Resources for all concerned with culture of authoritarianism in society, banalisation of communalism, (also chauvinism, parochialism and identity politics) rise of the far right in India (and with occasional information on other countries of South Asia and beyond)
Assam: Bajrang Dal camp organisers booked for imparting arms training
Bajrang Dal
said 350 youths were trained in handling guns, performing martial arts,
besides learning lessons on arts, politics and spirituality at the camp
organised in Mornoi village in the district.
Nagas of Assam have condemned the “racist” song during the Bihu performance that created a world record on April 13. After AANWS, All Assam Tangsa Students’ Union slammed the use of the “racist song” that called the Nagas okora, meaning stupid or dumb.
Photobombing death
Narcissism is a useful example of the banality of evil
Mukul Kesavan | Published 26.09.21, The Telegraph
The photographer jumping on a man shot dead by policemen in Assam on Thursday is a creature of two intersecting histories. The first is the history of State-sponsored majoritarianism, which in India generally and Assam particularly, is beginning to devolve into a form of fascism. The photographer knew that stomping on Muslims, dead or alive, was sanctioned by the zeitgeist. But he was also performing for the camera in a way that is the signature behaviour of this digital age.
The clip that went viral is, in itself, an example of the ubiquity of cameras in our world. You first see the photographer stamp on the man. Immediately afterwards, a policeman hits the prone body with his lathi as if in corroboration. The photographer then knees the dead man, punches him and is ushered away by policemen. Another cameraman moves into the frame, inching up to the body to get a closer shot. Abruptly the stomping cameraman reappears. He takes a running jump and lands on the dead man with a bullet hole in his chest, overshoots and then returns to assault him. A policeman leads him away for a second time.
That makes at least three camera persons embedded in the armed police party responsible for the evictions and the subsequent firing. And that’s not counting the cameras in the phones likely carried by everyone on the scene. If we didn’t live in a world where every other act gets videoed and turned into a home movie for someone’s delectation, the dead Muslim would likely still have been killed by the police but the photographer wouldn’t have done his ghoulish death dance: that was an act of performative depravity rooted in the idea of an audience.
We have been here before. A few years ago, there was a video of middle-class men calmly beating ragged Dalit workers with metal slats and filming themselves in the act. The provocations on Indian news channels are forms of performative depravity, as are the political pronouncements of the more brazen representatives of the majoritarian right.
But this sense that we are continuously performing for an imagined community of unseen eyes isn’t political; it’s a function of the coming together of phone cameras, cellular connectivity and social media. This does two things: one, it amplifies narcissism because people can share themselves and their doings online, instantly, and two, it creates a peculiar disjunction between their here-and-now, that is to say, their corporeal lives and their digital avatars. (It’s interesting that when we’re not online, we acknowledge in our minds that we are ‘offline’; our engagement with the physical world of taste and touch and smell is now described, by default, as a state of disconnection.)
This increasingly gets people to do things in their off-line lives that they wouldn’t do otherwise, for the sake of their online personas. The person who walks up to the edge of a cliff to take the perfect selfie and falls off is only the most extreme example of this growing conviction that the physical world exists to supply us with props for our online lives.
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the progressive socialist who represents New York’s 14th district in Congress, created a social media splash when she attended a swish gala at the Metropolitan Museum’s Costume Institute in a long white dress with ‘Tax the Rich’ emblazoned in red on its back. A pundit in a conservative British newspaper grudgingly conceded that right-wingers denouncing AOC for hypocrisy — swanning about with the rich and famous while railing against them — missed the point and misread her audience: she was using a real world ‘do’ as a platform to perform and get her message across to a larger audience online.
This hyper-awareness of an audience is now existential: ‘I perform therefore I am.’ Everything we do, including eating meals cooked by others, is Instagram-able. I have a friend who constantly shares dreadful portraits of himself wearing his best ‘camera face’ with no self-consciousness because he clearly believes that there is no such thing as a bad ‘view’ or ‘share’ or ‘like’ or ‘follow’. They all count… literally.
It’s pointless being superior about this because we are all implicated. In the old days of non-digital photography, when I sent off camera rolls for developing and then got the prints in the mail, I was always exasperated by the idiot pictures I had taken of the Qutub Minar or the Amber Fort because I didn’t figure in them. In my absence, they were just bad amateur postcards. Selfies pre-empt this problem; they foreground you, with the world assigned its proper place in the background as an anchoring detail.
Selfies are like late-medieval paintings in European museums, when an exclusive focus on Christ or Mary gives way to pictures with landscapes worked into the composition, visible through casements but still dwarfed by its iconic subjects. Selfies have reached the same point in a reverse journey: Western art moved outward from the iconic image to the landscape; we are receding from pictures of the world around us into the voids of our nostrils.
There is a banality to online narcissism because it reduces the world to your presence in it. Nothing matters, except being there and letting people know that you were there. This is what the photographer did: he photobombed a man’s death. We can see from his actions that he enthusiastically endorsed the police firing but approval wasn’t enough: he needed to be in the moment, in the frame. Narcissism in this degree is a useful example of the banality of evil. In the photographer’s mind, he jumped on a what, not a who, a prop, not a person.
Narcissism is by definition auto-erotic, but the self-obsession that marks these lives is best described without euphemism: it is a masturbatory view of the world. What we see in that clip is political porn that will be endlessly ‘curated’ and shared by bigots and incels hunched over their screens. A long time ago, Gil Scott-Heron sardonically sang that the revolution will not be televised. The counter-revolution, though, will be shown in instalments, one vile video clip at a time.
Over
several decades and generations, as we see in Gujarat today, such a
political and legislative system produces cities that are very starkly
segregated on communal lines. (Illustration by C R Sasikumar)
On May 28, 2021, 11 houses in close proximity to the
Gorakhnath Temple in Gorakhpur were proposed to be acquired by the Uttar
Pradesh Government citing reasons of security. Later reporting revealed
that most of the residents had signed their consent on the proposal
under pressure and fear from the state apparatus. These houses have been
occupied by Muslim families for nearly a century and it is important
for us to reflect on the fact that exclusively Muslim households were
shortlisted for the construction of security posts and other facilities
in the area.
Alarming as it is, the incident in Gorakhpur is a small scale example
of similar strategies of homogenising urban neighbourhoods on communal
lines that the government has been implementing in many other cities and
states across the country. An imagined threat to law and order and
safety of the inhabitant of these areas always fronts these strategies
as their rationale.
Take for example the election rhetoric in Assam. Page 13 of the BJP’s
manifesto for the assembly elections in Assam featured their promise to
enact “appropriate laws” to curb “the menace of love jihad and land
jihad” in the state. Although it is granted only three lines in the
entire manifesto, the issue of “land jihad” was featured prominently in
the Union home minister Amit Shah’s speech on March 26 in Guwahati. The
party emerged victorious in the polls, and therefore, these laws are
likely to be formulated and implemented.
“Land jihad” is a conspiracy theory in the Hindutva narrative that
claims that Muslims are waging a religious war on Hindus by buying real
estate in Hindu majority areas with the aim of dominating the
neighbourhoods and gradually executing a Hindu exodus. Just like the
rhetoric that created legitimacy for the “love jihad” law preceded the
legislation in Uttar Pradesh, the rhetoric around “land jihad” gained
pace in BJP’s election campaign in Assam. More importantly, just like
there are no records or legal definitions of “love jihad”, the “menace
of land jihad” also remains undefined and unrecorded and targets
consensual real estate transactions between individuals.
While we have seen in Uttar Pradesh what a law against “love jihad”
looks like, it remains unclear what would a law against “land jihad”
seek to achieve and how will it try to do that? If, however, we want to
understand what kind of laws work the narrative of “land jihad” in our
cities, we must look at Gujarat.
Gujarat has unique legislation concerning the buying and selling of
real estate in its cities. The legislation is called The Disturbed Areas
Act, 1991, and restricts the exchange of real estate between people of
two different religious communities. In the areas declared as
“disturbed”, the exchange can only take place if an application for the
same is approved by the district collector.
The law was enacted in 1991 and sought to prevent distress sale
following an event of communal violence. Over time, however, areas that
have not seen communal violence in several years continue to remain
categorised as “disturbed” and the state has since added more areas to
the list — sometimes without an incident of communal violence.
In Ahmedabad alone, over 750 areas are covered under the Disturbed
Areas Act, 1991. Later amendments in the Act have made it much easier
for the district collector to declare an area as “disturbed”. The
amendments state that an area can now be declared “disturbed” on the
basis of just a “possibility” of communal riot or polarisation (‘What
has changed in Gujarat’s Disturbed Areas Act’, IE, October 19, 2020).
The Act — in its vague language — is widely used to prevent Muslims
from buying properties in “Hindu dominated” parts of a city, thereby
segregating neighbourhoods. It is also a tool of communal politics. For
example, Sangita Patil, the MLA candidate in Gujarat Assembly Elections,
2017, promised her voters to get her constituency of Limbayat declared
as “disturbed”. Upon winning the seat, she fulfilled the rather ironic
promise and the area was declared “disturbed” in October 2017 in order
to “…stop them (Muslims) from spreading into Hindu areas”. Similar
impositions were done in posh neighbourhoods of Rajkot in January 2021,
and in some cases, like that of Bhayli in Vadodara, residents themselves
demanded that their area be categorised as “disturbed” after some
Muslim families were allotted houses in Bhayli under the Pradhan Mantri
Awas Yojana. The coming of Muslims in Bhayli was seen as a disturbance
in the “peace-loving Hindu neighbourhood” (‘Residents demand Bhayli under Disturbed Areas Act, threaten to boycott polls’, IE, February 13, 2021).
The characterisation of minorities as the unwanted other forms the
socio-political space that allows for legislations like the Disturbed
Areas Act to operate. And in most instances, we see the narrative of
“land jihad” — an unverified, undefined and unrecorded problem — as an
integral part of the rhetoric. We see this in the manifesto of BJP and
in Amit Shah’s aforementioned speech in Assam as well.
The promise to enact laws against land jihad features under the
heading “Protection of Civilisation in Assam”. As the suffix implies
“land jihad” is allegedly executed by Muslims and therefore, the
“civilisation” of Assam needs protection from Muslims buying real
estate. It also implies that it is the Hindu population of the state
that has the first right over the land and Muslims buying land in an
area of their choice is a religious war waged by an illegitimate
outsider.
Amit Shah also accused Badruddin Ajmal, the leader of All India
United Democratic Front (AIUDF), of “changing the identity of Assam
through land jihad” again implying that the identity of Assam is not
inclusive of Muslims and Muslims buying land in Assam morphs its
identity into something that it is inherently not. In this context, the
Union home minister also used the word “infiltrator” to refer to the
perpetrators of “land jihad”, further characterising the minorities as
unwanted others.
Over several decades and generations, as we see in Gujarat today,
such a political and legislative system produces cities that are very
starkly segregated on communal lines. Polarisation of the people through
hate speech, riots and propaganda provides the social consent to create
and operate communal legislations in the city. As legislations legalise
communal identity as the qualifier of the right to live in certain
areas of a city, the divide is executed into the built form — in
neighbourhoods, roads, apartment buildings and even government housing —
preventing people from living in diverse neighbourhoods and reducing
the interaction between communities to a minimum while also denying
minorities the right to buy properties in the neighbourhoods of their
aspirations.
What we do not know, we fear, and increased segregation, followed by
reduced interaction and lack of familiarity, perpetuate and promote
communal stereotypes. The dirty other — created through propaganda and
political hate speech — is reinforced and the built environment — now
segregated — creates a more expansive space to incorporate and sustain
legislations like the Disturbed Areas Act, 1991, and potential
legislations like the one the BJP has promised to enact in Assam.
Socio-political rhetoric creates polarised cities through legislation
and polarised segregated cities further contribute towards divisive
politics. Intolerance is created and sustained through a form of
structural violence that gradually produces geographies of alienation
and segregation.
Recent developments in Gorakhpur, the BJP’s manifesto in Assam and
the political rhetoric of “land jihad” in the election campaign imply
that the party intends to export the aforementioned politics of the
built form from Gujarat to other states of the country where it sees the
opportunity to translate the politics of Hindutva into an urbanity of
hate.
Zuberi is an academic and writes about politics, culture, architecture and city studies
Many liberals and self-proclaimed
Marxists in Assam held the firm belief — they still do — that the
National Register of Citizens will eradicate the gaze of suspicion on
‘illegal’ people. This belief is nothing but an instance of false
consciousness, a story manufactured by the caste Assamese middle class
and the Assamese nationalist to invoke a spirit of acceptability among
people towards the NRC. A bureaucratic exercise cannot be a solution to
social malice.
The elite among Assamese Muslims also supported the NRC process in this hope, as did a number of ‘miya’
poets. But by the time the NRC list was published last year, Assamese
civil society bodies started expressing their dissatisfaction with the
1.9 million people who were left out of the register. The figure was too
less for them.
The NRC is far from over. The stories of hope that were sold
are fading with every passing day. The anti-foreigner rhetoric has
resurfaced, once again. It has been given a new lease of life and has
indoctrinated a new group of youngsters into the fold of Assamese
nationalism. This has resulted in a toxic mix of jingoism and hatred
towards those perceived to be outsiders.
Other lives
The recent debate that emanated from the public rejection of the idea of a char-chapori museum
by Assam’s health minister, Himanta Biswa Sarma, is a case in point.
The proposal for a museum, which would reflect the culture and heritage
of the people living in Assam’s char-chaporis, had come from
the Departmentally Related Standing Committee on Education of the Assam
government. The committee had proposed this idea along with another
museum for the Gorkha community. The proposal was presented to the
legislative house in March; 10 of the 15 committee members who gave
those recommendations are from the ruling party in Assam.
Char-chaporis are heterogeneous, non-colonizing spaces that
are not inhabited by Bengali Muslims only. The health minister’s
resistance reflects not only the sensibilities of the Assamese but also
the condition of minorities in Assam. It is evident that Assamese
society suffers from ‘sociocentrism’, a condition in which the identity
of a pluralist society is articulated through a dominant member of the
group. For the caste Assamese, it is unimaginable that artefacts
associated with the Bengali Muslim community can be a part of the
Srimanta Sankardev Kalakshetra in Guwahati. Sarma’s remark also embodies
a mindset that perceives the Bengali Muslim to be a polluting element
degrading Assam’s culture. Hence the need for segregation and the
rejection of the idea of a shared space. The rejection reveals the
extent of alienation and dehumanization of minorities, especially miyas.
Sorry picture
The elements that are integral to the iconography of the miyas being circulated on the social media — a torn lungi, barbed wire, muri, ittar —
portray what the French writer, Albert Memmi, calls ‘heterophobia’: the
fear of difference, both real and imaginary. There is proof of such
fear lingering in Assam. The health minister reportedly blamed the
‘invasion’ of Covid into Assam on Muslims. The chief minister is
reported to have noted in a public rally in Bodoland that the ‘Mughal’
assault on Assam continues, and that if we don’t become conscious of it,
Assam’s mother tongue will become Arabic. These comments come in the
backdrop of the Assam government discontinuing the funding for madrasas in
the name of modernizing education. This kind of vilification has
coincided with the rise of right-wing politics in Assam. But this should
not take away from the fact that antipathy towards minorities has been
organic to Assam’s culture.
The NRC is not a solution. It is only an instrument to consolidate Assamese cultural essentialism.
Assam NRC: Deprivation of citizenship should be through rigorous procedure, says People's Tribunal
Shruti Mahajan September 9 2019
Citizenship gives an individual the right to have other rights and a process like drafting of the Nation Register of Citizens (Assam NRC) must follow a strict procedure, a Jury of a People's Tribunal observed on Sunday.
Following an intense two-day hearing of depositions by experts and testimonies of those affected in Assam, a Jury comprising retired judges, legal experts, activists, writers, and professors chalked out the issues plaguing the NRC exercise and the grim situation that it has led to. In its interim report, the Jury opined,
"In the context of Assam – as well as in the context of the entire country – citizenship, as the right to have rights, is one of the most basic, fundamental human rights in modern societies. Deprivation of citizenship must follow the most rigorous procedure available and the overriding concerns must be fairness and efficiency."
The Jury comprised retired judges of the Supreme Court, Justice Madan Lokur and Justice Kurian Joseph, Former Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court, Justice AP Shah, Professor Faizan Mustafa, Human Rights Activist Syeda Hamid, Ambassador Deb Mukherjee, Writer Githa Hariharan, and Professor Monirul Hussain.
The Jury Report
The Jury found that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal, as well as the exercise of overseeing and monitoring the process of NRC from 2013 till now, raise very pertinent constitutional questions.
While overseeing the process of NRC, the Supreme Court took on an administrative task and in situations like this, the system of remedies is virtually taken away, the Jury opined. Important questions as to the functioning and independence of the Foreigners Tribunals, which will decide on the appeals filed by those dropped from the NRC, have also been raised in the report.
The judiciary's role in the process has increased the hardships, rather than easing the process given that strict deadlines were set leading to elevated pressure on the authorities. The focus of the courts on deportation and detention rather than on release of detainees is also pointed out by the Jury in its report.
"Judicial orders have set difficult conditions for release from detention camps – conditions that cannot be met by marginalised and vulnerable people.
Despite the scale of the exercise, the judiciary’s insistence on setting deadlines has increased the pressure on both the process and the people involved."
Justice (retd.) AP Shah
In the context of Foreigners Tribunal and their functioning, Justice Madan Lokur said that these tribunals were "functioning in an arbitrary manner." There ought to have been uniformity and a standard procedure to be followed by these Tribunals, which has, however, been absent from the process. He further added that the trend of exercising the option of detaining a person as the first choice as opposed to the jurisprudence of liberty followed in India is very disturbing. He further stated,
"Not enough thought was given to the human cost implication of this process."
Justice (retd.) Madan Lokur
Justice (retd) Kurian Joseph touched upon the aspect of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 being available to non-citizens also in the context of those persons who were left out of the NRC and had to prove their citizenship. Quoting the first line of the Indian pledge, Justice Joseph said,
"All Indians are my brother and sisters... but unfortunately lakhs of people in Assam are not in a position to feel this human dignity and this constitutional dignity."
Justice (retd.) Kurian Joseph
The NRC process in Assam, over the years, has caused a humanitarian crisis leading to suicides, anxiety, feeling of cultural and ethnic inferiority and this disenfranchisement process has placed the marginalized and minority groups in great jeopardy and placed a disproportionate burden on vulnerable groups such as women and children. This grim situation has been taken note of by the Jury after hearing devastating testimonies of the people from Assam who endured great suffering.
Issues
A host of issues emanating from the NRC and the question of citizenship were raised during the two-day hearing of the Tribunal. This included issues of land, culture, and migration to the evolution of citizenship in India.
Problems in the drafting of NRC and the functioning of Foreigners Tribunal and the constitutional processes, as well as legal remedies and role of Judiciary, also formed a large chunk of the discussion. Setting up of Detention Centres and the process of detaining persons arbitrarily was also discussed in detail.
The speakers included advocates Prashant Bhushan, Vrinda Grover, Mihir Desai, Gautam Bhatia, Aman Wadud, Mustafa Khaddam Hussain, Nizam Pasha along with activists Teesta Setalvad, Harsh Mader, Ravi Nair, Mohsin Alam Bhat, Mrinal Sharma, Sajjad Hassan, Zameer Ali, Abdul Kalam Azad. Professor Neera Chandhoke and Senior Journalist Sanjoy Hazarika also made depositions.
SEE FULL REPORT AT: https://barandbench.com/assam-nrc-peoples-tribunal-deprivation-of-citizenship-must-follow-rigorous-procedure-says-jury/
“As concerned citizens, we look to the Supreme Court to reaffirm India’s constitutional and international obligations to rights on sensitive issues. That is why we are disappointed by recent statements by the Chief Justice of India on a complex matter relating to illegal detention and deportation, without heeding India’s own constitutional and international obligations,” it said.
CJI’s admonition of Chief Secretary
The statement was in reference to Chief Justice of India Ranjan Gogoi’s admonition of Assam Chief Secretary Alok Kumar for proposing a methodology for the release of a handful of foreign prisoners who had been in detention beyond their term of sentence for illegal entry. The rebuke was while advocating greater detention of suspected ‘foreigners’.
“We regard these remarks as unfortunate as the case concerned the wilful violation of the human rights of hundreds of detainees who were languishing in what the court itself accepts are “inhuman conditions”, the CHRI said, referring to Article 21 that says no person in India can be deprived of her/his right to life and liberty without due process.
“There is no deportation agreement with Bangladesh. International law lays down that such deportations can take place only with the consent of the country of origin. Bangladesh has consistently refused to accept that its citizens migrate in large numbers to India. Indeed, Bangladesh regards such unilateral efforts as harmful to a bilateral relationship that is critical for the security and stability of both countries and especially of our eastern region. We cannot place ourselves in a situation where we are seen as forcing people out at gunpoint; it would be ethically unjust, wrong in law and draw international condemnation,” it said.
The rights body said its members were sensitive to the concerns in Assam and other parts of the country about the problem of illegal migration from Bangladesh, a long-standing issue that has defied official proclamations and pledges of “push back”, “deportation” and “detection”.
“Any method used must be undertaken within the rule of law frame, be just and fair and designed to minimise individual hardship and tragedy. We believe there is a need that this is a tragedy of growing intensity which is gathering momentum as a result of the current National Register of Citizens (NRC) exercise in Assam,” the CHRI said.
The Citizenship (Amendment) Bill incorporates the BJP’s
articulated ideological position vis-à-vis undocumented immigrants in
respect of three countries — Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The
ideological position of the ruling party is that undocumented immigrants
belonging to Hindu and other religious minority groups in these three
countries cannot be treated as “illegal migrants” in India and need to
be granted citizenship, while the Muslims among them are “infiltrators”
must be identified and driven out.
The BJP introduced the Bill in
Parliament in 2016 when the NRC was being updated in Assam. The
objective of the Bill is very clear: to remove the “illegal migrant” tag
on members of six religious groups — Hindus, Jains, Christians, Sikhs,
Buddhists, and Parsis — from these three countries and reduce the
requirement of residency in India to six years to make them eligible to
apply for Indian citizenship.
The ASGP and AASU gave the BJP space and became its allies.
Linguistic nationalism or chauvinism, which earlier acted in tandem
with religious chauvinism, is now seeking to assert itself in the
Northeast. Indian nationalism has become the first casualty.
The blood-curdling incident of the lining up of five Bengali
Hindus and shooting them dead, execution style, on the Brahmputra
waterfront in Assam’s Tinsukia district, by suspected militants of the
United Liberation Front of Asom on Thursday has brought shame to the
country and appears to be a consequence of the divisive communal
politics played by the ruling establishment.
The BJP began to play overt communal politics in order to demonstrate
that Muslim “infiltrators” had entered Assam from the erstwhile East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh) due to the slackness of the former ruling
party, the Congress, to safeguard so-called Hindu interests.
This had been the theme song of incumbent Prime Minister Narendra
Modi’s election campaign in 2014, when he was seeking to win the last
Lok Sabha election. Due to the zeal to expose “infiltrators” — the
loaded expression deployed in the Assembly election campaign in
Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh by BJP president Amit Shah — the exercise
to update the National Register of Citizens was begun.
The inhuman side of this action by a coercive state has become all
too evident, forcing people to take their lives and obliging the Supreme
Court on Thursday to relax the absurd criteria of proof being demanded
so far and extending the deadline of furnishing proof of Indian
citizenship to December 15 from November 25.
It is not unlikely that very few, if any, of the 40 lakh people
trapped in the web of finding genuine proof of citizenship to satisfy
NRC requirements will in the end be deemed to be “foreigners”. In the
main, we are talking about poor people, working hard to make ends meet.
We should, for perspective, keep in mind that not many of us will be
able to bring forth official papers to establish our being Indian.
To further burnish its pro-Hindu (and impliedly anti-Muslim)
credentials in order to satisfy the RSS-BJP majoritarian constituency,
the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill was introduced in July 2016,
superseding the Citizenship Act of 1955. This was a ruse to permit
Hindus from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan to gain citizenship of
India as “refugees”, while Muslims were “infiltrators” to be hounded
out. This has angered the Hindu residents of Assam who, under the
leadership of groups like AGSP and AASU, had conducted the
“anti-foreigner” agitation in the early 1980s, which turned out to be a
movement against Bengali-speakers in general.
The ASGP and AASU gave the BJP space and became its allies. Now they,
along with Ulfa, a terrorist group rooted in Assamese sub-nationalism,
seem to be turning on the BJP. Linguistic nationalism or chauvinism,
which earlier acted in tandem with religious chauvinism, is now seeking
to assert itself in the Northeast. Indian nationalism has become the
first casualty.
ethnic tensions
‘A hate crime directed at one community’: Killings in Tinsukia deepen the ethnic divide in Assam
The split has acquired political overtones, driven largely by fears over the Citizenship Bill and the updation of the National Register of Citizens.
Mob kills 2 suspected insurgents carrying arms in Assam, days after Tinsukia killings
Two suspected ultras carrying arms died after they were attacked by a mob in Assam. It comes days after five people were killed by suspected ULFA(I) insurgents in Tinsukia district.
Nov 04, 2018
Sadiq Naqvi
It is time Chief Justice of India Ranjan Gogoi reins in Bharatiya
Janata Party president Amit Shah and his friends from vitiating the
process of updating the National Register of Citizens for Assam, which
aims to separate genuine Indian citizens from those the State defines as
“illegal immigrants”. Through their venomous speeches they have turned
the exercise into a tool for communal polarisation and terrorising
Indians outside the northeastern state in a bid to gain votes.
Justice
Gogoi has a reason to worry because he and Justice Rohinton F Nariman
have been supervising the updating exercise. Even though there have been
many claims of faulty exclusion from the National Register of Citizens,
the process has acquired credibility precisely because the Supreme
Court’s monitoring of it has been devoid of political motivations. [. . . ]
Political consensus can only guarantee peace and normalcy in Assam, says Hiren Gohain
Former Gauhati University professor Hiren Gohain called for “patience, goodwill among communities and a resolve to understand one another” as a way out of the tense environment in the state.
By: Express News Service | New Delhi | Published: August 30, 2018 11:10:15 pm
Gohain made the remarks while delivering a lecture on Immigration to Assam and the Colonial Legacy today at Jamia Millia Islamia. (File)
Underlining the need for “popular political consensus” as the only guarantee for peace and normalcy in Assam, former Gauhati University professor Hiren Gohain called for “patience, goodwill among communities and a resolve to understand one another” as a way out of the tense environment in the state.
“Throughout the late 90s, the demand for NRC gained momentum. There was an influential civil society movement for return of this rule of law…The Muslim clerics (like Maulan Abdul Haq) for the first time conceded the anxiety of the Assamese for national existence within the Indian Union and hesitatingly then supported the Assam Accord with 1971 as the cut-off year for citizenship,” Gohain said while delivering a lecture on Immigration to Assam and the Colonial Legacy today at Jamia Millia Islamia.
“The demand for NRC rose soon after the Assam movement. It gained traction and became popular, consensus as a definitive solution for the problem of identifying true citizens. That its implementation has unearthed new and knotty problems is after all to be expected since these could hardly be seen at the time when it was only a programme on paper,” he said.
“Granted that certain political forces are trying to communalise it through undue interference from outside but to scuttle it will be to leave the question unresolved and leave room for pushing Assam back into a period of interminable blood-soaked humanitarian disaster. Patience, goodwill among communities, resolve to understand one another can see out of the woods. The alternative will be to give a walkover for national and international forces fermenting trouble,” Gohain said.
As he traced the origins of the National Register of Citizens (NRC), Gohain referred to the term ‘migrant’, opining that “migrant is a bland word, something almost like a beggar”. “The term migrant absolves the West of its crimes. Likewise, in the present instance, there are resounding throwing about terms like Hindus and Muslims, migrants and foreigners – in total disregard or deliberate misreading of their socio-economic context. Hindus and Muslims were categories used by colonial rulers and scholars first to categorise a same country-wise communities cutting across regions and cultures,” he said.
Referring to the violent upheavals witnessed in Assam from the 20th century till the present date, the noted intellectual spoke about the context in which NRC emerged. “The sole idea behind it was to resolve the long-standing dispute about large-scale immigration threatening the very existence of the various ethnic indigents. The dispute has entangled the state of Assam in periodic confusion, uproar and bloodshed. NRC was supposed to provide a definitive lasting solution to it in the 90s. Supposing the project is abandoned, who or what will preserve the fragile social peace and normalcy in Assam. The state? Can we really trust any ruling party in power at any time to guarantee it? Could the Army or the CRPF alone have a complete touch – We would not have the example of Kashmir with the staggering human costs. A popular political consensus is the only guarantee,” he said.
Responding to questions on the consequences of the NRC in terms of justice and rehabilitation, Gohain said, “I don’t share the idea of deporting people. But as for identifying, this is the essence of NRC and as you know, the NRC process involves a very complex method of identification including what is called legacy data… On the basis of all those and names of those people who are descendants, it is proposed to establish the antecedents of the descendants through a scientific method but the problem is the bureaucratic implementation will be crash. It is forgotten that our common people has a very little idea of documents, they avoid government offices and (see them as) a source of trouble. If some person lacks documents, it should not automatically be taken for granted that he is not a resident. This happens to many tribal people for example. So, a more compassionate attitude should be in place. But because of the agitation and vicious propaganda, it is not possible, it is very difficult but I think that is the only way out in the present, the kind of horrifying situation we were in the 90s.”
GUWAHATI: As Centre is set to complete counting the Indian citizens living inAssam by
June-end and list their names in the National Register of Citizens
(NRC) and exclude illegal settlers from Bangladesh, five UN special
rapporteurs have jointly have written to Union minister of external
affairsSushma Swarajand
reminded her of India’s obligation to adhere to international human
rights norms and standards against racial discrimination.
The
rapporteurs on minority issues, contemporary forms of racism, promotion
and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and on freedom of
religion or belief in their letter stated, “There is no official policy
outlining the implications for those who will be excluded from the final
NRC. It is reported that they will be treated as foreigners and that
their citizenship rights may be revoked in the absence of a prior trial.
They may subsequently be asked to prove their citizenship before
so-called Foreigners’ Tribunals.”
They stated that NRC update has
generated increased anxiety and concerns among the Bengali Muslim
minority in Assam, “who have long been discriminated against due to
their perceived status as foreigners, despite possessing the necessary
documents to prove their citizenship.” [ . . . ]
Assam BJP politicizes rising rapes, plays on people’s fears
With rape cases on the rise in the northeast Indian state, the
ruling Bharatiya Janata Party blames the former Congress government and
'illegal Bangladeshis'
Pinku
Muktiar (pinkumuktiar99[at]gmail.com) is at the Department of Sociology,
Tezpur University, Assam. Prafulla Nath (khar1khuwa[at]gmail.com) is at the
Tribal Studies Centre, Assam University, Diphu Campus, Diphu. Mahesh
Deka (maheshdk3[at]gmail.com) is a journalist based in Guwahati.
o o o
Over
the years, in Assam, there has been a disturbing denial of citizenship
rights of Muslims, who are branded as Bangladeshis. In the aftermath of
an eviction drive conducted by the government in Kaziranga National
Park, the article focuses on the narrative that the villagers have to
offer, while interrogating the nature of Assamese nationalism.
The Kaziranga National Park, a world heritage site which is home to
the world famous one-horned rhinos, grabbed media headlines in September
2016. Unlike previous occasions, the park did not draw media attention
due to unabated rhino poaching, but because of an eviction drive carried
out by the Assam government in fringe villages of the national park.
Following the order of the Gauhati High Court, the eviction drive in
three fringe villages—Banderdubi, Deosursang and Palkhowa—of the
Kaziranga National Park, was carried out on 19 September 2016 by the
Government of Assam. Two persons including a 12-year-old girl student,
were killed in police firing during the massive protest against the
eviction. This subsequently sparked off a heated debate in the print,
electronic, and social media. Those evicted were mostly Muslim peasants
of East Bengal origin. The supporters of the eviction drive directed
suspicion to the identity of these people by using phrases like “illegal
Bangladeshis,” “rhino poachers,” and “suspected citizens.” Krishak
Mukti Sangram Samiti (KMSS), an influential peasants’ organisation in
the state, opposed the eviction without releasing compensation to the
people of the villages, drawing flak from different quarters. The KMSS
chief Akhil Gogoi was mocked on social media for his stand on the
issue.
This article focuses on the narrative that the Banderdubi villagers
have to offer against the administration’s eviction drive. We made an
attempt to understand the anguish of the evicted people, their
deplorable state in makeshift dwellings, and the justification of their
rights of rehabilitation and resettlement.
After the eviction, people’s entitlement to democratic and human
rights, rehabilitation, and resettlement was overlooked. We argue that
the narrow, communal, divisive and myopic approach adopted by a section
of the upper-caste Assamese Hindus to categorically exclude the migrant
communities from Bangladesh, is a whip to the Assamese nationality.[1] Moreover, the eviction drive was communalised for vested political interest and along with the "caste Hindu" Assamese,[2] different tribal elites actively fuelled the communal agenda.
One of the evicted house by NH-37.
Dubious Discourse
In Assam, the dubious trend of branding Muslim religious minorities as
“illegal Bangladeshi” is not new (Chakraborty 2012). Interestingly, the
educated mainstream Assamese society and different ethnic groups of the
state are following this discourse and blurring the difference between
the identities of the old and the new settlers. The media’s simplistic
and unidirectional portrayal of these settlers as “Bangladeshi” creates
hostility towards those of a different faith and identity.
Historically, various religious, linguistic, and cultural groups who
had migrated to this region at different junctures contributed in
different ways to enrich the fabric of Assamese society (Gohain 1989,
Guha 1993, Sharma 2012, Sharma 2006). Cultural tolerance and secularism
is thus a distinct trait of this society. The Assamese middle class
being a part of the ruling class has largely been successful in
projecting its own class and factional interests as the interest of
Assamese nationality or the people of Assam. Because of its weak
position in the production process, this class is not sure about its
destiny or its future. It has been portraying its own identity crisis
and apprehensions as the crisis of the Assamese nationality or of Assam.
In fact, this class has become the “de facto spokesperson” of Assamese
nationality during the post colonial period (Hussain 1993:93). Though
the contributions of exploited and marginalised peasants have been
significant in the process of Assamese nationality formation, their
voices have been stifled and suppressed. The narratives of deep anguish
and discrimination faced by these Bengali Muslim settlers from East
Bengal continue to be excluded by the mainstream society. This trend of
ostracisation by the caste Hindu Assamese in the formation of Assamese
nationality is not new.
The horrors of suspicion and bloodshed such as the Nellie massacre[3] in
1983 are testimony to the atrocities inflicted on Muslims of East
Bengal origin and the hostility towards them (Kimura 2013). However,
there also exists a small trend of progressive nationalism.
Unfortunately, the narrow, communal and divisive prism of Assamese caste
Hindus is prominent in the political and social sphere of Assam.
Report from the Field
We reached Banderdubi on 2 October, 2016 to collect first-hand data and
know the experience of the evicted masses. The outrage on television and
in print media merged with misguided public opinion moulded by social
media which brands Bengali Muslims as illegal Bangladeshi.[4] This also encourages the erroneous notion that the illegal infiltrators are appropriating “our lands.”
According to oral history sources, the Karbi and the Assamese people
used to inhabit the Banderdubi area before the Muslim settlement
started. In the 1950s, Bengali Muslims from the neighbouring Nagaon
district migrated to Banderdubi. The annual flood of Brahmaputra
deposits silt, making the land highly fertile for agriculture. The
original dwellers of the village later migrated to Kaliabor, Nagaon,
Bokakhat and nearby hills after selling off their land to the agrarian
Muslim community. The cultivation of paddy and cash crops yielded profit
to the Bengali-speaking Muslims of Banderdubi. These people who are now
above 60 years of age, in fact belong to the second generation and in
some cases to the third generation. The mosque in Banderdubi was built
in 1951 and the primary school was provincialised in 1966.[5] There
were 205 families (including 7 caste Hindu Assamese families) in
Banderdubi when the eviction was carried out. The Bengali Muslim
families of this village claimed to have government documents, land
records, land patta,[6] and voter identity cards, which meant that terming them as “illegal infiltrators” was fallacious.
Khagen Kalita, an evicted victim belonging to the caste Hindu
Assamese community, said that his forefathers had resided in this
village for over 100 years. He claimed that each person residing in
Banderdubi is a legal Indian citizen. Another person, Idrish Ali (aged
54), lamented, “everyone labels us as Bangladeshi. Yes, we are
Bangladeshis.” He then handed us a land revenue receipt from 1929 and
the land ownership records of his forefathers. It was disheartening to
see legal citizens called illegal infiltrators by misguided populism. If
the evicted masses were Bangladeshis or suspected citizens, then why
were they not sent to detention camps? Why did the government announce a
compensation of Rs 5 lakh to the families of the two persons killed in
the police firing during eviction?
Nabir Hussain (aged 37) owned around 12 bighas[7] of myadi patta[8] land
and occupied a few patches of government land and sustained his family
through agriculture. His face was wrenched in anguish which later gave
way to tears. On being asked he shared,
“We are not humans. If we were, then the democratic
government would not have done this against us. We are now camping on
roads. The people were also unaware about whether their compensation
would be in terms of cash or land. Social organisations like All Assam
Muslim Student Union (AAMSU) and All India United Democratic Front
(AIUDF) have been providing us relief, but for how long?”
Temporary camp by the National highway.
Afazuddin, a panchayat member of Banderdubi village, maintained that the sentiment of "jati, mati, bheti"[9] (community, land and existence) is being manipulated for political gains. He says,
“The brutality of the government in Banderdubi eviction
was mainly because of two reasons—firstly, we are poor and uneducated
and secondly, we are Muslims.”
A map of Banderdubi village prepared by the revenue department in
1964 was shown to us. The voters list of 1965 is already doing the
rounds on social media.
Kaziranga was declared a National Park in 1974.[10] The
arbitrary demarcation and inclusion of areas into the Park did not take
into cognisance the human settlements that existed in the area prior to
the creation of the Park. Banderdubi was one such village. It has been a
revenue village of the Assam government for the last 50–60 years and
the land revenue receipts available with the villagers bear testimony to
this fact. The village has a total of about 2,245 bighas of land.
Around 500 bighas are myadi, some eksoniya and some are tarju land.
They pay regular land revenue to the government. However, there are
instances of eviction of people from the eksoniya and tarju land by the
government from time to time.
Abdul Hasim (aged 55) added,
“Shoot us, if you find a single Bangladeshi in Banderdubi. I was born here.”
He earns his livelihood by cultivating paddy and mustard. But, for
the sake of Kaziranga and its pride—the one–horned rhinoceros—he was
willing to let go of his land. In return, he wanted an assurance of
compensation and rehabilitation from the government.
“We wanted compensation prior to the eviction drive. Is
not it my right? We are now staying in the camps, but for how long?
Where do we go from here?”
High Court Order and Banderdubi’s Opinion
Following the Gauhati High Court’s order, the state government carried
out the eviction drive. One such notice for eviction was issued last
year as well. This time also, they anticipated eviction only from the
government land. But their nightmare came true when it dawned on them
that all of Banderdubi was to be evicted.
Irrespective of religious faith, the Hindus and Muslims of the
village stood together and protested against the high court’s order.
Later, Akhil Gogoi was called upon to give a face and course to the
protest. Prior to the eviction, on 15 September 2016, the villagers
(both men and women) marched to the Kaliabor Circuit House, overcoming
the scorching heat. They went with the hope that Himanta Biswa Sarma (a
cabinet minister in the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led state
government) and the state Water Resource Keshab Mahanta would understand
their deplorable state. Few representatives from among the villagers
were called for discussion, and verbal promise of compensation within 40
days was made to the bearers of patta land.
Interestingly, the Hindu families were called for discussion
separately and compensation that was four times the value of their land
was promised, because their land was on the side of the national
highway. It was outrageous to see democratic politics dividing people on
communal grounds for vested political interest. The evicted people who
were taking shelter in four camps said in unison that KMSS leader Akhil
Gogoi requested the people to go in a for non-violent protest. Gogoi had
said that non-violent protest would compel the government to withdraw
the decision of the eviction drive.
Camp of the villagers after eviction.
Rhino Poachers and Animal Corridor
There was noise about two other things after the Kaziranga
evictions—first that the rhino poachers belonged to the Bengali Muslim
community, and second that Banderdubi was nestled in the animal
corridor. The villagers had their explanations. There were also
instances of two or three youths from the village being arrested and
sent to jail for their alleged involvement in rhino poaching. But
without credible evidence, it is fatuous to claim the entire village as
rhino poachers. The villagers complained that there is a tacit nexus
between the forest officials and poachers. Gopal Konwar, a youth from
another village nearby, further added that during the last annual floods
the villagers had rescued wild animals and handed them over to the
forest department.
Technically, from Jakhalabandha to Bokakhat, the entire area is an
animal corridor. In that sense, Banderdubi too falls within the animal
corridor. During the annual floods the wild animals move up to the
hills, but this was not possible in Banderdubi since it is mostly
inundated during the floods. So Banderdubi, being a refuge for the wild
animals does not arise.
“The Kanchanjuri tea estate in the Kuthori range of Kaziranga is
within the animal corridor as it is situated on the hills,” explains
Khagen Kalita. Interestingly, a signboard signifying animal corridor
also stands in front of the Kanchanjuri tea garden. The people of the
village told us that the tea estate belongs to a powerful and affluent
minister of the state government.
Education, Health, and Food in the Camps
Children in the camp.
Banderdubi primary school had a total of 160 students. Two days prior
to the eviction, the furniture was removed from the school and the
students were meant to be shifted to the nearby schools. But the reality
was gloomy. When these students from Banderdubi went to the nearby
schools for enrollment in the aftermath of eviction, they were denied
admission. The reason cited was the lack of teachers and infrastructure.
It became arduous for the students to seek admission in the middle of
the year which essentially meant the loss of the academic year. The
education minister, who is otherwise credited for bringing about a
revolutionary change in education through Teacher Eligibility Test
(TET), has not paid attention to the murky future of these innocent
children.
Women and children in the camp.
“We didn’t receive any relief from the government since 19 September,
even a glass of water,” claims a woman in the camp. During the eviction
drive, security personnel and police included both the male and female
force, but male personnel were deployed to evict the women from their
village. An anganwadi worker revealed that the camps—now home to 12
pregnant women, 15 lactating mothers and 20 teenage girls—lack even
basic access to safe drinking water and food. The condition of these
women is pitiable.
Osman Ali (13) wounded by bullet during police firing. Osman Ali (13) recalled the dreadful eviction and said, “I was with
my mother. Suddenly we heard bullets being fired and we ran for our
lives. One bullet hit my thigh. After that, I didn’t remember anything.”
On being asked about his school, he replied passionately, “I will study
hard and realise my dream.” We were short of words to console Ali.
In Conclusion
This field study gave us credible evidence to be convinced that the
Banderdubi villagers are bona fide citizens of this country. At the
ground level, however, the Kaziranga eviction exemplified a grave truth.
The BJP-led coalition state government is riding on the sentiments of
“jati, mati, bheti” and creating a wedge among the people on communal
lines. Being citizens of an independent nation, these evicted masses
were denied basic democratic and human rights. Interestingly, though the
state government announced compensation for the evicted lands within 40
days, people are yet to receive compensation in any form. The muteness
of social and nationalistic organisations like Asom Sahitya Sabha (a
literary organisation of Assam), ASU and the Asom Jatiyatabadi Yuba
Chaatra Parishad (AJYCP) which boast of Assamese nationalism, is quite
disturbing. Branding a particular community as Bangladeshi without
veridical facts is deeply problematic and antithetical to the concept of
Assamese nationalism which is characterised by humane, democratic and
secular society.
After the Kaziranga eviction, the government continued evictions in
different places specially in various Bengali Muslim dominated areas
like Mayong, Sipajhar, Barduwa, and Manas National Park. There was a
constant effort through popular media campaigns to establish the evicted
masses as “illegal Bangladeshis” and encroachers. These evictions were
spearheaded by the BJP after coming to power in the state and a serious
repercussion was the construction of a binary on religious grounds. This
policy of the government is not only communally divisive, but also an
attempt to gain political mileage in the name of evicting Bangladeshis.
In various news reports, it is seen that erosion and flood have
already washed away lands of most of the peasants in Assam irrespective
of caste, creed, and religion. As a result, the peasants have no option
left but to either encroach on government land and grazing reserves or
to live life in char (sandbars or mid channels bars in a river)
areas. However, given the history of recurring flood and erosion in the
state, such evictions posit some serious questions—firstly, the state
government does not have a proper land policy for its people, and
secondly, there is no uniform land allotment policy in practice for
those who have lost their lands due to erosion.
If the state and the non-state actors jump into the manufactured
discourse of “jati, mati, bheti,” all the good things of Assamese
nationalism in terms of cultural tolerance and secularism would perish.
Case Cited
Kaziranga National Park v Union of India and others (2015): Public Interest Litigation (suo motu) No 66 of 2012, Gauhati High Court judgment dated 9 October. (http://ghconline.gov.in/Judgment/PIL662012.pdf)
Notes:
[1] The Assamese nationality is a multi-caste, multi-racial,
multi-religious and a multi-class category. All the groups that entered
into the region at different period of the history have become a part of
the Assamese nationality which includes the non-caste Assamese Hindus
like Ahoms, Koch-Rajbonshis, Morans, Motaks, Chutiyas, Deuris, Kocharis;
Muslims, comprising of Syeds, Shaikhs, Morias and Julahas; caste Hindu
Assamese composed of Brahmins, Gonaks, Kayasthas, and Kalitas; and other
lower caste people such as Kaibartas, Malis, Hiras, Bonias, Sutradhars,
and Kumars. It also subsumes the Muslim peasants of east Bengal origin
as well the tea plantation tribes who migrated to Assam under the
colonial regime in the first half of the twentieth century. Similarly,
Nepali people who had migrated to the region in the colonial and
post-colonial period also enter the fold of Assamese nationality. Even a
small portion of Bengali (Hindu Bengali) and Marwari population has
become a part and parcel of Assamese nationality.
[2] The term “caste Hindu” is used in academic scholarship on Assam.
Caste Hindu is not an official category and it is not a distinction made
by government records. In this article, the term refers to the
different caste groups such as Brahmins, Keot, Kalita, Kayastha, Nath
Yogi, Kaibartaya in Assam.
All the groups that entered the region at different periods in
history have become a part of the Assamese identity which includes the
non-caste Assamese Hindus like Ahoms, Koch-Rajbonshis, Morans, Motaks,
Chutias, Deuris, Kocharis; Muslims, comprising of Syeds, Shaikhs, Morias
and Julahas; caste Hindu Assamese composed of Brahmins, Gonaks,
Kayasthas, and Kalitas; and lower caste people such as Kaibartas, Malis,
Hiras, Bonias, Sutradhars, and Kumars. The Assamese identity also
subsumes the Muslim peasants of east Bengal origin, tea plantation
tribes who migrated to Assam under the colonial regime, Nepalese people
who had migrated to the region in the colonial and post-colonial period,
as well as small portions of the Bengali (Hindus) and Marwari
population. It is important to note that though these tribal and
non-tribal groups identified with the Assamese identity, there has been
always a domination of the caste Hindu Assamese leadership in terms of
political and other interests of the state.
Scholars like Gohain (1989, 2002), Guha (1993), Hussain (1993:22-30),
Sharma (2006) have discussed the formation of Asssamese identity in
historical context. They have shown that the Neo-Vaishnavite movement in
medieval Assam propagated by Sankardeva (1449-1569) accelerated the
process of hinduising the tribal masses—a process that was initiated by
the Brahmins (Gohain 1989; Guha 1993) much before Sankardeva. These
scholars have mentioned that tribal masses were easily attracted to the
Sankardeva’s model of hinduisation due to a number of reasons.
Sankardeva and his disciples used easily intelligible language in their
texts to propagate Neo-Vaishnavism. The practice of worshipping several
deities prevalent in traditional Hinduism was replaced with simpler
monotheism. The complex and authoritative rituals (often involving
sacrifice of animals) of the Brahmanical tradition were abandoned for
simpler ritual practices. This simplicity and ease of Neo-Vaishnavism
was responsible for its popularity among the tribal populace who
embraced Hinduism.
The pace of the Neo-Vaishnavite movement was not similar in every
corner of the state. In upper Assam, it was quite popular and tribal
groups such as Thengal Kacharis, Sonowal Kacharis, Marans, Motaks,
Ahoms, Chutias, Deuris, a section of the Mishing were converted to
Hinduism and many of them entered the caste fold. The tribal neophytes
were given the lowest status in the caste hierarchy and it became
possible for the lower new caste group to attain even the highest status
in the caste hierarchy by emulating the practices of the higher castes
in the order.
[3] The Nellie massacre took place on 18 February, 1983 at the height
of the Assam Movement (1979–85). Almost 2,000 Muslim peasants of East
Pakistan origin were killed in a single day because they were considered
Bangladeshis.
[4] Almost all Assamese newspapers published articles supporting the
eviction and branding the evicted people as suspected citizens
(Bangladeshi) and land encroachers.
[5] In Assam, schools are usually established by the local people of a
particular area. These schools are known as venture schools. After a
period of time, the government starts to recognise these schools as
government schools and these are then known as provincialised schools.
[6] Patta is the official land holding document.
[7] Bigha is a unit of land measurement. Three bighas is equal to one hectare.
[8] Lands are divided into three categories as per the land revenue
department of Assam—tarju, eksoniya, and myadi. Tarju lands are ones
which are not surveyed. Eksoniya and myadi are surveyed lands the proper
mapping of which is done by the concerned department. Eksoniya land is
land leased or occupied by someone for a period of one year from the
government and revenue is paid on the same. The Government can take
these two types of land from anyone without paying any compensation.
Myadi patta land is owned by someone with official document proof.
[9] Jati, mati, bheti (community, land, people) was a popular slogan of
the Bharatiya Janata Party in the last Assam assembly election in 2016.
[10] From colonial times to the present day, the policy of conservation
of flora and fauna in Kaziranga has gone through various phases. In
1905, E S Carr, the Conservator of Assam, submitted a proposal for a
game reserve in Kaziranga with an area of 232 square kilometres. Later,
an area of 152 square kilometres was added to it and in 1908, this was
declared as game reserve. In 1916, the reserved was renamed as Kaziranga
Game Sanctuary. In the year 1950, it was again renamed as Kaziranga
Wildlife Sanctuary. (Saikia 2011: 253-293; Kaziranga National Park 2018)
Image Courtesy: All images by Pinku Muktiar, Prafulla Nath, and Mahesh Deka.
Bangladesh worried about influx of Bangalis from Assam
Tribune Desk
Published at 02:32 PM February 22, 2018
File photo: Women stand next to policemen as they wait to check their names on the draft list of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) at an NRC centre in Chandamari village in Goalpara district, in the northeastern state of Assam, India, January 2, 2018 Reuters
The situation in Assam is threatening India-Bangladesh ties, Bangladesh government officials said
The ongoing process of the National Register of Citizens in India’s Assam state may result in a mass displacement of Bangalis from the region and create another refugee crisis for Bangladesh, senior officials of the Bangladesh government said on Wednesday.
According to the Indian national daily The Hindu, officials during their New Delhi visit said the situation in Assam was “threatening” India-Bangladesh ties and would be exploited by “anti-India elements and Islamic fundamentalists” who are opposing the Awami League rule.
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s Media Affairs Adviser Iqbal Sobhan Chowdhury said the citizenship issue would be “another disappointment after the setback on the Teesta water sharing agreement.”
He said Bangladesh believes India should think of its ties with the country before going ahead with “the full implementation of the citizens register in Assam.”
He further said if the process led to the exodus of a section of the Bangali population of Assam “it would trigger another Rohingya-like refugee crisis.”
The Hindu reports that Bangladeshi policy-makers agreed that the failure to conclude the Teesta water sharing agreement between Dhaka and New Delhi “has been disappointing and the ongoing process in Assam will complicate the situation further.”
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina reiterated the same sentiment on Tuesday, saying it was sad that West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee did not want to allow the Teesta deal.
The report further said these observations have gained significance as a section of the ruling party believes that India has not reciprocated the prime minister’s support on “counter-insurgency steps in the northeastern states.”
The officials reportedly said the Awami League government under Sheikh Hasina, “without any expectation of reciprocity,” supported India in apprehending ULFA leaders who had taken refuge in Bangladesh. However, all that effort will go in vain, undoing bilateral cooperation, if there is a new refugee flow from Assam.
With two major floods in 2017 and the Rohingya crisis, further turmoil caused by the citizen register in Assam will add to the volatility of the country ahead of the general polls, the officials added.
They further said the citizen register in Assam was “reminiscent of the communalism of the 1940s.”