The Economic and Political Weekly,Vol - XLVIII No. 40, October 05, 2013
Muzaffarnagar 2013: Meanings of Violence
by Hilal Ahmed
The issues of weak governance and the cynical communal politics of the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Samajwadi Party have been noted in the recent spate of violence in western Uttar Pradesh. This article looks at the social dynamics of caste assertions, new media technologies and the merging of the good governance and Hindutva narratives to try and understand how and why a commonplace incident of criminality transformed so quickly into such a major bout of communal violence.
The recent Muzaffarnagar violence, in which more than 50 people were killed, is described, explained, and even analysed in two different yet connected ways.1 There is an event-centric portrayal of this violence. We are told that the trouble began in the last week of August 2013, when a teenage Hindu/Jat girl was harassed by a Muslim boy in the Kanwal village of Muzaffarnagar district. Two brothers of this girl killed the Muslim boy; however, they were also lynched to death in retaliation.2 This is not a rare incident in this highly crime-prone district of Uttar Pradesh (UP). Media reports and even serious academic research show that family rivalries and community honour often lead to a series of murders in Muzaffarnagar area (Naqvi 2013). But, the subsequent events transformed this episode into a typical “communal” clash.
It is reported that although the local officials banned public meetings by imposing Section 144, a public meeting was held on 30 August 2013 in the city after the Juma congregational prayers. Many district and state-level Muslim leaders associated with the Congress, the Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) attended this meeting and delivered inflammatory speeches. Consequently, communal tension increased. In the meantime, a fake video, which claimed to capture the killing of the Jat boys, was posted on social media and led to further polarisation. In protest, a mahapanchayat of thousands of Jat farmers was called on 7 September near Kanwal village.3 The local Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) unit, it is informed, was directly responsible for organising this rally. As expected, the mahapanchayat was addressed by local Hindu leaders, who delivered equally provocative speeches. After the scheduled programme when people were headed home, they were attacked by a mob and 12 people died in this wave of violence. To control the situation, the state government asked for the army to be deployed. However, the organised killings did not stop for next two days and the death toll went up to 39. Many people left homes and took shelter in the camps.
This narrative revolves around a few empirically-grounded anxieties: how did the political leaders get permission from the district administration to organise two massive rallies, especially when Section 144 was imposed? Why did the state government fail to arrest the political leaders who organised these meetings, despite the fact that their names were mentioned in the FIR which was subsequently filed? The scope of these questions is magnified further by underlining a few conspiracy theories: a secret alliance between SP and BJP for sharing Muslim and Hindu votes; a game plan of Congress to divert public attention from basic issues; BJP’s attempt to capture the Jat constituency, etc. These inferences are either debated as “explanations” for what happened and/or as the “conclusions” which these events led to.4
There is another, ostensibly grand, political narrative of this violence, which seeks to establish an observable connection between the events of Muzaffarnagar and the emerging configurations of Indian politics. The debate on the elevation of Narendra Modi as BJP’s prime ministerial candidate, the failure of Akhilesh Yadav-led UP government in controlling the riots, the increasing communal clashes between Hindus and Muslims in north India, and the Vishva Hindu Parishad’s (VHP) famous Ayodhya yatra, are seen as inseparable fragments of the larger picture of this highly polarising Hindu communal politics. This narrative evokes the “history” of Hindutva politics, especially its violent manifestations during the peak days of Babri Masjid-Ram temple controversy, as a legitimate reference point.
The political-moral significance of these explanations should not be underestimated, particularly when a large number of people (mainly Muslims) have been affected and a certain kind of rightist Hindu essentialism is taking concrete political shape.5 However, we need to problematise this violent incidence further, not merely to understand the contextual and sociological nuances that provide a background to the main events but also to make sense of the language of emerging Hindu rightist politics. There are, in my view, three crucial aspects, which we need to underline in this regard. The first is the social structure of Muzaffarnagar district, especially in terms of caste configuration among Hindus and Muslims and their changing religiosity, which has affected the public presence of religious identities in significant ways. The second is the proliferation of a different media – the mobile phone – which has reconfigured social relations, especially in rural areas in recent years. Finally, a third aspect of the specificity of the political idioms which are being employed by the BJP and the VHP to describe this incident – either as a question of dignity and pride or as a problem of governance.
Caste and Community
Caste and religiosity are inseparable facets of community identity in western UP. Yet, the complex amalgamation of religion and caste has somehow not given adequate attention in recent discussions. We are told that it is a standard communal riot between “Hindus and Muslims”, though some observers have called it a Jat-Muslim conflict. These expressions are not entirely incorrect; however, they seem to overlook the internal social diversity (especially in castes terms) on the one hand, and the subtle and enduring modes by which diversity is transformed into one polarised entity (in religious terms), on the other. Let me take two examples to elaborate this point. In an ethnographic study of two Jat-dominated villages of Muzaffarnagar in the post-Babri Masjid period, G K Lieten (1996) notes:
The Hindutva storm which has been blowing over UP from 1990 has prompted some of the brahmins and jats to adopt overtly religious practices. The village temple, which had been lying unused, except for an occasional visit by brahmin ladies on their fasting day, has been renovated and a loudspeaker now helps to broadcast ‘kirtans’ in the morning hours. The form is religious, the content is political. It is aimed at awakening the Hindus.
This is an interesting observation which underlines not merely the emergence of a new form of religiosity but also a different sort of public presence of an identity. It does not, however, mean that Hindutva politics has completely engulfed the local sensibilities. Of course, the social and political distinctiveness of the contemporary Jat identity is often represented predominately in “caste” terms, especially in relation to agrarian issues and/or the demand for reservation; yet, the “religious” expressions of caste-based customs and ritual practices of Jat communities cannot entirely be ruled out.6 Thus, as it appears, the slow and gradual processes by which the boundaries between caste-culture and religion-politics are eroded might have transformed the bahu-beti bachao mahapanchayat of 7 September into a struggle to protect Hindu dignity from “love-jehadis”!
The questions of Muslim caste-diversity and public presence are equally important aspects to understand the victimhood of Muslims in these riots (though this point has been almost entirely ignored in most of the discussions). Like the Jat community, the Muslim community of Muzaffarnagar is also deeply caste-divided. There are Ashraf Muslims (upper caste) on the one hand, and a number of non-Ashraf communities on the other.7 The presence of Muslim caste system can easily be seen in Muslimdominated villages of Muzaffarnagar where mohallas (localities) are marked on caste lines. The rise of Muslim Pasmanda (backward) politics in the region is also significant. The Pasmanda Kranti Abhiyan, a movement to mobilise backward Muslims of UP which began in 2012, gave a very interesting slogan: Dalit-Pichchara ek saman, Hindu ho ya Musalam (dalits and backwards are same, whether they are Hindus or Muslims). In fact, the first phase of this movement is about to complete on 30 September 2013. According to the official pamphlet of the Abhiyan:
Pasmanda movement seeks to eradicate Hindu-Muslim differences and conflicts in the country by emphasising the significance of caste question. Muslim politics often talks of electoral alliance between Muslims and Dalits, and/or Muslims and backwards. On the contrary, the Pasmanda politics attempts to create socio-political unity between dalits and dalits; between backwards and backwards, irrespective of their religion as Hindus or Muslims (Pasmanda Kranti Abhiyan 2013, p 8; my translation).
This pamphlet also expresses the fear that backward Muslims have been the main victims of communal riots and police atrocities so far. This anxiety is not speculative. As per an unofficial estimate, most of those Muslims who died in the present violence were backwards. This does, however, mean that the caste of Muslim victims was ascertained by the attackers before killing them! Obviously all Muslims were identified as the enemy community in this entire episode. Nevertheless, the point is: the marginalised, poor and backward sections of Muslims are the soft targets of communal violence.
If the Pasmanda politics poses a serious challenge to the dominant communal and secular politics of UP, the Tablighi Jamaat – a religious reform movement – bring in an equally powerful discourse of Islamic religious unity and public manifestation of religiosity. It is important to note that the Tablighi Jamaat is a self-claimed apolitical movement as it strongly discourages formal participation in this-worldly affairs. Yet, the ideas, norms and practices of the Tablighi Jamaat have affected the public presence of the Muslim identity in significant ways. For instance, having a beard without moustache, wearing long kurta with relatively short pyjamas (or tahmad) and white skull cap are observable markers of a typical Islamised identity of a male Muslim in this region.8 This Muslim visibility is substantiated by another powerful symbolic pointer: the green minarets of mosques in the villages.9 The outcome of this apparent Muslim visibility was obvious: it was much easier for the rightist Hindu leaders to point out Muslims as Talibanis and Muslim villages as “mini Pakistans”. In fact, this is precisely what the fact-finding team found:
Wearing the skull cap and beard has been a custom for several among those of the Muslim faith in the district. But in the two months preceding the September violence, many among them reported being publicly upbraided for displaying emblems of loyalty towards the Taliban, which supposedly made them sympathisers or even participants in what is constructed in the media discourse as the global jihad (RFFT 2013).
New Technologies
This brings us to the second point: the new media. The question of fake video circulation through mobile phone networks was discussed as a passing reference.10 We have to understand the fact that technology, especially the mobile phone (with camera), has affected every aspect of social and cultural life in western UP. The conventional distinction between “informed cities” and “ignorant villages” does not reflect the changing constitution of rural India, especially villages situated near big cities. The mobile phones, along with satellite television, have increased the influence of dominant discourses. The “live” and/or still images of sacred religious places, dream destinations, critical events and even global wars (apart from “not to be discussed” issues such as localised pornography!) have created many “visual-yet-imagined communities”.11 These images are often regarded as “evidence” to ascertain the veracity of events and claims. This might have been the reason why the politically motivated elements could successfully use the mobile network for organising the so-called bahu-beti bachao mahapanchayat. The much-talked-about fake MMS, thus, should be seen in this much wider “mediatised” context of Muzaffarnagar.
Let us finally look at the specificity of political vocabulary of the BJP and the VHP. The carefully drafted press release of the BJP concentrates on the inability and failure of the SP government. This standard response, it seems, revolves around the party’s official line on “effective governance”. Interestingly, the sophisticated rhetoric of governance, which primarily aims at capitalising on the growing urban middle class discontent, is clearly a derivative form of an old Hindutva argument: “India as a Hindu nation”.12 However, this is not the case with the state-level BJP. For instance, Uma Bharti was quick to underline the fact that there could be “more tension” in UP if politicians from her party are arrested for instigating the riots. The focus of these claims has been the localised spontaneous nature of this event – an “action-reaction theory”, which might be used to take political advantage of growing communal hostility in UP. The VHP, on the other hand, has been quite vocal and as expected, more polemical. They identify “love-jehad” as the main reason behind the violence and urge the government to enact a law to curb the activities of the “love-jehadis”.13 The Hindu dignity and pride is central in this assertion.14 This provocative explanation is more alarming: it reproduces communal stereotypes and at the same time re-establishes hegemonic values in an overtly patriarchal tone.
Although it would be too early to draw any concrete argument from these three idioms – governance, spontaneity of violence and Hindu pride – which are evoked by the BJP and VHP working in tandem, the rise of a renewed and rejuvenated Hindutva cannot be ruled out. However, the specificity of larger political context – the anti-corruption discourse, the Muslim Pasmanda politics, dalit assertions and so on – should not be underestimated; and precisely for this reason, we must pay close attention to the emerging modes by which contemporary Hindutva expresses itself.
Notes
1 Officially, 39 people died and 25,000 were displaced; however, the Report of the Fact-Finding Team (hereafter RFFT), coordinated by the Centre for the Policy Analysis, contradicts the official figures (RFFT 2013).
2 Although there are various accounts of this incident, this is the most acceptable story so far (RFFT 2013).
3 This was the second mahapanchayat; a relatively small gathering was organised on 31 September by the Jat community.
4 RFFT also presents these inferences as “conclusions”.
5 Officially, six Hindus/Jats and 33 Muslims have been killed. Most of the displaced people are Muslims (RFFT 2013).
6 Talat Asad’s criticism of W C Smith’s distinction between faith and cumulative tradition is relevant here. Asad says: “Faith is inseparable from the particularities of the temporal world and the traditions that inhabit it. If one is to understand one’s own faith – as opposed to having it-or to understand the faith of another, one needs to deploy the relevant concept whose criteria of application must be public – in a language that inhabits this world” (Asad 2001).
7 I use terms Ashraf and Pasmanda to underline the political significance of these categories. For an excellent discussion on the use of the category ‘Ashraf’ see Ahmad (1967).
8 For an informed discussion on Muslim dress see, Tarlo (2010).
9 For an elaborated discussion on this point see Ahmed (2012).
10 The RFFT also does have a section on media, but the emphasis is entirely on the “production of rumors” (RFFT 2013).
11 In a recent study of a Rajasthan village, Ann Grodzins Gold analyses the complex relationship between mobile phone and changing social imaginations. See Gold (2012).
12 Narendra Modi’s official website says “Government has only one religion – India first! government has one holy book – the Constitution. The government must be immersed in only one Bhakti-Bharat Bhakti! The government’s only strength is Jan Shakti! Government’s only ritual is the well-being of the 125 crore Indians! The only code of conduct of the Government should be ‘Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas!’ (NMW). This quote has to be seen in an equally interesting background. The pamphlet, Why Hindu Rashtra, published by RSS, says: “Anyone who is the national of this country, irrespective of being a Shaiva, Shakta, Vaishnava, Sikh, Jain, Muslim, Christian, Parsi, Buddhist or Jew by way of his creed or mode of worship, is a Hindu” (RSSW1). This Hindu-based oneness is further reiterated in 2009, when RSS’ Akhil Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha passed a resolution saying: “the ABPS demands that all reservations, concessions and privileges based exclusively on religion must be abolished. It urges the countrymen to make the society aware of the impending dangers of such policies and exert pressure on policymakers to abandon them” (RSSW2).
13 VHP’s press release says: “When harassment of women by love-jehadis become unbearable in the villages, the bahu-betiyan bachao andolan emerges out of the wounded society” (lv jehaidyo. ke ga>v-ga>v xIlhr~a kI 63na0> jb bdaRSt ke bahr ho g{ to ]nke iv=@d smaj ka rOd/ =p “bhu, bei3ya> bcaAo” AaNdoln ke =p me. qD_a huAa hE|)VHP Press Release, 2013.
14 For an elaborated discussion on Hindutva’s notions of pride and freedom, see Katju (2011).
References
Ahmed, Hilal (2012): “Public Presence of Mosques and Muslim Identity in Postcolonial Delhi”, The Book Review, Vol XXXVI, pp 13-15.
Ahmad, Imtiaz (1967): “The Ashraf and Ajlaf Categories in Indo-Muslim Society”, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 2, No 19, pp 887+89-91.
Asad, Talal (2001): Reading a Modern Classic: W C Smith’s “The Meaning and End of Religion”, History of Religions, Vol 40, No 3, pp 205-22.
Gold, Ann Grodzins (2012): “Scenes of Rural Change”, Dalmia Vasudha, Sadana, Rashmi, The Cambridge Companion to Modern Indian Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (South Asian Edition).
Katju, Manjari (2011): “The Understanding of Freedom in Hindutva”, Social Scientist, Vol 39, Nos 3/4, pp 3-22.
Lieten, G K (1996): “Inclusive View of Religion: A Rural Discourse in Uttar Pradesh”, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 31, No 23, pp 1411-16.
Pasmanda Kranti Abhiyan (Hindi) published by Pasmanda Kranti Abhiyan 2013.
Tarlo, Emma (2010): Visibly Muslims: Fashion, Politics, Faith (Berg: Oxford).
Web Sources:
Naqvi, Faraha (2013): “The Chilling Familiarity of Muzaffarnagar”, The Hindu, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-chilling-familiarity-of-muzaffarnagar/article5138832.ece, (accessed on 19 September 2013).
BJP’s Press Release: http://bjp.org/images/pdf_ 2013/ press_h_dr_ sudhanshuji _sep_11_13.pdf (accessed on 19 September 2013).
VHP Press Release: http://vhp.org/press-release /%e0%a4%b5%e0%a4%bf%e0%a4%b6%e%a5%8d%e0%a4%b5-%e0%a4%b9%e0%a4%bf% e0%a4%a8%e0%a5%8d%e0%a4%a6%e0%a5% 82-%e0%a4%aa%e0%a4%b0%e0%a4%bf%e0% a4%b7%e0%a4%a6-%e0%a4%95%e0%a5% 87-%eoa4%b8%e0%a4%82%e0%a4%b0-2, accessed on 19 September 2013.
RFFT: Report of the Fact-Finding Team: Muzaffarnagar (2013): “Violence by Political Design” http://www.milligazette.com/news/9286-muzaffarnagar-riots-2013-violence-by-political-design, accessed on 19 September 2013.
RSSW2: http://www.archivesofrss.org/index.php? option=com_prastav, accessed on 19 September 2013.
RSSW1: http://www.archivesofrss.org/index.php? option=com_book&task=showFile&bookid=8, accessed on 19 September 2013.
NMW: http://www.narendramodi.in/category/quotes/, accessed on 19 September 2013.
Hilal Ahmed (ahmed.hilal@googlemail.com) is a fellow at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi.
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