Editorial
Too easily offended: the Konark temple case
The Konark temple case shows some penal provisions are handy tools of harassment
The Supreme Court’s observations, while denying bail to defence analyst Abhijit Iyer-Mitra,
to the effect that he incited religious feelings in a video posted on
social media, were out of place in what was a bail hearing. Such
endorsement by the Court, which observed that Mr. Iyer-Mitra would be
“safer in jail”, in response to his counsel’s plea that he feared for
his life, was less than appropriate. Sending someone to the “safety” of a
prison is no answer to questions raised by a prosecution under
stringent laws that involve restrictions on free speech on grounds of
maintaining public order and tranquillity. In a video post against the
backdrop of the Konark temple, Mr. Iyer-Mitra had made some comments
that were clearly satirical in nature. While it is entirely possible
that his remarks offended some people, it is laughable to assume his
intent was to sow discord or create religious enmity. The State police
contended otherwise, charging him with outraging or wounding religious
feelings and, quite mystifyingly, alleging that his remarks were
directed against the “Odiya people”. On cue, the Odisha Assembly is now
probing whether his satirical jokes constitute a breach of privilege of
the House. Mr. Iyer-Mitra’s arrest in New Delhi by a police team from
Odisha for his comments and some other tweets is another instance of the
rampant misuse of two sections of the Indian Penal Code — 153A and 295A
— on the charges of promoting enmity between different groups on
grounds of religion. However, a magistrate denied the police permission
to take him to Odisha on transit remand, and instead granted him limited
bail until September 28 on the condition that he join the investigation
by that date. His petition for regular bail has now been rejected by
the Supreme Court.
The entire episode flags a larger concern:
provisions that ought to be invoked only under serious circumstances — a
grave threat to public order and tranquillity, for instance, or, in the
case of Section 295A, when a purported insult to religion has been done
with malicious and deliberate intent — are being misused in a routine
manner. When the onus is on the prosecution to show there was criminal
intent either to provoke disharmony or deliberately offend religious
sensibilities, it is simply wrong to invoke these sections for
everything that someone finds objectionable. Irreverence or even bad
taste is not a crime. A mere response suffices; the use of prosecution
and arrest are
unjustifiable. Such an attitude will only make for an intolerant
society consisting of easily offended individuals. In a mature
democracy, the casual resort to criminal prosecution for perceived
insults to either a religion or a class of society ought to be actively
discouraged. In fact, the case must serve as yet another prompt to begin
the process of reading down Sections 153A and 295A.
