Economic and Political Weekly
June 08, 2002
Commentary
Karnataka:Hindutva Policies in Coastal Region
Towards a Social Coalition
In recent years, a new confident Hindutva has enforced its presence in several districts of coastal Karnataka, seeking to consolidate its base among diverse castes. Yet, to combat the bonds of economic cohesion and cultural cohabitation that still retain their resilience among communities – Hindu and Muslim, this new Hindutva will need to continually build new identities and deconstruct existing ones.
by Muzaffar Assadi
Over the last couple of months, Karnataka has witnessed an expansion of ‘New Hindutva’ forces. Successive communal riots or conflicts have strengthened the bases of this new Hindutva. However, what has changed the course of new Hindutva politics in recent days is the broader social coalition that it has been able to construct with backward classes/castes, including the dominant castes. The post-Godhra situation has come in handy to strengthen further and expand its social base. This is reflected in the way certain pockets of Karnataka reacted following events at Godhra. Mysore, Belgaum, Hubli, Gokak, and two coastal districts – Dakshina Kannada and Udupi districts not only observed bandhs but these districts saw one or the other form of communal conflict. Prior to Godhra, Coorg district also saw massive communal riots in which “62 houses, 76 shops, 17 mosques either were destroyed or damaged, 62 acres of coffee estate, including arecanut plantation were completely destroyed. The total loss was around 1.25 crore”.1 Here the desecration of an old temple in Palur was used as a pretext to engineer conflict.
The incident in Aasodi village in Kundapur Taluk of Udupi district towards the end of March this year signal the arrival of the new politics of new Hindutva in the coastal belt of Karnataka. Udupi and for that matter Mangalore have been the centre of Hindutva politics for the last couple of years; the Pejavar Mutt of Udupi is thenerve centre of local as well as national politics.
It was a small rumour during the village ‘jatre’ or festival in Aasodi that was effectively used by the new Hindutva to pit the Karvis (fishermen community who are also called ‘mogaveeras’ – a backward caste) against the Muslims. Rumour spread that Muslims were injecting the dreaded disease ‘AIDS’ through syringes to those who were participating in the village festival. This canard spread even prior to the village festival in Aasodi. The issue was further aggravated with the rumour that Muslims were targeting ‘women’, as ‘soft targets’. Nonetheless no one ascertained the veracity of the rumour, even the changing nature of such a rumour – its origin, reasons, logic and also why the rumour changed from mere ‘injection’ to ‘AIDS’ then to ‘anthrax’. This led to the Karvis attacking Muslim houses, destroying property including shops and physically attacking Muslims of the neighbourhood. More than 20 houses were completely destroyed. Karvis used all kinds of weapons commonly used duringcommunal riots. Nonetheless the moot question is why a backward caste/class such as Karvis joined the Hindutva stream and thereby participated in the communal riots. Even though inthe immediate context, the Aasodi incidentisan insignificant one when compared to Gujarat or Coorg in recent days, however it cannot be negated. It has larger implications both for Karnataka politics and for Indian politics. It cannot be treated as an ‘aberration’ now a commonly used description during communal conflict or riots.
One important way to understand the communal conflict in the coastal belt of Karnataka is the way in which this new Hindutva has been able to construct a new social coalition of groups in recent days. One aspect that provided the required space for newHindutvato form a social coalition is the presence of competitive mercantile/merchant capitalism. The latter’s growth has been the outcome of two important factors over the years: the destruction of feudal structures through successful land reforms which belongs largely to the realm of politics; two, establishment of larger linkages and the opening up of the economy to the larger market. This is the reason why coastal Karnataka was not only connected to metropolitan cities like Mumbai in 1970s, through the mediation of ‘Udupi hotels’ but also to the west Asian economy and other economies of the world. Interestingly destruction of feudalism and the opening up the economy to the larger economy went side by side or together. If western capital entered the coastal economy through the largenumber of ‘modernist’ items, metropolitan capital entered through the reproduction of ritual/cultural symbolism such as ‘Nagamandala’ (serpent festival), ‘Nemas’, ‘Bhoota Kolas’ or ‘Kambalas’. This metropolitan capital in fact became lumpen capitalor capitalism as it had no other agenda except reclaiming lost glory of ‘Guttus’ – a form of zamindari system attached to particular families. Nonetheless this particular lumpen capitalism also helped the growthof Hindutva forces. This is because in the process of reproducing ritual or cultural symbolism, capitalism or capital provided a platform to construct a Hindu identity. This was made further possible due to the close affinity that the lumpen/metropolitan capitalism had with new Hindutva groups in metropolitan cities like Mumbai. In other words, it was the import of Hindutva ideology transplanted through the reproduction of ritual symbolism, which helped in broadening the social base of Hindutva. The segment or the categories involved in this process were deterritorialised categories that were trying to retain or reclaim their cultural roots or identity, without realising the fact that in the ultimate analysis it would provide larger spaces for the rising new Hindutva.
In fact, one of the reasons for deterritorialisation has been successful land reforms. One section had moved to metropolitan cities like Mumbai in 1970s, while other sections had to contend with the locality. One interesting impact of land reforms was that it created hitherto unknown categories a space to claim new identities. For the first time for example, Billavas, a toddy tapper community was able to claim an identity as traders, businessmen, politicians, hoteliers, import-export businessmen, and finally become part of the merchant capitalist class.
New Identities for Social Coalition
Nonetheless, Hindutva identity was also constructed through other means. One important means is the convening of ‘Hindu Mahasabhas’, or ‘Hindu Samajosava’ other than the usual ‘Ganesha festival’ or ‘temple bhajans’. It is through these ‘samajosavas’ that Hindutva engineered a larger social coalition of groups or identities. Different backward castes or classes were invited to participate; including the heads of their respective mutts. Every year this has been the programme, systematically done to indoctrinate the ideology of Hindutva. This has helped in the social coalition of dominant caste (‘bunts’), backward castes/class (‘billavas, kulalas, devadiagas’, etc), and the upper caste (‘konkanis, brahmins’, etc). It is in this context that internal contradictions have been covered up to impose a larger unity, build a larger coalition among the groups. In the immediate context the internal contradictions or the conflicts are treated as not the major or the immediate concern. Thus, politics necessitated the construction of two externalities: one, construction of the ‘Other’ and two, construction of an ‘abstract threat’. It is here that the convergence of a debate or discourseon ‘globalisation’ and the ‘Muslims’ needs to be located. One important thing is that in the process of constructing a homogeneous category of Hindus, Hindutva allowed spaces for localised symbolism to exist.
Nonetheless the idea of Hindutva was constructed on the basis of two important narratives and two identities: in the former, the narrative was externalised in which ‘Muslims’ and ‘globalisation’ were treated as major conflictual categories. At the analytical level, globalisation is viewed in a secular fashion. As far as identities are concerned, particular identities of each community were not only retained despite ‘celebrative politics’, also a supra identity of Hindutva was constructed. In the process Hindutva was able to create a social coalition of different identities or the communities. This particular coalition can be called the coalition of ‘4Bs’ – brahmins (konkani and other), bunts, billavas and other backward classes.
Nonetheless others too joined the coalition in the process: mogaveeras, kulalas, devadigas. Moogaveeras or Karvis presence was seen in the fishing, canning, seafood sector, etc. The entry of other communities particularly Muslims into their economy was obviously seen and viewed in suspicion. This perfectly suited the interest of the new Hindutva to accommodate the community into their ideological framework. Nonetheless, the social coalition created a structure of relations: at the top the upper castes, (konkanis/brahmins) providing the required ideological framework that would not directly involve them in communal riots or physical attacks on the ‘others’; rather the task of attacking, destroying the properties is assigned to newly appropriated backward castes/class. The dominant caste is given the task of leading Hindutva institutions such as Hindu Sena, Bajrang Dal. This has had the effect on cementing a permanent coalition especially when the social coalition has been created for a specific reason and to the relative disadvantage of the backward classes.
The most dangerous aspect of Hindutva is that it is entering into different domains, other than the social one, such as the domain of political power structure. Almost all the cooperatives in the coastal belt – be it arecanut, coco, land development bank, or district cooperative banks, have been taken over by Hindutva elements. Here Hindutva projects itself as ‘soft Hindutva’. At present, however, one cannot negate the possibility of the latter turning into “hard Hindutva”. Secondly, although the bureaucracy largely comes from the dominant caste of otherparts of Karnataka, there are instances wherein bureaucracy has played into the hands of Hindutva. One glaring example is the way in which it raised the bogey of ‘ISI’ presence in different parts of Karnataka. This came to surface recently in the Aldur (Chickmagalur) communal riots, where many innocent people were arrested on the flimsy ground that they were sheltering ‘ISI’ agents. Similarly, even an illegal telephone call to west Asia was termed as the presence of ISI in coastal belt. In the case of Bababudan Giri in Chickmagalur the bureaucracy was more than happy to extend all kinds of help including historical documents to strengthen the arguments of the Hindutva forces. Thirdly, slowly but steadily even the police is being appropriated to the Hindutva cause through its ‘celebrative politics’ and through the symbolism of cultural reproduction. The appropriation came to the surface when the police took a particular position in the recent Coorg (Palur) communal riot, Kundapur riot, etc. This does not mean that Hindutva has completed the agenda of controlling, capturing and dominating the domain of power structure. In the domain of political power, new Hindutva still has to go a long way. This is mainly because constructing a homogeneous identity in the presence of multiple identities within the domain of power structure is not an easy one.
Nonetheless, outside the power domain, Hindutva was able to engineer its social coalition. At the same time it had to employ new narratives and new discourses while constructing the ‘other’ than the usual stereotyped discourses. It is here that new Hindutva adopts ‘selective amnesia’ on the one hand, and employs new trajectories on the other. Selective amnesia can be seen in the way it conveniently overlooks the issues of partition, as partition is seen more as a textual discourse than as an actual experience. Secondly, it conveniently overlooks the discourse on historical invasion such as the one employed in the case of Ayodhya or in the recent case of Gujarat. Even it is hesitant to use the multiplicity argument (of Muslims multiplying faster than the Hindus). Finally, it overlooks the difference between culture practices and the linkages between the communities.
A more important, but discrete discourse that Hindutva employs is economism – which largely suits the social coalition too. It is here that the conflict between the merchant capitalism/st belonging to Hindutva and the ‘other’ becomes apparent – in fact, Hindutva is largely financed by merchant capitalists from within such as traders, shroffs, textile merchants, hoteliers, the corporate sector, timber merchants, etc. However, cultural reproduction of symbolism by the lumpen/metropolitan capitalism provided the space to different communities or categories to enter the domain.
It is true that absence of historical experience or discourse made Hindutva fall back on discrete economic discourse. Two categories of Muslims are often treated or analysed as ‘others’ – Baerys and Navayathi Muslims. They are also called ‘Sabis’ – a derogatory term to identify the community as backward and anti-modern. It is here that the growth of the community into merchant capitalist class, competing with the Hindutva groups, mainly with the new social groups cannot be glossed over.
Transformation of Navayathi Muslims into merchant capitalist class dates back to their history as traders right from the medieval period. They are largely a mix of Arab and native stock. What changed the character of Navayathi Muslims in the post-colonial present is the ‘invention of west Asia’ which directly linked their local economy to the larger economy or the market. Secondly, Navayathi Muslims in nothern parts of coastal Karnataka, turn into a deterritorialised category on one side, pumping back money earned from west Asia into the local economy on the other. The economic control through the mediation of gulf money especially in the textile business, hotels, canning, timber, etc, came in handy to construct the fear of ‘others’ taking control over the local economy and thereby the locality. The latter is seen and analysed in terms of space, culture and identity. The construction of the ‘other’ and the deployment of an ‘abstract threat’ led to perpetual conflictual situation between Hindutva and Navayathi Muslims in the coastal belt. Here too Hindutva conveniently appropriated backward classes to advance its claims and base.
The most important category among the Muslims are the Baerys. Baerys are largely pitted against the Hindutva forces in the coastal belt – they constitute the primary conflictual categories. Baery is a word derived from ‘Byara’ trade. They are found mainly in the stretch between Kasargod in Kerala and Byndoor in the northern parts of coastal Karnataka. They are also confused with ‘Malabar Mopillas’. They constitute around 15 per cent of population in the erstwhile Dakshina Kannada district. Their profession varies from beedi rolling (57 per cent), agricultural labourers and petty traders. In recent times, they have moved to such businesses as timber, granite, hospitals, textiles, import-export, fisheries, including establishing educational institutions and philanthropic activities. However their shift to merchant capitalism also came due to the booming Gulf economy. Their prosperity in certain fields has brought to the surface, new forms of conflict in the coastal belt.
One of the problems new Hindutva confronts is how to deconstruct cultural interdependence or the linkages between the communities. There is a close linkage between local culture and the Baerys. Their language is a curious mix of Tulu and Malayalam. They also follow the Jain’s principle of guild system, which they call as ‘Padinaraga’ system. Influence on the native culture is visible at other levels. Baerys follows the ‘Bari’ system of social position of categories; they also follow matrilineal system or ‘Illam’ system which is very close to ‘Gotra system’ (for example, Putti Bari and Kodi Bari should not come from same lineage). More than that, the Baerys influence on the local culture cannot only be seen in such ‘Tulu Paddhanas’ (or ballads) as ‘Bobbarya Paddhanas’ or ‘Mysandhayana Paddhanas’ but in the cultural practices of ‘Bhootas’ – dead men becoming ghost or spirit. Many Baerys have become Bhootas – ‘Bobbarya’ and ‘Ali Chamundi’ Bhootas are most important among them. These Bhootas have been worshipped by backward castes/classes in their every day practices. There are other Baerys who became ‘Bhootas’ – ‘Kudpal Bhoota’, ‘Monti Fatumma’, and ‘Ali Saithana’, etc. The influence of Baerys cannot be negated in other fields too: in Mulki, Bappa Baery constructed a temple which later on came to be known as ‘Bappa Nadu Kshetra’. In Udyavar (Manjeshwar), the temple festival begins with a visit to local mosque. This is called ‘Sekammas’ visit. In many temples, the drum beating or playing ‘Nadaswara’ or ‘Vadye’ or ‘China Vadye’ is assigned to the local Baerys. All this interdependence, cultural intimacy have made the deconstruction of historical linkages a difficult one. This is the reason why Hindutva could not stress on cultural discourses and thus fixed on discrete economic discourse. This is the case in coastal belt but not in other parts of Karnataka. In Chickmagalur, for example, Hindutva forces are attempting to appropriate cultural symbols and thereby negate the cultural relations existing between the communities. In other words Hindutva uses cultural arguments depending upon the conditions and the context. However, in the case of the coastal belt the discrete economic discourse was employed to destroy the property of Muslims. Godhra rumours became pretexts. Nonetheless, backward castes, (mainly Karvis in Kundapur) were appropriated by the Hindutva to realise its agenda. Will the construction of social coalition remain a permanent feature? Will social coalition become strong or remain united? What will happen to the ‘liberal face’? – are some of the questions that needs to be probed.
Conclusion
Social coalition that this Hindutva has created will remain fragile due to multiple factors. One of the reasons is the emergence of counter OBC identities. These identities though not expressed in the form of caste or social practices more than economic deprivation have the potentiality to turn economic issues into social issues. Most OBCs identify themselves with poverty, backwardness, and economic inequality. This goes counter to the Hindutva project. A challenge in the sphere of economism would definitely translate into a larger challenge to the hegemonic character of Hindutva mediating through the merchant capitalism of the coastal belt.
Meanwhile the metropolitan capital turned lumpen capital is now trying to transform itself into industrial capital. The former is now attempting to play a major role in industrialisation. For the first time it voiced its opposition to environmental groups and anti-globalisation forces in a convention recently. This is largely a Mumbai-based group, belonging to OBCs – bunts, billavas, mogaveeras, kulalas, devadigas, etc. The major aims of the Mumbai group centred around 13 issues: pollution control, zero pollution industries, strictly monitoring pollution by adopting international standards, establishing IT industries, thermal projects, establishing pharmaceutical industries and ayurvedic industries and biotechnological parks, etc. Nonetheless the interests of the Mumbai group and the new Hindutva could definitely clash especially on the issue of industrialisation/globalisation. The latter day new Hindutva is opposed to globalisation and massive industrialisation on the presumption that western capital would dominate the local merchant capital in due course. On the contrary the Mumbai group support globalisation and massive industrialisation, without realising the fact that its capital would be taken over by global capital due to its sheer strength. Nonetheless the social bases of Mumbai group and the Hindutva are one and the same – they come from the ‘4Bs’. Once the respective agenda of the Hindutva and the Mumbai group comes into conflict, its effect will be filtered down to the social coalition. This is the reason why the social coalition will remain fragile. This does not mean that the new Hindutva would withdraw or remain silent: it will continue to invent new methods, new strategies, new discourses (including historical and cultural) to retain and consolidate its bases. One thing is fairly sure that new Hindutva will not survive without a broader social coalition.
It is in this context the primacy of ‘liberal space’ comes into picture. This ‘liberal space’ belongs to the realm of the ‘critical modernist’ and partly to the left. Paradoxically the liberal space is shrinking. Even the spaces of left have been slowly but steadily taken over by new Hindutva. In fact, the coastal belt was once known for the left movement. It is here the irony of the secular and backward class/caste politics now lies.
Note
1 PUCL (2001): Decembernally Kodaginalli Nadedha Komu Galabheya Bagge PUCLna Sathya Shodhana Samitiya Varadhi, Bangalore, 2002.
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