Citizenship rights, not burka
Why the Harsh Mander-Ramachandra Guha debate must continue — and expand.
Written by Suhas Palshikar | Updated: March 22, 2018
Unfortunately, the way Hindu majoritarianism has framed the Muslim question in recent times, there is little space for imagining that the two types of politics — Muslim politics of reform and Muslim politics for their full citizenship rights — can combine. (Illustration: C R Sasikumar)
Reading Harsh Mander (‘Sonia, sadly’, Indian Express, March 17) and Ramachandra Guha (‘Liberals, sadly’,
Indian Express, March 20), one cannot avoid the feeling that the issues
need to be redefined and expanded. Mander stops at a frightening
narrative of invisibility while Guha is content with a reformist
platform irrespective of political context. It is only to be wished that
this debate continues and that it helps the liberals and supporters of
diversity in shaping their stand in the dual battle — with illiberal
ideas and with majoritarianism. As a nation, we lost one moment of
introspection on the so-called “Muslim question” in the aftermath of the
demolition of the Babri masjid in 1992; now is the second moment we are
almost about to lose — and this time around, we shall not only lose the
grasp on the Muslim question but on the larger riddles of religion and
modernity, difference and democracy.
Let
us begin with Guha’s concern about the burka. One need not hesitate to
posit that if women are dictated a dress code, this certainly should be a
matter of concern. Having said this, we need to put this issue in
perspective. Women not wearing the burka are no less oppressed than
women in burka; what we need to fight for is not a dress code but the
mindset that relies on religion to imprison the person of a woman.. At
the same time, the question of unilateral dissolution of marriage needs
to be treated as far more important than the injunction to wear a burka.
But
even if one agrees with Guha, a nagging question would still remain: If
burka-wearing women are coming out to join a rally, should their burka
be an impediment? Particularly, if it is understood as a marker of who
they are? So the question is not whether or not the burka is a practice
deserving abandonment; the question is whether a community be asked to
hide its identity in order to be able to participate in public political
activity. Wouldn’t we be scandalised by stories of Sikhs having to get
rid of their turbans in order to avoid being targeted? Guha’s deep
liberal concern notwithstanding, the current avoidance of the burka
would surely smack of the dot busters? When somebody is bent on
attacking you for wearing a bindi, wearing it suddenly acquires the
resonance of defiance.
Two,
Guha’s argument actually expands the concerns of Mander, because Guha
combines the question of political leadership and the question of social
reform. This is important because Muslim politics cannot become truly
democratic unless, as Guha argues, it sheds the shackles of religious
obscurantism. It takes us to the question of Muslim social reform and
its relationship with Muslim politics and Muslim representation.
Many
have commented on the striking inability of reformist leaders to find
their feet in the community. The fond memory of Hamid Dalwai that Guha
has invoked is indeed instructive. Dalwai, like Gopal Ganesh Agarkar
(1856-1895) in the 19th century, was impatient with the authority of
scriptures. Like Agarkar, he would rather adopt a rationalist approach
to religion and like Agarkar, Dalwai, too, failed to cut any ice with
the public — in his case, the Muslim public. Ironically, he had far too
many Hindu followers, more so posthumously, when sections of Hindutva
politicians from Maharashtra began upholding him. Around the ’90s,
Dalwai was the most favoured for Savarkarite Hinduists in the state who
quoted him to prove how Islam is flawed.
The
misappropriation of Dalwai was due to his trenchant critique of Islam.
That also explains why Dalwai did not have many followers in the Muslim
community. While intellectually, the rationalist critique of religion
might be attractive, in a world of believers, to argue for change on the
ground that religion has no sanctity in the lives of people is a sure
way of alienating people from the reform agenda. Agarkar, too, did not
have followers.
The
example of Gandhi, in contrast, is useful. Before Gandhi takes the step
of claiming that if Hindu scriptures approve of untouchability, he
would discard them, he takes the tortuous step of arguing that
scriptures do not approve untouchability. He makes an enemy of a
specific practice — untouchability — without making an enemy of religion
and then argues that something that is immoral cannot be part of
religion and if, therefore, so-called religion approves of something
immoral, we need to revisit religion. Dalwai, like Agarkar, presented
impeccably reformist credentials but without the ability to intervene.
Gandhi presents us clumsy arguments, and for many, even suspect
credentials, but had the ability to intervene.
To
the extent that reform is a public political agenda, it must have the
capacity to intervene. Hence, the example of Dalwai (or Arif Mohammad
Khan), is inadequate to admonish Mander or to dissuade burka-clad women
and their menfolk who foist the burka on them. The critical issue is the
evolution of leadership that has the ability to focus on matters beyond
faith and yet at the same time, persuade the followers to consider
reform seriously. Guha is implicitly right — what the Muslim community
in India has often got is a leadership that uses attractive minorityism
in the name of the Indian Constitution and keeps organising in favour of
triple talaq and Shari’a. One wishes Mander had dwelt upon this
entrapment of the Muslim community along with its near complete
marginalisation.
Unfortunately,
the way Hindu majoritarianism has framed the Muslim question in recent
times, there is little space for imagining that the two types of
politics — Muslim politics of reform and Muslim politics for full
citizenship rights — can combine.. Such a combination could happen only
when Hindu majoritarianism was not politically ascendant. So, it is not
sad that Sonia’s Congress appears set to abandon the Muslims, the real
sadness is that the Congress for long intellectually failed to realise
and politically failed to practise a robust combination of reform and
citizenship. When a senior Congressperson today argues in favour of
instant triple talaq and when parties like the Congress and SP dither in
welcoming the court ruling on this issue, they are only continuing with
that double failure.
That
failure, combined with the cynical use of the Muslim women’s question
by the current regime, has added to the marginalisation of the
community. Merely by virtue of being Muslim, a person is discouraged
from taking positions — on history, culture, identity, even economic
issues such as the share of communities in jobs. If a Muslim person were
to participate in the debate over the Supreme Court ruling on the
national anthem, would she be heard merely on the merits of the
argument?
This
unprecedented marginalisation of the Muslim community tends to
overwhelm at the current juncture. Should Muslims be discouraged from
participating in politics as Muslims or along with their idea of
Muslimness? Not necessarily making demands as Muslims, but just
appearing as Muslims? That is the question Mander’s piece raises but
Guha skips. Should reform be a precondition for citizenship rights or
must citizenship rights push Muslims toward reform?
Ideas series: The Minority Space
Two pieces carried recently in these columns — Harsh Mander’s ‘Sonia, sadly’ (March 17) and Ramachandra Guha’s response ‘Liberals, sadly’
(March 20) — have set off a larger discussion on democracy,
majoritarianism and how these shape the space for minorities. While
Mander wrote about the growing invisibility and marginalisation of
Muslims in the public-political sphere in the current moment, for Guha
the problem is the surrendered possibilities of Muslim political
leadership and social reform. The debate continues
