India 2014 elections: Modi will gain even if BJP loses

The Asian Age, June 27, 2013

Verdict ’14: Modi will gain even if BJP loses

by Bharat Bhushan

Mr Modi will arrive as a leader of stature… (but) the BJP will not be able to use public anger against misgovernance and corruption electorally

It is not only the plummeting rupee and the declining rate of growth which have a déjà vu feel of the 1990s about them. The Bharatiya Janata Party also seems to be boldly marching backwards with Gujarat chief minister Narendra Modi’s call for implementing a uniform civil code and party veteran L.K. Advani pitching for revoking Article 370. In the period between1991-1996, it was because of supporting such issues that the BJP became, politically speaking, untouchable.

Atal Behari Vajpayee, as the leader of the BJP, kept his distance from the more divisive activities of the party such as the mobilisation for the temple in Ayodhya and tacit support for the demolition of the Babri Masjid. Nevertheless, despite winning 161 seats in the 1996 general election, no regional party wanted to be seen in Mr Vajpayee’s company.
Only two years later, in 1998, did 12 parties came forward to form an alliance with the BJP. By 1999, the National Democratic Alliance included 23 parties. This came about because all controversial and divisive issues were shelved. The BJP convinced its allies that the proposed Ram Temple in Ayodhya would be built either through a dialogue or through a court judgment, that it would not take up the revocation of Article 370 nor would it push for a uniform civil code.
The NDA also paid rich dividends to the BJP in subsequent elections. The overall percentage of votes polled by the BJP in the Lok Sabha elections increased by an average of four to five per cent. The number of parliamentary seats the BJP could contest effectively increased because of votes transferred by alliance partners. Before the formation of the NDA, the BJP polled only about 20 per cent of votes (20.1 per cent in the 1991 general election and 20.29 per cent in 1996).
The NDA helped take this vote share to 25.59 per cent in the 1998 and 23.75 per cent in the 1999 general elections. When anti-incumbency hit the NDA, the BJP’s vote share fell to 22.16 per cent in 2004 and then to 18.80 per cent in 2009 because voters were happy with the Untied Progressive Alliance government.
According to one NDA leader, deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani’s living room, at its expansive best, was not large enough to accommodate all the NDA representatives. Today, the NDA — comprising just the BJP, the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Shiv Sena — can sit comfortably on a three-seater sofa. To argue that today’s moth-eaten NDA can do better than the NDA of 1999-2004 is to test public credulity. A shrunken NDA will mean fewer effective contests and a reduced percentage of votes for the BJP.
Further, there are large parts of the country where the BJP has no prospect of winning, or “Zero MP Zones”. Without a pre-poll alliance with the Dravidian parties, the BJP cannot expect to win any parliamentary constituency in Tamil Nadu (39 Lok Sabha seats) and Puducherry (one seat). It had won nine seats in alliance with the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in 1999. In Kerala (20), the BJP is as non-existent as it is in Lakshadweep (one). The party drew a blank in the last two elections in Andhra Pradesh (42 Lok Sabha seats), whereas it had won seven seats in alliance with the Telugu Desam Party in 1999. The BJP won only one seat in West Bengal (42 seats) in 2009 and with no alliance in sight it might not be able to better that performance.
In Orissa (21), despite Hindutva forces trying to polarise voters by initiating violence against Christians, the party drew a blank in the 2009 Lok Sabha election.
In about 11 Lok Sabha seats in the Northeast (minus Assam), the BJP is absent. Add to these the seats in Kashmir Valley (three) and becomes clear that the BJP will not be in effective contest in about 180 Lok Sabha seats. That leaves it only 363 seats to contest in the rest of India.
It is, therefore, difficult to understand the claims of people like Baba Ramdev and Ashok Singhal, of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, that the BJP can get more than 300 seats. In the largest state, Uttar Pradesh (80 seats), the BJP cannot hope for an alliance with either the Samajwadi Party or the Bahujan Samaj Party. A triple murder accused out on bail and forbidden by the courts to enter his own home state of Gujarat, Amit Shah, has been sent to Uttar Pradesh to ginger up the voters. Unless Mr Shah foments communal tensions — a gruesome strategy already mastered by the BJP in its Hindutva lab of Gujarat — it is difficult to see how the BJP can stem its falling vote share in the state from 30 per cent in 1999 and 22 per cent in 2004 to 17.5 per cent in 2009.
In Bihar, after the split with the Janata Dal (United), the BJP’s tally can only go down. In Chhattisgarh, fortune may not continue smiling on the party after the massacre of Congress leaders by Maoists. A split Shiv Sena in Maharashtra means there is no consolidation of Hindutva votes that would have suited the BJP. In Karnataka, the BJP will go down after B.S. Yeddyurappa’s exit. Without allies the BJP’s electoral performance will improve marginally only in a small number of states such as Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand and Rajasthan.
While it is difficult to see why the BJP has given up on the politics of reasonable accommodation, it is perhaps easier to understand Mr Modi’s motivations. He gains even if the party loses. He would arrive on the national scene as a leader of stature. As a contender in national politics, it would also be harder for individuals to sue him for past misdemeanours. The BJP will be the net loser because it will not be able to use the groundswell of public anger against misgovernance and corruption electorally.

The writer is a journalist based in New Delhi