The Hindu, Dec 15, 2003
Of Hindutva and governance
By Pratap Bhanu Mehta
Signs of Hindutva were unmistakable in the elections... [But] we are so used to equating it with belligerence that we do not notice it when it takes subtler forms.
THE CONDUCT of the Bharatiya Janata Party in the recent Assembly elections has led many observers to argue that it has undergone a far-reaching transformation. From the party of Hindutva, it has become the party of governance, from an organisation beholden to the Sangh Parivar, it now is acting as a responsible ruling party, instead of playing on an apocalyptic politics of Hindu self- esteem, it is now occupying the space of sensible policy. In many ways this assessment is picking out a discernible trend: the BJP has for some time looked more the natural governing party than the Congress. It outclasses the Congress in sheer political talent across the board. It has the ability to set an agenda on more fronts than one could list, from infrastructure, foreign affairs, Kashmir to economic reform. It is a party that, for better or for worse, now defines the policy space on almost every front, while other parties are reduced to being mere respondents or naysayers. It would be churlish to deny the fact that the BJP is in many respects capable of governing at least as well as any of its rivals. Any opposition that does not acknowledge this reality is premised on a pipe dream.
It is not surprising that the BJP should capitalise on its governance capacities. Only its opponents have made the mistake of supposing that the BJP can expand its base on Hindutva alone; the BJP itself has never been under this illusion. The contrast between governance-based elections and identity politics-based elections is in any case overstated. Even Narendra Modi ran on both issues of Gujarati pride and claimed to have brought water to Gujarat. But equally it would be a mistake to suppose that the BJP has given up on Hindutva or that Hindutva does not represent, in the long run, a profound and insidious danger to the fundamental premises of a liberal constitutional democracy. Far from this election being a sidelining of Hindutva, the results represent its increasing triumph.
Hindutva works as an explicit plank of mobilisation when the following conditions obtain. First, there has to be a framing context or a specific event that generates anxiety that the politics of Hindutva can tap. Such an anxiety can be generated by terrorism, a narrative that stitches together events such as Godhra and Akshardham, or during the 1980s the fallout from the Shah Bano case. The BJP then taps into this anxiety. During the present elections, there was no such framing context, no immediate event to fuel a politics of anxiety and resentment. It was thus intrinsically difficult to unleash the energies of Hindutva. This lack of a framing narrative also freed the media to cover a wide variety of issues rather than focus insistently on the secularism issue alone.
Secondly, what would be an issue around which Hindutva politics would mobilise? In some ways it has already become the dominant sentiment: on all the issues, be it cow slaughter, conversion, cultural transformation, expansion of its base amongst tribals, the acceptance of religion in politics, changes in the self-perception of Indians, marginalisation of minorities, Hindutva is already mainstream. It has already redefined the public sphere in ways that cries of "Hinduism in danger" no longer have quite the same appeal. This is not because Hindutva does not have wide support; it is because it has to a great degree been successful.
The one major issue on which Hindutva politics could mobilise would be Ayodhya. But this is a tricky one to use. For one thing, any mobilisation on this issue runs the risk of inviting the question: what has the BJP been up to on this issue for five years? It can now mobilise on this issue only when one of two conditions obtain. Either it is utterly desperate, or there is a reasonable chance that this mobilisation will result in the construction of the temple. Given the current institutional and legal constraints, the BJP cannot launch another movement, because a movement without an end result will simply yield diminishing returns. It will take this issue up only when it is now in a position to deliver on it. It is easier to organise movements for the sake of it when you are in Opposition, they are harder to justify when a party holds the reins of power. And the temple issue also gets sustenance from a larger framing context that was unavailable this time.
Therefore it should not be surprising that Hindutva was not, directly, a main plank. But signs of it were unmistakable: Mr. Modi was not an insignificant presence; in its own quiet way, the Congress Government's banning of `trishuls' in Rajasthan had an influence. We are so used to equating Hindutva with belligerence that we do not notice it when it takes subtler forms. The BJP was not belligerent not because it has given up on its core ideology, but because it feels that the tides of history are with it. The courts, based on the Archaeological Survey of India report might rule in its favour; most parties are behaving as if it is only a matter of time when the temple in Ayodhya will be built. The governance agenda has come to the fore on the backs of Hindutva, but it will not entirely supplant it. If the BJP Governments begin to run into serious electoral trouble again, or if some unfortunate events hand it a framing context on a platter, the belligerent BJP will make a very swift appearance again. Its cadres will not simply melt away.
Any nation that is built on a politics of resentment and the marginalisation of the minorities, as Hindutva inevitably is, cannot long endure and prosper. Hindutva has the potential of creating a volatile politics that can still plunge this country into chaos, and jeopardise the project of creating a free society where no individual is stigmatised for who they are. The violence in Hyderabad, and the liturgy surrounding Uma Bharti's swearing in, were brief reminder of all that can still happen in this country. The real lesson of these elections however is that opponents of Hindutva cannot win simply by opposing it and calling it names. They have to do what the BJP has done, link an ideology to an energetic and robust organisation with some political imagination. The Congress party, under Sonia Gandhi, is incapable of doing that. It does not have leadership that can translate public sentiment into a concrete political programme or play craft politics. It does not have a clear ideology or organisational acumen. Most political parties that were in the political wilderness like the Democrats in the U.S. or Labour in Britain, made strenuous efforts to reinvent themselves and defined themselves by the adjective "new." Where is the "new" Congress? If the Congress fights on its record of the last two decades, it does not have a leg to stand on; and Sonia Gandhi is a reminder of its grim past rather than a harbinger of the future.
The BJP attracts more young political talent than almost any other party. Underlying that move is an attraction of the politics of the "new," a politics that gets us over our own recent past. Hindutva is a social movement that has produced an enormous amount of social churning that a lot of people feel empowered by. It has lodged itself in the interstices of our psyche, while the Congress looks positively conservative and closed by comparison. The forces of Hindutva are now confident enough to set their sights on longer-term goals, of which governance is inevitably a part. But governance is easier to promise than deliver, and the BJP like any political party will remain vulnerable on these issues. Under those circumstances and in the right context, belligerent Hindutva will be once again on the agenda. But the current calm should not lull anyone into the illusion that governance will do away with Hindutva; if anything good governance will only enhance the long-term appeal of Hindutva. These elections should not be taken complacently as a sign that the Indian electoral system can inevitably tame all fanaticism; they rather point to the fact that opponents of fanaticism have their work cut out for them.
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