India: Can Hindutva politics deliver economic growth? | Roshan Kishore

Live Mint - July 17 2017

Can Hindutva politics deliver economic growth?

Relying on religion for legitimacy can undermine economic growth and innovation over the long run
Roshan Kishore

New Delhi: In his first address to fellow parliamentarians after becoming the Prime Minister in 2014, Narendra Modi mentioned in passing that India had been enslaved for 1,200 years, a point he reiterated in his Madison Square Garden speech later that year. Modi’s reference was undoubtedly to the long reign of Islamic rulers in the country, whom he chooses to see as the slave masters of India.

Modi’s unconventional view of India’s history may surprise many who consider the period of “slavery” to have begun only under British rule in the 18th century. But his view has the strong support of Hindutva votaries, as economist and politician Meghnad Desai pointed out in his 2016 book Making Sense of Modi’s India.



Votaries of Hindutva also tell us that ancient India (under Hindu rulers) had made exceptional strides in science and technology; developing aeroplanes, atomic bombs and plastic surgery. Even Modi has endorsed such claims. This narrative is accompanied by another claim: that India will regain its ancient glory under a prolonged spell of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) rule, and become one of the dominant forces in the world.

Can Hindutva-based politics deliver growth over the long run, as Hindutva votaries claim? Or would it derail progress, as their opponents argue?

A recent book by Jared Rubin, an associate professor of economics at Chapman University in California, can perhaps help us arrive at the answers to such questions. Rubin’s key argument is that whether or not religion derails economic growth depends on the balance of power between the religious and economic elite in a society. If the political elite draw legitimacy and sanction from the religious elite, a society’s institutions can pose obstacles to economic growth, his work shows.

An economic historian, Rubin draws on the lessons of history to throw light on these issues in Rulers, Religion, and Riches: Why the West Got Rich and the Middle East Did Not. Till a point in time, the Arab world under the Ottoman Empire was much more advanced than its Western European counterpart in all walks of life. Despite this advantage, it was Europe which became the world’s leader in modern economic growth. Why did this happen?

It was under Islam that the Arab world gained its supremacy in the world and it was under Islam that its decline began. So simply blaming religion alone for backwardness would not suffice, argues Rubin.

Instead, he offers a more nuanced explanation. The rulers of the Arab world drew their legitimacy from the clergy. While this allowed the rulers to maintain order in a violent world without having to take recourse to military action very frequently, it also meant that the clergy came to have an outsized influence on Arab society and economy, stifling its growth over the long run.

Islamic codes prohibiting interest earnings became a fetter on growth of modern banking. This had an adverse effect on the development of capitalist enterprises. A 250-year-long ban on the printing press—to preserve the religious elite’s monopoly on knowledge—led to a decline in scholarship and innovation, impeding growth and development.

Rubin argues that there were similar forces at work even in the Christian world. The relative backwardness of Spain and the relative advancement of Britain since the end of the medieval era could be attributed to the differences in the role of religion in the politics of these countries, he argues.

As in the case of the Ottoman Empire, the political class in Spain drew its legitimacy from the clergy. So, a ban on printing presses in order to preserve the religious clergy’s monopoly over knowledge had to be accepted. Similarly, any scientific method of knowledge-seeking which questioned religious beliefs was suppressed.

Things were different in Britain. Protestant reformation had significantly undermined the influence of the church. In order to seek legitimacy, the king had to seek support from the economic elite in parliament. In return, the economic elite wanted progressive laws to facilitate commerce. And the economic elite won the day.

But why didn’t the economic elite in the Arab world (or Spain) demand changes in laws or codes which were impediments to economic development? The answer to this perhaps lies in the work of Timur Kuran, a professor of economics and political science at Duke University, who enunciated the concept of “preference falsification” to explain why Islamic societies fell behind others.

Simply put, this means that people supportive of change refrain from expressing their true preferences for fear of punishment or social opprobrium. In the absence of any criticism of the status quo, this situation might become self-perpetuating. So, it was the fear of persecution by the religious clergy that prevented people from demanding printing presses in the Arab world, according to this theory. Kuran argues that preference falsification per se does not decide the economic fortunes of a society. However, if it happens to appease views which are inimical to economic growth, economic backwardness is inevitable.

Rubin argues that Kuran’s work offers the demand-side explanation of why the Arab world fell behind. Rubin describes his own work as the supply-side explanation of this phenomenon.

Rubin’s addition to Kuran’s work has important bearings on one of the most influential schools of thought in development economics: the “institutional” school, which emphasizes the role of institutions in powering economic growth. The most powerful proponents of this school, Daron Acemoglu of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and James Robinson of Chicago University, argued in their best-selling book Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty that the prosperity of nations depend on whether their institutions are “extractive” or “inclusive”. Extractive institutions concentrate economic and political power in the hands of a small but powerful clique whereas inclusive institutions encourage competition and contests for power. Once a nation is able to establish inclusive institutions, it creates a virtuous cycle of positive feedback, driving growth and innovation, and ensuring the stability of such institutions, they argued.

However, recent developments in the advanced world, particularly in the US, have led to questions about this theory, and about the resilience of institutions in that country. Acemoglu himself seems to be having second thoughts about the theory. In a January 2017 Foreign Policy article, Acemoglu is sceptical (almost dismissive) about the ability of institutions in the US to survive the “personal rule” of Donald Trump . The article goes on to warn against “unwavering—and outdated—belief in the famed strength of America’s institutions” and compares Trump to the likes or Hugo Chavez, Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

What explains this break in the virtuous circle proposed earlier by Acemoglu and Robinson? In a blog post discussing Acemoglu’s Foreign Policy piece, Rubin answers this question. Inclusive economic institutions are often a by-product of other, more deeply entrenched institutions. These depend on what the political elite have to do to stay in power.

Rubin identifies two ways through which political power can be retained: coercion and hegemony. A dictator ruling through armed supporters uses the former. A democratically elected leader does not need an armed militia because he has hegemony or popular acceptance. Normally, democratic leaders champion inclusive institutions. This is what Acemoglu and Robinson refer to as the positive feedback loop in their work. Rubin, however, argues it is not necessary that a leader elected through democratic means must adhere to inclusive values.

This can happen if he can increase or even hold on to his support while undermining such principles and institutions. Trump’s campaign for the presidency and his continued attack on several important institutions of the US is one such example, argues Rubin.

“Past U.S. presidents with legitimacy derived from (relatively) free and fair elections tended to find inclusion beneficial for their legitimacy, so democracy in the U.S. tended to be associated with increasingly inclusive institutions (well, at least for white men),” writes Rubin. “But inclusive institutions are an outcome, not a cause... A president who can chip away at the institutions that constrained previous presidents while still maintaining some degree of legitimacy with a sufficient portion of the population can undermine inclusive institutions in the context of a democratic setting.”

Rubin’s work has disturbing implications for the world’s largest democracy, which has witnessed a rising affirmation of majoritarianism over the past few years. It would have been just mildly amusing if the rising tide of Hindutva politics only encouraged exaggerated claims about the past. But its effects have been far more pernicious.

The frenzy around cow protection, which has claimed the lives of several innocent Muslim men, is the latest example. While Modi has condemned the excesses of cow protection vigilantes, who have targeted Muslims in the guise of cow protection, he has continued to underline the need for cow protection itself. Besides, he himself had promised to bring an end to the so-called “pink revolution” in the country during the 2014 election campaign.

Ironically, the so-called “pink revolution” or the rapid rise in export of meat from India, has helped raise incomes for farmers, and has improved India’s export earnings. The current frenzy around cow protection not just hurts cattle farmers and the cattle trade but also poses an inflationary risk. Yet, it also has the potential to polarize the electorate and appease the BJP’s ideological core. Even among its young supporters, who otherwise profess liberal values, a large majority has strong objections to beef-eating, showed a Lokniti-CSDS survey.

To be sure, neither the dominance of politics over economics nor the use of majoritarian totems to polarize the polity is entirely new in this country. In his 2005 book, Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Communal Riots in India, political scientist Steven Wilkinson of Yale University pointed out that whether or not the Congress acted to suppress Hindu-Muslim conflicts in a particular region depended on the local party dynamics and the extent of Muslim support for the party in that region. The Congress party took a completely different stance on these issues in Uttar Pradesh as compared to Kerala, as political scientist Prerna Singh has documented. Cow protection itself was promoted by some of the tallest leaders of the Congress party, including Mahatma Gandhi, and found a place in the directive principles of the Indian Constitution despite the reservations of B.R. Ambedkar.

In his book, The Indian Ideology, Perry Anderson, a historian and sociologist at the University of California, Los Angeles, has argued that the pre-independence Congress was at its core a Hindu organization, with only a minuscule Muslim membership. Anderson, one of the sharpest critics of the Congress, argues that the party has promoted a weak form of secularism that has done precious little for Muslims in the country.

But even that limited form of secularism is today under strain with the BJP’s growing footprint in the country. While it is nobody’s case that all voters of the party subscribe to its exclusionary politics, its ideological core continues to favour Hindutva politics and tends to have a “Manichean world view”, as this newspaper once described it. The party continues to grapple with an inherent contradiction: on the one hand, there is a desire to foster innovation and prosperity, and be a powerful force on the global stage, and on the other hand, there is a desire to pander to social obscurantism and primordial tribalism.

The big question is whether that ideological core will prevail, or will be tamed. The future of India’s economy and society would depend on the answer. The work of Rubin and Kuran illustrate the dangers of relying on religion or religious activists for legitimacy. But their work also raises the hope that things can change if the elite, especially the economic elite, have the will and imagination to assert their true preferences, and to demand change.

India: increase in donations to temples after demonetization

The Telegraph - November 12, 2016

Editorial

A matter of riches
- The increase in donations to temples after demonetization was announced reveals certain less than pleasant aspects of Indian society

India would have startled Shakespeare's Macbeth. Had the confused king been present now, at perhaps the Tirupati temple, he would have learnt that it was possible to tread a primrose way not to, but away from, the everlasting bonfire. When the government of a country abruptly renders the widely-used notes of two high-value denominations useless in order to make hoarders of black money crawl out of the woodwork, people are apt to get a bit jumpy. No one wants to be seen turning in too many high-value notes to the bank while Big Brother watches keenly, however much the government may reassure the 'innocent'. Ironically, the suddenness of the change, the very thing that was supposedly meant to catch the hoarders of black money unawares, also opened up the primrose way to escape.

Moved by the helplessness of the numerous visitors to the temple of Venkateswara and the temple town, Tirumala, the temple authorities, although they initially baulked at accepting notes of Rs 500 and Rs 1,000, finally relented. But if arranging for free food and water and accepting notes of all denominations as well as credit and debit card payments for prasad and tickets were actions consciously undertaken by the temple authorities, donations to the hundi were, in a sense, uncontrollable. Donations go to the bank every day anyway, a temple official said. But such donations are anonymous; Big Brother would not be able to identify the biggest donors of high-value notes. Even authorities of the Golden temple at Amritsar, who firmly refused notes of Rs 500 and Rs 1,000, could not stop them from pouring into the golak, the temple's donation chest. Reports indicate that donations to around 100 temples and various trusts showed a sharp rise immediately after the prime minister's announcement of demonetization. Since the deity is forever inscrutable, it would be difficult to determine whether this sudden upsurge of religious feeling received the deity's approval. But there can be no doubt that donating to the deity's service was a most attractive primrose way leading away from an uncomfortable bonfire.

Attributing forgiveness to the deity is a human need, and, as this eagerness to turn black into white shows, not always for entirely spiritual reasons. Giving to god removes all taint: the muddy turns clear, the bloodied grows healthy again. Even Saint Teresa of Calcutta believed this. But what is more interesting is the reported interest the government is showing in the spurt in donations. Does the government really believe that the people whose unaccounted for wealth feeds the parallel economy preserve their money in notes of Rs 500 and 1,000? And that they have been quickly getting rid of these by pouring them on to the feet of the deity? Maybe not. But hypocrisy is an attribute of Indian culture; it leaves no sphere of life untouched.

India: Faith based banking in a country which has secularism enshrined in its constitution !

Islamic Banking in India – For Financial Inclusion of Muslims or to squeeze them further ?
https://kafila.org/2016/06/08/islamic-banking-in-india-for-financial-inclusion-of-muslims-or-to-squeeze-them-further/

'Main workers' across religions see a dip says Times of India

[What the Hell is the Main Worker ? a bizzare invention by this Times of India chap. I suppose he means people with tenure and formal jobs - editor, Communalism Watch]

The Times of India
'Main workers' across religions see a dip

Subodh Varma | TNN | Jun 8, 2016, 03.26 AM IST

NEW DELHI: Among all religious communities, the share of people working as 'main workers', that is, those who worked for most part of the year, declined between 2001 and 2011 while the share of 'marginal workers' - those not getting work for more than six months a year - increased. The share of people who were not working at all, mainly women, increased in all communities.

The proportion of people in each religious community seeking or available for work, too, showed an uptick. It was marginal among Christians and Jains, and staggeringly high among 'other' religious groups, mainly tribal communities.

These findings were recorded in 2011 by the census enumeration, and released on June 7, 2016. Although over five years have passed since this data on nature of work was collected, the Registrar General of India - as the census office is know - has released it only n ow.

While 44% of the working age population were main workers and 14% marginal workers, a staggering 42% were 'non-workers'. The vast bulk of these were women looking after domestic duties. This trend was reflected across various religious communities. Sikh and Jain communities had the lowest proportion of marginal workers but the highest share of non-workers. This is due to the lower participation of women in even marginal work, rendering them non-workers.

Interestingly, the census data includes numbers for those who were seeking or available for work among both the marginal workers as well as non-workers.

At the country level, the proportion of such work seekers had increased from 11% in 2001 to 15% in 2011. This trend was visible across all communities with share of work seekers among Muslims and Christians touching 16%.

India: It's useful (and not before time) that India Inc. has begun to speak up against majoritarian bullying (Mukul Kesavan)

The Telegraph, November 2, 2015

Fringe and rather more
- Buyer's remorse, the BJP and Bihar
Mukul Kesavan

When ratings agencies, central bankers and corporate titans begin to speak directly of intolerance, of the connection between insecure minorities and India's growth prospects, Mr Modi and his white-collar fellow travellers pretend to listen. To dismiss protesting artists and writers as Congress clients orphaned by that party's defeat comes naturally to a parivar inoculated against the individual imagination; telling Moody's Analytics or Narayana Murthy that they're imagining things is harder. When someone as adept at reading the prevailing wind as Kiran Mazumdar Shaw begins to tweet careful dissent, it's clear that deep in the bowels of India Inc. buyer's remorse has begun to stir.

Jayant Sinha, minister of state and the Bharatiya Janata Party's most credentialed corporate recruit (IIT, Harvard, McKinsey) did his best. Confronted on a talk show by a recording of Narayana Murthy's categorical assertion that India's minorities were beginning to feel insecure, that their security was the necessary precondition to economic growth, he blandly agreed and suggested that statements by the prime minister and the National Democratic Alliance's senior leadership reflected an absolute commitment to inclusiveness and social harmony.

Unluckily for Jayant Sinha, Mr Modi and his colleagues had just spent weeks in Bihar campaigning in an idiom that reflected the reverse. Sushil Modi, Amit Shah and Narendra Modi had made speeches, granted interviews and mounted political advertisements dedicated to dividing the electorate along communal lines. They had done this so brazenly and intemperately that the Election Commission had to order its officials in Bihar to forbid the BJP from using two advertisements that had "...the potential to create disharmony and mutual hatred between different communities".

One of the advertisements consisted of variations on a rhetorical question intended to highlight the Mahagathbandhan's alleged partiality to Muslims: "[I]s it good governance to snatch reservation quotas from the plates of Dalits and OBCs and serve them to religious minorities? Till when will this chief minister [Nitish Kumar] who swears by good governance continue to carve up the rights of Dalits and backward castes and fraudulently distribute them to religious minorities?"

The second banned advertisement was intended to be read alongside the first, like a real-world version of a two-part tweet. "Is it governance to harvest votes by raising crops of terror?" Read together, these advertisements insinuated that Nitish Kumar was stealing from Dalits and other backward classes what was theirs and giving it to Muslims to harvest the terrorist vote.

Democratic politics is a contact sport and in Indian elections, as elsewhere, parties give as good as they get. But even by that robust standard a political party that pits India's poorest communities against each other in a zero-sum game, positions itself as pro-Dalit, pro-OBC and anti-minority and implicitly stigmatizes that minority as terrorist, is not a party that should intone ' Sabka saath, sabka vikas' and expect to be believed.

The naked bigotry of these advertisements can't be attributed to an excess of local zeal; this line of attack was sanctioned from the top of the BJP hierarchy. Thus Sushil Modi, the head of the party's Bihar chapter, was even more specific than the advertisements in his social messaging. On October 28, he tweeted that "[i]n its attempt to win the minority vote en bloc, Nitish Kumar, Lalu Yadav and the Congress are carving out 9% of Dalit-OBC reservations to give to Muslim-Christians". Sushil Modi scorned the mealy-mouthed anonymity of 'religious minorities' in favour of a hyphenated bogey that named the enemy 'Muslim-Christians'.

But even Sushil Modi is no more than a provincial leader. The cue for this line of attack came from the prime minister of India, Narendra Modi and the president of his party, Amit Shah. A couple of days before the advertisements were published, Modi got the campaign rolling by accusing Nitish Kumar and Lalu Yadav of conspiring to transfer a part of the quota reserved for Dalits and other backward castes to members of "another community".

It's worth reflecting on the enormity of this. Modi has dog-whistled before during election campaigns; through the general election in 2014 he tried to make political mileage out of the 'pink revolution' (the trade in beef) in Bihar and suggested that rhinos had been displaced to accommodate illegal Muslim migrants in Assam. Sordid as this was, he was the leader of the principal Opposition party at the time, not the prime minister of the country.

When the prime minister of all Indians campaigns in a state election by casting "another community" as the unworthy recipient of favours stolen from Dalits and backward castes, he divides his people and discredits his office. He sets the tone for his party's members and supporters. He indicates that it's legitimate to single out and demonize the members of this coyly anonymous community. He doesn't have to be specific because every single person in his audience knows its name. For those innocents who don't there are lieutenants like Sushil Modi to make things explicit.

The politics behind this squalid campaign is straightforward: this is a competitive election and the fifth and final phase of the polling in Seemanchal on November 5 might make the difference. Seemanchal in north-east Bihar has a substantial Muslim population in districts like Kishanganj, Katihar, Purnea and Araria. Seemanchal is also one of the poorest, most backward parts of Bihar and the BJP's strategy is to consolidate the non-Muslim vote by describing the leaders of the Grand Alliance as men trying to buy Muslim votes with reservations stolen from the Hindu poor.

This is the BJP's explicit strategy in Bihar, with Modi in the vanguard and Amit Shah bringing up the rear. Amit Shah warned that a BJP defeat would be celebrated with fire-crackers in Pakistan. The sangh parivar is not above using Pakistan as a contemptuous metaphor for Muslim neighbourhoods, especially in Amit Shah's home state, Gujarat.

Encouraged by his boss's invocation of Pakistan, Rajiv Pratap Rudy, the minister of state and member of parliament from Saran in Bihar, saw a Grand Alliance advertisement on the website of a Pakistani newspaper, Dawn, and jumped to triumphant conclusions. "Nitish advertises in Pakistan daily 'DAWN' e-edition to reach voters in Bihar. Why Pak? Whom does he want to reach?" Online responders pointed out to Rudy that the ads had been placed by Google AdSense which served up advertisements based on a browser's location and IP address, not by Nitish Kumar. An embarrassed Rudy deleted the tweet which wouldn't have seen the light of day if the BJP hadn't declared open season on "another community".

In her interview with The Indian Express, Kiran Mazumdar Shaw said she was very "...disturbed by fringe elements trying to disturb communal harmony". Reining in "fringe elements" figured very largely in her expression of concern. Invoking "fringe elements" in Indian discourse is a polite way of both expressing worry about bad things happening and insulating the political leadership from any direct responsibility for them. If Shaw really believes that the BJP's response to, say, the Dadri lynching represented the fringe, she either hasn't been paying attention or her definition of the fringe encompasses Union ministers, MPs and chief ministers.

In Bihar it is the top brass of the BJP that set the agenda and decided that trolling Muslims would be the centre-piece of its election campaign. The notion that "fringe elements" - trishul-bearing, potty-mouthed lumpen or their online counterparts, trolling bhakts - need to be reined in by the BJP's leadership is either delusional or a form of political discretion. It's useful (and not before time) that India Inc. has begun to speak up against majoritarian bullying; it would be better still if its spokespersons aimed their anguish at the right address.

Moody’s is right to warn that belligerent communal rhetoric could ruin India’s economic prospects (Edit in TOI)

The Times of India

Moody blues: Moody’s is right to warn that belligerent communal rhetoric could ruin India’s economic prospects
November 2, 2015, 12:08 am IST TOI Edit in TOI Editorials | Edit Page | TOI


Prime Minister Narendra Modi has gone all out to pitch India as a global business destination. But the research arm of international ratings agency Moody’s has injected a timely note of warning on domestic actions that might scupper this bid. In a report titled ‘India Outlook: Searching for Potential’, Moody’s Analytics has said unequivocally that unless Modi reins in BJP members making controversial statements, India runs the risk of losing domestic and global credibility.

President Pranab Mukherjee, addressing the Delhi high court on its golden jubilee, pitched yet again for pluralism and tolerance. And RBI governor Raghuram Rajan devoted a good part of his IIT Delhi convocation speech to explicating why tolerance is essential for India’s economic progress. While tolerance allows the best ideas to come forward and compete, in an intolerant regime the worst ideas can’t be questioned. In place of the false opposition between tolerance and nationalism that hyper-nationalists within BJP presume tolerance, as Rajan proposes, should be deemed a patriotic service.

As the Moody’s report points out, there are two interrelated ways that religious majoritarianism and the spreading culture of bans and intolerance can hold up economic progress. First, rising ethnic tensions will discourage investors who have a host of international destinations to choose from. Second, the political debate in the country will turn away from development to more divisive issues, creating stiffer opposition to the government in Parliament and holding up the passage of reform measures key to turning around a sagging economy – such as GST, relaxed labour laws and land acquisition norms. Modi needs to lay down the ‘sabka saath sabka vikas’ line more firmly within his own party and government by telling his hardline colleagues they can’t have the cake and eat it too: it’s either economic progress or the religious agenda.

Manas Chakravarty on Hindutva nationalist ideology and the development of capitalism in India

livemint.com - 19 October 2015

The significance of Hindutva

Reasons why a religious, nationalist ideology could be a big help in the development of capitalism in India

Manas Chakravarty


PM Narendra Modi has been giddily globetrotting to attract capital to our shores. As long as communal disturbances don’t become chronic, foreign investors will hardly be concerned—they are bothered only about profits. Photo: PTI

Is the recent upsurge in religiosity and cultural nationalism a threat to the development agenda on the back of which the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) supposedly rode to power? Is the ruling party’s Hindutva ideology distracting attention away from the economy? Is the ‘good’ BJP being held hostage by ‘bad’ fringe elements in the Sangh Parivar?

Nothing could be further from the truth. The ruling party has never made any secret that, for them, Hindutva and economic development go hand in hand. The prime minister has made no bones about his cultural nationalism, to the extent of asserting that India had extraordinarily skilled plastic surgeons in ancient times. His speeches on cow protection are legendary. But it’s not just that BJP leaders have spent decades imbibing the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) ideology. There are other reasons why a religious and nationalist ideology could be a big help in the development of capitalism in India.

It is an enormous task to change a country of peasants and petty producers and traders into a modern capitalist one. True, many countries in East Asia have made the transition within a generation. But in none of them did the transformation take place under democracy. The task in India is made all the more difficult because it is a society riven by caste, linguistic, religious and cultural fissures.

The crucial ingredient for economic development is capital accumulation. England did it through the enclosure of common land and by exploiting its colonies. The erstwhile Soviet Union expropriated surpluses from the kulaks. Present-day China does it by financial and other types of repression. India has traditionally done it by promising the masses the moon and passing all kinds of pro-poor legislation, while taking little interest in their implementation and by providing sops, including cheap land and other resources, to the corporate sector. And in areas far removed from the cities, there has always been outright exploitation.

But, after decades of democracy and empowerment of the backward castes, the masses can no longer be taken for granted. Aspirations have gone up. Consider the ongoing agitations by the Jats and the Patels, two relatively well-off communities. And unlike in China, the government cannot use force to subdue them, although it is trying. Promising development is easy, but delivering growth with jobs is not. All the more so when government spending has to be kept in check, lest we attract the baleful gaze of the rating agencies. The Congress party tried to buy off the masses with sops, but that didn’t work simply because the rest of the economy went into a tailspin and inflation went through the roof. The contradiction between capital accumulation and social welfare burst out into the open.

Faced with this situation, what can the country’s ruling classes do? The masses are not enamoured of free markets. But nationalism is another matter and has been used to good effect. Consider the whipping up of nationalist passions and the invocation of Confucian values by the Chinese government in its awesome effort to label capitalism red in tooth and claw as communism. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has always been a great admirer of the Chinese model, rather than the Western free market one.

Religion too has often been pressed into service. The Republican Party in the US has made good use of the religious right. Vladimir Putin has an alliance with the Russian Orthodox Church. These ideologies deflect attention from economic matters and paper over class conflict. In the US, workers have been so confused by the strategy that they have been content to see their share of GDP fall over decades.

In India, the ideology of Hindutva serves that purpose. It tries to paper over the cracks between the many fissures in Indian society. It tries to meld Hindu society together by pointing to a glorious past, sullied by the advent of the ‘other’, especially the Muslim and Christian ‘other’. It denies class and caste conflict. If the ruling party cannot fulfil its promises of material benefits, at least its ideology delivers psychological gains. It gives a sense of belonging to people who are seeing their traditional world fall apart and who are losing age-old moorings in society. It taps into resentment against a snooty liberal cosmopolitan elite, who have so far enjoyed the fruits of development. And if it helps the ruling party in its bid to win a majority in both houses of Parliament and in the major states, then it can overcome some of the restraints imposed by India’s democracy. The so-called ‘fringe’ is an inseparable part of this strategy.

Not that the government is neglecting the economy. That would hardly go down well with the elite, eager to plug into global circuits of accumulation. The prime minister has been giddily globetrotting to attract capital to our shores. As long as communal disturbances don’t become chronic, foreign investors will hardly be concerned—they are bothered only about profits.

But the government is unlikely to get quick results. The world economy is not in a good shape. The export engine of growth has shut down. The domestic corporate sector is in the doldrums. The banks are in a mess. A recent Credit Suisse study showed the richest 1% in India own 53% of the nation’s wealth, while the bottom half make do with a mere 4.1%. What better way to distract attention from these realities and buy time than by going in for a spot of ideological grandstanding now. And if it helps consolidate the Hindu vote in Bihar, so much the better.

Of course, whether we must pretend, as Lord Keynes put it, “that fair is foul and foul is fair; for foul is useful and fair is not”, is another debate altogether.

Manas Chakravarty looks at trends and issues in the financial markets.

India: Shariah-compliant financial products will only advance a retrograde political agenda (Sadanand Dhume)

http://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/et-commentary/shariah-compliant-financial-products-will-only-advance-a-retrograde-political-agenda/

Shariah-compliant financial products will only advance a retrograde political agenda

by Sadanand Dhume

Should the secular Indian state advance the religious norms enshrined in Islamic shariah law? This is the question raised by an ill-advised move by SBI Funds Management to start an Islamic mutual fund called the SBI Shariah Equity Fund. The fund, whose scheduled launch this week has reportedly been deferred, will be benchmarked to the S&P BSE 500 Shariah Index. Managers will pick stocks guided by a shariah board, whose responsibilities include procuring appropriate fatwas, or religious edicts, for permissible investments.

To understand why this is a terrible idea, go back to the roots of modern Islamic finance. First proposed in pre-Partition India by Jamaat-e-Islami founder Abul Ala Maududi (1903-79), shariah-compliant financial practices are part of a larger Islamist project to order every aspect of the state and society by the medieval norms enshrined in shariah law. According to Duke University’s Professor Timur Kuran, Maududi’s goal was not to foster prosperity in his community, but to underscore the idea that “to be a Muslim is to live differently”.

Islamic finance ostensibly hinges on three principles: a ban on interest, a wealth tax (zakat) and honesty in business. More broadly, it applies religious norms to business decisions. Shariah-compliant funds, for instance, will not invest in companies whose practices are frowned upon by Islam, such as pig farms or banks that charge interest.

Historically, Maududi’s idea languished for decades before being given a boost by Saudi oil wealth in the 1970s. Since then Islamic finance has grown steadily. Standard and Poor’s estimates that shariah-compliant assets are worth about $1.4 trillion worldwide, the vast majority in Muslim-majority countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Malaysia.

Maududi envisioned Islamic finance as accomplishing three goals: minimising Muslim interaction with non-Muslims, deepening the transnational identity of the community of believers, or ummah, and injecting Islam into every aspect of daily life. Over the years, Islamist groups worldwide, including the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world and the Jamaat-e-Islami in the Indian subcontinent, have worked tirelessly to advance these objectives. It’s no coincidence that Islamic finance has grown along with a broader swing in the Muslim world away from secularism and toward literalist interpretations of Islam.

MAINSTREAM THE GHETTOES

What does all this mean for India? Simply put, policymakers need to gauge products such as the new SBI fund not merely in narrow financial terms, but in terms of their larger implications.

They can start by asking some basic questions. Should state-owned institutions in an avowedly secular republic advance Islamist political goals? Is India better served by integrating its 150-million strong Muslim population into the financial mainstream, or by ghettoising it in the economic equivalents of Ahmedabad’s Juhapura or Thane’s Bhiwandi? Does the new fund inch India closer toward accepting Islamic banking, which it has so far avoided?

The answers ought to be self-evident. That the questions were apparently not asked highlights a certain naiveté at the heart of India’s financial establishment. Last year, during the waning days of D Subbarao’s tenure as RBI governor, the central bank set a poor precedent by granting a licence to a non-banking finance company in Kerala based on shariah principles. The new SBI fund would further strengthen the dubious principle of mixing religion and finance. It would also make India only the second non-Islamic country (after Britain) with a stateowned bank that offers a shariahcompliant fund.

For the BJP-led government, the shariah-based fund ought to be a litmus test. In the 1990s, the BJP rose to prominence in part by critiquing the Congress’ tendency to equate secularism with pandering to the most orthodox elements in Islamic society. At its heart, stripped of financial complexities, this is what the proposed new fund represents.

Indeed, when given a choice, ordinary Muslims worldwide show no special affinity for shariah-based financial products. Most are happy to use regular banks that pay interest. Moreover, pious Indian Muslims already have the option to channel their investments through shariahcompliant private funds such as the Tata Ethical Fund. There’s no reason for state-owned institutions to follow.

GIVE IT A QUIET BURIAL

More broadly, instead of promoting Maududi’s divisive vision, India ought to do exactly the opposite. Rather than minimise Muslim exposure to regular financial instruments, India should encourage more Muslims to enter the financial mainstream.

And instead of spawning financial products that appeal to religious identity, state-owned banks should simply treat Muslims like they treat all other Indians. Indeed, if properly implemented, the prime minister’s ambitious financial inclusion plan, the Jan Dhan Yojana, could offer a template of sorts by increasing the number of Muslims with bank accounts.

For now, though, the ball is in SBI Fund Management’s court. If it’s wise, it will give the SBI Shariah Equity Fund a quiet burial and move on to more sensible projects. The last thing India needs is clueless bankers who strengthen a dangerous ideology without understanding the consequences.

India: A Hindutva variant of neo-liberalism

The Hindu, April 4, 2014

A Hindutva variant of neo-liberalism

by Varghese K. George

The linkage between the Hindu assertion, material prosperity and economic growth is what makes the idea of Hindutva rate of growth, as opposed to the ‘Hindu rate of growth,’ which is a derisive description of a slow economy

“Jo Hindu hit ki baat karega, wohi desh par raj karega — only he who promotes the Hindu interests will rule the country” declared a huge poster of Mr. Narendra Modi outside the Bharatiya Janata Party’s headquarters in New Delhi in December 2007 when he won his second victory in Gujarat. That election — and not December 2012, when he won the third election — could be seen as the launch of Mr. Modi’s version of Hindu politics, which has been a distinct improvisation of its original version.

What is being tested nationally in 2014 — contrary to what political analysts are terming as the debate on development triumphing over Hindutva — is what one could call Hindutva 2.0. Many commentators have acknowledged the existence of a Modi variant of politics, but few have understood it. Going by Mr. Modi’s public pronouncements over several years, Hindutva 2.0, is a particular variant of neoliberalism that dovetails religious nationalism with economic progress.
Unfolding of Hindutva 2.0

Traditionally, the Hindu right in India has had to deal with three dilemmas that have stunted its growth. First, the conflict between the Hindu traditionalists and the middle class; second, the hierarchical caste structure that endowed leadership to the minority upper castes, something that the majority lower castes began to resent increasingly as democracy took root; and third, the organisational question of how the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) should relate to its political wing (initially the Jan Sangh, and later, the BJP).

Consequently, the BJP’s growth has been geographically patchy and electorally episodic. Drawing upon this history of Hindu nationalism in India, many people predict — and some hope — that Mr. Modi may not be able to outdo his predecessors, Mr. A.B. Vajpayee and Mr. L.K. Advani in the run for prime ministership. “We defeated Vajpayee at his peak. Mr. Modi is no match to Mr Vajpayee,” says Mr. Jairam Ramesh, Congress strategist.

History is, of course, a valuable pointer to the future, but it also teaches us that there can always be a first time. What has been unfolding in the Gujarat social laboratory over the last decade as Hindutva 2.0, has in no small measure overcome the three dilemmas mentioned earlier.

Mr. Modi’s capability to mix the modern and the traditional is striking. When the small car Tata Nano project shifted from West Bengal to Gujarat, he likened it to lord Krishna, born in Mathura in Uttar Pradesh, reaching Dwarka in Gujarat to grow up. In the early days of the Jan Sangh, it could not emerge as the voice either of the Hindu traditionalists or of the free market. The Swantantra Party had become the more legitimate voice of the free market.

A decade ago, Mr. Vajpayee’s free market policies were staunchly opposed by Sangh affiliates such as the Swadeshi Jagran Manch. Mr. Modi managed to banish them all from Gujarat, making it a middle class utopia. The anti-capitalist strand in the Hindu right that repelled the modernising, pro-market middle class is now invisible and inaudible.

On the other hand, appeals for traditionalism continue. “This is the land of people who worship cows. How can you support those who support cow slaughter?” Mr. Modi asked his audience in Bihar on April 2, invoking a favourite issue of Hindu politics for more than a century. A special campaign that the RSS launched in 2010, for cow protection, has remained active since then, and the alleged stealing of cows by Muslims is often cited as a reason for communal riots in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.

Mr. Modi’s backward caste origins, a running theme in his campaign, helped by the social context, have helped him overcome lower caste suspicion of Hindutva politics. The willingness among the upper castes to concede leadership to the lower has also helped, with Mr. Modi managing to send out a message that the political aspirations of the lower castes have enough room within Hindutva politics. This aspect has been analysed in an article in The Hindu (“In 2014, Hindutva versus caste,” March 26, 2014).

This has been a contentious issue for decades, and at the core of the debate is the question of whether the political wing should give primacy to discipline and control, or openness and adaptability. After the BJP’s debacle in 2009, the issue came to the fore yet again with people like Mr. Arun Jaitley arguing for a modern, liberal approach for the party, delinked from the RSS. Mr. Modi himself had been challenging the RSS’ authority in several ways until 2012. However, the BJP failed to find its feet and fell further into the abyss, making it the perfect setting for a return of the Sangh into its affairs. But the RSS-BJP question has been resolved in a peculiar fashion that deludes the veterans in the Sangh into believing that they are in control; but what they are doing is merely bidding for Mr. Modi.

But things are as they used to be between the BJP and the Sangh, says Mr. Ram Madhav, a senior Sangh functionary. “There are two areas of cooperation. First, the common ideology that we believe in; second, the sharing of human resources. On both these counts, the Sangh and the BJP continue to maintain their traditional linkages,” he says. As for the projection of Mr. Modi as the sole leader of the current campaign, Mr. Madhav says it is not unprecedented. “The RSS is not against the projection of an individual leader. In fact, it is necessary. People are forgetting that in 2009, the slogan was ‘Advani for Prime Minister.’ He was also the face of the Ram Janmabhoomi movement. Therefore, the projection of Mr. Modi is not unprecedented or uncharacteristic,” he says.

The RSS’ writ runs in the BJP nowadays to ensure that Mr. Modi’s writ runs, and not to enforce any ideological regimen. The RSS no longer holds the right to veto, but has an obligation to play along with the agenda set by Mr. Modi.
The Hindutva rate of growth

There is a viewpoint that equates the economic policies of the Congress and the BJP, but it overlooks several distinguishing characteristics. In fact, the most distinguishing feature of Hindutva 2.0 is the model of economic progress that it promotes, in which Hindu assertion is featured as a prerequisite for economic growth and prosperity.

Gujarat is one State that is fighting a case in the Supreme Court to oppose scholarships for Muslims, and Mr. Modi has derided welfare schemes as being “dole politics.” He said that the Food Security Act was merely a piece of paper. The indifference of this politics to welfare apart, the emphasis is on how Hindu resurgence brings in material progress. In December 2012, on the 20th anniversary of the demolition of the Babri Masjid, and in an article in Outlook, pro-Modi commentator Swapan Dasgupta said that it was a necessary prelude to the economic prosperity that followed in India: “Finally, the Ayodhya years coincided with the gravest crisis of the ideological consensus forged by Jawaharlal Nehru. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, the rise of radical Islamism in the neighbourhood and the failure of the ‘socialistic’ way to deliver economic growth led to old shibboleths being questioned. Coming in the midst of this uncertainty, Ayodhya pushed the old order over the cliff. Later on, India moved tentatively towards market economics, material prosperity and a more pragmatic relationship with the world.”

For those who deconstruct Mr. Modi’s speeches, a similar linkage is discernible. The cut-off point where Gujarat takes off for Mr. Modi is 2002. All comparisons are before and after 2002. ‘So many schools and so many irrigation projects until 2002; and so many after,’ his 2007 speeches in Gujarat would go. And for riots — ‘there were so many until 2002, when it was settled once and for all. And after 2002, there are nil.’

This linkage between the Hindu assertion, material prosperity and economic growth is what makes the idea of Hindutva rate of growth, as opposed to the “Hindu rate of growth,” which is a derisive description of a slow economy. That was due to the Hindu timidity in this imagination; something that the Indian middle class fears the country may slip back into. This is what makes the core of Hindutva 2.0 and what is helping Hindu nationalist politics to overcome its several traditional weaknesses.

varghese.g@thehindu.co.in

India: Overseas Friends of BJP meet in Delhi elicit NRI support for its “Mission 272+” (report in The Hindu)

. . . the BJP pulled out all the stops to elicit NRI support for its “Mission 272+”.

The mood was celebratory at the congregation, as NRIs and visitors, including the former Prime Minister of Fiji, Mahendra Chaudhary, and England’s Lord Rajinder Paul Loomba, listened to the BJP leadership urging it to forge resources to help “Narendra Modi become PM.”

The Aam Aadmi Party’s success story, buttressed by overseas support, in the Delhi Assembly elections is not lost on the BJP. But, it declared, it was not reaching out for funding, but for support. “We are not doing this for money, I personally think raising funds from abroad is not taboo, but we are not collecting money from PIOs,” said BJP overseas affairs convener Vijay Jolly.

Spokesperson Nirmala Sitharaman said the BJP accepts funds only from those who hold an Indian passport, pay through cheque and have an account in an Indian bank.

Indians living abroad are not a new constituency for the BJP, but it wants to sharpen its campaign to reach out like the AAP had done. Apart from Rs. 6 crore that came from foreign contributions, the AAP benefited from canvassing on social media, spearheaded by Indians abroad. “The BJP reaches out on the promise of investment opportunities and enterprise, unlike the AAP which is seeking change,” said sociologist Dipankar Gupta.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/after-aaps-success-bjp-fights-for-nri-mindspace/article5545242.ece?homepage=true

Laboratory of Fascism: Capital, Labour and Environment in Modi’s Gujarat | Rohit Prajapati and Trupti Shah

Laboratory of Fascism: Capital, Labour and Environment in Modi’s Gujarat

by Rohit Prajapati and Trupti Shah

We are caught in a false debate in which the reality is presented in an erroneous perception. Narendra Modi, the perpetrator of 2002 carnage is counter posed with Mr. Modi the “development leader”. We call it a false debate, since for us, who have lived and grown in Gujarat over the past five decades the two aspects are actually the same – that of fascist. And we use the label of fascist for Modi with utmost seriousness and with full awareness of what the term involves. Of course, we have a different situation in India today, compared to Italy or Germany in the 1920s and 1930s.
http://www.sacw.net/article5980.html

Meera Nanda on India’s superstition industry | Frontline

Frontline, 18 September 2013
Cover Story

In the name of faith

Asaram Bapu’s alleged sexual assault on a young girl offers an opportunity to throw light and lift the veil on the state-temple-corporate complex. By MEERA NANDA

http://www.frontline.in/cover-story/in-the-name-of-faith/article5137396.ece?homepage=true&css=print

India: 'worsening of economic crisis will improve the chances for Modi BJP's prime ministerial candidate' - says banker and market analyst with Credit Lyonnais

Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) is a renowned investment and brokerage firm. Its Chief Equity Strategist, Chris Wood, told the Economic Times: The best hope for the Indian stock markets would be a worsening of the country's economic crisis, he argued. Why? Because that will improve the chances of Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi emerging as BJP's prime ministerial candidate, according to Wood.

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/india-runs-risk-of-sovereign-debt-crisis-christopher-wood-chief-equity-strategist-clsa/articleshow/22498737.cms

India: Riots in Muzaffarnagar scorch region's flourishing paper industry

From: The Times of India
Riots in Muzaffarnagar scorch region's flourishing paper industry
Arunav Sinha, TNN | Sep 12, 2013, 01.42 PM IST

LUCKNOW: The flames of the recent communal clashes in Muzaffarnagar seem to have burned a hole in the pocket of the paper industry of districts supplying in bulk — not only to the eastern part of Uttar Pradesh, but also to the National Capital Region.

Going by conservative estimates, the losses incurred by the paper industry in this western district of Uttar Pradesh are nearly Rs 8 crore per day. Roughly, the loss figures for the paper industry translate to Rs 40 crore since Friday (September 6).

The paper industry in Muzaffarnagar comprises of the production of primarily three types of paper — graph, duplex paper (which is used mostly by the packaging industry) and paper which is meant for writing and printing.

Giving more details about the losses, Ankur Bindal, a paper trader of the district, says, "It seems our problems would only increase with each passing day."

On an average, the daily loss suffered by the paper industry could be summarized as follows: Losses incurred by paper merchants on graph paper to the tune of Rs 5 crore per day; loss of Rs 1 crore per day in duplex paper and of more than Rs 2 crore per day in paper meant for writing and printing.

"Almost all the 28 paper mills/units in the district have not done any business since Friday (September 6). Some units stopped working by Saturday morning, since curfew was imposed.

"The daily tonnage of paper, in Muzaffarnagar ranges from 2,800 tonnes to 3,000 tonnes," said Bindal. He added that as many as 10,000 workers are employed in the paper industry of Muzaffarnagar, and it is yet not clear as to when workers would be able to resume work.

On whether there has been any delay in the delivery of the orders booked, Bindal said traders were keeping their fingers crossed, and hope that the situation returns to normalcy as soon as possible.

On the possibility of prices of paper going up, he said that generally, prices remain stable without frequent fluctuations.

As per the website of paperex-india.com, Indian paper industry is among the top 12 global players today, with an output of more than 13.5 million tonnes annually and an estimated turnover of Rs 35,000 crore.

The paper industry in India is improving with a strong demand push and is in expansion mode to meet the projected demand of 20 million tonnes by 2020. It is on a growth trajectory and expected to touch 8.5% GDP in the coming years from the present growth rate of 6.5%.

Video of Teesta Setalvad Lecture in Goa on "The Politics of Development"

The Tainted Lectern (Suvir Kaul)

Outlook, 18 March 2013

The Tainted Lectern
by Suvir Kaul

First, the facts as we know them: on February 28, 2013, an e-mail circulated in the University of Pennsylvania announced the 17th Annual Wharton India Economic Forum for March 23. The student-organisers of the forum listed Narendra Modi, the chief minister of Gujarat, as a keynote speaker. Several of us who read this announcement decided to write and circulate a letter objecting to the platform offered by this forum to Modi, for reasons that we detailed in our letter. In our concluding paragraph, we duly asked the organisers to revoke their invitation to Modi. We were hopeful the organisers would withdraw their invitation, but understood this was unlikely. Therefore, we also pledged "to protest his presence-virtual as it will be, given that he remains ineligible for a US visa-in a variety of ways, including at the meeting of the forum".

Reminding the organisers of our pedagogic interest in this situation, we concluded by writing: "We will also do all that we can to continue to educate our community about the incalculable and continuing harm done by Modi's brand of politics to the secular values enshrined in India's Constitution." As soon as we circulated our letter of protest in the university and on a social media site, signatures from students, faculty and members of the community poured in. By the next morning, Friday, February 29, when we e-mailed the letter to the organisers, with a copy to the dean of the Wharton School and to two members of the faculty at Wharton who run the Wharton Entrepreneurship Program (which was a sponsor of the forum), we had over 150 signatures (many more have come in since then).

Here is an important detail (which virtually no one in the media has examined, and most commentators have ignored): just as we were not privy to the decision that led to the issuing of the invitation, we were not told about the reasons for it being withdrawn. No one from the forum or from Wharton did us the courtesy of responding to our e-mail. The only statement issued from the forum organisers lists the dissent of "multiple stakeholders" within the university, including Wharton alumni. Yet we began to see an odd pattern emerging in the news coverage in India: one news portal leads with a story, and then that text is repeated, with only minor changes, in story after story on competing news portals. Most stories or anchors spoke only of the objections expressed by a handful of faculty; hardly any journalist seems to have bothered to ask the student-organisers of the conference if they decided to rescind their invitation to Modi because their own faculty-administrators overruled them (which would suggest an issue internal to Wharton), or whether they themselves changed their mind after reading about Modi's abysmal record on human rights.

We could not have anticipated (I doubt the student-organisers could have either) just how much coverage the withdrawal of their invitation to Modi would receive. It was important to those of us who drafted and signed on to the letter of protest that Narendra Modi's rise to national prominence in India not occur without hard questions being asked about his history as a Hindutvavadi politician and an administrator under whom minorities have been victimised and marginalised. Now that we have followed the news frenzy that began after Modi was disinvited (and the Adani Group's withdrawal of its platinum sponsorship), we know that, in spite of every effort made to turn this into a debate about free speech, those questions about Modi's role in the mass killings and displacement of Muslims in Gujarat in '02 are being aired and debated once again.

This was never an issue of free speech: Modi exercises his unlimited access to the media at will (including now in a planned video address to supporters in New Jersey and Illinois). Instead, we sought to protest-and protest is the bedrock of institutional democracy-the forum's offering him an unchallenged platform from which to further a political agenda which delinks economic development from basic human rights. This is, sadly, also an agenda subscribed to by many corporations and indeed B-schools. Further, we know that national debates like this one also invite us to think about the forms of human development in our future: should justice and equity not be central to our planning? These are in fact the concerns that animated our letter of protest. As faculty at the University of Pennsylvania, we often have students from the Wharton school in our classes, and there, as in our letter to the organisers of the forum, we serve our function as educators, whose job it is to identify difficult questions and enable students to learn to think broadly and humanely about their shared futures.


http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?284283

The Empire Begs Back: What does it mean when the UK High Commissioner visits Modi?

Kashmir Times, 30 October 2012

by Badri Raina

Rightwing Hindutva social forces may well have collaborated with the colonising Britishers during the highnoon of India’s Congress-led freedom movement, their standard polemic after Independence has been that what ought to have remained an indigenised Bharat has been systematically degraded into an internationalised India by generations of secular-liberal Indians whom they habitually characterise as “Macaulay ki Aulad” (Macaulay’s children, because the induction of English into Indian administration and education is seen to have been the one decisive act of such subversive cultural transformation).

In that polemic, Nehru has often been their chief bete noir, regarded as an “un-Indian” anglophile, a denigrator of long-held Hindu customs and traditions, a shallowly westernised moderniser, and, worst of all, a leveling and godless socialist at heart.

Well now, how times do change.
There is jubilee among current-day Hindutva sartraps as we write: for lo and behold, no less than the British High Commissioner in India has gone and met the globally ostracised Narendra Modi!

Only one conclusion is permitted—that Modi’s international isolation has ended, the high-falutin world that espouses all that nonsense about “human rights” has come to its senses, and that Britain has put the imperial seal on Modi’s progress report as a great “developer.”

Pathetic you might say, and you would be right.
Yet why, despite the disclaimer made by the High Commissioner that the meeting should not be construed as any sort of endorsement of Modi, the meeting at all?
The fact is that many of the “developed” world’s erstwhile givers are today reduced to being willing takers from the very worlds which they once ravaged for their development. The so-persistent economic collapse of western Capitalism now underway leaves them little choice but to seek afresh among the brown and the pale races for some piece of their burgeoning cake.

Put simply, the Empire is begging back.

And the poor British High Commissioner is not alone. Do recall that not too many months ago, no less than the American Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, went to meet another Indian Chief Minister, namely, Mamta Bannerjee in West Bengal to plead with her for suspending her opposition to the induction of FDI in Indian retail.
Desperate times, desperate visits.

Yet why does Gujarat seem a preferred destination? The reasons here are not far to seek.

The last thing that has ever interested the Western ruling classes, strident protestations notwithstanding, has been the state of democracy or human rights in other parts of the world, except when it suits them tactically to foreground such “values.”

Their economic interests are always seen to be best served by regimes that ensure minimal democratic opposition in their domains, next –to- no labour issues, and a state apparatus always at beck and call to curb tendencies that may thwart the brutal procedures of profit maximisation.

Which is the reason why ever since the reorganisation of the geo-politics of the globe after the second world war, the concerted efforts of Western ruling classes were to consolidate totalitarian regimes, military juntas and dictatorships, even theocratic barbarisms that would be friendly to infusions of western Capital and to its free runs among the resources of the world’s “hinterlands.” And if, for instance, in West Asian regions, selectively, western Capitalism has recently felt the imperative to destabilise some regimes ostensibly to promote democracy, the simple logic has been that these were cows that were no longer yielding milk and butter in desired proportions.

Reason why a Bahrain or a Yemen, or, most of all, the world’s most oppressive negator of human rights, Saudi Arabia, remain in good books; they continue to yield dividends that the Western “military-industrial complex” (Eisenhauer’s coinage) cannot afford to jettison in favour of either democracy or human rights. Nor is it an issue that the Ben Walid region in Libya has this past week seen a genocide at the hands of the new Libyan regime far worse than anything Gaddafi could have been accused of, or Assad has done in Syria. You see the new “liberated” Libya has now placed its oil fields with glad alacrity at the service of American oil corporations. Ergo, both democracy and human rights have returned to Libya, haven’t they? Both guarded by the Al Queda in the Maghreb. Could there be more sanguine confluence?

In our part of the world, China remains the primary preferred destination for western Capital for reasons aforesaid—no oppositional political formations, no out-of-control unions, all backed by unusual social cohesiveness. Everything pretty much amenable to unhassled single-window clearances.

After China, India’s own Gujarat as led by Modi. A leadership that has so nicely rendered his own party null in all decision-making matters, complete absence of the least forms of Left-of-Centre politics, a Congress party that until now has been at a complete loss to demarcate itself from Modi’s polemic about “development,” and heinously shy of taking on the local Caligula on the subject of the massacres of 2002, fearing loss of vote.

Thus having proved that he can parcel off rich farmlands, forest reserves, coastal fishing areas, mineral and water resources, to foreign and Indian developers at will, without fear of political or social upheaval, who better to meet in an India where in most other places oppositional political forces and non-governmental organisations often make the job of milking the realms painfully cumbersome. Modi can deliver, as dictators do elsewhere. At least so long as they behave like “our sons of bitches” rather than somebody else’s.

Thus, what does it matter to the High Commissioner in question that the Modi phenomenon in Gujarat has wilfully, and seemingly irretrievably, ghettoised her fear-ridden Muslims, disenfranchised her adivasis, fisher folk, farmers (five thousand suicides in less than a year)? Or that malnutrition among Gujarati adivasis,dalits, women, children should be among the highest of any Indian state? Or that the sex-ratio of women to men among Gujaratis should be among the lowest as well? Not to speak of an administration that is shown day after day in court and other legal-investigative proceedings to have been hand-in-glove with both the genocide of 2002, with cussed attempts to subvert all subsequent attempts to unravel the truths, and with the “encounter” murders of scores of innocent or inconvenient citizens.

All that the High Commissioner is asked to see by the Tory regime in Britain, abetted with all its resourcefulness by the mercantilist Gujarati diaspora, is what goodies Modi is prepared to offer in return for the so-publicised stamp of approval, and timed with great finesse to precede the coming elections in December wherein, from all accounts, Modi is no longer sitting as pretty as before, thanks to the defection of a powerful Patel falange working now as a separate political party, and a resurgent Congress rather more effective in showing up the truth of Modi’s claims about “development.” Notwithstanding the fact that some electronic channels friendly to Hindutva, and to Modi especially, are busy prognosticating an improvement in Modi’s seats in the Assembly even as they tell us that his vote share is slated to go down some 4%.

Inwardly among many Gujaratis, a sense of shame attaches to the efforts afloat to sell the Modi-High Commissioner meeting as a vindication of the Hindu samrat (czar) by Macaulay after all.

It will remain to be seen how the elections in Gujarat turn out. With all the hulaballoo, if Modi loses seats, Brittania might not feel so good about her grand gesture. If Modi crushes the secular “pretenders” well then, other ambassadors may follow the High Commissioner to make hay in the Modi sunshine, wherein foreign investments and Hindutva fascism may, after all, coexist happily to salvage, in whatever measly proportion, Western Capitalisms’ sinking flotilla.

Nationalism and Fear of Foreign Capital: The Indian capitalists in organised retail are angels are they?

BJP leader Murli Manohar Joshi, CPI leader Amarjeet Kaur, JD(U) leader Sharad Yadav, CPI(M) leader Sitaram Yechury and BJP president Nitin Gadkari share the dias during a rally organised by Confederation of All India Traders against FDI in retail and other anti-people policies of the UPA government, in New Delhi on Thursday. Photo: V. Sudershan

see the news report in The Hindu

A platform called Confederation of All India Traders against FDI in retail, i.e. small traders fora part of the unorganised retail (a heavy support base of the communal Hindu right) organised the big rally in Delhi uniting the Left and the Right wing parties. One can understand the left opposing rise in price of fuel and gas but opposing FDI in big retail beats all logic other than rabid nationalism.

I am writing this to neither defend the interests of foreign multinationals that may or may not come to India with their foreign direct investment in organised retail, nor this elitist policy decision of the UPA govt. This decision by the 'golden boys' of the UPA govt to open the gates to FDI in retail will in all probability be a damp squib and not lead to any deluge of foreign firms entering India. The foreign firms heading to India to enter retail may not lead to a million jobs but certainly to a few thousand. The point is why is the left not willing to confront capitalist retail head-on, why is it burying its head in nationalism. Left's opposition to FDI in retail comes over as a preference for Indian capital as opposed to devilish foreign capital - i.e., as a nationalist rather than class critique. The left could present a cogent alternative economic proposals that they take to the public along with a critique of prevailing economic policy. But, they must take a clear social distance from right wing BJP opposition party.

Reliance, Godrej, RPG, Birlas, Kishore Biyani's Big Bazar are major domestic capitalist firms in India's organised retail and they have been there for the past 10 - 15 years, still these groups control just 5% of India's retail market. The omnipresent local corner stores, street vendors, thela-wallah outlets that often employ child labour and dont pay minimum wages in India's cities havent dissapeared because of the arrival of Indian capitalists in organised retail. This unorganised sector forms the majority of all retail. The WalMarts and the Carrefours if they do manage to come to India will not decimate the small retail. The arrival of big firms in retail will provide an opportunity to organise workers for better rights and working conditions. The left should go whole hog to unionise these workers instead of peddling a nationalist posture that fuels xenophobia.

This nationalist opposition to FDI, seems to come from a shared language of the Left and Swadeshi Jagaran Manch type fora.
- Harsh Kapoor /sacw.net

on Hindutva, development and the rise of subnationalism in India

Third World Quarterly
Volume 33, Issue 4, 2012
Special Issue: Governing Difference: Inequality, Inequity and Identity in India and China

Making Gujarat Vibrant: Hindutva, development and the rise of subnationalism in India


Tommaso Bobbio*

pages 657-672
Available online: 30 Apr 2012

Abstract

A significant aspect of India's postcolonial history has been the rise of subnationalism—popularly addressed as the challenge of regionalism—which has often pitted the Indian state against the regional centres of power. In fact, the organisation of Indian territory along linguistic lines favoured the emergence of regional movements challenging the authority of the central government in arguments typical of nationalist rhetoric, such as the specificity of language, territory and traditions. This notion of subnation, however, has taken a new turn during the past two decades of neoliberal reforms as regional states compete with each other to attract greater foreign and domestic investment and to secure higher growth rates. Taking as a point of departure the case of ‘Vibrant Gujarat’, this article proposes rethinking the emergence of subnational cultures in the past two decades in the light of the effects of the neoliberal economic reforms and the rise of Hindu extremist movements in the political arena.

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2012.657423

Does RSS, BJP opposition to foreign investment in retail have to do with their trader base ?

From: The Telegraph, December 1 , 2011

Packaged in Nagpur, resold in BJP store

RADHIKA RAMASESHAN

New Delhi, Nov. 30: Nagpur is running the backend operations of the BJP as far as retail is concerned, giving new shelf life to faces that were in cold storage during the Atal-Advani era.

One such figure was on display today when the BJP fielded Murli Manohar Joshi to address the media this afternoon. Joshi is not just the prime mover behind the party’s adjournment motion against FDI in multi-brand retail but he is also its most consistent “swadeshi” face that he often masked when the NDA was in power.

Today, Joshi drew his importance from the fact that had he not vetted the BJP’s 2009 manifesto, an “oversight” that “crept” into the NDA’s governance agenda before the 2004 elections might have haunted it now.

The physics professor — who drafted the BJP’s economic resolutions in the years before Atal Bihari Vajpayee and L.K. Advani accepted the reality of reforms — quoted from the 2009 manifesto to “prove” that the party was against retail FDI. He also referred to the NDA’s vision document of 2004 that waxed eloquent about “swadeshi”.

Asked about another 2004 document — the NDA’s development and governance agenda — Joshi feigned ignorance. It stated that if re-elected, the BJP and its allies intended to allow FDI in retail.

If Joshi’s advance to the forefront reflected the reach of the RSS headquarters in Nagpur, the statement of another BJP leader, so far considered pro-reform, suggested how retail has become a holy cow.

“I am for foreign investments even in touch-me-not areas like defence and media. But I will draw the line at retail because it is an idea whose time has not come,” the articulate leader said, playing on Victor Hugo’s line that Manmohan Singh had given wide currency to while pushing reforms.

The BJP leader cited the reasons: domestic manufacturing might be adversely impacted; self-employment will suffer; a consolidated market might restrict consumers’ choices; and “too much” was being made of the argument that only foreign retailers can develop cold chains.

However, this leader, like the others taking up cudgels against retail FDI, couldn’t back the objections with empirical evidence. After plodding for days, the only supporting study a BJP source dug out was titled “The cause and consequences of WalMart’s growth” by Emek Basker, an economics professor of Missouri University.

The RSS’s clout was in evidence elsewhere, too. BJP president Nitin Gadkari — he was bowled over by Pranab Mukherjee’s luncheon outreach to him before the winter session and felt that it was time to pursue reform-related legislation in a “spirit of consensus” — today extended the party’s “whole-hearted support” to a national bandh retail traders and trade unions have called on Thursday.

“There was pressure from Nagpur,” a source said. The Sangh directed its progenies like the Swadeshi Jagran Manch and the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh to participate in the December 1 bandh and asked the BJP to support it “from the sidelines” if it didn’t wish to overtly associate itself with it.

Even then, the BMS chief Girish Awasthi suspected the BJP’s motives. “Their leaders are dodgy on reforms,” he said. “Watch, they’ll vote for the pension bill. This retail business, they are against it because they are on the side of the big domestic retail chains. Our heart bleeds for the kiosk vendors and the small shopkeepers.”

Deepak Pradeep Sharma, the SJM convener, boasted that if Joshi junked the retail bit from the 2009 manifesto, it was “because of our signature campaign”.

Not that the swadeshi lobby had dropped its posturing when Vajpayee was in power. A source said that when Vajpayee — backed by Jaswant Singh and Brajesh Mishra —flagged retail FDI at a cabinet meeting, the proposal was shouted down.

But the dispensation then tried to work around the obstacles. “Vajpayee suspended the decision but those with an appetite for reforms managed to place it in the 2004 manifesto,” the sources said.

The Sangh’s eagerness to stick by the trading community reflects its inability to reach out to new constituencies. Even at the Anna Hazare campaign in Delhi, many of the people who turned up at the fast venue were traders – a turnout that was immediately sought to be tied to the Sangh.

The BJP leadership also appears to be only too willing to ride piggyback on this support base. With the race to be the prime ministerial candidate still wide open, no one seems to be in a mood to take a stand that may not go down well with the Sangh, without whose support their hopes for the top job will be dashed.

“We cannot afford to lose the backing of the middle-level businessmen and the small traders, they are our backbone. Industry is not our core constituency,” a BJP leader said.

Six months ago, when the BJP’s economics cell had invited industry representatives to speak on retail FDI, the battlelines were visible. The younger members, especially a vocal and telegenic spokesperson, attacked the speakers when they spoke in favour of it.

The older ones associated closely with the Vajpayee dispensation had to quell tempers. “Later we told the hot-heads ‘what kind of a signal do you want to send about a party that positions itself as the Congress’s only national alternative? That the BJP is a dinosaur?’” a participant recalled.

The answer to that question will have to wait until the BJP figures out who runs its operations, both backend and frontend.