillaume, an economist, says this resentment against foreigners has been building since the 1970s, when soaring oil prices dealt a body blow to the French economy in general and the industrial belt in particular. The longer-term forces of globalization were also at work by then: Iron ore previously mined around Hayange was now imported at lower prices from Mauritania or Canada. And then there were advances in technology, which wiped out human jobs. An industry that employed 155,000 people in 1975 had shrunk by two-thirds by 2009 as thousands took early retirement. In Hayange, a plant that employed 13,000 in 1973 has no more than 2,200 workers today, according to union figures.
Like other rust belt towns, Hayange has suffered from its reliance on a single sector. “It’s an area marked by its mono-industry,” Olénine says. Centuries ago, when the de Wendels were building their steel empire, cash had poured out of workers’ pockets into shops and bustling cafes that drew people from miles around. Today the absence of that cash means the cafes are mostly empty.
“Before there were businesses in Hayange; there was work right in front of us,” says one unemployed steelworker who declined to give his name, sipping a beer over a newspaper in a bar. He waved in the direction of the blast furnaces. “Now it’s dead. It’s terrible.”
* * *
Today, about a third of Hayange’s residents commute to Luxembourg, most of them skilled workers in service industries like IT and banking who believe the cheaper rents here are worth the two-hour round trip. Despite the decline of industry, unemployment rates in this stretch of northeastern France are not particularly higher than the national average of 10 percent, but this is largely because so many work across the borders — 90,000 in Luxembourg and tens of thousands of others in Germany, Belgium, or Switzerland. Even FN voters in Hayange admit their uncomfortable reliance on their European neighbors. But their mayor insists the party could come up with a workaround if Le Pen quit the European Union as threatened.
Other than commuting to a foreign country or subsisting on government handouts, there is relatively little to do for work in Hayange. In the wider region, Wahnich says the famously strong French safety net has had the perverse effect of feeding populist anger, because it has served as a constant reminder of how little improvement there has been in people’s prospects.
“The archetypal miner is now 60 and has been laid off for 15 years, paid to do nothing. He’s richer than his son,” he said. “Meanwhile, there has been no revival of the economy. The children either leave, or they stay and are less well paid than their parents.”
France’s once-vaunted job security — a legacy of past left-wing victories — has become a liability, making companies reluctant to take on new permanent employees while the economic outlook remains bleak, and encouraging them to shift production abroad. 
In 2015, nearly 90 percent of new job contracts were temporary — most for less than a month.
In 2015, nearly 90 percent of new job contracts were temporary — most for less than a month. Hayange is no exception: Many of those left at the steel plant are on short-term contracts and live in constant fear of losing their jobs. “We’re like tissues — they take us, they use us, and then they throw us away,” said the unemployed steelworker. The 45-year-old is at a loose end after finishing up an 18-month stint at the plant. He feels too old to retrain, and family commitments leave him unable to leave the region. All he can do is hope there’ll be more need for him next year.
Opinion polls forecast that Le Pen will win a place as one of the top two candidates in the first round of the presidential election, going through to the runoff in May (though, for the moment at least, they don’t expect her to win). Few expect Socialist party candidate Benoît Hamon to make much headway. Most expect Le Pen’s opponent to be either centrist former economy minister Emmanuel Macron, who has been surging in the polls of late, or right-wing candidate François Fillon, even though his fortunes have been falling as a result of an ongoing corruption scandal.
Neither of her opponents have much appeal to voters in places like Hayange. Fillon, a proud Thatcherite, has made clear he wants to slash corporate taxes and ax a half million public sector jobs. Meanwhile, Macron has cast himself as pro-EU and business-friendly, and has suggested tax cuts for the wealthy.
In the United States, the quirks of the Electoral College gave outsized influence to Trump voters in rural and rustbelt states. In France, by contrast, the anger of people in places like Hayange will propel Le Pen to the presidency only if they represent more than 50 percent of the voting public. Wahnich and most others believe they are unlikely to see a Le Pen victory, not least because France’s last experience with authoritarian leadership was within living memory, in the form of a Nazi puppet regime. “When faced with a right-wing populist candidate, it doesn’t have the same resonance for an American as it does for a French person, historically speaking,” he said. In rust belt towns like Hayange, the authoritarianism of the past might lend itself to a political culture comfortable with the National Front, but this is not, he believes, the story of France at large.
That said, the anger on the streets of Hayange — against useless politicians, the EU, the ravages of borderless trade — can be felt far beyond this town. Le Pen billed herself as the “candidate of the forgotten” as long ago as the last election in 2012. This time, it feels like the time of the forgotten might finally have come around.

January 22, 2017

Hindu nationalism is more Italian and Christian than Sonia Gandhi

The Times of India - January 22, 2017

Hindu nationalism is more Italian and Christian than Sonia Gandhi

Pankaj Mishra

Hindu nationalists have always made large claims about their exemplary and inimitable Hindu-ness. In Essentials of Hindutva, the book that comes closest to defining the ideology of modern Hindu nationalism, V D Savarkar claimed that the Hindus are a people who possess a common pitrubhumi or fatherland, common blood, "common Sanskriti (civilisation)" and a common punyabhumi or holy land.

A range of figures — from Narendra Modi alleging that Sonia Gandhi with her Christian ancestry represents 'Rome Raj' and V S Naipaul raging about the Muslim invasions of India to today's trolls attacking Western scholars and journalists — have offered a distinctive version of Indian history: one in which a glorious Hindu past is violated by various foreigners.

This history calls for an acute consciousness of the defeat and humiliation of ancestors, an awakening to historical pain, and a resolve to rectify the wrongs of the past with superhuman efforts at power and glory in the present and future. The latter include self-sacrifice for the greater cause of the nation, as Modi has repeatedly exhorted after unleashing demonetisation. An intellectual genealogy of Hindu nationalism, however, reveals that there is nothing uniquely 'Hindu' about it.

Much has been written about the RSS modelling itself on the Nazis and the Fascists of the 1930s. But the origins of Hindu nationalism are more accurately located in the emotional and psychological matrix of exiled 19th-century Europeans. Savarkar and many other upper-caste Hindus derived from these Europeans their obsession with identifying a common fatherland or motherland, blood, civilisation and holy land.

Many educated Europeans in the 19th century, who were entering or being coerced into the modern world of industry and commerce, tried to construct an awesome past, often with the help of outright forgeries (such as the poems of Ossian, which inspired Napoleon as well as German Romantics). Ransacking the debris of the past for signs to their glorious future (as distinct from Gandhi alighting on the humble charkha), they endowed ruins that had been ignored for centuries with profound meaning. Ancient Greece suddenly became for many the symbol of a lost unity and harmony (budding Italian nationalists, however, succumbed to grand visions of ancient Rome).
This new historical consciousness was a particularly soothing balm to people uprooted and bewildered by the revolutionary processes of industrialisation, urbanisation and secularisation. Those traumatised by a profoundly disruptive modern world developed a strategic — and selective — memory of the past in order to reorient themselves in the present and define the possibilities for a better future. History itself began to seem, as in the Muslim-invasion version of Indian history, like a series of abrupt breaks — one that also held out the promise of radical new beginnings.

The most seductive of these fables of tragic collapse and imminent rebirth were told by people from fragmented countries who found themselves ranged against vast empires, such as the Germans, the Scots and the Italians. And the most fervent among those dreaming of a common holy land were exiles and expatriates.

Like the Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) of today, expatriate Europeans were also the most zealous nationalists, longing desperately for identity and belonging in their alien settings. The most famous and internationally influential among them was the Italian activist and thinker Giuseppe Mazzini, whose organisation Young Italy found imitators as far as Japan.

It would be an understatement to say that Savarkar was obsessed with Mazzini. Living in London in the first decade of the 20th century, this Chitpavan Brahmin in his restless exile published a volume of Mazzini's writings with a breathless introductory essay. He modelled his organisation Abhinava Bharat on Young Italy and he continued to immerse himself in Mazzini's writings during his long imprisonment in Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Militantly irreligious, like Savarkar, Mazzini spoke of regeneration of the Italian nation rather than of traditional religion. In his view, Italians had a sacred mission — the establishment of the 'Third Rome' following the First and second Romes of the Caesars and the Church. He wanted the Italian people, whom he only knew from afar, to dedicate their lives to the fulfilment of their nation's special mission, which involved, among other things, the creation of undivided or 'Akhand' Italy through the re-conquest of territories that had once belonged to the first and second Romans.

Nationalism, as Mazzini conclusively defined it, was a system of beliefs that ought to pervade collective existence, and encourage the spirit of self-sacrifice. His writing resonates with praise for martyrs who 'consecrate with their blood and idea of national liberty'. Indeed, Lala Lajpat Rai explicitly identified Mazzini as the founder of a whole new religion of martyrdom and sacrifice — one that Modi has pressed upon Indians with special vigour after the fiasco of demonetisation.

But, like many upper-caste Indian devotees of Mazzini, Lajpat Rai did not realise that Mazzini's own notions were derived from a hugely influential French Catholic priest Felicite de Lamennais, whose 1834 book Words of a Believer was one of the most widely read books of the 19th century. It was Lamennais who tried to establish a precise relationship, subsequently insisted upon by nationalists in India as well as Italy, between the 'motherland', and the isolated individuals who voluntarily 'penetrate and become enmeshed' with it.

Savarkar could not have formulated his messianic nationalism without the help of such deeply Christian ideas of sacrifice, martyrdom, resurrection and redemption that his hero Mazzini introduced into the political discourse of the 19th century. Indeed, Mazzini's fantasies of re-establishing Akhand Italy and Rome Raj hover over every page of Essentials of Hindutva; his pseudo-Catholic obsessions have suffused all subsequent Hindu nationalist dreams of a common blood, fatherland, civilization, and holy land. In this sense at least, Hindu nationalism is more Italian, and Christian, than Sonia Gandhi.

Mishra is the author of the forthcoming book, Age of Anger: A History of the Present

October 19, 2016

Soup Kitchens and Street Fighting: The Brownshirts in Hamburg

via H-Net

Andrew Wackerfuss. Stormtrooper Families: Homosexuality and Community in the Early Nazi Movement. New York: Harrington Park Press, 2015. 352 pp. $35.00 (paper), ISBN 978-1-939594-05-1; $90.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-939594-04-4.
Reviewed by Alex Burkhardt (University of St Andrews)
Published on H-German (October, 2016)
Commissioned by Nathan N. Orgill

Soup Kitchens and Street Fighting: The Brownshirts in Hamburg
 
There is a long tradition of scholarly inquiry into the Nazi Sturmabteilung (SA), the brown-shirted paramilitary wing of the National Socialist movement that was in no small part responsible for the mayhem that descended upon the streets of Weimar Germany in its last fraught years. Pioneering work in the 1980s by historians, such as Conan Fischer (Stormtroopers: A Social, Economic, and Ideological Analysis, 1929-35 [1983], Richard Bessel (Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism: The Storm Troopers in Eastern Germany, 1925-1934 [1984]), and Peter Longerich (Die Braunen Bataillone: Geschichte Der SA [1989]), furnished a strong empirical base on the social background, ideological leanings, and propagandistic provenance of the Stormtroopers. More recent studies by the likes of Sven Reichardt (Faschistische Kampfbünde: Gewalt und Gemeinschaft im italienischen Squadrismus und in der deutschen SA [2002]), Daniel Siemens (Horst Wessel: Tod und Verklärung Eines Nationalsozialisten [2009]), and Dirk Schumann (Political Violence in the Weimar Republic, 1918-1933: Fight for the Streets and Fear of Civil War [2009]) have brought the tools of cultural history to bear on Nazi paramilitarism, offering further insights into the value systems and “organisational cultures” that underpinned it. In Stormtrooper Families, Andrew Wackerfuss, a historian with the United States Air Force, makes a further contribution to this already extensive body of literature with a local study of the Hamburg branch of the SA.
Stormtrooper Families is structured into nine chapters that proceed chronologically, and it might be possible to discreetly divide the book into three sections, which deal in turn with the background, course, and aftermath of the crucial period from 1929 to 1933, when the Hamburg SA was in its heyday. The first three chapters explore the organization’s prewar origins and its difficult fledgling years in the 1920s. Wackerfuss first provides a brief history of Hamburg, focusing particularly on the years before the First World War, which, he argues, were critical to the later psychological and political development of the SA. In chapters 2 and 3, he shows that the city’s first Brownshirts were mainly ex-soldiers disenchanted with the Weimar Republic, but also that, before 1929, the Hamburg SA remained a vocal but numerically quite negligible factor in local politics.
In the elections of September 1930, however, the Nazi share of the vote skyrocketed, and Adolf Hitler’s party became a major player in national politics, signaling the beginning of the end of Germany’s interwar experiment with democracy. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 focus on these last volatile years of the Weimar Republic, when the SA was at its zenith and was key to the Nazi campaign to seize power. The Hamburg SA expanded propitiously during this period, waging constant and bloody war on the streets against its political opponents, mainly the Communists. This enormous propensity for political violence is the focal point in chapters 4 and 6, which concentrate not only on the chronic, low-level conflict that was a constant feature of the SA’s (and Hamburg’s) makeup but also on two set pieces, the Battle of Sternschanze and the Altona Bloody Sunday, when the SA, along with the police and Communists, managed to bring virtual civil war conditions to parts of the city. Chapter 5, meanwhile, focuses more on what Wackerfuss calls “the caring side” of the SA (p. xv)—the vast social support network of soup kitchens, health-insurance schemes, and barrack-style “SA Homes” that the paramilitary organization established in the city and used to both attract and integrate members.
The final three chapters focus on the decline of the Stormtroopers after Hitler became chancellor in January 1933. Though the Hamburg SA was initially in a triumphant mood and unleashed a wave of violence against its enemies in the months after the Nazi “seizure of power,” it soon became a problem in itself for the wider Nazi movement, which was now looking to consolidate power and had less need of an unruly paramilitary organization. The liquidation of a large part of the SA leadership in the Night of the Long Knives and its gradual fading into insignificance thereafter are the focal points of chapter 8 and the epilogue.
This book, then, is ultimately a local study of a single organization. But it is not a typical social history, being relatively free of tables or statistics that show, for example, the occupational background of members of the Hamburg SA. Instead, this is a broader “cultural history” of the Brownshirts in the city, focusing more on the content of the SA’s newspaper, the relationships between its key figures and its recruits, the social networks it established in and around Hamburg, the nature and provenance of its violence, and, crucially, the role played—and tensions inaugurated—by homosexuality within its ranks.
Wackerfuss brings a very perceptive eye to his subject. His analysis is augmented by insights from social psychology and cultural theory, and some of his conclusions are highly thought provoking. In the first chapter, for example, he lays bare the central significance that an imaginary idea of prewar Hamburg—a gleaming “city on the hill” (p. 16)—had for the young Stormtroopers and, even more important, the role of their fathers in conveying this image. Stormtroopers, Wackerfuss suggests, wanted to honor their fathers and assume their rightful place in this tradition of success, but the loss of the war and the German Revolution of November 1918 prevented this. Thus, the central motivation of their lives (and the factor that drew them to the SA) was a desire to restore Hamburg to its (perceived) prewar state, which of course meant destroying the hated Weimar Republic. However, as Wackerfuss compellingly shows, the Stormtroopers, unlike their fathers, were prepared to accomplish this with violence; that is, they sought to uphold the bourgeois order through practices that were (ostensibly) contradictory to that very order. Joining the SA, then, was an act of both conformity and rebellion.
This was not the only contradiction at the heart of the Hamburg SA, however. As Wackerfuss repeatedly shows, many of its members joined the organization because they viewed it as a force for order and “moral authority” that would support the traditional family (p. 60). However, it also drew them into an exclusively male universe in which homosexual relationships could and did flourish. The SA’s enemies on the left, despite their ostensibly “progressive” politics, showed no compunction about using this in an attempt to discredit the Nazi paramilitaries. But Wackerfuss also argues that this dynamic of ambiguous sexuality—in an environment of increasingly uncertain gender relations—was one of the key factors that drove the SA to violence. The desire to prove their putative “masculinity” through involvement in a violent male fighting league was, he suggests, one of the main reasons people became involved in it at all.
Along with these unstable dynamics around sexuality and identity, SA violence was also driven by a remarkably paranoid narrative that ran throughout its press. In a detailed analysis of the Brownshirt newspaper, Wackerfuss shows that Stormtroopers consistently presented themselves as victims of enemy violence and as constantly on the defensive, which meant that subsequent SA aggression was understood by its practitioners as retaliatory and retributive. Similar narratives, he argues, are observable in the local Communist press. This mutual paranoia and sense of victimhood produced a spiraling dynamic of almost sectarian violence that was perceived as “defensive” by both sides, though it was frequently anything but.
But the marked instability evinced by the Hamburg SA in the domains of both sexual identity and violence were to prove its undoing after Hitler became chancellor in January 1933, as the very practices and internal tensions that had made it such an effective unit for winning power were precisely those that made it an embarrassing liability in a National Socialist state. The result was the Night of the Long Knives. In Hamburg itself, where the SA purge claimed eleven lives, this unmistakeably indicated the decline of the Nazi paramilitary group, demonstrated by, for example, the local Nazi Party’s decision to stop compiling reports on the causes of Stormtrooper suicides. The SA had fulfilled its purpose and the party was, to some degree, past caring about it.
Despite the insightfulness of some of Wackerfuss’s analysis, there are a few issues with the overall focus of this volume. In the introduction, he promises “the truth about the connection between sexuality and Nazism,” a claim the book does not deliver on (p. x). Indeed, its weakest sections are those that stray from its central subject: the Hamburg Sturmabteilung. For example, chapter 7 contains a section about the Reichstag Fire and how Communists portrayed this as the result of a homosexual “conspiracy” within the Nazi movement, while the final chapter concludes with some reflections on the pernicious stereotype of “the gay Nazi” and how certain contemporary figures have used this in the service of a homophobic agenda. These aspects of the book are not uninteresting, but they dilute its focus and detract from what is, ultimately, its main task—to present a comprehensive sociocultural history of the Hamburg SA. Indeed, homosexuality plays an important role in Wackerfuss’s analysis of the Sturmabteilung in Hamburg, but it is arguably not the central factor treated here. The occasional divergences into the wider links between Nazism and homosexuality thus add little to the account, and the book might have been stronger had it understood itself in more limited terms as a sociocultural history of the Hamburg SA (and the place of homosexuality within it).
If, however, we do indeed view the book in these less ambitious but still worthy terms, then it can comfortably be judged a great success. Wackerfuss scores a lot of points in two basic aspects of the historian’s craft: style and archival work. He has done the latter extensively, and he conveys his findings with considerable and unusual flair. Above all, as already mentioned, he imparts some striking insights into the group and individual psychology of SA men that are not to be found in more drily empirical studies. Academic readers will find his contribution to our knowledge of the SA, and especially his perceptive analysis of the psychology of some of its members, immensely useful, while more casual readers will surely find his account, quite simply, very enjoyable to read.

July 04, 2015

Book Review: Right-Wing Populism in Europe

Full Text (PDF) Book review: Ruth Wodak, Majid KhosraviNik and Brigitte Mral (eds), Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse Discourse & Society July 2015 26: 503-505,

http://das.sagepub.com/content/26/4/503?etoc
 

June 16, 2015

Germany's Pegida anti-Islamisation group says it has a new hero: Narendra Modi (Anuradha Sharma, scroll.in, 15 June 2015)

scroll.in

immigration debate
Germany's Pegida anti-Islamisation group says it has a new hero: Narendra Modi
Group's leader says he'd like to invite the Indian prime minister to address one of its infamous Monday rallies in Dresden.
Anuradha Sharma · 15 June 2015


Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s overseas fan club is swelling. Among his new fans are the leaders of Germany’s Pegida ‒ a German acronym for the Patriotic Europeans Against Islamisation of the West group that was formed in Dresden in October. The organisation hit the global headlines in January when, in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo massacre in France, 25,000 sympathisers turned out to protest Muslim immigration to Germany.

Pegida has since inspired the formation of me-too groups in other parts of Germany (Legida in Leipzig, Bogida in Bonn, Fragida in Frankfurt) and abroad (US, Canada and UK). It has continued to make its presence felt by organising street demonstrations in Dresden every Monday.

When Scroll.in interviewed the two top Pegida leaders ahead of their rally in Dresden last Monday, they were effusive in their praise for India’s prime minister. “We need a leader like him in Germany here,” declared Lutz Bachmann, Pegida’s head and founder. Bachmann had quit Pegida late in January after a photo of him styled as Adolf Hitler went viral but rejoined a month later. His aide Tatjana Festerling added, “Not only in Germany, but the whole of Europe. We need courageous leaders who are positioning themselves against Islamisation.”

Old India hand

As it turns out, Festerling is a yoga practitioner who visits India regularly for meditation retreats. This, she insisted, gave her some insight into the challenges faced by the subcontinent. “I know you have a lot of problems there, wherever you are in your country,” she said. “We have lots of troubles with these people [Muslims] like you have.”

She added: “We are speaking against losing our culture. All northern European cultures are fading away. We have mosques all over. We have muezzins calling five times a day. In some cities, you will find totally different parallel societies. There is no concept of integration among them.”

In the first round of the mayoral elections in Dresden held on June 7, Festerling polled almost 10% of the vote. The surprising performance comes as a shot in the arm to Pegida, which critics was already being written off as a fading movement. Both Bachmann and Festerling were ecstatic and believe that the result is evidence that they have a political future not only in Dresden, but in other German cities as well. In the next one or two years, Bachmann hopes, Pegida will be able to have a strong footing as a political party.

Despite a heavy downpour, last Monday’s rally at Dresden’s historic palace square saw more than 1,500 supporters. The aged and disabled in wheelchairs, office-goers still in their ties, teenagers with tattoos and piercings, sympathisers from other German regions, and also from neighbouring countries, all gathered amidst heavy security presence to listen to their leaders. A procession meandered through the city.

A fixture

While the number of participants is falling, the demonstrations have become a fixture in Dresden. “It’s become a weekly city event,” said Alexander Schneider, a senior journalist with the local newspaper Sächsische Zeitung. “But the movement in itself has lost its fervour.”

Hans Vorländer, the professor of political science at Dresden Technical University who was part of a team studying Pegida, said that they group had lost its political purpose: now, he said, the demonstrators rally together for the company of like-minded souls, just like members of a sports club or revellers at a beer party. The gains it made in the city elections came not because voters were especially enamoured of Pegida’s ideals but because they were upset with the system. “It’s like a game they are playing, without purpose, or end, or strategy,” Vorländer said. “At some point it has to end.”

A major factor that will cause Pegida to fail, Vorländer said, is Germany’s strong civil society. Ever since the Pegida protests began, Germany has been witnessing counter-demonstrations all through the country. “Compared to other countries, in Germany it [Pegida] cannot be organised as a steady political party or movement just because of, for historical reasons, the strength of civil society and there are some social mechanisms of setting up taboos on certain issues, and these taboos can be considered as historical lessons from Nazism,” Vorlander said.

In the meantime, Bachmann has been trying several strategies to fuel the movement, which he says is not “anti-Islam”, but anti-Islamisation”. He has been inviting right-wing speakers from other countries to address the Dresden rallies. Geert Wilders, the right-wing leader from Netherlands, attended the demonstration on April 14 in which he heaped praises on Pegida supporters.

“We would like to get in touch with Indian politicians,” Festerling said.

Bachmann’s keen desire is to have Prime Minister Narendra Modi at one of his events. “Tell him that we invite him here in Dresden,” he said.

September 02, 2014

What is the scale of the problem of far-right extremism in Europe? (Video)



What is the scale of the problem of far-right extremism in Europe? (Video, 2 minutes)

The FREE Initiative (Far-Right Extremism in Europe Initiative) has produced a series of short films to showcase the tactics and methods taken by those tackling far-right extremism across Europe. Hear the stories of those who are on the streets having the hard conversations with far-right activists, those who have rid entire towns of neo-Nazi gangs, and those who have pushed hundreds of violent extremists to leave the scene. Listen to the stories of survivors of far-right violence, who share their stories to prevent attacks like this from happening again.

Films directed by: Rino Pucci and Marcos Villasenor

Music: Simon Porter.

June 30, 2013

Book Review: Sandrine Sanos. The Aesthetics of Hate: Far-Right Intellectuals, Antisemitism, and Gender in 1930s France

Sandrine Sanos. The Aesthetics of Hate: Far-Right Intellectuals, Antisemitism, and Gender in 1930s France. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012. xi + 369 pages. $65.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-8047-7457-4.

Reviewed by Julie Kalman (Monash University)
Published on H-Judaic (June, 2013)
Commissioned by Jason Kalman

Fascism, Racism, Colonialism, and Antisemitism

Before I turn to my review of Sandrine Sanos’s work, I wish to declare my own shortcomings and interests as a reviewer. I am not a specialist of twentieth-century France, and I cannot presume to speak to the historical and historiographical context of Sanos’s book. However, like Sanos, I seek to consider the ways that antisemitism can illuminate aspects of French history, as well as the insights that we can gain from literary analysis in historical context. It is from this perspective that I read Sanos’s work, and in this sense that my own comments should be understood.

Sanos sets out with an admirable aim. She wants to bring together historical and disciplinary approaches, to map the gaps that, according to her, still bedevil the history of the far right in interwar France, despite the heavy academic traffic in this field. She promises to consider literary and political writings together, to revisit and rethink the nature of interwar French fascism. She argues that literature served a distinctly political purpose--as a form of resolution to a perceived political crisis. In turn, an analysis of this literature, as well as journalism, allows us to better understand fascist anxieties and visions for France.

Of particular significance is Sanos’s focus on antisemitism and colonial racism, and the ways in which, as she puts it, the two forces were “imbricated, rather than parallel” (p. 8). However, this is not a book about antisemitism. Rather, Sanos’s aim is to consider the antisemitism of far-right interwar French journalists, as one part of their attempts to express their hopes and anxieties through literature. Sanos’s approach is illuminating, in this sense: she places the antisemitism of the interwar far right in historical context. When we understand the role that the fantasized Jew played for her protagonists, we understand them better, but we are also offered new perspectives on historical understandings of antisemitism that sweeping works focusing uniquely on the same phenomenon simply cannot provide.

Sanos focuses on a select group of figures, concerned with “the dissolution of the boundaries of the nation, the status of the male self, and the future of French culture and civilization” (p. 9). Her book tells the story of the far right’s obsession with manliness and the nation. In face of modernity, abjection, and degradation, how could the boundaries of normative masculinity, and their link to a virile, strong France, be defined? These anxieties, Sanos tells us, were expressed in terms of gender, sexuality, race--categories that all became fixed on a fantasized Jew--and politics. Not only, therefore, was the Jew homosexual, feminized, rapacious, and black, but also communist. The Jew “embodied a perverse sexual threat to the nation” (p. 221). She seeks to elucidate, in their writings, “the inseparable relationship between aesthetics and politics, culture and ideology, that obsessed so many 1930s writers and critics,” and which, she argues, “has yet to be fully historicized” (p. 119).

Sanos’s book takes the reader through an exploration of the personalities that make up her Young New Right (these include figures such as Thierry Maulnier, Robert Brasillach, and Jean-Pierre Maxence), their place in a longer story of far-right politics in France, and their own obsessions. Her final three chapters focus increasingly on the meaning in the writings of figures such as Maurice Blanchot, Louis-Ferdinand Céline, and Robert Brasillach. The figure of the Jew becomes ever more prominent in these chapters, as Sanos teases out the place of these writers, their relationship to the first half of her book, and the meanings behind their writings.

In chapter 1, Sanos explores and contextualizes “The Crisis of the Self” that young far-right intellectuals saw as characteristic of the 1930s. She sets out how they drew on categories of civilization, race, gender, and sexuality to express their sense of dislocation in a time that they perceived as a crisis, and how they brought together aesthetics and politics in their enunciation of a far-right ideology. Crisis was evident everywhere: in literature, art, politics, and culture. The generation that followed the Great War felt only emptiness. How, then, to recover and reformulate the self? For Sanos’s far-right intellectuals, this necessitated overcoming “fragmentation, narcissism, and deviance” (p. 26). Only a properly authoritarian state could ensure that the self would be properly regulated, in step with the nation. In this way, their idea of the self came together with their gendered understanding of the nation, and the proper social order. Moreover, since crisis was evident in culture, it was necessary, if not urgent, for Sanos’s young far-right critics to engage in the cultural sphere. They had to define literature. After all, the novel, too, was in crisis. This concern of the relationship between the self, culture, and the nation, and “its privileged expression, literature, infused their vision of their political role and intellectuals” (p. 40).

In her second chapter, Sanos explores the genealogy of the far right, or the idea of these right-wing intellectuals as a generation, as she puts it, “of refusal, dissidence, and oppositional politics” (p. 43). Sanos seeks to consider these young far-right intellectuals as a group, in order to understand what it was about their time that bound them together. In part, this was friendship and collegiality. She also considers their antecedents. The difference between their new discourse and the old, according to Sanos, lay most particularly in their refusal to be labeled fascist, and the place they gave to antisemitism in their nationalist ideology. What characterized them was their bringing together of the literary and political.

Chapter 3 is an exploration of the obsessions of the Young New Right, particularly abjection, decadence, and degradation: features that they saw as striking at the heart of the nation and of French civilization. Blum, and Jews more generally, were “both symptom and origin” of this phenomenon (p. 93). Indeed, the figure of Léon Blum became “the repository of everything that these far-right intellectuals felt tainted by” (p. 133). Sanos argues that the literature has tended to downplay the role that antisemitism played in the creation of an extreme right-wing vision of nationhood by the Young New Right. She wants to suggest that volume is not necessarily a reflection of intensity, and that although antisemitic references did not occur frequently in the press of the Young New Right, nevertheless, their worldview cannot be fully understood without making space for their antisemitism. Here, Sanos nods to a link between antisemitism and broader racism, whereby France achieved its greatness, in part, through colonialism, and “mastery over ‘natives’” (p. 77). In the eyes of the Young New Right, France had not only lost control of its colonial populations, it had also been colonized, internally. Sanos explores the central role of the Jewish socialist Léon Blum, who came to power with his left-wing Popular Front coalition in 1936 (a moment seen as a crisis of the nation for the Young New Right). The abjection that the Young New Right so feared and abhorred came to be located within the fantasized person of Blum, and it in this sense, she argues, that we must understand that antisemitism was central to their understandings of self, nation, and civilization.

The focus of Sanos’s fourth chapter is the literary critic Maurice Blanchot. For Sanos, the complicated nature of Blanchot’s own trajectory “speaks to the complex and paradoxical nature of the 1930s” (p. 119). How, in particular, might we incorporate his far-right journalism with his literary works, still influential? Sanos wants to excavate the moment in which Blanchot’s “difficult” writings were produced, and in this way, historicize them. This complexity is brought to light, in particular, with regard to the nature of Blanchot’s writings on and relationships with Jews. He was a lifelong friend of Emmanuel Lévinas, and helped to hide his wife and daughter in 1941. He saved another Jewish friend--the journalist Paul Lévy--from arrest in 1940. While commentators have generally downplayed Blanchot’s antisemitism with the argument that a literal counting of the number of mentions of the word “Jew” in his work yields scant returns, Sanos argues, instead, that we must consider context. In the far-right press of the 1930s, an attack on Léon Blum or Julien Benda was “charged” with meaning (p. 124). Jewishness in Blanchot’s work, she argues, stood in for the otherness of all those who were seen to place the sanctity of the nation’s borders under threat. Thus Jews threatened France’s very status in Europe. This issue was particularly acute where it concerned language, the cornerstone of French civilization, which was distorted and made a travesty by intellectuals such as Julien Benda, thus threatening French culture. The Jew also represented “the fraught relationship between the self and the nation,” an obsession in Blanchot’s writing (p. 124). Thus, for example, Blum was painted as a feminized figure, lacking the virility of the idealized French citizen.

In chapter 5, Sanos turns to the Paris doctor Louis-Ferdinand Destouches, or Louis-Ferdinand Céline. Again, she sets out to integrate his antisemitic pamphlets of the 1930s with his celebrated postwar literary works. For Celine, both race and gender formed the foundations of Frenchness. Like his fellow far-right writers, he sought the restoration of a French masculinity that modernity had brought to crisis. In other ways, Céline was unique. His racial antisemitism, whereby the experience of race, both without and within France, led to a realization of the Jew’s power, constituted “a new idiom” (p. 163). The Jew and the Negro were one--“Negroid Jews”--and this Jewishness had invaded the metropole, causing dissolution and degradation. The Jew’s imputed blackness served to emphasize a difference that was intrinsically racial, locked in the body. Sanos argues that these themes, of French degradation, and a racialized view of the world, are clear across all of Céline’s work. Céline differed from other Young New Right critics in this way. Whereas all agreed on the nation’s abjection, most far-right writers understood racial contamination as being sequestered in the colonies, allowing the metropole to remain pure. Céline “tore the veil” (p. 191), and brought this contamination into the heart of France through the figure of the racialized Jew.

Sanos’s reading of fascism, racism, and antisemitism together continues through her final chapter, on the fascist newspaper Je suis partout (I am everywhere). She privileges the paper’s main contributors, such as Robert Brasillach, and Lucien Rebatet, and seeks, again, to place them, their writings, and Je suis partout, in historical context. “Their conception of French citizenship,” she tells us, “could be defined only through the reaffirmation of a masculine, bounded, and antisemitic individual, who should be infused with an innate sense of the nation’s history and civilization” (p. 197).

There is an evident progression in Sanos’s work. However, readings of the kind that she is offering here can tend to become repetitive. This presents both a great reward and a great challenge to the writer. Two forces compete in Sanos’s book. One is the narrative that drives her discussion. The other is the repetition of themes that by the end, does tend to become rhythmic. At times, I also found myself wishing for greater contextual detail, both with regard to the period under discussion, and the figures on whom she focused. This, for me, would have given Sanos’s work greater balance between historical and literary approaches.

These quibbles aside, however, Sanos’s important achievement is to bring together the forces of racist colonialism and antisemitism, and to read them together. Sanos shows us that in 1930s France, anxieties about the nation, fantasized as under threat by colonizing Blum-like Jews, echoed idealizations of a great France, defined by its colonies, peopled by properly subservient and obedient natives. That their journalism ignored the fact that the French colonies increasingly became spaces of contention during the1930s, only serves to underscore the desires of far-right writers. Robert Brasillach, tried and executed after the war, explained in 1938 that “whether you want or not, France rules over seventy millions of white, yellow, black, Muslim, converted, fetishistic, civilized, barbarian men who do not have a single idea in common, except one: they do not like the Jews” (p. 235).

If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the list discussion logs at: http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl.

Citation: Julie Kalman. Review of Sanos, Sandrine, The Aesthetics of Hate: Far-Right Intellectuals, Antisemitism, and Gender in 1930s France. H-Judaic, H-Net Reviews. June, 2013.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=37971
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.