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March 23, 2014

A Note on Recent Ethnic Violence in Assam | Hiren Gohain (EPW)

Econoic and Political Weekly, Vol - XLIX No. 13, March 29, 2014

A Note on Recent Ethnic Violence in Assam
by Hiren Gohain


The complexity of the recent ethnic violence in Assam has its roots going as far back as the early 20th century. With the various ethnic militant outfits having no clear-cut policy regarding the other groups, while some demonstrate a knee-jerk reaction leading to horrendous acts of ethnic cleansing, there seems to be no other thought than domination of the Other. A democratic perspective is singularly missing. What is the centre's outlook on these contentious issues?

Hiren Gohain (hiren.gohain@gmail.com) is a distinguished Assamese literary and social critic.

In the last quarter of 2013, in fact, soon after the announcement of the formation of a separate Telangana state, violence erupted in several regions of Assam with significant tribal populations, almost as if on cue. In the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) area, thousands of tribal youth – both men and women – decked out in warpaint and Apache haircuts, sat down on rail tracks threatening to cut off communications with the rest of the country unless their demand for a separate state was met. Almost all organised Bodo groups supported them vocally.

The All Koch-Rajbangshi Students’ Union (AKRSU), the militant students’ organisation of the Koch-Rajbangshis, who have nursed a long grievance for having been cut out of a deal between the government and the Bodos in the accord forming the BTC, in spite of being as indubitably autochthonous as the Bodos, also began to breathe fire and raise vehement demands for a separate state of their own, scissored out of areas of West Bengal and Assam, not excluding the BTC. Panicking at their own prospects, immigrant Muslims, adivasis transplanted in the 19th century from Chota Nagpur by the British, and the Assamese (new settlers or people who had been there for ages), banded together on a common platform to voice their own opposition to such demands.

In the Karbi Anglong Autonomous District, furious Karbis too blocked roads and shouted angry slogans, with women in an equally war-like mood, insisting that their long-standing demand for a Karbi autonomous state be met at once, and then went on to burn down, one after another, government offices that were rumoured to have been stacked with files containing massive evidence of corruption by the Karbi political elite in association largely with Assamese officials. The local Assamese residents of Diphu were in a state of shock, and curfew had to be declared and maintained for days to bring the situation under control.

The air was thick with accusations and counter-accusations, with the tribals growling against long-standing oppression and deprivation by the Assamese ruling class, and the Assamese bitterly denouncing the political ambitions and greed for lucre among the emerging tribal elite, forgetful of their own record. There are a few sane voices pleading for reason, a democratic attitude and accommodation, but their voices seem lost in this wilderness. History, genuine and mythical, is quarried selectively to prop up each side’s argument, though it is difficult to understand what relevance events from two millennia ago can have on what is happening today.

The Assam chief minister has deployed the army and the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in Karbi Anglong, but did not care (dare?) to take a tough line with the tough-talking Bodos and Koch-Rajbangshis, who have not yet resorted to violent methods, but have broadly hinted that that option was not closed. In reaction, the long-suffering and now desperate non-Bodos also murmured about resisting violence to the bitter end. The chief minister had a series of talks with leaders of these movements and assured them that he would convey their views to the centre. What is the centre’s outlook on these contentious issues?

To the central leaders, tribal demands for autonomy and Assamese anxieties about dissolution of a historic nationality with its rich culture and literature are mere law and order issues, and not matters of crucial moment to Indian democracy. They are given to finding stopgap solutions that carry in their wake dangers that become full-blown later on. The new ideal of “least government” that came in with neo-liberalism has allowed them to scatter inadvertently seeds of further tensions and conflicts. All that matters now for their friends, big multinationals and national monopoly capital, is a reasonably stable condition with various ethnic groups hostile to one another, but not engaging in internecine feuds, so that rich natural resources of the region, like precious minerals, oil, natural gas, hydropower and rare medicinal plants can be plundered in a matter of a few decades, leaving the indigenous tribes and later immigrants to fight it out among themselves in the end.

The Karbi Agitation

When Meghalaya was formed, initially by amending the Constitution to insert Article 244A in 1969, the Karbi leaders clearly said that they did not want any such arrangement and were quite happy to remain in Assam. But the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution had been drawn up with a primitive tribe in mind, and when education and consciousness spread, however slowly, the new educated Karbi elite realised the rudimentary nature of powers conferred for self-government and started agitating for a separate state, which received extensive support among the Karbis. But, the Congress, with its own Karbi leaders and their following, succeeded in keeping things within control. Over the years, however, more and more powers were delegated to the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council in order to mollify the restless ones; but that dream never quite disappeared. One of the grievances of the Karbis was that even the annual budget of the autonomous council was prepared in Dispur, capital of Assam. Under Jayanta Rangpi’s leadership, the movement, though massive, never slid into violence against non-Karbis. But, as things have dragged on, Jayanta Rangpi fell out of favour and more militant and reckless leaders took over, and inter-community relationships have suffered a serious setback. It became common wisdom that only such “direct action” could yield results. Such misadventures were not dealt with a firm hand by the centre, the ultimate centre of power.

A ghastly incident took place on 15 July 2013 at Diphu, headquarters of the Karbi Anglong Autonomous District, which many consider a prelude to the later outbreaks of violence. An Assamese resident of Diphu had hired an autorickshaw driven by a Karbi youth, perhaps representing a more impatient and intolerant Karbi generation, to take him and his young son to the market. Upon arrival at the destination an altercation ensued over the fare, a minor everyday occurrence. Suddenly, the driver shouted in rage: “Are you Karbi or Assamese?”. At this, several other young men among the bystanders drew near and started belabouring the Assamese youth who had just reached 20 years.

The father, who had been in Diphu for a long 23 years, tried desperately to save him, but to no avail. He phoned the nearby police station and a police jeep arrived soon after. By that time, passions had been inflamed, and the police also lost their nerve in the presence of a huge gathering on the spot, and left the place in a hurry. The father’s wails had no effect. His young son, Jhankar Saikia, was beaten to death before his eyes, and nobody intervened to save him. Yet, he was a familiar figure in the market and called every shopkeeper by his name. Condemnation by the press and public in Assam reached such a pitch that the chief minister of Assam was forced to order stricter management of law and order. But the culprits were not brought to book.

The Bodo Case

The Bodo case has its own history. From the early 20th century, educated Bodos led other tribal communities against the dominant castes of Assam (not the colonial masters who backed the privileged castes), accusing them of caste-based discrimination, mistreatment, and suppression of their rights. In 1933, under the banner of the Tribal League, the Bodos, the most numerous and advanced among the indigenous tribals, fought to wrest from an apathetic government the guarantee of land rights to people accustomed to shifting cultivation, facilities for education of their children, and reservation of jobs in government service.

The fight against colonialism became a little obscure as caste Hindu Assamese, backward castes, scheduled castes and tribals fought among one another for a share in the pittance offered by the colonial rulers in the name of public welfare. The caste Hindu leaders of the freedom struggle promised action on such matters once Independence was attained, but the tribal leaders openly expressed doubt, that it was but a ploy to delay and deny them the right to a decent and dignified life, and condemn them forever to poverty and backwardness. However, just before Independence, a deal was struck between Bhimbar Deuri, charismatic leader of the Tribal League, and Gopinath Bordoloi, the undisputed leader of the Assam Pradesh Congress Committee, which assured tribals of reservation of land under tribal belts and blocks, reservation of seats in educational institutions and government service, and reservation of certain assembly seats.

Accordingly, the Assam state assembly passed certain Acts creating such belts and blocks where land will be inalienable, save under certain conditions. However, even though after Independence the tribals could take a few steps forward, and some progressed far enough to form a small middle class, implementation of these Acts was insincere and patchy. Parts of such belts and blocks were de-reserved for settling refugees from Pakistan and immigrant Muslims left high and dry by erosion of riverbanks and chars, and starting industrial projects without consent of tribals.

The tribal elite now reviewed the earlier decision of the Tribal League and formed a Plains Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA) to mobilise people for pressing their demands and eliminate injustices. Started in the late 1960s, it soon assumed a stormy character, with demand for a separate tribal state in the plains filling the Assamese elite and their compatriots with anxiety. But, soon, dissension among leaders of various communities heading the PTCA left the Bodos as the predominant group in the council. They demanded and won the right to teach their children in the Bodo language instead of the prevalent Assamese. In 1973, they raised the demand that the textbooks should be in the Roman script as Assamese phonetics could not properly articulate Bodo sounds. It was a plausible scientific theory, though, as is well known, a script and its sound system may vary widely. The real intention was to insulate the Bodos from Assamese influence.

The degree of mistrust and hatred reflected in the move revealed the bitterness of the Bodos at the complacent assumption of the Assamese that they were doing well enough under Assamese tutelage. In the Mangaldoi subdivision (now a district), the police opened fire on a Bodo demonstration demanding introduction of the Roman script, killing 13 people and deeply embittering the Bodos. The PTCA movement lost its momentum by the late 1970s, and its leaders became ministers briefly in a Janata government. Its place was taken by the All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU), which, for some time, even came under leftist influence. The Bodo Sahitya Sabha had also become an influential body, and along with ABSU, it began to echo the demands and aspirations of the Bodos, especially its middle class.

Anti-Foreigner Assam Movement

The Bodo peasantry was particularly handicapped by the loss of their land to hard-working immigrant Muslims, better trained to manipulate land-tenure regulations and the officials managing them. Many had been reduced to being landless labourers. Therefore, they joined en masse in the anti-foreigner Assam movement (1979-85) in the hope of recovering land. When the leaders of the All Assam Students Union (AASU), with whom ABSU leaders like Upen Brahma, who had become a charismatic leader in his teens, had collaborated with zeal, came to power, they let them down by neglecting their concerns. They then raised the slogan for a separate Bodoland with catchy and stirring sentences like “Divide Assam 50-50”, “No Bodoland, No Rest”, and so on.

Unfortunately, the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) government, drunk with the illusion of power and die-hard Assamese nationalism, decided to crush the movement by force when small concessions did not satisfy the Bodos. This period is a little murky. The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) had arisen with a resolve to carve out an independent Assamese state, and the Government of India (GoI) had reportedly sent experienced Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) officers to Bodo-majority areas to train Bodos in the use of modern arms, presumably with the hope of countering Assamese chauvinism. The repressive measures taken by the AGP government were crass and brutal, including indiscriminate shooting, and rape of Bodo women by the police and the CRPF. A place called Bhumka saw rape and murder of as many as seven women, filling not only Bodos, but also most Assamese with horror. (The present author wrote about those incidents in his column in EPW during the 1980s.)

Slowly, Bodos began arming themselves, but turned their guns against other communities in the neighbourhood. A Bodo Security Force inspired terror among non-Bodos with its intemperate violence. The Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) was formed in 1993 by Hiteswar Saikia, then chief minister of Assam, in precipitate haste. It did not work out as the leaders of the administration of BAC allegedly indulged in massive corruption, ultimately yielding place to the fearsome Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), who used terror tactics on defenceless and helpless common Assamese people of the region to force the government’s hand. Primary schoolteachers, postal peons, and small businessmen were hunted down. Certain national political parties in the opposition encouraged Bodo aspirations in the hope of electoral gains. The BLT cadre struck terror with unimaginable acts of brutality, such as surrounding a family of ordinary Assamese villagers and their kinsmen, without any interest in politics, as they sat down to an annual Bihu feast in the courtyard of their house, and mercilessly gunning them down. Many such incidents were a sort of misguided retaliation against the sufferings of the Bodos at the hands of the Assam Police and the CRPF in the past. But they did not even spare moderate Bodo leaders if they questioned their methods. Quite a few lost their lives under the BLT fire.

The Population Argument

One serious argument against granting of a separate state to the Bodos was the fact that over the extensive region where the Bodos demanded their state, there has been since the distant past a mixed population, with mixed settlements of Bodos and non-Bodos (largely Assamese). In certain villages, Bodos were in a majority, but in many other villages their proportion was at best a little over a third. But the Bodos claimed that they had been reduced to a minority by the influx of outsiders.

In order to empirically test the veracity of this strongly-held idea in the early 1990s, I started examining the records found in Census Reports from 1901 onwards. To my surprise, I found that if the region was considered as a whole, the Bodos never could have been a preponderant community there. In most of the police station areas, they were not in a majority. The situation has not changed much over the decades, though there has been a spurt in the population, both among Bodos and non-Bodos. Then how did such an idea take such deep roots among the Bodos? The ABSU, during a phase of militancy, undertook a self-operated census in the region they claimed as their own, their native land, and showed that it had a 97% Bodo population!

There may be two reasons for such a subjective idea taking a firm hold in their minds as being the truth. First, it is a fact that Bodos were natives of the region and have identified themselves with it. Second, there were sizeable numbers of people from outside who had settled there. But, this is no reason to hold that all non-Bodos were outsiders who had robbed the Bodos of their inherited land. A few years back, I came to the conclusion that the reason for the numerically weaker position of the Bodos lay in their way of life. They depended for their livelihood on shifting cultivation with primitive tools. Production at that level, therefore, could not support a substantial population. My own memories of a childhood spent close to a Bodo community were that the incidence of infant mortality was quite high. Modern medicine was also not familiar to them. Now that they have access to more dependable sources of livelihood and modern medicine, the growth in their population today is fairly high.1

The Centre’s Decisions

Now comes the role of the centre as a decisive factor. When Assam, especially western Assam was in the throes of a campaign of terror by Bodo extremists, the Congress government in Delhi sought a hurried answer through the mediation of Rajesh Pilot, who then served as the government’s troubleshooter. He initiated a tripartite conference and offered the Bodos the present dispensation of the BTC with substantive powers and covering a very large area of three different districts. On 10 February 2003 the Bodo leadership accepted it with alacrity and declared that, henceforth, they would live in peace and friendship with the Assamese. It was a package hastily made up, with Bodos being given 30 seats in a council of 46, with only five seats reserved for the non-Bodos. The then chief minister of Assam, Hiteswar Saikia, pointed out that the arrangement was patently unrealistic and unfair to the non-Bodo majority, but was overruled. Thus, the BTC was by no means an extension of democracy, but of Congress realpolitik. The Bodo leadership, however, nursed a grievance that while the Assamese ministers and officials spent money at will, the expenditure of sums given to BTC was strictly monitored. There was further a grouch that the home department, and thus control over law and order and the police, was exclusively in the hands of the state government.

Apart from the Assamese, the Koch-Rajbangshis, who were as indubitably indigenous to the region as the Bodos, and who had a line of powerful kings there in the late middle ages, were deeply aggrieved. So far, they were as passionately and patriotically Assamese as any other Assamese community. But, this bitter blow, which disempowered them in their ancestral land under the very nose of the Assamese rulers, made them turn to other ways of finding justice, and they also claimed their right to a separate state comprising areas from both Assam and north Bengal. At first, there was some hope that by gaining the status of scheduled tribe, they would be able to free themselves from the constraints imposed by the BTC provisions, but the hope faded when on academic grounds the GoI rejected their demand time after time. The decision of New Delhi to form Telangana has stiffened their resolve to serve an ultimatum, with the implied threat that they too would take to arms if the demand is not fulfilled.

The situation is not worrisome to the centre. It is as though this is the concrete exemplification of the theory of so-called “circulation of elites”; all very nice and comfortable. Perhaps, the motive is to keep the north-east permanently on the boil to the advantage of big capital, native and foreign, like certain regions of Africa haunted by poverty, massive displacement, wars and epidemics. There will also be certain foreign-funded agencies given a free hand by the GoI to offer their support and assistance to such machinations.

Addendum

I had jotted down these points in July 2013. Since then there have been other developments that further indicate the confused and intractable nature of the problem with its horrifying impact on the lives of common men and women. The earlier mass hysteria has simmered down to a state of uneasy quiet, broken by sporadic disturbances.

The original Bodo secessionist outfit, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), formed under the leadership of Ranjan Daimary in the early 1990s, split into two in 2009 with one group opting for talks with the centre, and the other, led by Daimary, vowing to continue their armed struggle. There have been bloody clashes between the two groups, with entire villages loyal to one group or the other bearing the brunt of this bloody rivalry. In 2011, Ranjan Daimary was caught, probably with the connivance of the Government of Bangladesh, where he had taken shelter. Under unceasing pressure from P C Haldar, the centre’s facilitator for negotiations with the militants, Daimary too retreated from his earlier stance of uncompromising resistance and has become agreeable to unconditional talks. At this juncture, another group under a new leader, known as the NDFB (Songbijit group), parted company with Ranjan Daimary, refusing to lay down arms. This Songbijit faction of the NDFB has been indulging in sporadic acts of terror. In January 2014, a group of their cadre stopped a night bus coming from Siliguri in north Bengal, at Athiabari of Kokrajhar district of the BTC, identified and dragged out five Hindi-speakers and shot them dead. Elsewhere in the BTC too, Hindi-speakers are in fear of their lives owing to this new approach of the Songbijit group to the question of “liberation”.

Further south, in the Karbi Anglong Autonomous District, mistrust and friction among various ethnic groups settled there have become common. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) – NSCN(IM) has claimed a part of Karbi Anglong as part of their “Nagalim” (bigger Nagaland), and this has raised suspicion against the Rengma Naga tribe among the Karbi militants loath to part with territory of the district. In December 2013, nine Rengma Nagas had been gunned down by suspected Karbi militants, and the Rengmas also retaliated by killing four Karbi youths, in turn triggering a wholesale attack by Karbis on Rengma villages, marked by widespread arson, setting fire to standing crops and granaries, and physical assaults on the fleeing Rengma Nagas. Soon, the situation got out of hand and 3,100 terror-stricken Karbis and Rengmas sought shelter in refugee camps. While calm is slowly returning, many inmates in the camps are too terrified to return home.

No one knows where terror will strike next and find victims among innocent unsuspecting folk. It is clear that the empathy of many academics and social activists from mainland India for the aspirations for national liberation of ethnic groups and tribes of Assam is uninformed of the complexity of the situation. For instance, many of the ethnic militant outfits have no firm and clear-cut policy regarding the other groups settled among their compatriots or in their immediate neighbourhood. Some demonstrate a knee-jerk reaction leading to horrendous acts of ethnic cleansing. In any case, there is no other thought than domination, and a democratic outlook is singularly missing. To make the confusion worse, the shadowy agencies of the Home department of the centre, with a section of the Church in collusion, and suspected foreign agents coming as tourists, non-governmental organisations and journalists, chronically work in the disturbed region to widen differences and shore up crumbling isolationist traditions. As far as one can see, the authorities in power are in no hurry to establish permanent and stable peace on the basis of democratic and liberal sharing of space and rights.

Note

1 I cannot cite the newspaper articles and articles in fugitive magazines in Assamese, where I first published those findings. But, my interest was less in claiming credit as a researcher, than in making sense of tragic disputes in the Assamese society, then in turmoil.