Octopus of Hate - RSS and its brand of Hindutva is resilient and kicking

(Hard News
August 2007)

Octopus of Hate

Despite the current political setback and its failure to expand its xenophobic base, the RSS and its brand of Hindutva is resilient and kicking

by Pralay Kanungo Delhi

In the last 60 years, Hindutva's march from the margins to the mainstream of Indian politics has been spectacular. However, Hindutva invokes extreme hysterical responses being passionately propagated by the proponents and virulently vilified by the opponents. Coined in colonial Bengal during the late 19th century when Hindu revivalism was in ascendancy, it remained obscure till VD Savarkar, in the midst of Hindu-Muslim communal mobilisations, made it a political ideology in his seminal work Hindutva (1923). He defined a Hindu as a person who regards Bharatvarsha his pitrubhumi (fatherland) as well as punyabhumi (holyland). Logically, according to Savarkar, Muslims and Christians fall outside the ambit of the Indian nation as it is not their holyland. Being an atheist, for him, Hindutva not Hinduism constitutes the core of Hindustan; while the former is a history in full, the latter is only a derivative.

Thus, he emphasised that Hindutva (political/ideological) is superior to Hinduism (faith/religion), and thus, should always remain the guiding principle of Indian nationhood. Subscribing to Savarkar's exclusivist thesis, KB Hedgewar founded the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh(RSS) at Nagpur in 1925 to unite Hindus and propound India as a Hindu Rashtra (Hindu nation). Being more of a practitioner than a preacher, Hedgewar recruited young boys, set up shakhas (branches), imparted both sharirik (physical) and boudhik (intellectual) training regularly, and despatched a dedicated band of trained disciples as 'pracharaks' (propagandists) to open shakhas, indoctrinate young boys with anti-Muslim ideas and propagate Hindutva outside Maharashtra. His organisational ingenuity paid dividends in a short time when his emissaries, with the help of existing Hindu Sangathanist networks, were able to enter different parts of India.

Hedgewar's successor, MS Golwalkar, sharpened the ideology of Hindu Rashtra in his We or our nationhood defined (1939) by clearly defining 'We' and 'Others' and applauding Hitler's approach to the minorities. Though the RSS replaced this controversial text with a 'moderate' Bunch of Thoughts (1966), the latter followed similar trajectories and identified three enemies of Hindu Rashtra — the Muslims, the Christians and the Communists. As a master strategist, Golwalkar dissociated with the Hindu Mahasabha, did not antagonise the British, scrupulously followed the government fiat, and more importantly, did not allow the RSS to participate in the freedom struggle, thereby enabling it to expand quietly, away from government scrutiny and public gaze. Partition riots in north India provided the RSS an ideal opportunity to prove its credentials as 'defender' of Hindus and enhanced its credibility among them.

In 1948, the RSS was banned due to its alleged complicity in Mahatma Gandhi's murder by Nathuram Godse, a former swayamsevak, and most of its leaders, including Golwalkar, were arrested. The ban was lifted in March 1949, only after the RSS pledged to adopt a written constitution and confine itself to the 'cultural' domain. The adverse experiences during the ban period paved way for the birth of its political progeny, the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS) in 1951.

Besides an ideologue and strategist, Golwalkar was a brilliant organiser as well. During his long reign of 33 years, he enabled the RSS to reach each and every corner of India, institutionalised the pracharak system and meticulously shaped the Sangh Parivar by opening affiliates like the Akhil Bharatiya Vidhyarthi Parishad (ABVP) (the students’ wing), Bharatiya Mujdoor Sangh (BMS) (workers), BJS (political) and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) (religious) in order to penetrate different spheres of civil society. Despite all this, Golwalkar was more inclined towards 'culture' than 'politics'.

Balasaheb Deoras, a passionate and aspiring politician, succeeded Golwalkar in 1973. He had enough foresight to anticipate a climate change in Indian politics. Deaoras thought that the timing for the RSS to go for direct political intervention was right, and that the inheritance of an enormous organisational base from Golwalkar would give him enough leverage to go for an open and aggressive political experiment. Thus, he aligned with Jayaprakash Narayan against Indira Gandhi, opposing Emergency. Hindutva cadre, guilty of not participating in the first Freedom Struggle, called the anti-Emergency agitation the ‘Second Freedom Struggle' and got imprisoned in large numbers. The organisation, as a result, was banned. The strategy paid off — the first non-Congress government was installed at the Centre in 1977 in which the RSS became a key player. The BJS merged with the Janata Party; two of its prominent former pracharaks — Atal Behari Vajpayee and Lal Krishna Advani — became cabinet ministers and some other trusted lieutenants became chief ministers.

Though the Janata Party merger experiment was short-lived, it had advantaged Hindutva. Having access to government resources, it expanded the parivar network and empowered its cadre. Resistance by other constituents to its hegemonic ambition forced it to form the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1980.

Hindutva, for a while, had ideological confusions. After all, it was political pragmatism and ideological flexibility which gave Hindutva legitimacy, credibility, and access to resources. Moreover, Hindutva also felt the urgency to shed its old Brahminical image and co-opt Dalits and tribals in order to expand its social base; affiliate Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram was active in tribal areas. The BJP, for a while, even flirted with 'Gandhian Socialism.'

Thus, Deoras was obviously not keen to resort to a hardline strategy. However, the BJP being reduced to only two seats in Lok Sabha in 1984 elections, compelled the RSS to rethink its strategy. Thus, the Ramjanmabhoomi agitation was started which hardened communal passion and polarised Hindus and Muslims. Advani's Rath Yatra (1990) ignited the flames of communal riots, and finally, the Sangh Parivar pulled down the Babri Masjid in 1992. Hindutva demonstrated the might of a mammoth mass mobilisation; which was unprecedented in independent India.

Though VP Singh's Mandal politics put a spanner to Hindutva's rapid march and compelled it to adopt 'social engineering' as an agenda, and have an alliance with Mayawati in UP, it could not stop the momentum of the Ramjanmabhoomi agitation. This brought Hindutva to the centre of Indian politics.

Vajpayee, a swayamsevak, became the prime minister, first for only 13 days, and then for six long years. However, it was not Hindutva's exclusive government; a truncated mandate compelled the BJP to share power with disparate political forces, from socialists to 'separatists,' thereby forcing it to put the core Hindutva agenda on the backburner. Despite occasional stand-offs between the RSS and the Vajpayee government, their relationship remained within the Lakshmanrekha as 'liberal' Vajpayee had a good personal equation with the then RSS chief Rajendra Singh.

KS Sudarshan's takeover of the RSS in 2000 changed the scenario. A control freak, he always wanted to keep the BJP on leash. His interference in the day-to-day affairs of the government and the party became a routine affair. Moreover, he would also insist on the implementation of the Hindutva agenda. Despite compulsions of coalition, the government saffronised education and media, went for nuclear explosion, raised jingoistic nationalism during the Kargil war, and above all, empowered its affiliates and cadre to expand and entrench. More importantly, Vajpayee was coerced to protect Narendra Modi, the main accused of the 2002 Gujarat genocide.

However, 'liberal' Vajpayee was falling short of Hindutva's expectations, especially, his economic liberalisation made mockery of Sudarshan's Swadeshi. The RSS launched salvos against Vajpayee through its militant affiliates like the VHP and Swadeshi Jagran Manch (SJM), and the saffron brotherhood was plagued by bitter personal and organisational rivalry. Sudarshan had plans to replace Vajpayee with his own man after the 2004 general elections.

The unexpected electoral defeat in the 2004 elections rattled Hindutva's future game-plan. But its intoxication with political power was so intense that it failed to reconcile to the reality. The RSS soon revived an acerbic campaign against Sonia Gandhi to prevent her to become the prime minister. Sonia Gandhi quickly disarmed the parivar with her masterstroke of renunciation.

At this juncture, when the BJP's moral was already low, Sudarshan decided to strike hard. The RSS attributed the defeat to the growing alienation of Hindutva cadre during the Vajpayee regime and the latter's misplaced confidence on the India Shining campaign; Sudarshan advised Vajpayee and Advani to retire and instigated the 'purist' VHP to take on the 'polluted' BJP. Advani's Jinnah statement melted his loh-purush (iron-man) image overnight, and further, legitimised Sudarshan's intervention on the ground of ideological bankruptcy of the party. The RSS replaced Advani with Rajnath Singh as party chief, brought amendments in the party constitution empowering the pracharaks in the party hierarchy, and even took charge of the campaigns in the state assembly elections. Though the BJP's comeback in Uttarakhand raised hopes, the 2007 UP assembly results signalled disaster for Hindutva's political future.

Hindutva, at present, is nursing its wounds. Besides the political setback, it is deeply worried about the declining attendance in the shakhas, falling ideological rigour, rampant rivalry in each and every affiliate, corrosion of the pracharak system—the RSS steel frame, and above all, erosion of the authority of Hindutva's supreme commander -- the sarsanghchalak (RSS supremo). However, the fact is, despite these heavy odds, Hindutva has a remarkable resilience to bounce back.

The writer is an Associate Professor at Center for Political Studies, JNU