The
politics of communalism and secularism has gone through a turbulent and
tumultuous history in postcolonial India (Chatterjee 2007: 143). While
some scholars attempted to understand secularism as a sociopolitical
oddity in the religion-oriented Indian society, others interpret it as a
“political trick” to attract the attention of minorities, facilitating
vote bank politics (Suroor 2014). The conditions for a democratic
politics of secularism cannot be created unless historians grapple with
these contradictions (Chatterjee 2007: 143). This article explores the
complex connections between two related but distinct discourses—Indian
secularism and communalism.
Despite the fact that there has been substantial historical research
on nationalism and communalism in India, scholarly research on
secularism is inadequate. Shabnum Tejani (2008: 1–24) maintains that the
debate on secularism has been dominated by sociologists and political
theorists who attempt to locate it largely in the postcolonial context.
She argues that secularism within a liberal democracy played a key role
when India became independent. This, according to her, had been designed
for a specific reason—to create a democratic majority through the
appropriation of “untouchables” (Dalits) into a caste Hindu identity.
She appends that secularism was made one of the pillars of the Indian
nationalist thought, predominantly by upper-caste Hindu men. Therefore,
Indian secularism was not about the separation of politics from religion
or creating a particular “Indian” ethics of tolerance. Rather, it was
and is a nexus between caste, community, nationalism, communalism,
liberalism, and democracy.
The historical roots of Indian secularism cannot be appositely
understood without adopting a critical and empirical approach to studies
in the history of Hindutva politics and of majoritarianism in
contemporary Indian politics. This is largely due to the fact that the
Indian polity contains a majority–minority structure and therefore, the
very basis of secularism is jeopardised by dominant forces such as
religion. In recent times, religion is made to be closely associated
with community, nation and civilisation (Sunder Rajan and Dingwaney
Needham 2007: 1–5). In the face of this challenge and contradiction,
this article re-examines the idea of Nehruvian secularism, not through
the lens of state orientation but through the minority discourse.
Recently, particularly since the rise of Hindutva forces, labels such as
“anti-nationals,” “pseudo-secularists,” and “Macaulayites” among
others, have come to be readily associated with discussions on politics
and religion or secularism and communalism (Tejani 2007). “The standard
diagnosis,” as Ashis Nandy (2007) puts it, preferred by the Hindu
nationalists is that secularism—as practised by the Gandhians and the
leftists—has failed, as it has become synonymous to merely being a tool
to appease religious minorities. This, according to him, is the “clever
political ploy” designed to discourage political opponents, including
Jawaharlal Nehru (Nandy 2007: 107–09).
Against the array of scholars who have affirmed a secularist perspective, Rajeev Bhargava’s
The Promise of India’s Secular Democracy (2010:
63–105) throws some light on the different strands of secularism in
India, drawing up a critical perspective. While agreeing with the views
of T N Madan (1999), Nandy (1999) and Partha Chatterjee (1999), Bhargava
holds the view that one of the internal threats to secularism is the
failure to realise the distinctive character of Indian secularism.
Nevertheless, Bhargava (2010: 63–67) contests the postulation made by
those scholars who assert that the conceptual and normative structure of
secularism is flawed. He states that the discussion of secularism in
India should move beyond the conventional approach—separation of
religion and state. He anticipates that there should be a drastic change
in the perspective itself with a view to take the spiritual and ethical
elements common to all religious practices, and transpose them into a
secular, non-doctrinal framework for behaviour under the broader
umbrella called spiritualised, humanist secularism (Bhargava 1995: 341).
As an active political player who perhaps made a significant
contribution to the idea of religious egalitarianism, Nehru has become a
more pertinent anti-colonial crusader than any other leader in
contemporary India. In fact, he was the first Indian liberal democrat to
view communalism as an Indian form of fascism, to write a great deal on
communal politics and to emphasise the social relevance of secularism
in multicultural Indian society (Chandra et al 2008: 86–99). As a
sharply intuitive and keenly perceptive politician who did not commonly
wear his faith on his sleeves, he tried to develop a sense of political
morality without scaffolding it with traditionally practised Indian
religion and did not discern secularisation as the “ineluctable dynamo”
of Indian politics (Khilnani 2007: 89–106). Although he had a
discernible desire to separate the domains of religion and politics, he
had no alternative but to involve the state in the regulation, funding
and administration of various religious institutions (Chatterjee 1999:
141–53).
Communalism, as an ideology for political mobilisation, was
persistently resonating in the sentiments of the religiously conscious
communities (Engineer 1995: xiii–xiv). This is evident from the fact
that to date, almost every discourse on communalism and secularism
operates with preconceived notions about culture, religion, civilisation
and their interrelationships (Vanaik 1997: 130). Indian secularism, as
this article suggests, is a comprehensive package of Nehruvian
discovery, ideas, politics, and strategies, designed to grapple with the
communal politics of his times. Secularism in India has mostly implied
anti-communalism rather than any positive discourse from a rationalist
position (Sarkar 2007: 356–66). As a rationalist and believer of
scientific humanism, Nehru reasoned that religion should be divorced
from politics, hoping that communalism would eventually wane with
modernisation and development (Gopal 1996: 195–215).
Christians and Communal Politics
Though significant strides have been taken to study Hindu–Muslim
communal politics, the Christian community’s tryst with communal
politics in postcolonial India still remains a virgin terrain. The ways
in which the British rule “facilitated” missionaries and disseminated
the influence of Christians in colonial India (Seth 2007: 27) could
likely have sequestered the community from mainstream politics in large
numbers in postcolonial India. The available historical literature
suggests that missionaries and colonial officials were not two separate
watertight compartments, instead they helped each other in their
respective fields of knowledge, including language, literature, art, and
education (Trautmann 2009: 189–207). No discussion on how Christians
emerged from the margins of Indian history to the centre stage of Indian
modernity is possible without addressing their significant but
disproportionally represented role in shaping the idea of Indian
secularism, particularly under Nehru (Chatterjee 2011: 2–5).
Despite their patriotic sentiments, the followers of Christianity
were portrayed by the Hindutva forces as “anti-national” and a threat to
the integrity of India. It was alleged by the Hindu fundamentalists
that Christians and missionaries were fostering “anti-national”
tendencies in Nagaland, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar, Kerala and
other regions of the country (Mukherjee et al 2008: 26–27). It is a
historical distortion to argue that Christians, as a religious minority,
were anti-nationals in postcolonial India. The empirical evidence
suggests that the Christians in India neither demanded a separate
communal identity solely on the basis of religion, culture, history,
and/or tradition (except in some pockets in the North East), nor did the
community construct an exclusive identity on territorial, genealogical
and religious foundations (Chakrabarty 2003: 10–11). The proponents of
majoritarian ethics and the Hindu
rashtra made painstaking
efforts to paint the community with a different cultural pattern,
implying it to be incompatible with mainstream Indian culture. They also
claimed that Christianity was purely a colonial product (Robinson 2003:
287–305).
Though the colonial administration and missionary societies often
worked on mutual cooperation and support, colonial officials often
viewed missionaries suspiciously, as a hindrance to “religious
neutrality” in India. In fact, the question of keeping “undesirable
missionaries” out of India did arise in the 1930s.
1 The
colonial administration also developed hostility towards missionaries as
they were seen as “active propagandists” against the colonial rule.
2
Admittedly, some missionaries appeared to have played active politics
against the colonial government with the support of the Indian National
Congress.
3 Similarly, the attitude of the British Indian
government towards missionaries, in a few instances, endorsed missionary
presence in India.
4 Even after India’s independence, the
dominant narrative on colonial religious discourse continued to
historicise the very idea of Christianity as a Western import.
The revival of majoritarian communalism within the Congress and its
depressing implications on government policies forced Nehru to define
secularism in unambiguous terms (Guha 2007: 129–30). When religious
rhetoric became increasingly intertwined in the political process (Nandy
2002: 73–74), it created conflicting ideas of secularism, and divided
various political parties into two antithetical ideological
groups—inclusive Indian secularism and exclusive majoritarian
communalism. When the former constituted a microscopic minority, the
latter were overflowing in numerical strength (Thapar 2004: 198–99).
Similarly, the members of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and
the All India Hindu Mahasabha (hereafter Hindu Mahasabha), often
described as a pressure group within the Congress in the initial period,
persevered to reckon with the pioneering secular ideals of Congressmen
like Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, and B R Ambedkar.
They interpreted Nehruvian secularism to be built predominantly on
Western concepts and therefore, naturally alien to the Indian ethos
(Huda 1947).
In fact, they defined Nehruvian secularism as an unusual combination
of Anglo–Muslim Indianism, as depicted in Figure 1. While the social
vision of Nehru encompassed a secular state and plural society, the
proponents of majoritarian ethics and Hindu rashtra narrowed down the
scope of secularism to merely a political tool to insulate minorities,
including Christians (Chandra 2004: 72–75). Nehru’s secularism, in
contrast, seemed to have advocated equality of religions, neutrality
towards all religions, disassociation of religion from the state, equal
opportunity for the followers of all religions, and free play for all
religions (Chandra 2004: 6–7). While Nehru attempted to delink
secularism from majoritarianism, most of his fellow Congressmen tried to
find fault lines in his ideology (Rajagopalan 2005: 244–46).
‘
Hindu Rashtra:’ Secularism Debate
When India was passing through a turbulent period of transfer of
power, maintaining peace and order, and suppressing communal riots
became the immediate challenges of Nehru.
5 He believed that
secularism could be achieved only through a socialist democracy that
promises every citizen equal opportunities, irrespective of caste,
creed, and gender. He assured that as long as he was at the helm, the
country would never become a Hindu nation.
6 He deplored the
demand for a Hindu nation made by the Hindu Mahasabha and RSS. He
criticised the idea of the Hindu rashtra vehemently, for he believed
that doing so would make the international community look down upon
India as a narrow-minded country with strong leanings towards fascism.
He argued that such a demand was a reaction to the Muslim League’s
success in partitioning the country on religious lines and establishing
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Although he did not have any
antagonism towards Hinduism and its culture,
7 Nehru objected to the demand for a Hindu state for the simple reason that it would lead to a communal state,
8 which, in turn, would be a death blow to the hard-earned freedom.
Convinced of the potentially irreversible harm it might cause to the
nation, Nehru denounced mixing religion and politics, insisting that
such a move would silence the very life of secular politics that is
based on the principles of freedom and equality for all regardless of
one’s faith.
9 In his letters to the leaders of the Hindu
Mahasabha, Nehru expressed his distress at their activities and their
association with communal tensions and social disorder. In 1956, Nehru
categorically stated that the cry from a certain section of the Hindu
leadership for a Hindu nation was a regressive postulation. He believed
that the communal sentiments disseminated by these fringe elements was
an attempt to revive the supremacist poison of a particular
religion—Hinduism. He condemned the fact that the Hindus who raised the
issue of Hindu rashtra had even subjugated a section of their own
community and kept them in serfdom.
10
There is an element of reality in validating the argument that the
majoritarian community, by itsall-pervading dominant Hindu culture,
naturally overshadowed “other” cultural shades. Purushottam Das Tandon,
an orthodox Hindu who admirably represented the extreme communalist wing
of the Congress, was seen by Nehru as a threat to Congress and
government policy. He even issued a public statement to the press on 13
September 1950, deploring the fact that both communalist and reactionary
forces had expressed their joy at Tandon’s victory in the elections of
August 1950. Nehru’s home minister Vallabhbhai Patel, a senior
Congressman, had never seen Nehru eye to eye on the minority question.
As pointed out by Sarvepalli Gopal, the biographer of Nehru, even
Rajendra Prasad was “prominent in the ranks of medievalism,” who
differed with Nehru on a range of subjects, including the place of
religion in public life (Guha 2007: 127–35; Gopal 1979: 309). Patel’s
personal and official visit to the controversial Somnath temple in
September 1947, K M Munshi’s active participation in rebuilding the
temple, and Rajendra Prasad’s official participation in its “spectacular
opening,” pushed Nehru to deal with the question of communalism and
secularism with even greater urgency than before (Guha 2007: 127–35).
While
addressing the nation after the gunning down of Mahatma
Gandhi on 30 January 1948, Nehru equated communalism to poison and
appealed to the people to root out that venom. Resolutions were passed
to the effect that there was no place in the country for any
organisation preaching violence and communal hatred. Similarly, at the
governors’ conference held a few days later on 2 February 1948, several
suggestions regarding the need to ban communal organisations, including
the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS were made. As a result, for the first
time in independent India, contesting communalism through secularism
became a historical necessity, to ensure that communalism did not grow
its roots deeper in the country.
11
This provided Nehru the much-needed ideological buttress that pushed
his onslaught on communalism to the next level, whereby hedeclared that
the day for communal organisations in politics was a closed chapter in
history
12 and asserted that the best way to pay homage to Gandhi was to reject communalism.
13
Nehruvian secularism gained much more currency when Nehru himself
drafted and passed a resolution in December 1948. It pronounced:
India has been and is a land of many religions and many races and
must remain so. The freedom of India can only be based on a recognition
of this richly varied life bound together by an overriding unity, and by
full opportunities being given to every section of the people for
professing and practicing their religion and culture… as a democratic
secular state which neither favours nor discriminates any particular
religion.
14
In October 1951, the Congress party also passed a similar resolution
and condemned casteism and communalism as practices that are contrary to
the “true spirit” of religious and cultural traditions of the nation.
15
Nehru kept reminding the chief ministers of Indian states that he would
not allow communalism to malign the secular principles of the
government (Ghose 1993: 173). His critical approach against communalism
with special reference to the Hindu Mahasabha became a national drive
when in 1951 he wrote identical letters to all the chief ministers
concerning the issue.
16
Christians and Nationalism
When anti-colonial crusaders were resisting imperial rule in India, a
significant number of Christian leaders pledged their adherence to the
Congress and Gandhi. This is evident from the fact that the national
movement was followed up in its earliest stage by Indian Christians like
W C
Bonnerjee (Banerjee 1982: 248).
At a time when the
Hindu Mahasabha expressed no faith in the Congress and Gandhi with
regard to the communal question, the Christian leaders seemed to have
endorsed and even promoted Gandhi’s ideas.
The unabated support that the Christians lend to Gandhi’s ideology
reached its peak in the 1940s when the community expressed its resolute
confidence in the freedom struggle headed by him.
17 The
community believed in the ideal of a strong and indivisible India. D S
Ramachandra Rao, the president of the All India Christian Council
(AICC), appealed to every Christian to uphold the daring adventure of
Gandhi’s non-violence. He also asserted that the betterment of the world
and the preservation of human civilisation ultimately rested on
Gandhi’s principle of non-violence.
18 Commenting on Gandhi’s
fast-unto-death and his arrest in 1943, Maharaja Singh, the president of
the New Delhi session of the AICC, criticised the colonial government
and demanded for his immediate and unconditional release.
19
The Christian community’s protests against the arrests of Congress
leaders, dedication for the achievement of swaraj, commitment for an
indivisible and strong India, and its continued support to Gandhi’s
ideology—except his non-cooperation movement—were publicly commended by
Congress leaders. H N Kunzru, a Congress leader and member, council of
state, while addressing the 1943 session of the AICC in Delhi observed
that “it was heartening to find that the Indian Christian community is
struggling for unity, when threats of division were overwhelming.”
Applauding the community’s anti-communal approach throughout the Indian
freedom struggle, he strongly refuted M K Gandhi’s observation that the
contribution of Christians to India was “negative” in character. Kunzru
declared that Christians had played their part in the national movement
for securing a self-governing and self-reliant India by placing their
country above communal considerations.
20
The Christians had a range of discussions in 1943 on the political
situation of India, where they opposed the very idea of partition. They
condemned the widespread communal violence that erupted in August 1942.
The AICC called upon the British government to make an unambiguous
declaration that India should attain full freedom within two years. It
appealed to the leaders of the principal political parties and
communities in India to come to an agreed solution on communalism. It
observed that the communal question should be referred to an
international tribunal’s decision, if a solution could not be reached in
India. In its 1945 conference of Indian Christians, the community
demanded that the future Constitution of India must have the provision
of right to profess, propagate and practice religion, and suggested that
the change of religion should not involve any civil or political
disability.
21
Essentially, these three demands—the immediate grant of swaraj for
India, unconditional release of Congress leaders, and opposition to
partition—became the prime patriotic objectives of the Christian
community in 1945.
22 In fact, on 5 December 1946, the
Christian leaders determined that they must strive to bring about
communal harmony in the country, pledging that religion should never
cast a shadow between the country and its freedom. The ways in which the
community rejected the idea of separate electorates and reservation of
seats with joint electorates resonated strongly with the Indian public
throughout the freedom struggle.
23
As a result of their “commitment for national cause,” the members of
the Constituent Assembly contended with the demands made by the
Christians with regard to the right to propagation. An advisory
committee on minority and fundamental rights was set up by the
Constituent Assembly in January 1947. It consisted of A Dharam Das from
Uttar Pradesh, A Wilson and Jerome D’Souza from Madras, J Alban de Souza
from Bombay, B Kakra from Bihar, N C Mukherjee and Frank Anthony from
Bengal, J M Nicholas from Assam, and Rajkumari Amrit Kaur from the
Central Provinces and Berar. The “fair attitude” and “sacrifices” made
by the Christians were publicly acknowledged and applauded by K M
Munshi, legal pilot of the advisory committee, and Vallabhbhai Patel,
chairman of the advisory committee, who was considered to be a
“champion” of the Christian cause (Albuquerque 2005: 57).
In the course of the debates on the fundamental right to religious
freedom in May 1947, many members of the Constituent Assembly objected
to the inclusion of the right to propagation as a constituent of the
freedom of religion, though few expressed their sympathy towards the
community. Tandon, one of the members who opposed the right to
propagation later justified it, saying “… we agreed to keep the word
‘propagate’ out of regard for our own Christian friends” (Sarkar 2004:
237).Consequently, decisions were made to the effect that the
right to religion would be given to every religious community in India,
including the Christians. Postcolonial scholarship indicates that the
Christians did not lag behind any section of India in celebrating the
freedom gained from British rule on 15 August 1947 (Lightfoot Cordell
2008: 228).
Christians and Anti-national Discourse
Despite the fact that the community had demonstrated its patriotic sentiments forcefully,
Christians
in postcolonial India were identified by the proponents of the Hindu
rashtra as anti-nationals. The trauma of the centuries-long colonialism
and consequent anti-British sentiment could likely have instilled a
suspicious approach towards the missionaries and Christians. The
proselytising activities of colonial missionaries prompted the Hindu
fundamentalists to label all missionaries and Christians as
“anti-nationals.” Christians were targeted and accused of having
offended Hindu sentiments or of being in allegiance to a foreign power
(Guha 2007: 649–50).
As Neera Chandhoke (1999: 74) argues, the ways in which the Hindutva
and majoritarian politics made its claims and assertions, it subverted
the dream of flourishing plural cultures after Indian independence.Both
Hindu fundamentalism and Congress majoritarianism began to view the
right to propagation with cynicism. The issue of “discriminatory
treatment” to the Christians was first raised by Rajkumari Amrit Kaur,
the first health minister in Nehru’s cabinet,
in
November 1952. Consequently, on 28 November 1952, Nehru wrote a letter
to the chief minister of Madhya Pradesh, Ravishankar Shukla, directing
him to undertake all efforts to give equal treatment to the Christians
and to avoid any feelings of “unfair treatment.”
24
Nehru held the view that the Hindu Mahasabha and RSS were primarily
responsible for most attacks on the Christians and missionaries in
India. Congress leaders viewed these organisations as the most
precarious threat to the Constitution and secularism. This concoction of
controversies compelled Nehru to take up the issue of the Christian
minority with more urgency and purposefulness in the 1950s than ever
before.
25 Hindu fundamentalists and majoritarian Congress
leaders expressed their apprehensions about the misuse of the right to
religious freedom by the missionaries (Ahmed 2011: 60–61). The
Christians and their religious propagation became contentious when
majoritarian and fundamentalist forces began questioning the right to
propagation, anticipating a possible threat to the existence and
practice of Hinduism in Indian society (Robinson and Kujur 2010:
129–30).
It should be noted here that proselytisation during the colonial
period and the right to propagation as guaranteed in the Constitution of
the independent and democratic India were perceived as substitutes for
each other. Some members in Nehru’s cabinet even set up a motion to
interrogate the right to religion, which generated far-reaching
ramifications among diplomats outside India. The Indian high
commissioner to Canada, R R Saxena, raised doubts about the religious
neutrality of the government when the union home minister K N Katju
interpreted propagation as proselytisation. On 21 April 1953, Saxena
explained that the propagation activities in the country would be
curtailed if their activities are restricted only to proselytisation.
Consequently, Saxena sought a clarification from the foreign secretary
on whether there were any changes in the government’s policy on
religious freedom and neutrality. It was in the midst of this scenario
of mistrust that Nehru intervened and replied to Saxena on 8 May 1953,
assuring him that there were no changes in the secular approach of the
government. Nehru even advised Katju not to confuse the right to
propagation with the question of proselytisation.
26
The Christian community denounced Katju’s assertion, claiming that it
was equivalent to the restriction of fundamental rights in general and
the right to propagation in particular.
27 Nehru noted in
September 1953 that there was a feeling of consternation among the
Christians and many of them felt their future to be precarious in their
own country. He warned his party men against the imposition of
majoritarian views on the Christians as it would aggravate inner
conflicts, which he felt was more dangerous than physical violence.
28
He appealed to all “narrow-minded” Congressmen to not manufacture,
provoke or foster sentiments of Hindu majoritarianism, as it was opposed
to the secular and democratic principles advocated by Nehru’s
government (Gopal 1984: 171).
When Nehru supported Amrit Kaur in her rights to represent the
grievances of Christians, the home minister Katju not only accused her
of being supportive of the missionaries, but even branded her as an
advocate of the missionaries and Christians. Kaur in turn asserted that
Katju’s views on the Christian question were not in accordance with the
government’s policy and appealed to Nehru to entrust the issues of
Christians to the Ministry of External Affairs, as she had no faith in
the home ministry’s willingness to address the issue fairly.
29
Nehru’s intention of treating Christianity and the missionaries as
one among other religions, with an equal right to propagate, distanced
him ideologically from his cabinet colleagues.
30 The paucity
of tangible regulations to deal with foreign missionaries led to a
series of political speculations. In November 1954, the cabinet
formulated a policy that mandated that foreign missionaries should be
sponsored by specified local churches in India. It also announced
restrictions on the entry of missionaries without prior government
permission, leaving it to the state governments to withdraw or extend
their recognition under the Foreigners Act of 1946.
31
Sandwiched Nehru
Despite the deeply embedded north–south ideological divide on the
question of religious propagation, the marginalisation of Christians in
the Indian national body politic suggests that the Indian secularism, as
envisaged by Nehru, failed to provide an adequate basis for building a
tolerant polity (Prakash 2007: 180–81). When the Congress was in power
during Nehru’s times, discrimination on the basis of religion was widely
prevalent and the right to follow the religion of one’s choice,
guaranteed by the Constitution, was blatantly disregarded in some areas.
This is evident from the fact that when the freedom of conscience and
the right to profess, practice and propagate religion, subject to public
order, morality and health, were implemented, the missionaries and
Christians in India were asked to engage only in “humanitarian” works
and instructed not to exploit such activities for “proselytisation”
(Hardiman 2003: 103).
The Hindu nationalist organisations like Hindu Mahasabha and RSS
continued to be hostile to the Christians and Western missionaries in
India throughout the 1950s (Hauss and Haussman 2012: 349). There were
anti-missionary agitations and reconversions (popularly known as
ghar wapsi)
by
the Arya Samajists in Uttar Pradesh, and anti-Christian activities in
Madhya Pradesh orchestrated by the RSS, Jana Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha.
These organisations advocated that a change of religion essentially
amounted to a change in nationality. Consequently, Nehru—sandwiched
between majoritarianism and the Hindu rashtra—had to intervene to
categorically denounce their ideology, for he considered it a dangerous
proposition.
32 Expressing his distress over the attacks on
Christians and missionaries, Nehru in a press conference on 31 May 1955
said that Christianity in India was the third biggest religion and had
sufficiently deep roots and that the whole question should be looked at
from a political point of view, not through religious perspective. He
declared that the idea of a Hindu nation was fundamentally against the
Constitution and against a secular outlook.
33
Hindu-centric movements like the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) viewed
missionary presence in India as a threat to the Hindu religion and
alleged that with the help of huge resources at their command,
missionaries and Christians were taking “unwarranted advantage” of the
vulnerable sections for unfair religious conversions (Dogra 2005: 141).
The BJS claimed that there were potential threats from American–British
missionary activities, particularly in the tribal areas of Madhya
Pradesh, Assam, Bihar and Orissa (Baxter 1969: 144). Initiating protests
over the alleged anti-national activities of the Christians and
missionaries in the 1950s, the Congress government of Madhya Pradesh and
the BJS made every effort to identify Hinduism with nationalism and
Christians, thereby, as anti-nationals. The party even campaigned for
the deferment of government aid to educational institutions run by the
Christians and missionaries (Jaffrelot 1999: 164–65).
Debunking the right to propagation became a reality when Madhya
Pradesh succumbed to the pressure tactics of the BJS. The state
government took an exceptional interest in looking into the
“anti-national” activities of the Christians and missionaries in the
state. The BJS had organised an anti-missionary week inMadhya Pradesh,
which led to the appointment of an inquiry committee in April 1954 under
M B Niyogi, a former chief justice of the Nagpur High Court. The
committee submitted its report on 17 July 1956 (Jaffrelot 1999: 164).
Nehru was quite critical of the contentious attitude of the committee
and its consequent prejudiced proceedings, stating that he was not in
favour of the visits by government officials with police escorts to
schools, to seize school registers for the inquiry. Even before the
committee submitted its report, Nehru in his letter dated 14 July 1955,
addressed to Shukla, directed the chief minister to take steps to
counter the general impression that Christians were being prosecuted in
Madhya Pradesh.
34 In a note to G B Pant, the union home
minister, on 14 March 1955, Nehru criticised the Madhya Pradesh
government for denying the right to propagation to the missionaries and
Christians. He observed that the inquiry committee had created a great
deal of consternation among the Christian population. He insisted that
Pant make every effort to erase the feeling of tension and apprehension.
35
The committee that enquired about the activities of the missionaries
and converts in Madhya Pradesh found that there was a sharp increase in
the numerical strength of missionaries, from 4,377 to 4,877 between 1951
and 1955 and of them, 480 were in Madhya Pradesh with nearly half from
the United States (US). It also noted that the foreign missionaries in
India received ₹2.9 million between 1950 and 1954, two-thirds of which
was contributed by the US. According to the report, the amount was used
for building hospitals, schools and orphanages where “fraudulent
conversions” were attempted and achieved.
36
The report recommended that the government must withdraw support from
proselytisation-oriented missionaries; amend the Constitution to rule
out religious propagation by foreigners; prohibit circulation of
religious literature without the permission of the state government;
transfer foreign missionary properties to national churches, and
formulate legal measures to control illegal conversions. The ways in
which the committee conducted its inquiries were seen by the proponents
of Hindutva politics as an “eye-opener” for it indicted that the foreign
missionaries were misusing their position.
37 Similarly,
there were a series of reactionary responses from Christians all over
India. Although the report was not implemented by the government, it
created the feeling that the entire community was on trial, as if they
were stigmatised, intimidated and threatened (Jaffrelot 1999: 11–79).
Nehru, Pant, Amrit Kaur, the chief ministers of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya
Pradesh and other leaders had a series of discussions on this report.
Nehru was hesitant to act on the recommendations partly because of his
reluctance to interfere with the discretion of a state government and
partly due to his attempt to avoid tension and apprehension among the
Christians. Meanwhile, he expressed strong disapproval of the ways in
which the missionaries used religion to meet political ends.
38
The report was contested by the leaders of the Christian communities,
including the archbishops of Bombay and Nagpur, for its “sweeping
generalisation.” They challenged the claims of the report by insisting
that no foreign Christian missions—or Christians in general—had any
political purpose, and demanded that the findings of the committee be
substantiated.
39 In its remark, the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh noted that the attempt made by the committee was like a fishing
expedition, based on the supposition that something discreditable could
be discovered.
40 It is largely on the basis of the
recommendations of the committee that the state governments passed bills
against the so-called “forcible” and “fraudulent” conversions. As a
result of which, anti-conversion laws were enacted. Orissa became the
first state in India to enact a legislation restricting religious
conversion—the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967 (Osuri 2013: 57).
Evidently, the right to propagation was often (mis)interpreted to suit
the agenda of the dominant political ideology.
A Crisis of Secularism and Nehru’s Intervention
The available literature suggests that Christians expressed their
conviction and support in the idea of secularism advanced by Nehru—as
propounded in the Constitution, guaranteeing the right to profess,
propagate and practice their religion. When change of religion,
especially to Christianity, was considered as a process of
denationalisation, the right to propagation was seen by the proponents
of the Hindu rashtra and majoritarian Congress members as dangerous
because they apprehended that it would lead to the complete annihilation
of Hinduism. Eventually, propagating Christianity was identified with
Western supremacy and was interpreted as a threat to the Indian state
and its security (Jaffrelot 2010: 156–57). The religious conversion of
the Pariahs of South India and a few tribal communities in Madhya
Pradesh, as Chad Bauman (2008: 1–2) argues, entailed a process of
“deculturisation”’ and “denationalisation.”
Nehru was cautious of the growing anti-Christian sentiment in
Manipur, Bombay, Madhya Pradesh, and other states, where there were many
tribal Christians. The manner in which the proponents of Hindu
fundamentalism and Congress majoritarianism carried out the
anti-Christian propaganda provoked Nehru to label their activities as a
“politics of misguided nationalism.”
41 Yet, the politics of minority exclusion became politically vibrant and religiously repugnant.
Nehru vehemently criticised the Niyogi Committee and said that the
members with their partisan approach wilfully distorted a few incidents
of religious conversion.
42 The committee moved from its remit of religious aspect with renewed focus on the political implications.
43
When the missionaries and Christians repudiated the allegations that
they were converting illiterates, either forcibly or through fraudulent
means, with monetary temptations and other inducements, the Madhya
Pradesh government reacted with the claim that propagations were being
used for political and religious objectives.
44 Despite the
fact that the government was anxious to have men of unbiased and
impartial outlook to function as judges, the committee members appeared
to have functioned as advocates reflecting majoritarian sentiments. The
way in which the committee interpreted missionary propagation as a
danger to the progress of national unity and the coexistence of
different religious traditions, only reflected the essentially
unconstitutional approach of the committee. The view expressed by the
committee that the Christians and missionaries took advantage of the
religious freedom to create a Christian political party in the country
on the lines of the Muslim League to eventually demand a separate state
and become militant minority, completely sabotaged and disregarded the
community’s crucial contribution to the formation of Indian nationalism.
45
A range of criticism questioned the very nature and scope of the
inquiry committee. The Nagpur High Court condemned the terms of
reference of the committee, saying that there was nothing immoral in
persuading a person to change their religion for worldly gains. The
court indicated that an inquiry should not be opened merely to be
indignant or for being an object of suspicion.
46 Scathingly
attacking the controversial 99-point questionnaire of the panel, the
court noted that there was no doubt that certain questions were outside
the scope of the resolution of the government order. Making note of the
constitution of the commission, the court asked the committee to answer
the government citing the reasons for transgressing the terms of
reference.
47
In fact,
it is debatable whether it was ever a fact-finding
committee at all, as it had interrogated the constitutionally guaranteed
right to propagation premeditatedly. Though the committee members asked
both Christians and non-Christians to respond to their questions
without any preconceived approach, the manner in which the committee
asked questions showed that there was something tendentiously political
in its tone and content. Some of the questions were as follows: What is
the population of Christians in your area? What are the methods used for
conversion? Do you think that conversion to Christianity adversely
affects national loyalty? Do you think that different religions can
coexist peacefully? Do you think that if other religions showed the same
zeal and enthusiasm as the missionaries, there would be unpleasant
consequences? Does change of religion necessarily imply change of
culture? Such questions demonstrated that the committee was perturbed
with the growing Christian demography, fearing that it might legitimise a
religious monopoly in the country.
48
Moreover, the committee’s recommendations to proscribe missionaries;
inspect missionary schools with constabulary chaperone; treat Christian
hospitals as sites of conversion; amend constitutional provisions with
regard to the right to religion; authorise state administrations to
enact anti-conversion laws to interdict the so-called forceful,
fraudulent and induced conversions, and to restrain all kinds of
religious tracts circulated without government permission, among others,
created a scenario whereby some of the Indian states enacted
anti-conversion acts, consciously turning a blind eye to secular values
and the right to propagation.
49
A delegation of seven Catholic bishops led by Valerian Gracias of
Bombay met Nehru in March 1955 and submitted a memorandum arguing that
the governments of Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh
and Bihar had
registered scores of fallacious criminal cases against Christians and
that the police were intentionally refusing to take action against
“Hindu persecutors.” The representatives explained to Nehru that the
condition of Christians in North India was quickly worsening. Acting
swiftly, Nehru wrote to the home minister, directing him to make every
effort to eliminate the sense of fear and apprehension, and to create a
sense of safety amongst Christians. He asserted that any unfair
treatment towards them would not be tolerated and even stated that the
enquiry committee had done more harm than good by creating a great deal
of consternation among Christians.
50
To a large extent, Nehru could be seen as a sandwiched man, sidelined
by his fellow Congressmen and those who advocated Hindutva politics.
While Nehru maintained religious neutrality in festivals, his colleagues
trampled the very same principles. Flabbergasted by this recalcitrance,
he told his cabinet colleagues and senior party men that the best way
to observe a religious festival was to work hard in the service of the
nation.
51 Nevertheless, a sandwiched Nehru could not efface the deeply penetrated Hindu religious fervour of his cabinet colleagues.
Nehru and the first president of independent India, Rajendra Prasad,
had completely opposing principles on religion. While the former took a
neutral path in public speeches during religious festivals, the latter,
with his religious avidity, preferred to explicitly foist majoritarian
Hinduism. Expressing prejudiced attitudes towards the missionaries and
Christians on one hand and dissimulating to safeguard the principle of
religious equality on the other, uncovered the “other” side of secular
India.
52 When Nehru emphasised the need of social and economic revolution in religious gatherings,
53 other leaders reflected the “majoritarian sentiments.”
In the post-Nehruvian phase, when there were debates over whether
Congress leaders could accept invitations from religious bodies, there
were discordant views on religious neutrality, which further
incapacitated the core idea of Nehruvian secularism. The microscopic
minority among Congress leaders, who attempted to keep Nehruvian
secularism alive, blatantly condemned “other” Congressmen for their
close association with Hindu festivals to consciously ruin the party’s
secular credentials.
54
Nehruvian secularism faced a series of challenges and confrontations
both from the Congress members and the proponents of Hindutva politics.
The Congress leaders’ nostalgic espousal of Hindu religious activities
and rituals, and the manner in which they justified the belief that
secularism did not mean being anti-Hindu, generated scholarly debates on
communalism and secularism. The great Delhi debate on communalism in
May 1970 further divided Congress leaders ideologically into two rival
groups—under Kamlapati Tripathi and Chandra Shekhar. Where the former
advocated sentiment-oriented majoritarian ethics questioning Nehru’s
idea of religious diversities and pluralities, the latter made every
effort to uphold the constitutionally guaranteed equal respect to all
religions.
55 The question, asked by the secular academia
there, was: “Can secularism in India survive the functioning of
democracy?” (Menon 2007: 118–20). When the liberal Indian leadership
under Nehru crafted secularism to assure equal play of all religions,
Hindutva, a non-Nehruvian and non-modernist strand within the broader
nationalist framework, was made a substitute for secularism by the
proponents of majoritarian politics (Chandhoke 1999: 74).
Concluding Remarks
Indian secularism, as Nehru envisioned it, can be better discerned as
a legitimised panacea for the government’s conceptualisation of
religious egalitarianism in the multicultural society than merely as a
political apparatus to fight communal politics. The empirical evidence
presented in this study explicitly suggests that the idea of secularism
that gained legitimacy largely after Gandhi’s assassination underwent a
series of revamps and distortions over a period of time. Nehru’s idea of
fair treatment to all religions on the one hand and the combative
political approach towards Indian Christians on the other, created a
consistent but complex theoretical framework for Indian secularism.
Nehru’s idea of Indian secularism, which centred largely on the
premise of religious egalitarianism, interrogated the anti-national
label applied to Indian Christians. It asserted the constitutionally
guaranteed right to propagation by rejecting reports of forced religious
conversions, meticulously devised by the proponents of Hindu rashtra
and majoritarian ideology. As a revolutionary egalitarian thinker, Nehru
played a crucial role in the postcolonial period, articulating a
radical political vision that uncapped the limits and possibilities for a
truly secular India with equal rights to all religions.
Nevertheless, when the Congress considered the communally sensitive
Muslim League as a political ally in some Congress-ruled Indian states
like Madras, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh, a compromise with communal forces
became inevitable (Mishra 2007: 51–82). We can also understand the
plasticity of Nehru’s thought on this question in terms of his
biographer Sarvepalli Gopal’s (1984: 73) critical observation on Nehru’s
decision to enter into a political alliance with the Muslim League for
power in Kerala in the 1960s, as having “tarnished his reputation for
secularism” and weakened his position politically.
Nehru, who was sandwiched between majoritarianism and Hindutva
politics, was forced to negotiate his secular ideals with both his own
Congressmen and his political opponents—the Hindu Mahasabha, RSS and
BJS. Yet, Nehru’s secular credibility can be interpreted as the bulwark
of religious egalitarianism, partly because it attempted to reduce the
yawning majority–minority religious gap and partly due to its deep
commitment to the idea of equal right to all religions.
Notes
1 From W Le B Egerton, Assistant Secretary to the Viceroy, to the
Hon’ble H G Haig, CIE, ICS, Government of India, 7 February 1929, Letter
No 1559 G M, Home Department, 15 February 1929, File No 2-VI-Jais,
1929, National Archives of India.
2 See note 1.
3 See note 1.
4 Note by K R Menon, 16 March 1929, File
No 2-VI-Jais, Home Department, Government of India, National Archives of India.
5
Hindustan Times, 17 August 1947.
6
Hindu, 2 October 1947.
7
Hindustan Times, 7 October 1947.
8
Hindu, 13 October 1947.
9
Hindustan Times, 17 October 1947.
10
Hindustan Times, 10 April 1956.
11
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Vol 5, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 1987, pp 35–41.
12
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Vol 5, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 1987, pp 46–47.
13 Nehru’s speech at Wardha on 13 March 1948 from the
Tribune, 15 March 1948.
14
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 8, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 1987, pp 136–37.
15 G Parthasarathi (ed),
Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947–1964, Vol 2, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 1986,
pp 519–77.
16
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 15, part II, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund,
New Delhi, 1994, pp 126–28.
17
Tribune, 20 April 1941. Cited in
Towards Freedom, Documents on the Movement for Freedom for Independence in India, 1941, Part 1, Amit K Gupta and Arjun Dev (eds), Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2010, pp 17–18.
18 H N Mitra and N N Mitra,
The Indian Annual Register, 1919–1947 (in 58 volumes), Vol 45 (1940), republished by Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 2000, pp 318–322.
19 H N Mitra and N N Mitra,
Indian Annual Register, 1919–1947 (in 58 volumes), Vol 50 (1943), republished by Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 2000, pp 309–10.
20 See note 19.
21
Report of the XXX Annual Session of the All India Conference of Indian Christians, 1943;
National Christian Council Review, Vol 65, No 12, 1945,
p 240.
22 H N Mitra and N N Mitra,
Indian Annual Register, 1919–1947 (in 58 volumes), Vol 54 (1945), republished by Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 2000, pp 305–06.
23
Hindu, 5 December 1946.
24
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 20, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 1997, pp 201–03.
25
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 19, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 1996, p 554.
26
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, Vol 22, 1998, pp 237–39; and 1999, Vol 24, p 322.
27
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 19, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 1996, p 326.
28 G Parthasarathi (ed),
Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947–1964, Vol 3, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 1989,
pp 375–81.
29
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 25, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 1999, p 225.
30
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 24, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 1999, pp 321–26.
31
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 27, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 2000, p 439.
32
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 26, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 2000, pp 252–53.
33
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 28, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 2001, pp 482–505.
34
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 29, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 2001, p 161.
35
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 28, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 2001, pp 494–96.
36
Report of the Christian Missionaries Activities Enquiry Committee, chaired by M Bhawani Shankar Niyogi, Government Press, Madhya Pradesh, 1956, p 108.
37
Report of the Christian Missionaries Activities Enquiry Committee, Government Press, Madhya Pradesh, 1956, pp 99–135.
38
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 37, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 2005, p 290.
39
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 34, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 2005, pp 181–82.
40
Hindustan Times, 14 April 1956.
41
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 25, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 1999, p 225.
42
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 25, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 1999, pp 225–29.
43
Pioneer, 19 April 1956.
44
The Report of the Christian Missionary Activities Inquiry Committee, Vol 1, Government Printing Office, Nagpur, 1956, p 167.
45
The Report of the Christian Missionary Activities Inquiry Committee, Vol 1, Government Printing Office, Nagpur, 1956, pp 59–60.
46
Hindustan Times, 14 April 1956.
47
Hindustan Times, 14 April 1956.
48
The Report of the Christian Missionary Activities Inquiry Committee, Vol 1, Government Printing Office, Nagpur, 1956, pp 182–88.
49
The Report of the Christian Missionary Activities Inquiry Committee, Vol 1, Government Printing Office, Nagpur, 1956, pp 163–64.
50
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 28, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 2001, pp 494–97.
51
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 37, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 2005, p 760.
52
National Herald, 29 April 1956.
53
Hindustan Times, 24 April 1956.
54
Times of India, 27 May 1970.
55
Hindu, 27 May 1970.
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