|

November 19, 2004

BJP: back to the basics (K.N. Panikkar)

The Hindu
Nov 20, 2004

BJP: back to the basics

By K.N. Panikkar

The BJP is left with no other alternative but to appeal to the RSS for succour.

THE DEFEAT of the Bharatiya Janata Party and its allies in the election to the Maharashtra State Assembly confirms the verdict of the people in the parliamentary poll. The politics of dissension and discord, which the BJP had pursued, did not receive the approval of the nation. Although no single party was voted to power, popular opinion favoured the secular forces. Even the parties that had sided with the communal forces have been shown the door. That this occurred despite the pro-communal blitzkrieg of the mainstream media and enormous amount of money pumped into the propaganda campaign underlines the strength of Indian democracy. But for this role of a section of the media, the BJP would have suffered a more humiliating defeat.

The defeat has left the Sangh Parivar in disarray. The introspection that followed has led to two conclusions. First, it lacks a sufficiently large social base to carry forward its agenda. Secondly, the appeal of its ideology is still in a nebulous state, even among its followers. The Sangh Parivar is, therefore, in the process of identifying new social groups for incorporation into its fold. At the same time, it realises the necessity of greater ideological cohesion to bind its various constituents. The journey of L.K. Advani to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh headquarters at Nagpur immediately after his nomination as the BJP president was in pursuit of this quest.

For the BJP, the access to power it gained in 1999 was a windfall. It was not expected, not even by the optimists in the party. Nor was it the result of a popular mandate in its favour. Its share of votes was only just above 20 per cent and the number of seats was much below the halfway mark. Yet, a government was formed under its leadership with the support of political parties that had nothing in common, ideologically or programmatically.

The common minimum programme based on which 22 parties cobbled together a coalition was, therefore, a compromise, which had far too many rough edges. The friction among the coalition partners was therefore inevitable which, despite the best efforts of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who tried to project a liberal face to sustain the alliance, developed serious fissures. While the BJP was not able to implement the Hindutva agenda, despite the constant pressure from other sections of the Sangh Parivar, the right-wing hidden agenda that the BJP increasingly pursued was disconcerting to the coalition partners. By the end of the term, therefore, several allies deserted the coalition and those who chose to remain were mauled by the electorate. The failure of the coalition government was partially the result of its own internal contradictions. The alliance is now at the verge of collapse. The lesson the Sangh Parivar drew from the defeat and the subsequent developments is that its future would depend upon its ability to strike out on its own.

The BJP drew its strength mainly from two sources. First, from the social and cultural work of the organisations sponsored by the RSS. Secondly, from its ability to invoke emotive issues for political mobilisation. By the end of its Government's term, the BJP suffered on both counts. The members of the Sangh Parivar felt that the Government did not do enough to realise the agenda of Hindutva, which included the construction of the temple at Ayodhya, the enactment of a common civil code, and the scrapping of Article 370 of the Constitution.

Therefore many of them became lukewarm in their support and did not work hard enough for the party. At the same time, the euphoria aroused by the mandir agitation had died down and the party could not invoke another such issue to appeal to the religious sentiments of the Hindus. The effort to arouse national pride through the `shining India' campaign lacked any emotional content.

The commitment of the BJP Government to the agenda of Hindutva was never in doubt. Almost all leaders of the party, beginning with the Prime Minister, had repeatedly expressed their commitment to the construction of the temple at Ayodhya. They, however, could not implement it because the party came to power rather prematurely, much before the communal hegemony was fully realised. Yet, the BJP did not want to give up the advantages accruing from the control over state institutions, even if bridled by the compulsions of a coalition. The access to state power, it was believed, would open up immense possibilities for expanding its social base and for disseminating its ideology. The defeat in the election has left this project incomplete.

The Sangh Parivar is, therefore, forced to seek other strategies. Hence the new slogan immediately after the election: from Sansad to sadak, from the Parliament to the streets. The implication of the proposed change, however, is not privileging agitational politics over the parliamentary, but greater emphasis on `constructive' activities in order to further the communal divide. Towards that end, the Sangh Parivar has already chalked out a programme to promote the Hinduisation of social and cultural life, particularly of those who were traditionally excluded from the Hindu social order.

The Dalits and the Adivasis appear to be the targets of particular attention. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad has already prepared a blueprint for the `emancipation' of the Adivasis through constructive activities covering their economic, social and cultural life. As a beginning, the Ekal Vidyalaya foundation, an outfit under RSS control, has initiated steps to set up a chain of single teacher schools in the Adivasi villages.

This is part of a larger programme to incorporate those who are traditionally outside the Hindu social order into political Hinduism. The creation of a new religious identity is central to this project, which is effected through the transformation of daily life practices. A change in the pattern of worship is being brought about. The places of worship of the Adivasis and Dalits are being transformed into Hindu temples, with brahminical deities replacing the earlier folk and local gods and goddesses. In doing so the Sangh Parivar appeals to the sanskritising potential of Hinduisation for the Dalits and the Adivasis. The aggressive intervention of the Sangh Parivar in these areas has two implications. First, it is likely to entail the loss of the traditional culture of these groups. Secondly, conflicts would accrue with the Christians who are already doing philanthropical work in these areas. The attack on the Christians during the last six months is a part of this conflict.

The politics of Hindu communalism was mainly rooted in cultural nationalism, defined as an identity derived from Hinduism, as evolved from the time of ancient religious scriptures. Initially conceived by V.D. Savarkar and later elaborated by M.S. Golwalkar in order to define the nation as Hindu, the Sangh Parivar has now decided to rearticulate it to regain lost ground. This is likely to foreground new symbols for religious mobilisation and possible antagonism between religious communities. Baba Budan Giri in Karnataka where the Vishwa Hindu Parishad has already succeeded in undermining an ideal syncretic tradition is a good example. It is likely that other sites of dispute would emerge during the next five years.

The Sangh Parivar is in the process of reorienting its course of action and ironing out its internal differences. There is a three-way division in its social base. The BJP draws its support mainly from the urban middle class, the VHP has its influence among the merchants, traders, and unemployed youth, particularly in the rural sector, and the RSS derives its strength from the members of the upper castes. Although the aspirations and interests of these three segments are vastly dissimilar they had bestowed faith in the Vajpayee Government to represent and safeguard their interests. But once in power the BJP was keen to sustain the Government, for which ensuring the support of the allies was imperative.

The BJP was, therefore, reluctant to pursue fully the Hindutva agenda, as the allies had reservations. Consequently, the performance of the Government, except that of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, which had relentlessly pursued the RSS agenda, did not live up to the expectations of its supporters. The Sangh Parivar, therefore, faced a crisis of confidence, leading to mutual distrust and recrimination.

The defeat in the election deepened the crisis, so much so that the tension within the Sangh Parivar has come to the fore, with its constituents at loggerheads with each other. The RSS being the ideological mentor and relatively more disciplined is the only force that can hold them together. Therefore the journey of Mr. Advani to Nagpur, as the BJP is left with no other alternative but to appeal to the RSS for succour. Hindu communalism is thus poised to go back to the basics laid down by the RSS. And the basics are cultural nationalism and the politics of Hindutva. Given the past experience, it is reasonable to anticipate that their re-articulation will impact adversely on peaceful social relations.